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Abstract 
 
Orientalist Ethnonationalism: From Irredentism to Independentism 
Discourse analysis of the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative about the National Rebirth 
(1870-1930) and Kosovo Independence (1980-2000) 
 
The thesis focuses on the chronological identification and detection of the discursive 
analogies between the category of ‗the nation‘ and those of ‗the West‘, ‗Europe‘, 
‗democracy‘ and ‗independence‘ in the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist narrative.  
 
The study represents a multi-dimensional exercise analysing the ethnonationalist discourse 
from a wide array of sample text which was produced during two relevant historical periods: 
the period between 1870-1930 and the period between 1980-2000. The first interval covers 
the period which is known in the Albanian history as the ‗National Rebirth‘. The second deals 
with the recent history of political resistance of Kosovo Albanians and their ‗sudden‘ 
discursive shift, from the narrative of ‗unification with the Motherland Albania‘ (the 
unificationist/irredentist discourse) to the narrative of ‗the independent Kosovo‘ (the 
independentist discourse) 
 
The main theoretical pillars of the study focus on the theories about the nation (specifically, 
its ethnic variation) and its narrative, the nationalism—as well as the representational systems 
of orientalism and balkanism (Said, 1978; Todorova, 1997). The study demonstrates that the 
discourse about the nation and national identity among Albanians is produced primarily 
through the internalisation of the external, orientalist approach in defining and understanding 
the social reality of the Balkan societies. Such internalisation is analysed through the prism of 
local adoption of the sociocultural and sociopolitical hegemonizing discourse that constituted 
the Western orientalist ‗knowledge‘ about the Balkans—and, specifically, Albanians. (The 
study notes that such discursive strategy of internalisation of orientalist traits within the 
ethnonationalist narrative is not limited to the Albanian societies (in both Albania and 
Kosovo) but appears as common feature in most of the societies/nations of the former 
Yugoslavia. In time, the study highlights, such process of ‗nesting orientalisms‘ (Bakic-
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Hayden, 1996) was coupled with the phenomenon of the regional, exclusionist and competing 
ethnonationalist narratives which was aimed at constituing a nation‘s ‗westernness‘ and 
‗Europeanness‘ through denying it to the other. 
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Orientalist Ethnonationalism: From Irredentism to Independentism 
Discourse analysis of the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative about the National Rebirth 
[1870-1930] and Kosovo Independence [1980-2000] 
 
 
Chapter 1. 
 
Introduction 
 
On February 17th 2008 Kosovo declared its independence. To many, myself included, it 
represented a miraculous conclusion of a century-old journey of its majority ethnic Albanian 
population through diverse state formations that were replacing one-another during the 
turmoiled history of the region—and each of them followed with atrocious experiences of 
war, ethnic conflict and mass killings. It was the closing chapter of the saga about a former 
Balkan vilayet (province) in the Ottoman Empire which was annexed to the Kingdom of 
Serbia through the Balkan Wars  (1912-1913), made into an autonomous province during the 
Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia after the World War II, confronted with ethnic oppression 
by the end of the 20th century—only to become the arena of the last conflict in the long and 
gruesome period known as the decade of ‗Yugoslav wars‘ (1991-1999). 
 
A bitter-sweet decade to the Balkans, the 1990s coincided with both the demise of the 
communist regimes across the Eastern Europe and the revival of ethnic nationalist politics in 
all its destructive force. Simultaneously, both the ‗democratisation‘ and the practice of 
resorting to ethnonationalist vocabulary—assumed as pre-communist and anti-communist—
swept like a storm across the Balkans, leaving its most devastating mark on the societies of 
the former Yugoslavia. Back then, the newly found freedoms of political organising across its 
major republics—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Montenegro—were aimed at bankrupting the ageing one-party rule through obsessive revival 
of the narratives from the age preceding the totalitarian period. At the heart of those 
narratives were the idealised notions about ethnic nation, national identity and the 
nationalism mythology (Gavrilovic et al, 2009; Meier, 1999). 
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Those were the narratives that—Kosovo Albanians firmly believed—were brutally 
suppressed throughout the 45 long years of life under the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia. They had the power to construct and reconstruct the idealised portrayal of 
nations before the coming of communists, when the independent nation-states were, 
ostensibly, ruling the region. They projected a vision of a golden age of independent, national 
democracies during the murky periods of intermission between the ever-changing rules of 
foreign empires; they represented the forgotten and ‗subjugated knowledges‘ about a nation‘s 
glorious past, when the imperatives of the present day, such as ‗democracy‘ and ‗pluralism‘ 
were—so we believed—alive and prosperous. Be that the case, those narratives continued, in 
order to establish a future, post-communist and democratic society one had to go back in the 
history and learn from its legacies. Namely, from the revival of a selfish vision of ethnic 
nation-state in all of its cultural uniqueness, historical ancientness and, specifically, its 
ideological imperviousness towards the nations of others. One had to go back, to the future. 
 
Albanians, whether in Kosovo, in the Republic of Albania or in other areas that they inhabit 
in the region (western Macedonia, southern Serbia and Montenegro) operated with similarly 
grand projections in those last days of the communist rule in the Balkans. They, too, dreamt 
about the glorious past that would pave their way into the future of equal nations encircled 
within the borders of independent nation-states. Unequivocally, similarly to their competing 
neighbors, they would agree that such nation-states ought to be (re)established and enshrined 
on the principles of liberal democracy, civic freedoms, free market, liberal economy, political 
pluralism and human rights. Such notions were perceived as the ultimate ideological 
signifiers of nations and societies from the prosperous, western Europe and of what generally 
connoted the ‗western world‘. According to those narratives, to have a nation meant to live in 
the geographical Europe; to have a nation-state meant to be a member of the political and 
ideological Europe. 
 
Hence, to be part of Europe or, simply, ‗to go to Europe‘—as observed wittingly by Maria 
Todorova (1997)—emerges as the common ideological denominator of all nations and 
societies of the Balkans. Dreaming about ‗becoming‘ European, longing for Western 
‗acceptance‘, struggling for European ‗values‘ was—so it seemed—always here, with us. 
They represented the fundamental ideological imperatives of our way of ‗talking about the 
nation‘, indivisible from our discourse on nationhood, national liberation, progress and 
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democracy. Reaching out to the idealised vision of Europe and ‗the West‘ comprised the 
central feature of our national ‗awakening‘ ideology from more than a century ago. It‘s what, 
I argue here, initiated, narrated and shaped our idea of the nation as we persistently continued 
to associate its purpose, origin and history with the histories of western, European nations. 
 
On that cold February day of 2008, Kosovo was all about that. It was emerging as the 
youngest state in the world, through a decisive assistance and supervision by the major 
western political powers. National flags of all major western European states—led by the 
stars and stripes of the United States of America—were waving in Prishtina, Kosovo‘s 
capital, as hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians descended to the streets to mark the 
‗celebration of all celebrations‘: the end of a history trailed in blood, sadness and devastation. 
 
Yet, there was one flag on that day that was ruling them all, in its appearance, size or 
frequency of occurrence: it was the Albanian national flag, officially recognised as the 
national flag of the Republic of Albania. Its black double-headed eagle on a plain red 
background was held high in the hands of thousands upon thousands of Kosovars: proudly 
caressed with tearful eyes, on that February day it represented the symbol that meant so many 
things to so many of us. 
 
‗It helped us survive, so we could live to see this day‘, we kept saying to each other. That 
piece of clothe seemed to embed every collectively shared aspiration, to every living 
Albanian: it was our symbol of freedom, liberation, national pride and our dream of national 
unification. Always with us through the centuries, in weddings and funerals, in student 
protests and battlefields, defiantly outspread or secretly owned, it represented the ultimate 
object of sacredness—during both the Kingdom and the Federation of Yugoslavia. Only in 
my lifetime, so many people that I knew have perished on its behalf: on that February day, in 
its king-size model, it was waving from the balcony of my family home. 
 
Yet, all of our tears of joy carried another, hidden meaning on that day. We all knew: it was 
probably among the last of times that we would wave it in our hundreds of thousands. For, a 
different insignia was lurking in the background—the flag of the independent Republic of 
Kosovo, chosen through ‗strong suggestions‘ of the ‗international community‘ and devised to 
depict a new, different, European Kosovo. The yellow map of Kosovo on an EU-blue 
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background with six stars symbolizing the equality between all of its ethnic communities was 
to become, from that day on, the new national symbol. Kosovo was now a state in its own 
right. 
 
And, this new reality compelled me to reflect on how the unificationist, irredentist, 
ethnonationalist ideology that made the independent Kosovo into a political fact had been—
ironically—carrying the seeds of its own cessation. On that February 17th 2008, we, 
Albanians from Kosovo, were parting with a certain way of talking about our nation, a way 
that constructed and shaped our knowledge about it through hundreds of years. Willingly, so 
we kept saying, we gave up our aspiration to join the state of Albania, to unify ‗Albanian 
lands‘ and rectify the ‗historical injustices‘ done to us over the centuries. 
 
To-date, the majority of Albanians in the independent Kosovo believe that such outcome was 
the only possible, therefore the only right thing to do. It was a matter of ‗common sense‘, 
they say: either we accept the independent Kosovo or we return to life under the rule of the 
Republic of Serbia as an ‗autonomous province‘—a political status that brought us so many 
grievances, and which we tried to abandon through relentless political resistance. Any other 
option was to be rendered invalid, they would note, by the global political overlord: the great 
‗international community‘. 
 
But, why wasn‘t this possible? Who and what decides over what is possible and impossible in 
such complex sociopolitical situations and processes? And, how? What technologies of 
argumentation have been operating, endowed with the power to determine what type of social 
thinking and action would be ‗possible‘ and ‗impossible‘, ‗rational‘ and ‗irrational‘, 
‗permissible‘ and ‗prohibited‘ within a given time frame, sociocultural realm and geographic 
location? Indeed, how and when did we come to abandon the goal of unification and accept 
the idea of independence? What happenned to the ‗Great Albania‘? How and when did the 
‗Independent Kosovo‘ enter the realm of our political and ideological ‗common sense‘? 
Finally, how did we, Kosovo Albanians, come to think about the nation as a necessity of a 
modern (western) world, to conceive of our national identity, history, independence through 
external influences and international requirements? 
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These are questions that I will try to address in this study, through applying a chronological 
analysis of the ethnonationalist discourse employed in selected stages of its conception and 
evolution. 
 
The research ahead aspires to tackle such an ambitious scope of questions through narrowing 
its focus on the analysis of the certain ways of the language use which produced the meaning 
and projected the notions of nation, national identity and ideology among Albanians. Through 
a chronological approach, it analyses how the various styles of talking about the nation 
occurred on various stages of Albanian history. It focuses on the ways in which the nation 
was discursively conceived, defined, affirmed and transformed against sociopolitical and 
sociocultural influences during specific historical periods. It seeks to detect and identify the 
influences behind the recurring shifts in the understanding of such notions, i.e. shifts in the 
knowledge about them. Ultimately, the research ahead attempts to expose the link between 
such shifts and social actions that ensued, in the context of Albanian ethnonational ideology 
and political strategy. The analysis of the discourse during selected historical stages is 
conducted through employment of theoretical pillars such the studies of nationalism, as well 
the representational systems of orientalism and balkanism. The discourse analysis in the 
research entails a multi-dimensional approach, applied through selection of a diverse range of 
texts, from ideological pamphlets, poems and folk-songs.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The point of departure of this research is the phenomenon of nationalism—more precisely, its 
ethnic variation that dominates most of the Balkan societies, including Albanians from both 
sides of the Kosovo/Albania border. Due to a rather ambitious historical/temporal scope, the 
research is divided into separate, yet inter-linked chapters that, in turn, present the theoretical 
base (Chapter 2, 3 and 4), the methodology that was applied (Chapter 5), and the analysis of 
the selected sample texts from the diverse pool of the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative 
(Chapter 6 and 7). 
 
Chapter 2 of this research focuses specifically on the discussion of studies and scholarly 
debates about the phenomenon of the nation and nationalism. The review of theoretical 
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approaches regarding their definition, types and manifestations are divided in two major 
sections: 
 
(a) Its pre-industrial conception and definition that draws upon the works of the German 
romanticist philosopher, J.G. Herder (1744-1803). This part focuses on the ‗ethnicist‘, 
cultural model and the understanding of the nation as an ‗extended family with one 
national character‘ (Herder in Viroli, 2005). In many ways, the research exposes the 
strong presence of such a definition of nation through ‗thinking with blood‘ (Greenfeld, 
1992) in the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative and adherence to the views about the 
origin of the nation as both ‗natural‘ and ‗primordial‘ (Ozkirimli, 2000). 
 
(b) The 20th century, modernist and constructivist theories on the ‗novel‘ origin of nations, 
based primarily on the works of the leading scholars in the field: Ernest Gellner (1982, 
1987), Anthony Smith (1991, 1998), Benedict Anderson (1983) and Liah Greenfeld 
(1992). Here, the birth of the nation is discussed primarily as a work of modernity and the 
modern society—a ‗community of opinion‘ based on socioeconomic, sociocultural and 
sociopolitical association of social groups in their attempt to adapt to rapid changes of 
industrialization and urbanization. A part of this section analyses the popular distinction 
between ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ nationalisms (Kuhn, 1944; Brown, 2000), i.e. between the 
western-modeled form of ‗civic nationalism‘ and its peripheral, non-western (read: 
eastern) ethnic variation. Highlighting of this binary opposition in the discussion about 
nationalism is of particular relevance to the general focus of the research for, I argue, it 
provides a sound theoretical basis for analysing the discourses that constructed the 
external/western viewpoints about the Balkan (and Albanian) ethnic variation of 
nationalism. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the potential application of such a vast spectrum of theories about 
nations and nationalism against specific manifestation of Albanian nationalist discourse 
which bears strong hallmarks of the ethno-centric model. The employment of a significant 
number of theories of nationalism in this chapter is intended to broaden the general 
discussion about nationalism with respect to two particular aspects: 
(a) The description and explanation of manifestations of Kosovo/Albanian nationalist 
movements from the historical circumstances and geopolitical context (i.e. how would 
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they be explained and fitted within the current scholarly debates about the models of 
nationalist movements); 
(b) The analysis of their ideological content, of the ways in which the concept of the 
‗nation‘ was discursively conceived, naturalised and transformed among 
Kosovo/Albanian communities during specific historical periods (i.e. how the nation 
was ‗talked about‘ in the public discourse?)‘ 
 
With regard to the first aspect, the discussion and definition of the models of 
Kosovo/Albanian nationalist movements within specific historical periods and geopolitical 
circumstances is complemented with studies and theories about ‗peripheral nationalism‘ 
(Hechter, 2000) and, specifically, those about ‗nations without states‘, ‗stateless nations‘ or 
‗proto-nations‘ (Guibernau, 1997, Hobsbawm, 1990). They are employed with the aim of 
providing the historical/geopolitical framework for Kosovo/Albanian nationalism during the 
historical periods that are covered by this research (1870-1930; 1980-2000). Such theories are 
important in setting the historical and political context which I consider necessary for 
explaining and analysing the nature and manifestation of a nationalist movement—
specifically, that of Kosovo Albanians—and to locate it within the multitude of theoretical 
frameworks. 
 
The second part of the discussion about nationalism focuses on the ways in which the 
‗nation‘, its genesis, history, purpose and ‗national aspiration‘ has been discursively 
conceived, perceived and naturalised inside Kosovo/Albanians societies; indeed, how was the 
nation ‗talked about‘ by Albanians during specific historical periods covered by this study. A 
range of major theories has been employed with the aim of explaining the discursive logic at 
work which, I argue, constructed the ‗Albanian nation‘ as ethnocentric, perennial and, 
specifically, supra-religious. Here, contributions such as those about ‗perennialist 
nationalism‘ and ‗ethno-symbolist nationalism‘ by Anthony D. Smith (2001) remain among 
the major theoretical concepts through which the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalism is 
analysed and defined in the context of its application as both ideological text (narrative) and a 
social action (movement). 
 
Finally, the critical, constructivist, approach to the analysis of the ethnonationalist 
discourse—a critique of its essentialist claims about the origin of the Kosovo/Albanian 
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nation, about its historical ‗primordiality‘ and ‗perennial‘ existence—is conducted through 
addressing a range of theories from scholars in the field of modernist/constructivist theories 
about the nation and nationalism. Here, theories about the nation as an ‗imagined community‘ 
(Anderson, 1983), and about the myth-based narratives of national ‗awakening‘ (Gellner, 
1983) are deployed as critical pillars of my analytical point of departure, which holds that the 
discourse about the nation—‗talking‘ the nation, in Brubaker‘s term (1998)—lies at the core 
of the nation-building exercise. In particular, I was encouraged to follow the constructivist 
approach in this research as I embarked on the analysis of the discursive technologies that 
brought about the fundamental transformation of ideological goals of Kosovo Albanian 
nationalism in the second period of the analysis—its sudden shift from the 
irredentist/separatist model to the self-centered/independentist one. 
 
Having introduced the theories that are considered and discussed with the theoretical 
framework, let me briefly mention those that are left out or touched upon only sketchily, such 
as the relevant works from scholars such as Michael Billig and Rogers Brubaker and their 
theories of ‗banal nationalism‘ (Billig, 1995), the ‗nationalizing nationalisms‘, the ‗everyday 
nationhood‘ and ‗everyday nationalism‘ (see Brubaker, 1995, 1998, etc). The works of these 
scholars are considered seminal in the field of analysing the all-encompassing—even, to an 
extent, unconscious—employment of the nationalist ‗text‘ permeating steadily the wide range 
of routinized, daily communication and interaction within and between the institutions, 
groups and individuals in a nation. However, I argue that the notions of ‗banal nationalism‘ 
and ‗everyday nationalism‘ focus more strongly on the manner in which the nationalist 
discourse is produced and reproduced within the already established nations and nation-
states—which is not the major focus of this research. Instead, the study ahead focuses 
primarily on the analysis of the ethnonationalist narrative of a ‗stateless nation‘ during the 
process of ‗nation-building‘ (Kosovo/Albania, 1870-1930), as well as during the process of 
‗self-determination‘ and ‗independent state-building‘ (Kosovo, 1980-2000). 
 
In this respect this research represents a study of the ethnonationalist narrative which was of 
central importance to such social processes, which, I argue, produced the knowledge about 
the ‗nation‘, the very ‗national awareness‘ by the end of 19th century, and, subsequently, 
transformed and advanced into the aspiration for independent statehood, as is the case of 
Kosovo by the end of the 20th century. The focus of the study is on the causes and subsequent 
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manifestations of epistemological ‗fissures‘ and discursive ‗ruptures‘ of that ethnonationalist 
narrative during specific periods which generated significant social changes. 
 
A modernist analysis of relations between the nationalism and democracy (Greenefeld, 2002) 
has been employed while discussing the ‗discourse of democracy‘ in the context of 
transformation of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist narrative (see Chapter 7). 
Greenfeld‘s point about the political/civic nationalism and democracy as deeply relational 
categories—the complementarity of the latter with the ‗civic‘ model‘ and not with the 
‗ethnic‘ one—have been raised in a critical context and are aimed at supporting my claim 
that, from the outset, the discursive deployment of the concept of ‗democracy‘ was reduced to 
a strictly performative-level discursive practice during the decade of ‗peaceful resistance‘ and 
‗parallel system‘ in the Kosovo Albanian community. As argued by Greenfeld, the 
(ethnically) inclusionist nature of civic nationalism can provide a sound base for the 
development of democracy—but this can hardly be the case with the particularist (ethnically-
based) models of nationalism which, according to her, are regularly collectivistic and 
authoritarian. In this respect, I argue that the adoption of the ‗discourse of democracy‘ (see 
Chapter 7) by Kosovo Albanian political elites did not seem aimed at introducing a genuine 
democratic behaviour as a major social practice in the community during the period of 
existence of the so-called ‗parallel system‘. Rather, in line with Greenfeld‘s doubts about the 
‗exportability/importability‘ of democracy through particularist nationalisms, I argue that in 
the case of Kosovo Albanians the discourse of democracy was aimed at producing a 
performance-level social practice which, Kosovo Albanian elites believed, would encourage 
and accelerate international political support to their ethnonationalist cause. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the discussion and analysis of Orientalism and Balkanism which 
outline specific representational systems—bodies of knowledge about ‗the Orient‘ and ‗the 
Balkans‘—that were developed within west-European academia and political elites during 
various historical stages in their dealings with foreign/eastern cultures and societies. Seminal 
works by scholars such as Edward Said (Orientalism, 1978) and Maria Todorova (Imagining 
the Balkans, 1997) are the major pillars of this section‘s theoretical discussion. I argue that 
the description and explanation of orientalism and balkanism as worldviews about ‗the East‘ 
are critical for understanding the degree of influence that they exercised in constituting the 
actions by the western political authorities in their dealings with the societies of east-Europe 
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and the Balkans. The overwhelming, defining power of western authorities imposed these 
worldviews as supreme referential points for (re)organising social, cultural and political life 
among remote societies under their influence. The subsequent acceptance and internalisation 
by those societies produced the phenomenon of ‗nesting orientalisms‘ (Bakic-Hayden, 2006). 
I argue that, among others, the influence of ‗nesting orientalisms‘ in competing Balkans 
ethnonationalist narratives assisted in (re)producing mutual ethnic hatred, intolerance and 
conflicts. 
 
Chapter 5 explains the methodology that was applied with the research. As mentioned 
earlier, the analysis focuses on the ways and styles in which the (Albanian) language was 
used to construct and affirm the idea about the nation. This research involves a discourse 
analysis of the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative with a specific focus on the concepts that 
shaped and modified it during various historical periods, such as hegemony, ideology, 
intertextuality and interdiscursivity. 
 
In the broader sense of the methodological approach the study ahead is greatly influenced by 
the ‗archaeological‘ work of Michel Foucault (1970) in the context of detecting and defining 
the ‗unity‘ of the discourses about the nation in the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist 
narratives: (a) its ancient origine (theme of autochthonoussness), (b) the attachment to the 
West/European‘ civilisation (theme of inherent ‗westernness‘), (c) the trauma of externally-
induced national partition (theme of victimisation), and (d) the aspiration to ‗return‘ under the 
realm of the West/European civilisation (theme of reclaimed ‗Europeanness‘ and national 
triumph). The temporal periodisation of the thesis has been oriented accordingly with 
Foucault‘s observations about the ‗ruptures‘ in the discourses, the particular historical periods 
of mutation and their transformation—which, in this research are also defined as the 
outcomes of the struggle for ‗internalisation‘ and ‗naturalisation‘ of an external, ‗orientalist‘, 
body of knowledge, i.e. the so-called ‗internalised orientalisms‘.  
 
I have confined the exercise of the temporal location of such significant epistemological 
ruptures within the two historical periods which are widely considered as essential in the 
national history of the Albanians: the birth of the ethnonationalist narrative during the period 
of the National Awakening Movement (Alb. Rilindja Kombëtare) in the 1870s, and the 
period of its radical transformation among Kosovo Albanians through the shift—indeed, 
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adaptation—from the unificationist/irredentist aspiration to the self-centered independentist 
ideology that reached its peak in the 1990s.  
 
The further narrowing of the methodological approach, the pointing out and focusing on the 
major features in the research, such as the intertextuality, ideology, power and hegemony in 
the discourses was applied through drawing upon the practical works from a range of 
contemporary scholars and experts in the field of discourse analysis, such as Fairclough 
(1992), Hall (2001), Van Dijk (1998) Wodak (2008), Laclau & Mouffe (1990), Matheson 
(2005) Jorgensen & Phillips (2002) and others. While Foucault‘s oeuvre in the field of 
discourse analysis represents an essential methodological umbrella to this research, the 
studies from the afore-mentioned scholars provided me with a more focused methodological 
toolbox which assisted in increasing the analytical precision during the discussion of the 
major themes in the ethnonationalist discourse. 
 
Chapter 6 provides the first part of the analysis of the sample text identified and selected as 
representative of the major features during the period of the emergence and constitution of 
the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse, and the subsequent ‗national awareness‘. 
Specifically, it focuses on the historical period known in Albanian academia and historians as 
the period of the Albanian National Rebirth and covers the time frame between the years 
1870-1930. The major emphasis of the analysis in this chapter focuses on historiographic 
account of the events in the context of establishing the ‗conditions of possibility‘ for the 
discourse on the ‗nation‘ to emerge among Albanian community (eg. the retreat of the 
Ottoman Empire from the Balkan Peninsula and the subsequent emergence of exclusionist, 
competing ethnonationalisms in the region). The in-depth analysis is reserved for the 
identification and explanation of the ‗internalised‘ orientalist traits in that discourse, arguing 
that the process of ‗internalisation‘ of external, orientalist views about Albanians is congruent 
with and inseparable from the internal nation-building process—i.e. from the emergence of 
the ‗national awareness‘ about the ‗perennial existence‘ of the nation and nationhood1. 
 
Chapter 7 introduces the second part of the analysis through focusing on the major event in 
the recent history of eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia: the demise of 
                                                 
1 For purposes of juxtaposing particular representational practices, the analysis is permeated with examples of o rientalist approaches to describing the Balkans 
and Albanians through a number of travelogues and studies by various western authors and scholars who either visited or were involved in the Balkan affairs of 
the times. 
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the communist regimes (the end of 1980s) and the subsequent construction of the ‗discourse 
of democracy‘. The historical time frame that is covered within this chapter focuses 
specifically on the ethnonationalist narrative of Kosovo Albanians. The sample texts analysed 
in this chapter encompass the period between 1980-2000 and focuses on the ‗sudden shift‘ in 
the narrative, from the (century-old, traditional) discourse on the ‗unification‘ of Albania 
(separatist/irredentist nationalism) to the discourse on ‗independence‘ of Kosovo 
(peripheral/independentist nationalism). Further, the analysis also places an emphasis on the 
scope and the influence of the internalised orientalist/balkanist traits within the discourse of 
‗democracy‘ and ‗independence‘ through the re-production of ‗historical‘ claims about its 
(western/European) ancientness, Christian legacy and the inherent ‗democratic‘ social 
qualities such as the religious tolerance and the secular definition of the nation. 
 
In this context, the research draws the temporal/historical parallels between the discursive 
exercises of ‗internalisation‘ of (external) orientalist views about Albanians from the end of 
the 19th century (which produced the awareness about the ‗nation‘ as a category which is 
congruent with the those of ‗progress‘ and ‗Europeanness‘) and, the similar ‗internalisation‘ 
exercise from a century after—which resulted in the awareness about the interlinkage of the 
notions of ‗democracy‘, ‗statehood‘ and ‗Europeanness‘. In the research, the drawing of these 
historical parallels through locating and revealing underlying ‗intertextuality‘, ‗hegemony‘ 
and ‗ideology‘ in the discourse is conducted with the aim of underpinning the claim that both 
the emergence and the transformation of the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist discourse 
represent the work of an externally-induced discursive hegemony of the ‗orientalist‘ system 
of representation. In short, the research shows the continuous operation and the impact of 
such a discursive hegemony in the context of its adoption, accommodation and naturalisation 
within the Kosovo/Albanians‘ body of knowledge about their origin, history and the telos of 
the nation. 
 
Here, I would like to note that another important historical period—which would, by all 
means, qualify for constituting a significant ‗rupture‘ in the ethnonationalist discourse—is not 
considered with this research: the period of the World War II. The years preceding 1940 and 
those in the aftermath of 1945 undoubtedly produced fundamental changes in the 
sociopolitical and socioeconomic landscape across the region—such as the introduction of 
the communist regimes in Albania and the former Socialist federation of Yugoslavia. While 
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such major changes have been briefly discussed in the research (see Chapter 6 and the debate 
on orientalism/balkanism), there are two main reasons for its exclusion as the object of this 
study. 
 
The first relates to the geopolitical fact that, despite the WWII ideological upheaval and 
sociopolitical reorganisation, the ethnonationalist discourse—specifically in the context of the 
Kosovo Albanian community—had remained intact from that of its pre-war content. Indeed, 
for a brief period (1941-1944) Kosovo was annexed to the then-Kingdom of Albania through 
the Nazi occupation—a move that made the Nazi regime gain a brief, but significant 
popularity among some strata of the Kosovo Albanians community (see Vickers, 1995; 
Malcolm, 1998). Such short-lived operation ended with the capitulation of the Nazi Germany 
and the subsequent regional and international rejection of such Nazi-led ‗annexations‘. The 
Nazi Germany-led unification of Kosovo with Albania failed to produce the ‗unity‘ aspired in 
the unificationist discourses among Albanians communities in Kosovo and in the state of 
Albania as the latter were pursuing a predominantly anti-fascist, communist ideological base 
(through significant international/Allies‘ support). Henceforth, in the broader geopolitical 
context, the social reality of the Kosovo Albanian community went unchanged in the 
aftermath of the WWII: both before and after, Kosovo remained the integral part of 
Serbia/Yugoslavia. While the WWII aftermath saw the transformation of some significant 
ideological features of its ethnonationalist discourse, eg. integration of the so-called ‗marxist-
lenninist‘ feature to the ‗unification‘ aspiration—an attempt to reconcile the traditional 
‗unificationist‘ narrative with the newly-introduced national/communist social reality in the 
then-People‘s Socialist Republic of Albania (see discussion in Chapter 7)—the general 
ideological course of the narrative remained the same. In the research I argue that the very 
process of naturalisation of such modifications in the post-WWII Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse accounts for its ideological insistence to continue pursuing of the 
‗unificationist‘ aspiration regardless of the fundamental sociopolitical changes inside 
Albania—and because of the geopolitical consistency of the ‗trauma‘ of ‗national partition‘. 
 
The second reason for leaving out this relevant period from being part of the analysis in this 
research is technical: its inclusion would not only broaden the scope of the study, but would 
also risk failure to be adequately fitted within a limited space available for this format of 
analysis (PhD thesis). One of the ways that it could have been done would be through 
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reducing significantly the space that was reserved for the current major periods of analysis; 
this would, in turn, result in the shrinkage of the general analytical scope and inevitable 
reduction of the respective text samples analysed in the research. Ultimately, during the 
process of mapping out the periodisation ‗chart‘ of the research, I felt confident to exclude 
this relevant momentum in the history of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse 
because it failed to transform its aspirational course—the major feature of the national 
unification. Instead, I argue, that feature underwent radical transformation during the period 
of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the fall of communism and the introduction of the discourse 
of democracy (Chapter 7). This shift of the key paradigm in the discourse culminated in a 
fundamental sociopolitical transformation which ultimately resulted in the struggle for 
establishment of Kosovo as a nation-state in its own right. In this respect, I took the necessary 
decision to focus and single-out two major historical moments of discursive ruptures: the one 
that gave birth to the Albanian ‗nation‘, and the one that gave birth to the ‗state‘ of Kosovo.  
 
Finally, in the Conclusions I expose the claim that the great discursive exercise in nation-
building in Albanian history represents a consequence of adoption of the western social 
practice of nationhood through the decisive influence of external, orientalist discourses. The 
history of Albanians—in Kosovo, former Yugoslavia and/or in Albania—as well as the 
history of the Balkan nations, I argue, accounts for a blueprint of effects of internalisation and 
naturalisation of such, essentially colonialist, western worldviews about the eastern ‗others‘. 
Further, I argue that, locally, in the context of the former Yugoslav societies, such a process 
of naturalisation of orientalist traits introduced and intensified the process of reciprocal 
‗othering‘ of the emerging ‗nations‘ in the immediate vicinity. Such a phenomenon of 
‗nesting orientalisms‘ assisted in heightening the particularist and exclusionist variation of 
ethnic nationalism, which, in the context of the former Yugoslavia, resulted in ethnic hatred, 
intolerance, armed conflict and the policies of ethnic cleansing—often committed with the 
aim of testifying one‘s ‗westernness‘ through exposing the ‗easternness‘ of the immediate 
other. 
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Chapter 2. 
 
Literature Review: Nations and Nationalism 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss a number of theoretical concepts by various scholars from the 
field that define the phenomenon of nation and nationalism among social groups and ethnic 
communities: its variations, manifestations and transformations that occur as a consequence 
of reforming and re-organising the narratives of national identity and ideology. 
 
The first section unfolds various definitions of nation and nationalism from historical, 
sociological and etymological point of view. From pre-industrial concepts of the nation as an 
‗extended family‘ drawing upon the works of the German romanticist philosopher J.G. 
Herder from the 18th century, or its definition as a ‗community of solidarity‘ by the French 
writer Ernest Renan in 19th century; or, later, modern theories from the late 20th century on 
the nation as an ‗imagined community‘, a ‗social contingency‘ or ‗a community of opinion‘ 
as stated in the works of Benedict Anderson (1983), Ernest Gellner (1982, 1987), Anthony D. 
Smith (1991, 1998, 2008) or Liah Greenfeld (1992). Indeed, there are numerous definitions 
that examine and explain the birth of the nation while taking into account the different 
historical, political and cultural experiences which enabled the formation of different 
sociopolitical systems between and within the social groups, nations and states of European 
continent. In this chapter particular emphasis is given to Greenfeld‘s explanations on 
nationalism as a social norm, a canon that historically became an ‗importable‘ social practice 
in the ever-nationalizing world of nations and nation-states. 
 
In the second section, as I continue to observe theories of nationalism and nationhood, I try to 
implement selected scholarly explanations on the profile and typology of the nationalist 
ideology of Albanians—specifically, Albanians from Kosovo—which will be challenged and 
observed through the theories on ‗irredentist‘ and ‗peripheral‘ models of nationalism 
(Hechter, 2000). I find such theories particularly relevant for analysis of the Kosovo Albanian 
nationalism as they relate to political actions by social groups that became defined as 
‗national minorities‘ (Brubaker, 1996) in the aftermath of larger, geopolitical settlements in 
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the region. Theoretical analysis of the Kosovo Albanian nationalism in this chapter aims to 
introduce the discussion on that ideological and political narrative and the process of its 
transformation during the turbulent period of the breakup of the former Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia (1991-1999). 
 
Numerous books and studies have been written on the subject of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, the rise of ethnonationalism across its former republics—today‘s nation-states of 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo; here, 
I will mention just a few that will be referred to in the next chapters, such as Meier (1999), 
Benson (2001, Vladisavljevic (2008), Ramet (2005), Morton et al (2004), Udovicki & 
Ridgway (2000). They discuss at length the history, actions and ideological principles that 
were guiding republican political leaderships of the former federation towards the final 
dissolution of the joint state.  
In this section I will discuss further the contemporary theories on the profiles of nations and 
nationalisms and juxtapose them with the historiographic accounts on the development of 
Kosovo Albanian nationalism. Theories such as those about ‗proto-nations‘ by Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen (1997) or ‗nations without states‘ by Montserrat Guibernau (1997) are also 
invoked as additional theoretical pillars with the aim of examining and explaining the 
typology of the Kosovo Albanian nationalism as the political ideology of choice in their 
demands for national self-determination and statehood. 
 
What is a nation? 
 
Principally, there are two concepts and subsequent definitions that regard the manifestation of 
nations. The first one is the political definition of a nation ‗by the act of will‘ as described by 
Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a French philosopher and writer: 
 
A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart, creates the kind of 
moral conscience which we call a nation. So long as this moral consciousness gives 
proof of its strength by the sacrifices which demand the abdication of the individual 
to the advantage of the community, it is legitimate and has the right to exist. (Renan, 
‗What is a Nation?‘ in Woolf, 1996:58-59) 
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The other is the ethnic, cultural nation, defined as a construction that draws upon the power 
of what Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist from the early XX century named mechanical 
solidarity (in Giddens, 1978), a social practice based primarily on the commonly inherited 
values such as ethnic kinship, language, culture, and territory. This definition goes along the 
lines of what the German philosopher and theologian J. G. Herder (1744-1803) described as 
an ‗extended family with one national character‘ (in Viroli, 2005). 
 
The most natural state is one nationality with one national character. This it retains 
for ages, and this is most naturally formed when it is the object of its native princes; 
for a nationality is as much a plant of nature as a family, only with more branches. 
Nothing therefore appears so indirectly opposite to the end of government as the 
unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing of all kinds of people and 
nationalities under one scepter (2005:123). 
 
In his analysis of Herder‘s view on nation and nationalism, Viroli notes that to Herder, 
‗nation means oneness‘; ‗nation means life‘—‘nation is given and entitled to men‘s love, a 
deep attachment as strong as a plant‘s attachment to the soil and the air‘ (1995:119-22). 
Ultimately, the sentiment towards the nation should not differ from the feelings that one has 
towards his/her family. Nation is thus, the ‗fatherland‘, Herder concludes. 
 
Indeed, does the nation, nationhood represent an enforced identity of an individual (or, a 
group) based on naturally inherited values of kinship and culture? Or, is it a voluntary, 
contractual, act of will that lends its power ‗to political ruler on condition that it be used to 
satisfy the most important needs‘ (Hampton, 1986:256)? 
In this chapter I will offer a brief observation on the theories and the ongoing debate about 
the origin of nations and its constitutive narrative, nationalism. 
 
Primordialism and the ethnic origins of nation 
 
Historically, such simplified distinction of ethnic vs. civic, of sacred vs. contractual have 
been used to define two major schools of thought with respect to the definitions of the nation 
and nationalism as its constructing narrative. Ozkirimli (2000) argues that ‗primordialism‘ 
represents one of the fundamental paradigms of nationalism which he classifies as an 
academic approach rather than a theory: an ‗umbrella‘ that includes the academic views about 
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nationhood and nationalism as ‗a natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or 
smell‘ which entails that ‗nations have existed since the time immemorial‘ (2000:64). 
Primordialist approach is named after the adjective ‗primordial‘ which, according to the New 
International Webster‘s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language (1996 ed.) 
defined as following: 
 
(a) First in order of time, original, elemental; 
(b) First in order of appearance in the growth or development of an organism 
(biological meaning); and 
(c) An elementary principle, first, primeval transcending 
 
In his observation about the primordialist theory of nations and nationalism Ozkirimli refers 
to the works from scholars such as Edward Shils (1957) and his argument about the strength 
of the attachment that ‗one feels for his/her family members‘ and which does not ‗stem from 
interaction, but from a ‗certain ineffable significance. . . attributed to the tie of blood‘ (Shils, 
1957, in Ozkirimli, 2000:65). Such ties, according to Shils could only be described as 
primordial, conceived and survived since the time immemorial, timeless and, subsequently, 
eternal. 
 
In the context of the study of nationalist theories, primordialist approach cannot be viewed 
independently from the debate on ethnicity, Ozkirimli notes. According to him, primordialist 
arguments have been constructed ‗to explain the origins and the strength of ethnic identities‘ 
(2000:66). In this context, ‗primordialism‘ is employed to describe the nature of ethnic 
attachments which he classifies into three different versions: ‗naturalist‘, ‗sociobiological‘, 
and ‗culturalist‘: 
 
According to Ozkirimli, the naturalist approach can be considered as ‗the most extreme 
version of primordialism‘ (2000:66) which point of departure is based on the claim that 
national identities represent a ‗natural‘ part  of all human beings. ‗The nation to which one 
belongs is predetermined, ‗naturally fixed‘: in other words, one is born into a nation in the 
same way s/he is born into a family (Smith, 1995:31). 
Subscription to these views entails that all nations have their ‗natural frontiers‘ and therefore 
‗a specific origin and place in nature, as well as a peculiar character, mission and destiny 
(Smith, 1995:32). 
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Primordialist approach does not make distinction between nations and ethnic groups, 
according to Smith: nationalism is an attribute of humanity in all ages (ibid). Ozkirimli notes 
that such primordialist approach of explaining—indeed, narrating—the nationalism 
represents a viewpoint that is endorsed by most, if not all, nationalists; it represents the 
‗ideological view of the past‘ (2000:67) and continues to shape the works of nationalist 
historians as well as the rhetoric‘s of political elites that employ nationalism as the strategic 
discourse in the power struggle over the control/governance of a nation state. 
 
The sociobiological approach to explaining the origins of nations and nationalism is 
influenced in recent years through findings in the field of sociobiology, in particular with the 
works of Pierre van den Berghe (1978). According to Van den Berghe, the answer to the 
principal question of sociobiology: ‗Why are animals social, that is, why do they cooperate?‘ 
(1978:402) has been long intuitively known: ‗animals are social to the extent that cooperation 
is mutually beneficial‘ (ibid). In his comparative sociobiological approach Van den Berghe 
argues that the process of kin selection—mating with relatives—represents a ‗powerful 
cement of sociality in humans‘ (in Ozkirimli, 2000:71). According to him, ethnicity and race 
represent mere extensions to the idiom of kinship. ‗Therefore, ethnic and race sentiments are 
to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection‘ (ibid). In his 
interpretation of Van den Berghe‘s views, Ozkirimli notes that the fact that the extended 
kinship is sometimes ‗putative rather than real‘ is not important: just as in the smaller kin 
units, the kinship is often real enough ‗to become the basis of these powerful sentiments we 
call nationalism, tribalism, racism and ethnocentrism‘ (ibid) 
 
The culturalist approach—or, the ‗cultural primordialism‘—is generally attached to the 
works of Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz (1973) who, according to Ozkirimli and other 
scholars in the field such as Eller and Coughlan (1993) base their concept on three main 
ideas: 
 
1. Primordial identities or attachments are ‗given‘, a priori, underived, prior to all 
experience and interaction—in fact, all interaction is carried out within 
primordial realities. Primordial attachments are natural, even spiritual, rather than 
sociological. . . They have no social source. 
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2. Primordial sentiments are ‗ineffable‘, overpowering and coercive. . . If an 
individual is a member of a group, he or she necessarily feels certain attachments 
to that group and its practices (especially language and culture). 
3. Primordialism is essentially a question of emotion and effect (in Ozkirimli, 
2000:72) 
 
In this context, the cultural primordialism defines the nation through participation within a 
unique culture, a Kulturnation (also, a phrase often attributed to Renan) that is based on the 
common language, traditions, and common ethnicity of a larger group of people. This 
definition appears somewhat in line with what Anthony D. Smith defined as essential 
characteristics of the primary unit of a nation, the ethnie, as discussed earlier. Although in 
line with the modernist, constructivist, theories on the nation and nationalism, Smith‘s 
definition of it as a ‗named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and 
historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members‘ (1999:13), appears to be more in favor of an ‗ethnicist‘ or ‗culturalist‘ 
model: 
 
Though most latter-day nations are, in fact, polyethnic, or rather most nation-states 
are polyethnic, many have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie 
(…) in other words nations always require ethnic elements (1991: 39) 
 
To Smith, there must be an ethnie at the core of a nation for the latter to be able to derive 
essential components of national identity. Such an ethnocultural profile of the ethnie, in 
Smith‘s terms, stands for the original unit of the nation. 
 
One could argue that Smith‘s point of departure for defining the nation—through the 
primordial unit of the ethnie—does not differ from Herder‘s concept as it stands at the 
forefront of the ethno-culturalist definition, centered around the ethnic uniqueness and the 
‗natural‘ fact of the common origin. It refers to the unchangeable, preconstituted, criteria such 
as the common language, culture, origin, territory and the national myth, placing their 
relevance above that of the contract-based social interest and the labor division: 
 
…myth of common and unique origin in time and place is essential for the sense of 
ethnic community (…) Cultural dimensions remain secondary to the sense of 
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common origins and history of the group. This constitutes the core of the group‘s 
identity and of its sense of uniqueness. (1981: 66-67) 
 
The national myth or the myth about the nation is also one of the essential elements of the 
nation-building process. Referring to the spiritual power of nationhood as a derivation, or, 
indeed, a substitute, to the religious devotion, Vjekoslav Perica notes that ‗nation-states 
cannot exist without history and myth‘ and that they also ‗require a worshipful acceptance‘ 
(2002:5). He observes the importance of the national myth which he defines as the narrative 
about the origin, the national tale on the ‗birth of the community‘. Regardless of historical 
inaccuracy, this narrative ‗becomes sacred‘ (ibid) and manifests in a constructivist reciprocity 
– it shapes the national mindset which, in turn, constructs its sacredness: 
 
Regarding the phenomenon of the nation-state: it consists of territories with borders, 
peoples, armies, and bureaucracies, but that is not enough: the nation-state cannot 
exist without an adequate system of public patriotic worship, symbol, myth, and 
ritual. Nation-states require of their citizens not only that they be governed and they 
govern but also that they love their ‗country‘ and be prepared to kill, die, and lie for 
it. As in the case of religion, an individual or group‘s disrespect of this requirement 
calls for some kind of excommunication, punishment, and sometimes even death 
(2002:5) 
 
According to Maurizio Viroli (1997) the views launched through thinkers like Herder at the 
wake of the industrial age consider kinship, cultural and ethnic belonging as key elements of 
nationhood as they derive the ‗national soul‘ as the ultimate social achievement: 
 
In Herder‘s language the concept of national soul ‗is the mother of all culture upon 
the earth and all culture is the expression of national soul‘. ‗A person without 
patriotic spirit‘, Herder remarks, ‗has lost himself and the whole world about 
himself‘. He means that he has lost his own spiritual identity which comes from the 
contact with national culture. (1997:118) 
 
‗In the beginning, the nation was perennial‘, writes Smith (2009) as he notes that in every 
historical period—be that ancient Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks and so forth—were 
‗all ‗nations‘ when they were not ‗races‘ (2009:6). According to him, the modern evolution of 
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nations inevitably originates from the primordial unit of any nation, the ‗ethnie‘ or the ethnic 
community of which ‗ideal-typical‘ structure he gives an exhaustive account: 
 
1. A large mass of peasants and artisans in villages and small market towns, 
subject to various restrictions on their freedom (. . .) and wedded to local 
‗folk cultures‘ (vernaculars, legends, rural customs and rites, dress, dance and 
music) influenced loosely by the nearest Great Traditions 
2. A small urban stratum of competing elites in the main towns—rulers and 
their courts, bureaucrats, noble landowners, military leaders—monopolizing 
wealth and political power, and centered loosely on an administrative capital 
and core area, and patronizing specialist trading and artisan client strata; 
3. A tiny stratum of priests/monks and scribes claiming a monopoly of the 
community‘s belief system, ritual and educational services, and acting as 
transmitters and conduits of its symbolism between the various urban elites 
and between them and the peasants and rural artisans, thereby seeking to 
incorporate various Little Traditions of the latter into the central Great 
Tradition of which they act as guardians and agents of socialization; 
4. A found of myths, memories, values and symbols, often encoded which 
express and explain the community‘s perceptions of itself, its origins, 
development and destiny, and its place in the cosmic order; all of these being 
manifested in a round of ceremonies, rites artefacts and laws which bind the 
community to its celestial pantheon and its homeland; 
5. Processes of communication, transmission and socialization of the store of 
myths, memories, values and symbols among both urban elites and their 
specialist clients, and where necessary outwards and downwards to the 
dependent peasantry; using mainly temple ritual and worship, dissemination 
of the precepts and morals of sacred texts, the use of symbols in art, 
architecture and dress, the elaboration of oral traditions, ballads, epics and 
hymns, but also the promulgation of the legal codes and edicts, some 
rudimentary rote learning in local schools for selected members of various 
strata, and the use of military service and public works labour forces 
(1997:28-29 
 
To Smith, the ethnic model of nation focuses primarily on the feature of descent, other than 
territory. Here, the nation is seen ‗as a fictive, super-family‘, and it boasts pedigrees and 
genealogies to back up its claims, particularly in East European and Middle East countries‘ 
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(1991:12). Ethnie, then, is primordial, notes Smith. Below, I will offer further definitions of 
ethnies, ethnic groups, due to their particular importance to the focus of this research—the 
form and the manifestation and performance of nationalism among Kosovo Albanians who 
were officially defined as an ethnic community and ‗national minority‘ in the former 
federation of Yugoslavia with a history of distinct ethnie, or ethnic group. Below is an 
interpretation of the ‗ethnic group‘ by Frederick Barth (1998) as a population which: 
 
(a) is largely self-perpetuating 
(b) shares fundamental cultural values realised in overt unity in cultural forms 
(c) makes up a field of communication and interaction 
(d) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as 
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same 
order (1998:10). 
 
There is a difference between the ‗ethnie‘ or the ‗ethnic community‘ and nation, argues 
Adrian Hastings (1997), as he endorses the theory shared by Benedict Anderson (1983), that 
of the critical importance of the vernacularisation of literature but also the imminent external 
threat. Here is his observation of the differences between ethnicity (ethnic group) and the 
nation: 
 
1. An ethnicity is a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken 
language. It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national 
societies, but may survive as a strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own 
within established nations. 
2. A nation is a far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Formed 
from one or more ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its 
own, it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a 
people, together with the control of specific territory, comparable to that of 
biblical Israel and of other independent entities in a world thought of as one 
of nation-states (1996:3) 
 
Finally, the milder and more inclusive variation of primordialism has been introduced by 
Smith (1984) through the term ‗perennialism‘ which is derived from the adjective ‗perennial‘ 
and signifies the ‗continuing or enduring through the year or through many years‘, and 
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‗growing continuously, surviving (the New International Webster‘s Comprehensive 
Dictionary of the English Language, 1996 ed.) 
Primarily, I understand the perennialist theory nationalism as an academic attempt to 
reconcile the opposed approaches in the study of the nation and nationalism: the essentialist 
which is confined within the hardline primordialist/natural definition, and constructivist, 
which relies on the modernist theories about relational, transformative and narrative-
dependent nature of nation and which will be dealt in the next section of this chapter. 
In this context, perennialist view allows for the projection of the existence of nation in the 
historical antiquity while rejecting the idea about it as ‗natural‘ (in Ozkirimli, 2000); thus, 
perennialists do not identify a specific date of birth for nationalism. For them, the origins of 
both nations and nationalism stretch back as far as the medieval period—that is, well beyond 
the modern ages—and the ‗essence‘ which differentiates any particular nation from others 
‗manages to remain intact despite all the vicissitudes of history‘ (ibid:70)) 
 
Modernism 
 
Ozkirimli notes that modernist theories of nation and nationalism have emerged as reaction to 
the primordialism of the ‗older generations who tacitly accepted the basic assumptions of the 
nationalist ideology‘ and very soon became ‗the dominant orthodoxy in the field‘ (2000:85). 
In simplified terms, the dualism between ethnic/primordialist and civic/modernist origins of 
the nation is often described as the British/French model and the German model—where the 
British/French model is defined as resting on the ideology of political nation-building (civic 
nationalism) and the German ethno-cultural model (ethnic nationalism). A useful 
differentiation on the usage of these terms is stated in Brown (2000) as he discusses arising 
distinctions in the meaning of ‗Britishness‘ and ‗Englishness‘ in the UK in the period after 
1960s: 
 
The cohesion of the United Kingdom as a ‗nation-state‘ was previously manifested in 
the degree of interchangeability of the terms ‗English‘ and ‗British‘. But such 
ambiguities seem to have given way to a clearer differentiation between ‗English‘ 
perceived increasingly in ethnocultural terms, and ‗British‘ perceived in 
predominantly civic terms. (2000:2) 
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Below is an overview of scholarly works done on the definition of the notion and the concept 
of nation. Below is the model of the temporal shift of the meaning of the word as devised by 
Liah Greenfeld (1992). In her all-encompassing study Nationalism, Five Roads to Modernity 
(1992:6) she offers a graphic presentation of evolution and semantic change of the term 
nation during the history: 
 
Natio = a group of foreigners
Nation = a community of opinion
Nation = an elite
Nation = an sovereign people
Nation = a unique people
Medieval universities
Church councils 
Population of England 
Other countries and people  
 
Greenfeld notes that whereas its usage in the context of supra-ethnic ‗community of opinion‘ 
was introduced in Middle Ages, its civic/political connotation that the term bears today was 
born in the population of England of XVII century. It spread throughout the European 
continent as the invention of the new English aristocracy ‗which considered the traditional 
image of the society, where upward mobility was an anomaly, uncongenial‘ (1992:487). It 
simply substituted this with the idea of a ‗homogenously elite people‘ – the nation. 
 
Etymologically, Greenfeld explains the ascendance of the notion from its early context, used 
to describe a group of foreigners (Roman = natio; Greek = ta ethnae), to its 19th century 
connotation of sovereign and unique people in the Western Europe. 
 
The word ‗nation‘, meaning ‗sovereign people‘ was now applied to other populations 
and countries, which, like the first nation, naturally had political, territorial and/or 
ethnic qualities to distinguish them, and became associated with such geo-political 
and ethnic baggage. As a result of this association, nation changed its meaning once 
again, coming to signify ‗a unique sovereign people. (1992:9) 
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To Ozkirimli (2000), the general feature and the common denominator of modernist theories 
of the origin of nation is the belief that both nation and nationalism represent a novel, thus 
modern construction. Modernist perspective traces the birth of the nation and its narrative 
during the turbulent periods in the Europe of 18th and 19th century, specifically in the period 
imminent to the French Revolution (1789) and subsequent emergence of modern processes 
such as capitalism, industrialism, bureaucratic state and secularism (Smith, 1994:377; 
1995:29). In this respect, it is the narrative about the nation—nationalism—that gave birth to 
them as a ‗sociological necessity‘, Ozkirimli argues quoting Hobsbawm (1990) that 
‗nationalism comes before nations‘, and that ‗nations do not make states and nationalisms but 
the other way around (Hobsbawm (1990) in Ozkirimli, 2000:86). 
 
In my analysis with the next chapters of is research, in the context of the Kosovo/Albanian 
ethnonationalism, I will adhere to this approach which I find constructivist at its core, for it 
argues for the construction and development of the nation primarily through respective 
discursive practices, such as the narrative about the nation. Such approach will assist in this 
research in reinforcing my argument about the ‗elasticity‘ of the nationalist narrative and its 
capacity to change, transform, adapt through influences from other discourses and 
practices—dependently on the historical period in which an ethnic community, such as 
Albanians and, specifically, Kosovo Albanians would be living in. I argue that such a 
transformative capacity of the nationalist narrative as a discursive practice will, in time, 
produce a different perception and definition of the nation; it will influence both the 
interpretation of a nation‘s history—in terms of the ‗ideology of the past‘—as well as its 
contemporary definition, its mission and its future. 
 
Such transformative capacity of nationalist narrative appear in line with Renan‘s definition of 
the political aspect of nation-building as an ‗act of will‘, also known as Willensnation (in 
German); as such, it constructs the basis for numerous scholarly theories that view the birth 
of the nation as a work of modernity, the modern society – an attempt to adapt to rapid social 
changes of industrialization and urbanization. According to those theories, such an act of will 
makes the aspiration for nationhood a purely political, indeed contractual, action of an 
individual or a group. Such definition appears in line with Greenfeld‘s ‗community of 
opinion‘ or with Ernest Gellner‘s ‗norm‘ of nationness devised through ‗the fusion of will, 
culture and polity‘ (1983, 2006:54). 
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Rather, when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, 
centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite 
minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and 
unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly 
and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of 
political legitimacy (1983:55) 
 
What Gellner wants to highlight is the process of production of the social norms, which, 
eventually, shape the social and institutional practices. He understands the concept of nation 
along the lines of well-defined and ‗educationally sanctioned and unified cultures‘ which, 
once established will define the nation in terms of ‗will and culture‘. 
Although Renan is considered among the first thinkers of nationhood as a political act, his 
position on the motivations that drive an individual (or, a group) to become a national places 
a strong emphasis on ethno-cultural bonds that he sees essential for construction of the great 
community of ‗solidarity‘. According to him, the common race, the common religion, the 
common language, the common interest and the common geography represent, indeed, 
essential components that construct the conditions for promotion of a certain social, ethnic 
group into the category of the nation. But, it takes a yet another sentiment, Renan argues, in 
order for these components to be put in the nation-building motion: 
 
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which strictly speaking are just 
one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the 
present. One is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is 
actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage 
that has been received in common. (. . .). The nation, like the individual, is the 
outcome of a long and strenuous past of sacrifice and devotion. (1996:58) 
 
The nation is, therefore, according to Renan, an ‗expression of the great solidarity‘ that is 
shaped through common sacrifices: ‗it presupposes a past; however, it is epitomized in the 
present‘. Such community would, according to him, be based on ‗common glories of the past, 
a common possession of a rich legacy of memories‘ and even ‗the cult of ancestors‘ (ibid:58). 
It is a natural ambition for preservation of both personal identity and collective heritage. One 
could argue that Renan suggests an elevation of the commonness of ethno-cultural values 
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onto a political ideology; a politicization of the origin—a politics of ethnicity at the core of 
the nation-building ideology. It is at this point that some modernist scholars take a slightly 
different path with Ernest Gellner at the forefront who, in his symbolical essay paraphrasing 
Renan‘s What is a Nation? notes that his ‗community of solidarity‘ appears insufficient to 
explain the evolution of particular social groups into nations: 
 
…(unfortunately for this definition) the same also applies to many clubs, 
conspiracies, gangs, teams, parties, not to mention many numerous communities and 
associations of the pre-industrial age which were not recruited and defined according 
to the nationalist principle and which defy it. Will, consent, identification were not 
ever absent from the human scene, even though they were (and continue to be) also 
accompanied by calculation, fear and interest. (1983, 2006:53) 
 
According to modernist theories such as Gellner‘s, it is the administrative impositions of a 
particular social formation (kingdom, empire, state) that will eventually lead to cultural 
diffusion in a community (or between communities) on the road to nationhood and/or 
statehood. What this entails is that administrative institutions of a particular social formation 
will require an individual or a social group to adhere to the values which shape its conceptual 
basis: language, culture, social relations and political ideology. Thus, according to Gellner, an 
individual becomes a national not out of voluntary acceptance of shared values, but because 
of the structural requirements of modern, industrial societies: such requirements become 
social conditions; they are imposed through social relations, media and the public discourse, 
high culture, and other administrative requirements. 
 
In a similar argument, Anderson (1983) discusses the historical ‗arbitrariness‘ and the 
technology of such cultural diffusion as he makes the case for the role of ‗print-capitalism‘ in 
the ‗vernacularisation‘ of communities in the process of constructing the nation and national 
consciousness, identity. In his seminal work ‗Imagined Communities‘, Anderson sees the 
nation as a modern construct which is enabled through the standardization of language, 
literacy, education, communication and culture: 
 
In pre-print Europe, and, of course, elsewhere in the world, the diversity of spoken 
languages, those languages that for their speakers were (and are) the warp and woof 
of their lives, was immense; so immense, indeed, that had print-capitalism sought to 
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exploit each potential vernacular market, it would have remained a capitalism of petty 
proportions. (1983:43) 
 
This goes in line with Gellner‘s theory of cultural diffusion and impositions by the modern 
society which become structural requirements and are, in time, defined as a system of 
common values in a nationalized community: they become a national culture, a national way 
of life. Here, Gellner admits to Durkheim‘s ‗organic‘ model of social systems of a contractual 
nature (in Giddens, 1986:22-24) as he notes that the concept of nationalism ‗is rooted in a 
certain kind of division of labor, one which is complex and persistently, cumulatively 
changing‘. (1983:24). 
 
The ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ nationalism? 
 
Whereas its potentially pre-modern (ethnic) origin is still a matter of larger debate, there is a 
workable consent that the political ideology based on nationness or nationhood, the 
nationalism, represents the ultimate doctrine that shaped the map of the modern world. Being 
a state-building ideology, for the past two hundred years it manifested as a two-fold concept: 
civic and ethnic. Subsequently, such a difference came to constitute two major variations of 
today‘s nation-states: liberal democracies that are often defined as constructed through 
civic/political nationalism, and/or unitarist, particularist regimes resting on ethno-culturalist 
nationalist ideology. 
 
Nevertheless, such definitions provide only for simplistic, practical demarcation between 
existing models of nation-states, therefore such a rigid division has not been accepted by a 
range of scholars and experts in the field such as Brubaker (2004), Gans (2003), Silverman 
(1994), Brown (2000), Richter (1994) and others. According to Rogers Brubaker (2004), the 
ever-changing face of national ideology is one of the reasons that leads to such discursive 
distinctions: 
 
For more than a century, scholars and public figures have distinguished ‗civic‘ and 
‗ethnic‘, western and eastern, liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism. These and 
similar distinctions have provided a way of coming to terms with the empirically 
unruly and morally and politically Janus-faced phenomena of nationhood and 
nationalism. (…) The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, I argue, is 
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conceptually ambiguous, empirically misleading and normatively problematic. 
(2004:5) 
 
It appears extremely difficult to use such contradicting terms in a precise manner, although in 
numerous theoretical works the German model (ethnically based) appears mostly as an 
antithesis to the French and/or British (civic based). It is often considered ‗a symbol of the 
attempt to depict Germany (which had no unified state) as a nation on a par with that of the 
French‘ (cf. Brubaker, 1992:1, in Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999:19). In a 
simplistic use of the notions Germany is often presented as a role model of ethno-nationalist 
nation-states whereas the French model represents the flagship of civic, or political 
nationalisms. In the case of the former it is the nation that constructs its own state, whereas in 
the latter the constitution of the state constructs the national identity of its citizens, requiring 
adherence of its political principles. Shortly, the German nation produces the state of 
Germany; the state of France constructs the French nation. 
 
Moreover, in numerous texts a political value judgment is implied in the dichotomy 
Staatsnation versus Kulturnation, specifically between the ‗bad‘ Staatsnation and the 
‗good‘ Kulturnation. (Many scholars) relativize the significance of the distinction 
between ethnically based and a politically based understanding of the nation in the 
contemporary world inasmuch as they notice a ‗convergence‘ in the ideological 
patterns of these two ‗paths‘ to becoming a ‗nation‘. (1999:19) 
 
However, according to John Rex (1999), the simplistic interpretation of the political nation 
cannot avoid inclusion and operation with ethnic-cultural symbolism as these two appear 
intertwined in their relevance and manifestation: 
 
The problem is that, while it denies particularistic ethnic loyalties or subordinates 
them, it has itself to create its own sense of belonging, and it does this very often for 
instance to the mother country or the fatherland (1999:27) 
 
According to Brubaker, this ambivalent views and definitions of nations and nationalism are 
a consequence of the fact that nation and nationalism ‗designate a whole world of different 
things‘ (2004:132). However, in practical use, outside of the narrow circle of researchers 
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working primarily on nationalism, Brubaker notes, lies the distinction between civic and 
ethnic understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism. 
 
This has been used to suggest that there are, fundamentally, only two kinds of 
nationalisms (and nations): civic nationalism, characterized as liberal, voluntarist, 
universalist, and inclusive; and ethnic nationalism, glossed as illiberal, ascriptive, 
particularist, and exclusive. These are seen as resting on two corresponding 
understandings of nationhood, based on common citizenship in the first case, 
common ethnicity in the second. (2004:132) 
 
Brown (2000) points out at the division between the manifestations and theories of 
nationalism that has been channelled into two major categories: 
 
(a) ethnocultural nationalism, which, according to him has been labelled as ‗integral‘, 
‗organic‘, ‗ascriptive‘, ‗exclusive‘ or ‗radical‘—ultimately authoritarian and 
collectivist, and 
(b) civic nationalism, labelled as ‗liberal‘, ‗political‘, ‗social‘ or ‗voluntarist‘ – ultimately 
projected as potentially democratic and individualistic (2000:49) 
 
He notes that those types of nationalism are analytically distinct, but that their manifestation 
in various nations and societies can appear intertwined and combined, with one form being 
more dominant than the other. Below is a definition of distinction between the ethnocultural 
and civic nationalism, according to Brown: 
 
The widespread depiction of ethnocultural nationalism as illiberal and civic 
nationalism as liberal is based partly on the distinction between irrational and rational 
attachments, partly on the allegedly liberalising impact of the middle classes and 
partly on a distinction between reactive and self-generated identities (2000:50). 
 
In addition, Brown employs the term ‗cultural nationalism‘ instead of ‗ethnic nationalism‘ 
which he finds perpetually disputed between those who believe that it refers to the myth of 
ethnic identity, and those who refer to it as a biological fact ‗of genetically fixed primordial 
racial attributes‘ (1999:282). An interesting approach is given through the emphasis that each 
of these nationalisms revolve around the language of the family—and that the typology of the 
family is what defines their characteristics. Brown notes that the family of civic nationalism 
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is primarily the marriage family; entry into the family from diverse sources indicates 
‗commitment to a common loyalty or destiny‘. The family of the cultural nationalism, on the 
other hand, is primarily that of parenthood:, with the ‗commitment of (genetic or adopted) 
children to the family deriving from the belief in the common ancestry.‘ (ibid:283). 
 
Finally, Hans Kohn (1944) provided a different definition of differences between the ‗good‘ 
and the ‗bad‘ nationalisms—to paraphrase Brown: according to him, there is a Western 
(North Atlantic) type of nationalism, and the East-Central European nationalism. Kohn 
defines the first, North Atlantic nationalism, as ‗predominantly political occurrence‘ 
(1944:329) that is derived through the process of state-formation. The narrative of such 
nationalism, indeed, produces and constructs the nation as a distinct social group, as ‗it is 
connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism‘ (ibid:330). 
By contrast, the Eastern nationalism—which, according to Kohn, include the German, 
Russian and Indian variations—originated in ‗the ethnographic demands‘ and eventually 
developed in societies which were ‗at more backward stage of political and social 
development (ibid:329). He sees the Eastern nationalism as ‗excessive and militant‘ 
(1962:24), with a rather cultural than a political form and heavily dependent on ‗myths of the 
past and dreams of the future‘ (ibid). Drawing upon Herder‘s concept of ‗fatherland‘, Kohn 
refers to the German variation as a model of choice for the description of this nationalism, 
which is: 
 
...held together not by the will of its members nor by any obligations or contract, but 
by traditional ties of kinship and status. . . and by infinitely vaguer concept of ‗folk‘ 
which . . . lent itself more easily to the embroideries of imagination and the 
excitations of emotion. Its roots seemed to reach into the dark soil of primitive times 
and to have grown through thousands of hidden channels of unconscious 
development, not in the bright light of rational political ends, but in the mysterious 
womb of the people, deemed to be so much nearer to the forces of nature (Kohn, 
1944:331) 
 
National identity, an imagined community 
 
Other studies from the field demonstrate that, for a community to evolve into a nation 
‗through the idea‘ it has to construct a distinct individual and collective awareness, a new 
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type of identity. It ought to be able to imagine its cohesiveness, its commonness, its inner 
solidarity and devotion. Such a power of individual and collective ability to imagine the 
national identity and belonging was most notably stated by Benedict Anderson (1983): 
 
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most 
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion (1983:6) 
 
The history of the nation state and nationalism accounts for ferocious struggle to dismantle 
preceding social formations, empires and kingdoms. This process of disintegration of supra-
ethnic social formations is similar to the manner in which Anderson defines the long process 
of the ‗the decline of the imagined community of Christendom‘, which, according to him, 
happened through the confronting process of the ‗elevation of vernaculars to the status of 
languages of power‘. The popularization and institutionalization of local 
languages/vernaculars—particularly, the ability to print them—caused the subsequent decline 
of Latin by rendering it useless as the only, until-then, permitted written language of the 
peoples within the realm of Christendom. 
 
In simpler terms, Anderson argues that the legalization of vernaculars gave birth to 
(ethno)national awareness and new social relations. It was the replacement of ‗the sacred 
imagined community‘ with an abundance of smaller, national ‗imagined communities‘. The 
effect of such process resulted in formation of both the nations and nation-states. To 
Anderson, it was on the ashes of former empires and the imposition of new ‗languages of 
power‘ that the emerging nations were to redraw boundaries of new, smaller states. Such new 
identities that were coined in a new environment required new ideological base; nations were 
to (re)invent their national traditions through nationalism, according to Eric Hobsbawm 
(1983): 
 
Traditions are highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical innovation, the 
‗nation‘, with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national 
symbols, histories and the rest. All these rest on exercises in social engineering which 
are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies 
innovation (1983:13) 
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Hobsbawm argues that the process of invention of traditions –specifically, traditions that 
establish and maintain the national identity—is essential for construction of nationhood and 
national awareness. According to him, such a process entails ‗a set of practices governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition‘ (1983:1). According to him, such  
procedure of repetition would, eventually, imply the continuity with the past through the 
rites—and thus achieve the continuity and cohesiveness within the social group practicing 
them. Hobsbawm defines three overlapping types of ‗invented traditions‘ in the period since 
the industrial revolutions: 
 
a) Those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real 
or artificial communities; 
b) Those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and; 
c) Those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value 
systems and conventions of behaviour. (1983:9) 
 
Establishment of social norms, production of the national cohesion through the process of 
repetition of rites—all this appears to have had critical relevance in the process of the 
transformation of a social group into a nation with a unique collective, national identity. But, 
according to Anderson, it also takes a certain degree of collective imagination to enable a 
certain social group to project its cohesiveness and uniqueness. The logic of imagining one‘s 
nation and one‘s attachment to it, according to Anderson, is indivisive from imagining its 
unique identity and origin which, be that the case, has to be finite, limited, so that it can 
realise its uniqueness and identification through comparisons with other nations that lie 
beyond its boundaries. In his study ‗Imagined Communities‘ (1983) Anderson envisages the 
nations as a collectively ‗imagined‘ construct, projected through a shared imagination, and 
limited—so that only a finite social group can claim ownership over it. Below are some of the 
most relevant excerpts that underpin his theory: 
 
1) It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds 
of each lives the image of their communion; 
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2) The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond 
which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind; 
3) It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which 
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-
ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm; 
4) Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (1983:6-7) 
 
In his theoretical approach, Anderson highlights the elusive nature of the notion of nation and 
nationalism which, according to him present any historian of nationalism with three 
paradoxes: the paradox of (a) objective modernity, the paradox of (b) universality and the 
paradox of (b) political power which is disproportionate to their philosophical deficiency and 
incoherence. 
The paradox of ‗objective modernity‘ is related to the simultaneously ‗modern‘ and ‗ancient‘ 
nature of nations and nationalism; to Anderson, nations appear modern to historians, yet 
ancient—even sacred—to nationalists. The paradox of their ‗universality‘ is related to the 
commonly held idea that everyone in the modern world has—or, should have—a nation, 
similarly to the pervasiveness of having a gender. To Anderson, this ‗universality‘ represents 
a socially constructed norm of modernity, an outcome of social contracts and agreements 
elevated onto the level of naturalness and universality; such claim goes along the lines of 
Hegel‘s observation about the states: ’once none had the state, then some had it, and, finally, 
all have it’ (in Gellner, 1983:5). 
 
Finally, there is the paradox of its political power. To Anderson, ‗unlike most ‗isms’ 
nationalism never really produced a durable intellectual fabric or grand thinkers: ‗no 
Tocquevilles, Hobbesses, Marxes or Webers‘, notes Anderson. Yet, there is a certain, 
powerful and resilient fanaticism that permeates the idea of nation, nationalism—ultimately, 
the idea of national identity as a grand ‗fraternity‘: 
 
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for 
so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings. (1983: 8) 
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Many modernist scholars who admit to Anderson‘s key thesis, the structured imagining of 
nationness, agree that it could only occur as a direct consequence of the process of 
urbanization and industrialization (Smith, 1986; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Greenfeld, 
1992), a historical period which peoples of Western Europe were experiencing steadily since 
the late 17th century. According to them, the reconfiguration of the division of labor in 
industrial environment and evolution of social relations during this period established new 
stratification of societies. Enter capitalism. This raised the need to devise a new, modern form 
of individual and collective identity. Official use and, more importantly, ability to print and 
read in vernacular, local language was yet another sign of a differing social reality, according 
to Anderson: 
 
The convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human 
language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its 
basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation. (1983:46) 
 
The age of modernization, industrialization and the subsequent transformation of social and 
economic relations offered an additional, linguistic framework to that new identity. Former 
ethnies became socially stratified in emerging industrial circumstances; their public 
interaction and discourse was vernacularized and hence, the new sense of belonging 
appeared. Mechanical solidarity was being diluted and absorbed through organic solidarity 
which was being formed around the emerging communities of interest and the division of 
labor. Nations thus came to life with the modernity and industrialization and modified the 
framework of existing state formations into the new concept of the nation-state. 
 
In a remark that complements Anderson‘s thesis on the efficacy of introduction of the 
vernacular in the public discourse of a social group as a shift towards sustaining new, national 
identity, Gellner notes that ‗the written word seems to enter the history with the accountant 
and the tax collector‘ (1983:8). Again, Gellner places an emphasis on the role of modern 
social relations, where the process of vernacularisation conducted by the state became a 
‗structural requirement‘ and thus an essential ingredient to the national identity. In the 
‗Warwick Debates on Nationalism‘ (1996), his account on the evolution of Estonian national 
identity is of particular relevance to this discussion:  
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I mean, take the Estonians. At the beginning of the nineteenth century they didn't 
even have a name for themselves. They were just referred to as people who lived on 
the land as opposed to German or Swedish burghers and aristocrats and Russian 
administrators. They had no ethnonym. They were just a category without any ethnic 
self-consciousness. Since then they've been brilliantly successful in creating a vibrant 
culture (…) but, it was created by the kind of modernist process which I then 
generalize for nationalism and nations in general. (1996:367-8) 
 
Undoubtedly, the rationalisation of the work of imagination in the context of nation-building 
is a phenomenon not to be neglected; such is the capacity of a populace to ‗dream‘ its 
nationness, according to Stathis Gourgouris (1996). The historical manifestation of the 
nation, Gourgouris notes, appears almost overnight, and it is evoked like a ‗perfectly 
transparent dream‘—a collective dream: 
 
Nations came into historical consciousness precisely by articulating their own self-
interpretation while relegating it to damned oblivion the historical time of their non-
existence. (…) Dream and nation are thus implicated in a paradoxical complicity of 
form, their antagonism over the significance of oblivion and interpretation being 
consubstantial with their structural affinity as social forces in human history. (1996:6-
7) 
 
Gourgouris‘ attention to the national dream in his thesis about ‗dream-nation‘ focuses on its 
operative force as a ‗social fantasy‘ in line with Anderson‘s concept of imagined community. 
According to the former, such social fantasy represents the national attempt to make the 
history ‗sensible‘; it is, therefore, a set of forces ‗that enable us to identify history‘. Such 
national dream, national fantasy ‗lies in ambush behind every historical inscription‘ (1996:5). 
 
A state ideology? 
 
During the last century, nationalism became the fundamental ideology of state-building in the 
modern Europe. It turned into a norm, a canon that was to be followed by all nations that 
aspired equal status in the continent. Regardless of varying stages of internal development, 
many European societies began importing and domesticating the nationalist ideology during a 
common period – between the 18th and 19th century – considering it as an essential ingredient 
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for construction of their modern nation-state. A new era was introduced in the history of 
European societies: that of nationalization of societies and peoples. Gellner, in his quotation 
of Hegel and his observation about the states which once no one had—and now everyone 
does, goes at the core of his thesis: that both nations and states are socially constructed 
phenomena that should be considered as ‗contingency‘ and not a ‗universal necessity‘. 
Nevertheless, they represent the key social and political norm of the contemporary world: 
‗having a nation (or a state) is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to 
appear as such‘. (1983:6) 
 
According to Greenfeld (1992), nationalism is not necessarily a form of ‗particularism‘, i.e. 
nationalism as a political ideology does not necessarily have to be identified with any 
particular community or to the object relevant to this paper – the struggle for self-
determination and statehood. Greenfeld notes that as such, nationalism doesn‘t necessarily 
need to refer to the state (or even statehood) either as a reality or as an aspiration: 
 
‗It has to do with the definition of the ultimate source of authority which does not 
have to belong to the state, as religious believers among us so well know, although it 
may be in part delegated to it. As a result, nations without states of their own are in 
no way abnormal or incomplete, and the one-to-one correspondence between the two, 
while a fact or desideratum in many cases is not at all of essence to nationalism.  
(1992: 494). 
 
Nevertheless, predominantly, the formation of an independent state for the nation lies at the 
heart of most of the nationalist ideologies of stateless nations/communities. According to 
Chaim Gans (2003), nationalist movements often explicitly vow for the right to self-
determination as they voice practical demands on behalf of national groups they claim to 
represent ‗in both public and private spheres‘. Regularly, such demands evolve into those for 
establishing an independent, nation state. 
 
Many national groups interpret their right to self-determination as a right to 
independent statehood, which they in turn interpret as a right to a state of their own, a 
state which ‗belongs‘ to their people. Many nation-states view themselves as 
belonging to their predominant national group. Some nation-states, such as Israel and 
46 
 
several of the new states that belonged to the former Yugoslavia, express this overtly 
in their constitution or by means of some other important laws (2003:67). 
 
Historically, not all societies who imported nationalism were admitted to the family of 
nations or nation-states. In most cases this is due to the historical inability to establish and 
sustain their own state formations. In the emerging map of the nationalist Europe of nation-
states by the late 19th century such societies were to be defined as national minorities or 
ethnic communities within the administrative boundaries of a state. Often, they considered 
themselves ‗nations without states‘ as described by Guibernau (1996) or proto-nations as 
described by T.H. Eriksen (1997): 
 
Proto-nations (so-called ethnonationalist movements). By definition these groups 
have political leaders who claim that they are entitled to their own nation state and 
should not be ‗ruled by others‘. These groups, short of having a nation state, may be 
said to have more substantial characteristics in common with nations than with either 
urban minorities or indigenous peoples. They are always territorially based; they are 
differentiated according to class and educational achievements, and they are a large 
group. (1997:40) 
 
This idea of stateless nationalism which, Greenfeld argues, should not be considered 
abnormal, is partially admitted also by Gellner, Smith and others. Although Gellner admits to 
the thesis that the fundamental drive of majority of nationalisms is based on the demand for a 
nation-state, the link between nationalism and the state is not necessarily historical but, 
rather, ideological. Here‘s one important point by Gellner: 
 
(Moreover) nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that 
they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and 
constitutes a tragedy. But before they could become intended for each other, each of 
them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and contingent. The state 
has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have certainly 
emerged without the blessings of their own state. (1983:6-7) 
 
Indeed, can there be a nation without a state? Can such stateless ethnic communities qualify 
for contemporary definition of the nation in line with Gellner‘s ‗structural requirements‘? 
Can there be nationalisms functioning within fluid boundaries of an ethnicity and that can 
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shape its substance into that of a nation without the presence or the need for the institution of 
the state? An interesting insight comes from Montserrat Guibernau: 
 
‗By ‗nations without states‘ I refer to those territorial communities with their own 
identity and a desire for self-determination included within the boundaries of one or 
more states, with which, by and large, they do not identify. In nations without states, 
the feeling of identity is generally based on their own common culture and history 
(which often goes back to a time prior to the foundation of the nation-state or, to 
employ (Anthony) Smith‘s theory, to its ethnic roots), the attachment to a particular 
territory and an explicit desire for self-determination. (…) A nation without state is 
defined by the lack of its own state and by an impossibility to act as a political 
institution on the international scene. It is based on the existence of a community with 
a stable but dynamic core containing a set of factors, which have generated the 
emergence of a specific identity. (1997:132) 
 
One of the most common forms of nationalism within stateless nations is to be found among 
national minorities. According to Brubaker (1996) they have their own nationalism; they, too, 
make claims on the grounds of their national belonging and, often, geographic 
autochtonousness. As he unfolds his concept of triadic nexus of nationalisms that links (a) 
national minorities, (b) the newly nationalizing states in which they reside and (c) the 
external national homelands, he devises the concept of the core nation as the ‗owner of the 
state‘ (1996:4-5). Such core-nation employs the state power to promote its specific political 
and ethno-cultural interests. Such interests are complementary to Gellner‘s ‗structural 
requirements‘ and manifest through Anderson‘s battle of prevalence of ‗vernaculars‘ as the 
future ‗languages of power‘. According to Brubaker, such interests can endanger the position 
and heritage of distinct national minorities, whose definition itself presumes the existence of 
an ethnic majority as the norm. Brubaker invokes this argument as he observes the reactions 
of members of former nations who fell under the jurisdiction of new nation-states, and ended 
up with the status of ethnic communities, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and Socialist Yugoslavia: 
 
Again, tens of millions of people became residents and citizens of new states 
conceived as 'belonging to' an ethnic nationality other than their own. Most 
dramatically, some 25 million ethnic Russians have been transformed, by a drastic 
shrinkage of political space, from privileged national group, culturally and politically 
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at home throughout the Soviet Union, into minorities of precarious status, disputed 
membership, and uncertain identity in a host of incipient non-Russian nation-states. 
But many other groups in the region—including large numbers of Hungarians, 
Albanians, Serbs, Turks, and Armenians—found themselves similarly 'mismatched,' 
attached by formal citizenship to one state (in most cases a new - and nationalizing – 
state)... (1996: 5-6) 
 
Historical events that unfolded with the breakup of the former Communist supra-national 
state formations account for increase of ethnic tensions (cases of pri-Baltic independent states 
of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia with Russian-speaking minorities) and even armed conflicts 
(state aggression in former Yugoslavia that evolved into ethnic wars: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Kosovo). I admit to Brubaker‘s thesis that rapid, indeed negative, shift of the 
political status of communities from nations to national minorities can almost regularly make 
the ethnic nationalism (re)appear as an externally imposed political ideology. A significant 
number of them continue to be based on separatist platforms as revealed in the cases of 
regions of Republika Srpska in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Abkhazia in Georgia, Transdnistria in 
Moldova, Chechnya in Russian Federation2, etc. 
 
Often, it can mean a new importation of nationalism as a foreign (read: Western) doctrine. I 
will admit here to Greenfeld‘s concept of importability of nationalist ideology as a necessary 
nation-building platform which is valuable in the context of political developments in the 
south-western Balkans during the breakup of Yugoslavia: 
 
As the sphere of influence of the core Western societies (which defined themselves as 
nations) expanded, societies belonging or seeking entry to the supra-societal systems 
of which the West was the center had in fact no choice – but to become nations. The 
development of national identities thus was essentially an international process, 
whose sources in every case but the first lay outside of the evolving nation.‘ 
(1992:15). 
                                                 
2 For a detailed account, see Bahcheli, Bartman, Srebrnik in ‗De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty‘, 2004.  
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Chapter 3. 
 
Nationalism, the Albanian way 
 
In this section I will introduce the category of Albanian nationalism—specifically, its 
manifestation among Kosovo Albanians—with the aim of enhancing the framework of this 
theoretical discussion on nationalism. Through a brief presentation of its history and 
evolution I will try to form a theoretical framework through juxtaposing and confronting 
some of the models and theories of nationalism onto the historical background of Kosovo 
Albanian narrative about their national history, and their national ideology. 
 
I find the discussion and definition of the Albanian nationalism—and, specifically, its 
Kosovo Albanian ‗peripheral‘ variation—important to the overall aim of the research which 
focuses on the transformative capacity of ethnonationalist narrative due to external, 
discursive and epistemological influences in various historical periods. I argue that, despite 
the fact that the Albanian nationalist narrative is represented as entirely based on the 
primordialist/ethnic approach, its evolution—particularly in the context of Kosovo 
Albanians—demonstrates the power of the narrative to inflict substantial changes in the ways 
in which the nation‘s ‗primordiality‘ is reinvented, revised and—reformed. Therefore, in this 
respect the notion of ‗perennialist nationalism‘ (Smith, 1984) comes useful as it offers a ‗less 
radical version of primordialism‘ (Ozkirimli, 2000:68) as discussed in the earlier chapter—
and which holds that nations do evolve and develop over the centuries ‗with their intrinsic 
characteristics largely unchanged‘ (ibid). 
 
In the context of Albanians, those in Kosovo as well as others in the present state of Albania, 
western Macedonia or south Montenegro, the nationalist narrative accounts for a historically 
distinct ethnicity, an ethnie, in every stage of the Balkans history of conquests and continuous 
shifts of political rule. As it will be discussed at greater length in the following chapters of 
this research, they were ‗Arnauts‘ under the Ottoman Empire; they were ‗Shiptars‘, 
‗Moslems‘ or even ‗Turks‘ (Malcolm, 1998, Vickers, 2000) during subsequent 
territorial/geopolitical partition in the first decade of the 20th century, which produced the 
present state of Albania and brought Kosovo and its Albanian population under the 
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Serbian/Yugoslav rule. In the context of the latter, the ethnonationalist narrative and history 
appears intertwined with attempts for organising rebellions and insurgencies against a rule 
that was considered foreign and oppressive. I would argue here that, at least during the past 
hundred years, Albanians of Kosovo would formally share Gellner‘s primary preconditions of 
the ‘idea of the nation‘: 
 
(a) two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where 
culture means a system of ideas and signs and ways of behaving and communicating 
(b) two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognise each other as belonging 
to the same nation. In other words, nation maketh man… (1983:6-7) 
 
On the surface, it appears that Gellner‘s set of preconditions would suffice to define Kosovo 
Albanians as a nation even in the context of the modern connotation of the term. But, did they 
also represent a community of opinion in Greenfeld‘s terms, or community of solidarity in 
Renan‘s terms? Moreover, did the Albanian variation of ethnonationalism during the past 
century slipped from being narrated as strictly ‗primordialist‘, ‗natural‘ and ‗naturally 
given‘—to what Smith (1984) defines as ‗perennialist‘ and which, according to him, enables 
to concede the antiquity of ethnic and national ties without holding that they are ‗natural‘? 
Indeed, what was the nature of (Kosovo) Albanians‘ national identity? Was it based on 
adherence to a set of political principles (self-determination, national liberty, statehood), or 
was it a repression-triggered mobilisation for preservation of its distinct, culture, language 
and tradition? Or, again, both? 
 
As mentioned in earlier chapter and the theoretical debate about the origin of nations and 
nationalism, I adhere to the view that the ‗perennialist‘ approach attempts to combine the 
two—often diametrically opposed—views about the origin and the manifestation of 
nationalism, such as the essentialist/primordialist and constructivist/modernist. Therefore, in 
the context of this analysis of the Albanian nationalist narrative, the perennialist approach 
appears as the most suitable conceptual umbrella that would reconcile the ethnonationalist 
approach about the nation as existing since ‗time immemorial‘ and, simultaneously, able to 
change and transform through the centuries—while retaining its ethnocentric perspective. 
In this respect, Smith argues that one of the core ideas of perennialism maintains that 
‗modern nations are the lineal descendants of their medieval counterparts (1995:53). 
Ozkirimli notes that, according to such a view ‗we might come across nations in the Middle 
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Ages, even in the antiquity‘ (2000:69); the perennialists, Ozkirimli argues, concede that 
nations may experience periods of recess or decadence in the course of their historical 
journey; but ‗bad fortune cannot destroy the ‗national essence‘. (ibid). 
 
In this context, and with the aim of providing a local example in this theoretical exercise 
about the variation of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, I will refer to few essays written by 
Gani Bobi, a Kosovo Albanian sociologist (1940-1996), written during the 1990s, and his 
views on the Albanian ‗lifeworld‘ in the 1990s (term employed here comes from the 
definition by Edmund Husserl (1936). According to Bobi, it was characterized by the ‗lack of 
rationalisation‘ in several essential segments: 
 
(a) cultural reproduction (there are no reflexive and distinct relations with respect to 
cultural heritage and tradition); 
(b) social integration (symbols of collective identity are not yet in place; civic culture is 
not internalised; there is an absence of sufficient orientation in accordance to 
universal norms; 
(c) socialization (there is no attention given to the aspect of individualization) (1994:7) 
 
I would argue that to Kosovo Albanians, situated in the south-western Balkans—itself a 
peripheral region to the European developments of the 18th century—the constitutive 
components to the concept of civic/political nation operated by Greenfeld and other 
modernist theorists of nationalism, were distant. Until the beginning of the 20 th century social 
relations in Balkans societies were still dwelling within feudal/agrarian system. In the words 
of the French social geographer Michel Roux, who produced one of the few serious studies 
on Kosovo, it was the ‗Third World within Europe‘, a ‘veritable périphérie de la périphérie’ 
(Roux, 1992:238 in Duijzings, 1999:5). The official language in use, that of Gellner‘s 
‗accountants and tax collectors‘, was the language of the Ottoman Empire (from 15th to 20th 
century), that of the Serbian Kingdom (from 1900-1945), the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia (from 1945-1991) or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (from 1992-1999). 
Throughout this period, and specifically under the former Yugoslav rule, the Kosovo 
Albanians were defined through the notion of a ‗national minority‘, as explained by Brubaker 
(1996): 
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Caught between two mutually antagonistic nationalisms—those of the nationalizing 
states in which they live and those of the external national homelands to which they 
belong by ethnonational affinity though not by legal citizenship—are the national 
minorities. They have their own nationalism: they too make claims on the grounds of 
their nationality. 'Indeed it is such claims that make them a national minority (1996:5) 
 
Brubaker invokes the examples of the tens of millions of people across the East Central 
Europe who were left to dwell within the newly formed nation-states in the aftermath of the 
World War I. As in the case of Kosovo Albanians, such ethnic groups—indeed, national 
minorities—gained the new citizenship within the new states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria), but by ethnic nationality they perceived themselves 
as part of external, national homelands. 
 
Throughout the 20th century, Albanian national identity in Kosovo is thought to have been 
constructed in opposition to the other, adverse ethnic groups or nations, which in this 
particular study focuses on the Serbian nation and state as a generalized bearer of 
administrative/political state repression. However, according to a number of historians such 
as Malcolm (1998), Vickers (1998) and anthropologists (Duijzings, 1999) this was not always 
the case; historically, identities in Kosovo appear to have been of a quite fluid nature and 
manifestation, as noted in Duijzings: 
 
People have often changed their ethnic identity or converted to another religion 
without completely abandoning and forgetting the legacy of previous identities. 
Because of these historical experiences of conversion and ‗mimicry‘ (the outward 
adoption of an identity for the sake of survival), and the consciousness of mixed and 
composite origins, there is often a high awareness among Balkan inhabitants that 
most identities should not be taken for granted: they are often regarded as ‗guises‘ or 
‗constructs‘ that may be accepted or rejected. The phenomenon of contesting the 
identities of others is widespread, and is even part of the political game. Kosovo is 
just an example of this phenomenon. (1999:15) 
 
The elasticity of ethnic identity is confirmed by a historical fact that there are no accounts of 
conflicts between Albanian and Serbian ethnic groups during the rule of the Ottoman Empire; 
ethnic conflicts appeared with the dissolution of this empire and enlargement of new nation-
states during the early 20th century. The immediate post-Ottoman environment of Kosovo 
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(and Albania proper) is effectively described by Arber Xhaferi (1996), an Albanian writer 
and politician from Macedonia: 
 
Left without a system, and in the absence of other subsystems, divided into three 
religions, two language dialects, without unified linguistic, cultural, judicial norms, 
without local institutions, without its bourgeoisie and elite, without industry and 
financial capital, without an external sponsor, without distinct civic codes or unified 
national codes, they, Albanians, were destined for extinction. (1996:65) 
 
Therefore, in the western-European context of the debate on nations and nationalisms the 
emergence of Kosovo Albanian nationalism—or, for that matter, of the Albanian nationalism 
in general—represents an occurrence of a slightly later form. As such, it also accounts for a 
different evolution than that of nations and nationalisms of the Western Europe from the early 
industrialist period. It bears some similarities with a number of nationalist movements in 
Europe although the circumstances in which it developed makes it unique in both its 
aspiration and manifestation. As for its typology with respect to contemporary theories I 
would admit to the view that Kosovo Albanian nationalist idea evolved from starting as an 
attempt for equal treatment by the core-nation of the state/kingdom (Brubaker, 1996:5) to 
becoming separatist-irredentist and finally peripheral—as explored later in this research—
employing here with slight modifications terms used by Michael Hechter (2000): 
 
Irredentist nationalism occurs with the attempt to extend the existing boundaries of a 
state by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-
nationals. 
 
Peripheral nationalism occurs when a culturally distinctive territory resists 
incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own 
government. Often this type of nationalism is spurred by the very efforts of state-
building nationalism. (2000:15) 
 
Here‘s what I mean by separatist-irredentist: considering themselves as a population 
forcefully separated from the mother country (Albania, bordering Kosovo in the west) after 
the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, Albanians in Kosovo developed an aspiration for 
joining ‗the Motherland‘, the unified state of Albania. One could argue that historically they 
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never admitted to their official definition as an ethnic community—or, of the national 
minority—by the core-nation of the new state, the Kingdom of Serbia/Yugoslavia. The 
memory of partition from what was becoming the Kingdom of Albania (1912) conserved also 
the perception of themselves as a nation; more precisely, as its amputated part. Such 
perceptions were indeed labelled ‗irredentist‘ by the ruling regimes, particularly in the 
aftermath of the WWII, by the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia—a topic that will be 
examined at greater length in the next chapters of this study. 
 
Below I will invoke an interesting observation by Billig (1995) who questions the construct 
of the notion of ‗nationalism‘ in its western context which, according to him, tends to locate it 
into social and political ‗periphery‘: 
 
There is something misleading about this accepted use of the word ‗nationalism‘. It 
always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery. Separatists are often to be found 
in the outer regions of states; the extremists lurk on the margins of political life in 
established democracies, usually shunned by the sensible politicians of the centre. 
The guerrilla figures, seeking to establish their new homelands, operate in conditions 
where existing structures of state have collapsed, typically at a distance from the 
established centres of the West. From the perspective of Paris, peripherally placed on 
the edge of Europe. All these factors combine to make nationalism not merely an 
exotic force, but a peripheral one. (1995:5) 
 
Here, one would be tempted to start a debate on whether the nationalist movements and 
ideologies of the contemporary Europe are—indeed—the mere leftovers from the treaties and 
settlements that produced the ‗modern‘ European nations, and subsequently relinquished its 
‗periphery‘ (the Balkans and the Southeast Europe) to deal with their consequences. As 
mentioned earlier, Brubaker draws a long list comprised of ‗tens of millions‘ of peoples who 
‗suddenly‘ became national minorities across the region – from Germans in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, Hungarians in Romania, to Albanians in Yugoslavia. Their definition as 
‗peripheral‘ and the influence of such a projection in the development and transformation of 
the ideological fabric of their nationalism will be the focus of the next chapters of this 
research; there, I examine the western discursive hegemony that led to such transformation in 
of the Albanian ethnonationalism in both Albania (prior to the World War I) and Kosovo 
(during the Yugoslav rule). 
55 
 
 
But let us return to the theoretical debate about the relation between the Hechter‘s definition 
of ‗peripheral‘ and ‗irredentist‘ nationalism and its Kosovo Albanian manifestation. I would 
agree that it bears some elements of Hechter‘s model; yet, one should note that his model 
places the center of irredentist nationalism in the already existing state formation: in this 
case, the Republic of Albania, the assumed mother-country. In other terms, the already 
existing state is the subject of the irredentist nationalism whereas the territory which it claims 
represents the object. In this respect the case of Kosovo Albanian nationalism represents a 
somewhat unique situation of irredentism, for it is exposed simultaneously as both its subject 
and its object. In simpler terms, it was Kosovo Albanians who introduced the aspiration to 
rejoin the mother-country (through separatism), and it was them who demanded this to be 
accomplished by the mother-country. They expected a response by the mother country similar 
to what Brubaker (1995) calls ‗actions of an external national homeland‘: 
 
(External) homeland nationalisms assert states' right—indeed their obligation—to 
monitor the condition, (…) assert the rights, and protect the interests of 'their ' 
ethnonational kin in other states. Such claims are typically made when the 
ethnonational kin in question are seen as threatened by the nationalizing (and thereby, 
from the point of view of the ethnonational kin, de-nationalizing) policies and 
practices of the state in which they live. (…) (External) 'homeland' state claims that 
their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis ethnonational kin transcend the boundaries 
of territory and citizenship. 'Homeland,' in this sense, is a political, not an 
ethnographic category (1995:5) 
 
Hechter‘s definition of irredentism may fall short to explain a complex situation of Kosovo 
Albanian nationalism; nevertheless, his concept of the peripheral type could be employed as 
a prescription as to what follows with the failure of the former. For a number of reasons that 
will be analysed in the course of the study, the failure of Kosovo Albanian irredentist 
nationalism to trigger a complementary action by their external homeland forced them to 
embrace the peripheral type of nationalism – hence, their demand for self-determination. It is 
a situation well explained in Brubaker: 
 
Although national minority and homeland nationalisms both define themselves in 
opposition to the 'nationalizing' nationalisms of the state in which the minorities live, 
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they are not necessarily harmoniously aligned. Divergence is especially likely when 
homeland nationalisms are strategically adopted by the homeland state as a means of 
advancing other, non-nationalist political goals; in this case ethnic co-nationals 
abroad may be precipitously abandoned when, for example, geopolitical goals require 
this (1996:5) 
 
Ultimately, this appears to have been the case with the Kosovo Albanian nationalism. 
Brubaker‘s ‗geopolitical goals‘ indeed required Albania, as the external homeland, to ignore 
the separatist /irredentist outcry of the part of its fellow nationals in Kosovo. Such 
geopolitical constraints are a matter of ongoing debate in Albanian political discourse, as 
noted by Bugajsky (2005): 
 
Kosovarism as Albanianism could clearly be perceived as a major threat by 
neighbouring groups whatever the reality of popular aspirations. It can be viewed as 
an encouragement for expansionism and the goal of a ‗Greater‘ or ‗Ethnic Albania‘. It 
may thereby promote tension and conflict, as the Kosovars will stand accused of 
seeking absorption into a larger Albanian state once they attain full independence, 
and (Albanian capital) Tirana would also come under intense international pressure. 
(2005: 40) 
 
Such rigid geopolitical restrictions—the ‗international pressure‘ as noted by Bugajsky—
haunted the Kosovo Albanian nationalist elites throughout the period preceding the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia as well as its aftermath. In this study, I argue that the impact of 
such pressure induced fundamental modifications of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist 
narrative which transformed their political ideology from the (initial) irredentist model to the 
so-called independentist—a topic that will be analysed at length in the chapter 7. Such 
transformation entailed also the fundamental change in their definition as peripheral; their 
demands for self-determination produced the sense of self-centered and self-sufficient 
nationalist discourse as their major demand focused on the formation of an independent 
nation-state along the lines of its definition by Hastings (1997): 
 
A nation-state is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose 
people are not seen simply as 'subjects' of the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded 
society to whom the state in a sense belongs. (1997:4) 
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The new situation deployed a new ideological argument and, subsequently, a general shift 
into a new discursive formation, that of self-determination and independence, pursued and 
interpreted as an unalienable right of the (Albanian) people of Kosovo. 
 
To put it in simpler, chronological, terms: what was potentially started as an organised 
demand of an ethnie for improvement of its status at the demise of a multi-ethnic state was 
forcefully ushered into acceptance modernist, geopolitically conditioned, principles of civic 
nation-building. Therefore, in many respects, the modern elements of the Kosovo Albanian 
nationalist movement from the 1990s, particularly their demand for self-determination and 
independence should be viewed as an outcome of a historical accident, a social 
contingency—to paraphrase Gellner—an unanticipated, perhaps even unwanted, result and 
action. 
 
Such ideological evolution is discussed in the next chapters, where I examine the influence 
and effects of the transformation of the ethno-nationalist narrative with the aim of producing 
a political platform that would be acceptable and complementary with the assumed 
‗international norms‘ of civility and political action. In other words, what started as a 
‗unification nationalism‘ (Hechter, 2000) at the outset of the 20th century evolved into a 
‗peripheral nationalism‘ (ibid) by its end. In my analysis in the following chapters, I argue 
that such paradigmatic, discursive—indeed, epistemological—shift of the nationalist 
narrative and political strategy of action was driven by the commonly shared aim of the 
Kosovo Albanian political elites to introduce and apply an ‗internationally acceptable‘ form 
of nationalist/political organising. And, as I will argue in the following chapters, the 
local/Albanian interpretation of the term ‗international‘ has been regularly—indeed, 
historically—reduced to that of ‗western world‘ and/or ‗western governments‘. In the 
Kosovo/Albanian nationalist discourse the latter were adopted as the cultural references to the 
realm of civilised and advanced societies; therefore, an acceptable form of (ethno)nationalism 
that would not collide with western geopolitical interests in the region (such as the 
‗unification nationalism‘ through the change of administrative state-borders) would achieve a 
two-fold aim: a political safe haven for an oppressed ethnic community, as well as a dignified 
place for it among the western ‗community of nations‘. 
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It is precisely in this context that Greenfeld places an emphasis at her definition of the point 
of departure of the nation and nationalism as ‗a matter of dignity‘. In her analysis on the birth 
of nations in the XVIII century western Europe, which she ironically generalizes as outcomes 
of individual and group ‗vanity‘, she makes the important point of nationalization as a future 
social norm, a canon which spread through imitation and importation throughout western and 
eastern Europe. 
 
‗It guaranteed status and gave people reasons to be proud. Being a representation of 
identity, it is a social convention, socially constructed in its every element, and easily 
deconstructs if the convention is broken. (…) Within a nation, status (and, with it, the 
sense of pride and self-respect) can never be totally lost.‘ (1992:487) 
 
However, in practical terms, for a nationalist ideology to be successful – i.e. to achieve 
establishment of the nation-state, its ultimate goal – a community is bound to choose a model 
from an abundance of examples in the ever-nationalizing world. It has to find a role-model 
that would best suit its needs and circumstances – a ‗reference society‘ as defined by Bendict 
(1978, in Greenfeld, 1992). In the case of Kosovo Albanian nationalism such an act of 
selection of the reference society was a matter of vivid public debate throughout the decade 
of 1990s. This perpetual quest was caused by highly unstable and ever-changing political 
constellations among communities during the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation and 
often manifested periods of its serious crisis of identity as a political platform and a 
mobilising social practice. 
 
On this identity crisis of nationalism Greenfeld employs Durkheim‘s term of ‗anomie3‘ in a 
community—a state of ‗normlessness‘ and/or ‗aimlessness‘. Caused by various agents, 
situations and circumstances this anomie of nationalism would profoundly change its very 
character. The continuous quest for individual and collective identity would push the actors 
of a nation to reinterpret their aspirations, frustrations and interests in terms of indigenous 
traditions which might have existed in the previously dominant system of ideas/values in 
which now-rejected traditional identity was embedded. This is where Aleksic (2006) 
introduces the term mythistory in the attempts to define the Balkans variations of nationalist 
                                                 
3 I will use this concept in the context defined by Emile Durkheim in the ‗The Division of Labor in the Society‘, The Free Press, 
Macmillan, New York. 
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narratives: according to her, in the context of the Balkans the mythistory represents a 
combined narrative of nation in which the national mythologies and historical events are 
intertwined; they cohabitate, they construct and reconstruct one-another and, thus, produce 
different projections of identity during different time periods. To Aleksic, mythistory ‗is 
based on the impossibility of delineating a clear-cut distinction between the historical as 
opposed to mythological origins of nation‘ (2007:3). Such a mythistorical approach to the 
narrative of the nation has been common within the Kosovo Albanian nationalist discourse, 
as noted by Pula: 
 
This new ethnic confrontation, convergent with the all-national movement for 
independent Kosovo, gave new energy to Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. Other 
than mobilising the people, this conflict mobilised the history as well. Memories of 
‗eternal‘ conflicts between Serbs and Albanians were extracted from history‘s 
treasury whereas Albanian historians were attempting to raise the historical counter-
argument for ‗Albanianness of Kosovo, a thesis that would confront the Serbian 
nationalism based on the myth of Kosovo as the ‗cradle of Serbianness‘. (2005:32) 
 
In the context of such post-conflict crisis of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, Bugajsky (2005) 
places a rhetorical question about its current identity as he draws upon concepts in favour of 
independent state (i.e. a distinct nation-state) and those in favour of joining the ‗motherland‘, 
Albania: 
 
Kosovar identity is based on a long shared history of indigenous community as well 
as resistance to foreign occupation. Indeed, the sense of the community was 
strengthened during the existence of Yugoslavia, particularly as a result of the racism 
and brutality of the Milosevic regime. But, is this experience sufficient in forging a 
distinct national identity or will Kosovars inevitably drift and merge with Albania? 
(2005: 39) 
 
Independentism or irredentism? The independent state of Kosovo or the Great Albania? 
Regardless of fundamentally different social and political circumstances during the past two 
decades which caused this dilemma and anomie, it continues to permeate the nationalist 
discourse in Kosovo Albanian community and comprises the core of its dichotomous nature. 
In the chapter that deals with the construction of Kosovo Albanian ‗orientalist 
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ethnonationalist‘ narrative, I examine the discursive technologies that bridged this difficult 
ideological and programmatic gap of their political platform. As mentioned earlier, during the 
1990s its genuinely irredentist nature had to be redefined and reshaped into a struggle for 
independence and self-determination: I argue that such transformation was made possible 
through domesticating of what were considered to be the ultimate conditions laid out by the 
international community to accept a political solution within the existing, internationally 
recognised, state borders (Clark, 2000; Judah, 2008). 
 
In such circumstances, I argue, the Kosovo Albanian nationalist discourse engaged on 
mythistorical narration of the nation—or, what Aleksic calls, ‗the Janus-faced discourse of 
the nation‘ (2007:4)—which ambivalence enabled for the ethnic mythology based on 
autochtonousness, origin, language and culture to be presented as a set of civic principles in 
line with the norms of existing Western nationalisms which, allegedly, produced liberal 
democracies of today. I argue that it represented a very difficult task for a society which 
lacked adequate civic social stratification and was surviving under immense state repression 
and geopolitical constraints. This situation introduced a period of ideological frustration of 
Kosovo Albanian nationalism which is important from the historical perspective and goes in 
line with another point made by Greenfeld as she describes the nature of nationalism as both 
socially constructed and importable ideology: that of the state of ressentiment, a phrase she 
uses drawing upon definitions by Max Scheler and Nietzsche: 
 
ressentiment refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy 
and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings. (…) 
The first condition (the structural basis of the envy itself) is the fundamental 
comparability between the subject and the object of envy, or rather the belief on the 
part of the subject in the fundamental equality between them, which makes them in 
principle interchangeable. The second is the actual inequality (perceived as not 
fundamental) of such dimensions that it rules out practical achievement of the 
theoretically existing equality.‘ (1992:15)  
 
According to Greenfeld, the structural conditions—the sociological basis—for the 
manifestation of ressentiment are two-fold: the first condition is the capacity by the subject to 
perceive its object of envy as equal, a situation that makes them ‗interchangeable‘. The 
second condition is the actual inequality that, again, rules out the theoretically existing 
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equality and becomes the cause for the (collective) expression of the feeling of envy and 
bitterness: 
 
Ressentiment felt by the groups that imported the idea of the nation and articulated 
the national consciousness of their respective societies usually resulted in the 
selection out of their own indigenous traditions of elements hostile to the original 
national principle and in their deliberate cultivation (1992:16) 
 
In simpler terms, and in the context of Kosovo Albanian political struggle for self-
determination, such a feeling of ressentiment has been often addressed to their projection of 
the international community and the western (European) political authorities. Whereas this 
topic will be discussed at greater length in Chapters 6 and 7, I argue that it is important to 
note that the nationalist narrative of ressentiment with the ‗world‘ has been almost regularly 
related with the failure to achieve the western acceptance and legitimacy; specifically, the 
aftermath of the process of transformation of the nature and content of the Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse—from irredentist (deemed unrealistic) to independentist (deemed 
rational)—represented a period of heightened ressentiment in the community. As noted by 
Greenfeld, the manifestation of ressentiment is similar to that of anomie; in case of Kosovo 
Albanians, I argue, it was directed against the indifference of the international community 
and its indifference towards such an ideological sacrifice aimed at its appeasement and 
support. Whether in particular cases of such ‗ideological envy‘—e.g. envy at the reunification 
of Germany in 1989, at the independence of pri-Baltic states from Soviet rule in 1990s, the 
recognition of independence of former-Yugoslav republics (1991-1992) and so forth—the 
feeling of ressentiment emerged as a confused quest to resemble or, indeed, reject particular 
models of successful nationalisms in the world. One should also view this ressentiment-
nationalism as an important agent that has caused shifts and ruptures in discursive practice in 
Kosovo Albanian public ever since. Here is an interesting, simplified, point made by Mehmet 
Kraja (2005), a Kosovo Albanian writer and journalist, as he highlights the feeling of 
ressentiment and the social state of anomie: 
 
To be perfectly clear: we demand and aspire for Kosovo to become a state; the 
international community that assisted us to reach this point hesitates to recognise this 
natural right because of the scarecrow called Great Albania that, once achieved, could 
endanger the geopolitical balance. On the other hand, it appears clearly that we are 
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incapable of achieving on our own what we aspire. What is to be done? We must 
eliminate the preconception of the Great Albania from the minds of Western 
diplomats and documents. How can this be done? By convincing ourselves and others 
that we not only reject the Great Albania, but that we are different (from Albanians in 
Albania), that we have a different identity and that this identity is the best assurance 
that once Kosovo becomes independent, it will not join Albania. (2005, 289). 
 
This perpetual quest for an acceptable nationalism, i.e. acceptable to the Western 
governments as the source of international legitimation, is well-explained by Greenfeld when 
she notes that, historically, the sources of importation of nationalism were always ‗to the 
west’ of the importers. And, what is even more important, they were invariably defined as 
parts of the ‗symbolic West‘. To Greenfeld, Western-modelled nationalism is of primarily 
civic nature and never ethnic-based. From here, she points out the need for Eastern European 
nationalisms ‗to exchange their ethnic nationalisms for those characteristic of some Western 
European nations‘ (1992:33-34). 
 
In the next chapters, I argue that this rejection/acceptance syndrome remained one of the key 
issues that affected fundamentally the manifestation of Kosovo Albanian nationalism and 
performance of its political movement; through importation and domestication of the 
discursive practice of ‗democracy‘ and ‗non-violent resistance‘ the Kosovo Albanian 
nationalist elites struggled to gain international acceptance and legitimacy. Almost overnight, 
I argue, the great epistemological shift occurred within the Kosovo Albanian nationalist 
elites, poised to represent their political cause as complementary with the international norms 
of political action and thus disassociate their nationalist ideology from its definition as an 
‗ethnic‘ variant of nationalism. Here‘s an observation by Greenfeld on the ‗non-westerness‘ 
of such nationalism: 
 
Ethnic nationalisms developed as variants of an explicitly anti-Western ideology. 
Societies which imported national ideas from elsewhere - whether they defined 
themselves as nations early or late, but which did not at the moment of the adoption 
of national identity believe themselves to be inferior to their models - tended to define 
themselves in civic terms. In such cases, the record of their achievement provided 
them with sufficient reasons for national pride, and they had no need to resort to the 
claim that their superiority was inherent (in their blood, soul, soil, unadulterated 
language, or whatnot). (1992:33) 
63 
 
 
At a later stage I will examine aspects of the discursive technology that was used by 
interpreters of the ‗national cause‘ and the nationalism as ideology of choice; I will argue that 
it was based on the reification of the idea of the community through the public discourse and 
practice, in this case the notion of ‗Albanianism‘ as a supra-ethnic and—more importantly—a 
supra-religious narrative of sociopolitical mobilisation. Also, in the chapters that discuss the 
attempts of Kosovo Albanian nationalist elites to transform its narrative into an 
‗internationally acceptable‘ form (Chapter 7), I analyse the social and historical conditions 
that led them to the formation of linkage between the concept of ‗democracy‘, 
‗independence‘ and ‗nation-state‘. 
 
In the context of this theoretical debate, many scholars of nationalism indirectly admit to such 
claim. Often, nationalism is seen as a product of efforts to advance individual and group 
identity in the face of social changes of the modern world; a means to secure one‘s status and 
protect the dignity from ‗total social degradation‘, as noted by Greenfeld; an attempt to locate 
the sovereignty within the people and the recognition of the fundamental equality among its 
various strata – ‗the very tenets of democracy‘: 
 
Democracy was born with the sense of nationality. The two are inherently linked and 
neither can be fully understood apart from this connection. (…) Nationalism was the 
form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as 
a butterfly in a cocoon. Originally, nationalism developed as democracy; where the 
conditions of such original development persisted, the identity between the two was 
maintained.‘ (1992:10-11). 
 
Indeed, the (re)birth of the nationalist movement in Kosovo during the late 1980s and 
throughout 1990s should be interpreted as indivisive from the internalised concept of 
democracy as an ideological novelty of the decade. Its core message was the demand for 
democracy which was seen as both internal and external process; it was an appeal for 
establishing democratic norms of behaviour within the nation and between nations residing in 
an unstable federal state. 
 
However, in the case of Kosovo Albanian political movement the perception of nationalism 
evolved into predominantly ethnic and particularist form. I argue that this feature reduced its 
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discourse on democracy into a discourse on internal, ethnic hierarchy. Attempts to enforce 
such particularist variation of nationalism to converge with the principles of civic democracy 
ushered their political leadership into introducing a dualist representation of itself: external 
and internal. By external representation I have in mind the logic of discursive construction of 
itself as complementary to ‗geopolitical‘ requirements of the international, Western public 
(media, governments), whereas by internal representation I place an emphasis on its actual 
performance inside Kosovo Albanian society: its discursive practice, the impact it had on 
power-relations in the community and the construction of social hierarchies. 
 
Externally, (in line with Brubaker‘s geopolitical requirements) the national/political 
movement was introducing itself as a civic-based concept that was aiming establishment of 
democratic values in the society; a legitimate struggle for self-determination in line with 
principles of peaceful resistance, civic disobedience and demands for political liberties. 
Internally, it was ran on unitarist and particularist concepts designed by those who claimed 
competency over their interpretation and who engaged in designing of a new, different 
environment of power-relations in the community through employment of ethno-cultural 
myths and the authoritarian cult of national leader, in line with Greenfeld‘s explanation: 
 
‗Such national principle is collectivistic; it reflects the collective being. Collectivistic 
ideologies are inherently authoritarian for, when the collectivity is seen in unitary 
terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a single 
will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter.‘ (1992:12) 
 
In the case of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, such dichotomic attempt to (a) enforce national 
cohesiveness through authoritarianism and, at the same time (b) formally represent it as a 
democratic movement based on respect of diversities, peaceful resistance and adherence to 
democratic principles, gave birth to a genuine state of the community, the so-called parallel 
society, a parallel social system4. A socially constructed feature in its every element, this 
parallel society was based on the collective capacity to imagine and imitate the existence of 
institutional framework of the aspired nation-state, an act seen as necessary for the 
                                                 
4 The state of Kosovo‘s ‗parallel society‘ during the decade of 1990s comprises a separate, yet brief, section in the research chapters 
of this study. It  is examined in the context of the analysis of technology of construction of parallel discursive and institutional 
practices in Kosovo Albanian society—as a performance-based political action aimed at disassociation from the dependency to the 
Serbia‘s hegemonic rule, and at construction of the projection of a modern ‗democratic‘ type of political resistance.  
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enforcement of the idea of Kosovo as a de facto state, and of its Albanians population as 
inherently a nation-building one. In the light of this debate, in the following chapters I argue 
that it represented a certain discursive practice of reinventing and modernizing the concept of 
a nation in the form of an advanced, developing ethnie. The exclusive profile of its ethnic 
nationalism was employed for reconfiguration of relations of power in the community and for 
sustaining a social hierarchy. And, as the latter became a social and political norm, it 
appeared that—at least symbolically—the birth of democracy from the spirit of reformed 
ethnic nationalism was almost possible for Kosovo Albanian parallel society during the 
1990s, as they were switching from the unificationist/irredentist ideological narrative to that 
of peripheral/independentist. Its parallel ‗independent‘ state was to rest on effortless, formal 
modification of imported concepts of civic nationalism and democracy. It was yet another 
‗reign of words‘—to paraphrase Dimitrijevic‘s (2000) critique of Yugoslav system—which 
served the ends of political propaganda that projected an external image of Kosovo Albanians 
as dignified victims. 
 
In such parallel society—indeed, an underworld of makeshift parallel schools, hospitals, 
government, media, parties and NGOs—Kosovo Albanians managed to construct a new 
dimension of their political being. Being insignificant in its external impact to the repressive 
reality and state-conducted apartheid policies, such parallel society was allowed to indulge in 
devising its own, authentic perception of nation-building and democracy. Yet, in order to 
achieve this it was necessary to implement a radical ideological shift. 
 
I will make a digression here by recalling that the aspiration for democracy as an ideological 
deliverance from totalitarianism in the early 1990s appeared parallely with the attempts for 
re-nationalization of communities across Eastern Europe and the western Balkans at the 
demise of the Cold War and Warsaw Pact. By all means, democracy was an ideological 
novelty of the upcoming decade for communities which dwelling for half a century under the 
Communist rule in which nationness was either suppressed or remained inferior to the formal 
doctrine of ‗dictatorship of proletariat‘. Therefore, the introduction of the notion of western 
democracy in the context of Kosovo Albanian political struggle came as an ultimate 
ideological opposition to the previous, irredentist, practice. This was the point where the 
radical ideological shift had to occur (see Chapter 7)—shifts which explain the manner in 
which the ‗independentist‘ discourse and respective communicative strategies were employed 
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and enforced through the guiding principle of compliance with the perceived 
international/western views about acceptable forms of nationalist/political organising. I argue 
that such a swift—by all means, sudden—shift caused irreversible reconfiguration of power-
schemes in the Kosovo Albanian community and the redefinition of its national political 
strategy. In other words, what was until 1990 understood as illegal Kosovo Marxist-Leninist 
underground struggle for unification with the Communist Albania evolved almost overnight 
into a popular movement for democracy, statehood, free-market and capitalist economy. 
 
Now let us go back to the dualist performance of the parallel society, externally seen as a 
democratic mobilisation of an excluded community and internally ran on authoritarian 
hierarchy. I argue here that the reasoning behind this popular constructionist operation was 
based on a tactical political point; imagination and imitation of the state was entirely about 
projecting a sense of political maturity of the community and of its national leadership to the 
imagined West, in Greenfeld‘s terms. Among others, the future state had to be imagined as 
embracing and manifesting its essential prerequisites: the undisputable existence of its nation 
that was realising—indeed, making—the state through an act of will, and of democracy as the 
natural system of its governance. 
 
As the study will try to show, such discursive strategy of political ‗parallelism‘ by Kosovo 
Albanians and its national leadership failed significantly to achieve and resemble values that 
were imitated/mimicked: those of the western, civic democracies. Establishment of the state 
through an ‗act of will‘ was quickly contaminated by social forces that were operating on 
‗mechanical‘ principles of solidarity and social adherence; as the values of kinship and 
patriarchalism were prevailing over the  necessary right to diversity, the notion of democracy 
was perceived as equivalent with democracy and exclusive hierarchy. Values of the imagined 
‗West‘ were to be adjusted to serve internal needs of the rising authoritarian mindset. 
Greenfeld derives an important conclusion in this respect, from both historical and 
sociological view: 
  
As nationalism spread in different conditions and the emphasis in the idea of the 
nation moved from the sovereign character to the uniqueness of the people, the 
original equivalence between it and democratic principles was lost. One implication 
of this, which should be emphasized, is that democracy may not be exportable. It may 
be an inherent predisposition in certain nations (inherent in their very definition as 
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nations – that is, the original national concept), yet, entirely alien to others, and the 
ability to adopt and develop it in the latter may require a change of identity. (1992:11) 
 
The study of Kosovo Albanian parallel society and its ethnonationalist political ideology 
make this assumption discouragingly true. Moreover, in this particular case, such a failure 
caused another striking phenomenon, that of introduction of environment of parallel 
repression. The contamination of its parallel ‗lifeworld‘ through the introduction of an 
authoritarian discourse aimed at reorganising the social hierarchy was placing yet another 
layer of repression on the Kosovo Albanian community with far-reaching consequences; this, 
due to the fact that, being formally constructed by an ‗act of will‘, their parallel state was 
primarily dependent on one‘s devotion to moral norms of its nationalism. In other words, 
disobedience to external repression conducted by the oppressive Serbian/Yugoslav state was 
illegal; disobedience to internal state of the ‗willing‘ was—immoral. Such environment 
produced a situation of life under unique, parallel authoritarianisms which were often resting 
on symbiotic relationship. 
 
I argue that the occurrence of this phenomenon could be partially explained as a consequence 
of the alteration of the democratic variation of civic nationalism during the process of its 
importation and internalisation; aspired ‗civility‘ of its substance was quickly lost as it was 
compelled to perform under conditions of external/geopolitical constraints, strong patriarchal 
pre-modern culture and ethnic particularism of the importing community. Subsequently, this 
process of alteration affected the very meaning, definition and connotation of democracy in 
Kosovo‘s society. On behalf of democratic principles, its nationalism was practiced as an 
authoritarian political ideology. Below is another important observation by Greenfeld on this 
phenomenon which I employ as a relevant reference in the context of Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalism from the 1990s : 
 
The emergence of the ensuing, particularistic concept results from the application of 
the original idea to conditions which did not necessarily undergo such 
transformations. It was the other, in the original concept accidental, connotations of 
people and country which prompted and made possible such application. (1992:12) 
 
This applies a great deal on the perception and interpretation of nationalism among Kosovo 
Albanians and their discourse on liberation, democracy and independence during 1990s. The 
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imported definition of the nation, as an advanced community of opinion, was to be applied 
onto a society that was formally dwelling on pre-industrial perceptions; be this the case, its 
nationalism took a complementary path, evolving into a particularist variation and an 
(internal) authoritarian practice. Following Greenfeld‘s line of reasoning, its aspiration to 
sovereignty would be defined as merely ‗theoretical‘ because it entailed not only the 
exclusionist principle on the uniqueness of its people, but also a strong collectivistic 
tendency. 
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Chapter 4. 
 
Literature review: Orientalism, Balkanism 
 
Introduction 
Theoretical definition and debate about the ‗orientalism‘ and ‗balkanism‘ are the focus of this 
chapter. In this research they connote two representational systems, a set of discursive 
assumptions and practices—academic and institutional—that deal with description, 
regulation, construction and understanding of ‗Orient‘ and ‗the Balkans‘ as the West‘s (or 
Europe‘s) supposed ‗Other‘. A theoretical analysis of such discursive practices appears 
essential for understanding the origin, nature and features of ideological narratives of the 
cultural, political and national identity among societies defined as non-European or ‗semi-
European‘. There are two authors and, subsequently, two seminal works that will serve as 
pillars of this theoretical analysis: Edward Said (1935-2003) and his study of Orientalism 
(1978), and Bulgarian scholar Maria Todorova with her ground-breaking analysis of the 
external practices of representation of the Balkans, Imagining the Balkans (1997). 
 
Although dealing with separate objects of study—the origin of concept and knowledge about 
‗Orient‘ in the first, as well as the external understanding and depiction of ‗the Balkans‘ in 
the second—both of these works provide an essential theoretical basis for the argumentation 
of the main hypothesis of this study: the ideological interconnectedness between the influence 
of western (European) culture and politics, and the process of production and formation of 
the national identity as a contemporary sociopolitical category in the Balkans. 
 
Moreover, the orientalist and the balkanist discourses are instrumental in my attempts to 
identify and explain the communicative technologies and strategies that shaped the meanings 
of ‗nation‘, ‗nationhood‘, ‗democracy‘, ‗independence‘ not as much as discursive signifiers 
of societal ‗westernness‘ or ‗Europeannes‘—inasmuch as the signifiers of ‗non-Easternness‘ 
and ‗non-Orientalness‘ of political and ideological determination of those societies, namely, 
the Albanians. 
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In this context, as noted by Pula, ‗the historical discourse of (Balkans/Albanians) nationalism 
could be seen as an embodiment of a Western mode of knowledge par excellence.‘ (2006:72). 
The effects of such western knowledge par excellence produce the ‗discursive hardening‘, 
notes Buchowski (2008) which ‗permits politically stronger groups to define weaker groups‘ 
(ibid:463). In the following chapters, I will argue that the construction of Albanian national 
identity as a political category appears inseparable from the local introduction of such 
western knowledge and the subsequent domestication and naturalisation of such external 
discourse about itself, perceived as a vehicle/condition to achieving western legitimacy and 
its acceptance as a modern, European nation. 
 
Numerous books and scholarly debates offer accounts on the Balkans as the grand battlefield 
of interests, influence and ambitions of the western European powers of the times: Jelavich 
(1983), Hupchick (1998, 2002), Gallagher (2001), Johnson (1996), Kaplan (1993), Vickers 
(1995, 2002), Fowkes (2002) represent a few of the authors that offer historiographic, 
sociological analysis on the perplexed and complex nature of the evolution of Balkans 
societies during the period that followed the fall of the Ottoman Empire. To this research, 
they provide the relevant historiographic insight of its main focus, the developments in the 
Balkans societies and states during the 20th century. 
 
The other aspect of theoretical considerations highlights the works by the various authors that 
engage in the field of the analysis of the sociocultural/sociopolitical effects and influence of 
the orientalist and balkanist discourse on the societies in the vicinity of Europe ‗proper‘: 
Todorova (1997, 2005, 2007), Bakic-Hayden (1992, 2006), Bjelic & Savic (2002), Spivak 
(2003), Sulstarova (2005, 2007), Aleksic (2007), Fleming (1999, 2002) Buchowski (2008), 
Ugresic (1995) and others. Their analysis‘ and works focus on the discursive technologies 
that were applied by the West—specifically, the European academia, media, literature and 
political institutions—in the process of describing, explaining as well as associating the 
‗Orient‘ and the ‗Balkans‘ in the context of its former Ottoman/Eastern legacy. 
 
Of the political legacies that have shaped the southeast European peninsula (the 
Balkans) as a whole (the period of Greek antiquity, Hellenism, Roman rule, etc.), two 
can be singled out as crucial until the 19th century. One is the millennium of 
Byzantium with its profound political, institutional, legal, religious and general 
cultural impact. The other is the half millennium of Ottoman rule that gave the 
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peninsula its name, and established the longest period of political unity it had 
experienced. Not only did part of Southeastern Europe acquire a new name during 
this period; it has been chiefly the Ottoman elements or the ones perceived as such 
which have mostly invoked the current stereotype of the Balkans. In the narrow sense 
of the word, then, one can argue that the Balkans are, in fact, the Ottoman legacy. 
(Todorova, 2005:69) 
 
As noted by Aleksic (2007), the highlight of the most of the works about balkanist narrative 
consists of explaining the cultural, political, historical reasons that continue to shape it 
through ‗a dialogue between a patronizing/accusatory discourse and a self-defensive one‘ 
(2007:2). In short, the balkanist discourse is about highlighting the irrevocable differences 
that the area holds with respect to Europe and western civilisation as well as ‗justifying‘ the 
existence of such differences through stressing its ‗eastern‘ historical legacy. More 
specifically, according to Aleksic, such approach of sociocultural castigation has been 
predominantly coined as a western response during the decade of conflicts in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia (1991-1999), as a ‗simplistic pseudo-analysis‘ of the aftermath of the 
break-up of the federation and the outburst of atrocities, mass-killings and ethnic cleansing. 
 
Such linkage between the castigating ‗balkanist‘ discourse and the Yugoslav wars bears a 
specific relevance to this research as it includes Kosovo, the chiefly Albanian-inhabited 
province of the former Yugoslav federation. The influence of the balkanist discourse in the 
formation and the transformation of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse 
comprises a separate chapter of this research. In this respect, the exposure and analysis of the 
theoretical debate about orientalism and balkanism in this chapter will assist in setting up a 
workable basis for concentrating on that foremost focus of the study: the construction of the 
Albanian (and later on, the Kosovo Albanian) ethnonationalist discourse—and, subsequently, 
its national identity—as an outcome par excellence of such patronizing/self-defensive 
dialogue between the assumed western/eastern discourses and epistemologies.  
 
Orientalism 
 
Firstly, I will try to clarify the content of pervasive stigma that the notion of orientalism by 
employing an explanation by Said: 
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...it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship 
with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven 
exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with 
power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as 
with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern 
policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, 
values), power moral (as with ideas about what ‗we‘ do and what ‗they‘ cannot do or 
understand as ‗we‘ do) (2003 (1978):12). 
 
But, let us first try to explain in simpler terms, and later contextualize the meaning and the 
connotation that orientalism bears from the time when devised by Said and on. Insofar as 
‗Orient‘ carries the meaning of ‗the East‘ where ‗Oriental‘ characterizes a person, an object, a 
trait or feature belonging to the East, the orientalism refers to a system of knowledge on the 
places, countries and peoples from/at the East. According to Oxford English Dictionary 
(1971), Orientalism has been the term used for the subject and the works of the orientalists, 
scholars versed in the cultures, histories, languages and societies of Asia or the Orient, since 
the 18th century when the tradition was born. Historically, Orientalism evolved into a science 
with a distinct object of study through the establishment of departments for studying Arabic 
and Indian languages in British and French universities during 18th century (Macfie, 2002: 
25-50). Later on, such departments became known as Oriental Studies. 
 
To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a 
British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such 
disparate realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the 
Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long 
tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable scholarly corpus, innumerable 
Oriental ‗experts‘ and ‗hands,‘ an Oriental professoriate, a complex array of 
‗Oriental‘ ideas (Oriental despotism, Oriental splendour, cruelty, sensuality), many 
Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European use—the 
list can be extended more or less indefinitely (Said, 2003 (1978):4) 
 
In short, orientalism—as a discursive practice and as a body of knowledge about Orient—is 
indivisive from the notion of colonialism and its definition as the ‗geopolitical, sociocultural, 
linguistic and hegemonic project of domination and oppression rooted in the racialized and 
gendered contracts emerging out of Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries‘ (International 
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Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, 2008:11). In this research the notion of 
Orientalism will be employed as an additional theoretical base for explaining the process of 
political, cultural and sociological identification, classification and distinction of social 
environments which differ from what is generally defined as the Western culture, and which 
over time, as noted by Todorova, was self-proclaimed into ‗the civilised world‘ (1997:3). The 
Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Sociology (2007) provides an additional illustration on the 
formal, historical object of ‗orientalism‘: 
 
Orientalism is the study of the ‗Orient‘ and its ‗eastern‘ arts, languages, sciences, 
histories, faiths, cultures, and peoples by Christian theological experts, humanist 
scholars, and natural and social scientists since the 1500s. Orientalist writers consider 
the ‗Orient‘ as consisting of societies geographically east of Christian Europe to be 
explored, acquired, and colonized for their raw materials, abundant labor, and pieces 
of seemingly opulent civilisations in decline. These colonial explorations resulted in 
man made, imaginary geographies and political demarcations such as the Near East, 
the Middle East, Central Asia, the Far East, the Pacific Isles, the New World, and the 
‗Dark Continent.‘ (2007:3343) 
 
Historically, from 18th century, the process of military conquests and subjugation of societies 
residing to the east and south-east of the geographic location Europe by the major powers that 
constructed the notion of European/western civilisation – in Said‘s terms, the Great Britain 
and France – formed the conditions for ‗the Orient‘ to become the object of study through 
(and by) orientalism, as a discursive practice and system of representation. I will comply with 
the meaning attached to the notion of orientalism in Said‘s work – understood as a critique of 
the epistemological arsenal of ‗oriental studies‘ for their role during colonial conquests and 
rule imposed upon countries and nations of the Eastern hemisphere by Western European 
imperial powers. Implicitly, Said notes that if ‗the East‘ wouldn‘t have become a victim of 
Western colonialist conquests, there would have never arisen a need or interest to study ‗the 
Orient‘ and, hence, produce, a regime of knowledge about it; an institutionalized truth about 
what it is and what it means—an intellectual, cultural, political and moral authority: 
 
There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, 
disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of 
taste and value; it is virtually traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, 
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transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analysed. All these 
attributes of authority apply to Orientalism, and much of what I do in this study is to 
describe both the historical authority in and the personal authorities of Orientalism. 
(ibid:20) 
 
According to Said, orientalism places Europe or the West in a privileged position with respect 
to the East, which, in turn, is treated as its other. Here, it is important to note his clarification 
that ‗Orient‘ should not be confined solely to already stereotyped locations and cultures such 
as the ‗Far East‘, ‗Asia‘, ‗Arabia‘, ‗Middle East‘, but also other geographic, sociocultural 
entities such as India, Russia – even the Balkans: simply, in the orientalist discourse, Orient is 
all that is not considered ‗West‘.  
 
The demise of the global colonial system during 1950s and 1960s was followed with the 
criticism that the orientalist discourse was serving the western intellectual hegemony with 
respect to the ‗Orient‘—and that it provided a ‗scientific‘ justification to Western 
preconceptions about the Orient and the ‗orientals‘. It was a form of the ‗colonialism of the 
mind wherein the colonized are institutionally, pedagogically, linguistically and cognitively 
conquered by the colonizer‘ (International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 2nd edition, 
2008:11). The key principle of such hegemony, Said notes, lies with the ‗scientific‘ 
justification of the concept of a divided world—the Eastern and Western worlds. Said defines 
such differentiating technique as a method through which orientalist discourse provides the: 
 
(a) strategic location or ‗a way of describing the author‘s position in a text with regard 
to the Oriental material he writes about‘ (1978:20), and 
(b) strategic formation, or ‗a way of analysing the relationship between texts and the 
way in which groups of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density and 
referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large‘ (ibid). 
 
Reading about Orient entails taking sides ‗vis-à-vis Orient‘, notes Said. The discourse about 
Orient entailed one‘s cultural and political positioning towards it; it was a process in which 
‗the West‘ would gain positive connotations while the East would become simplified and 
produced as its essential other, its negation. Thus, the East becomes the West‘s negative 
mirror: undeveloped, indulged in irrational features such as passions, mysticism, ignorance, 
fanaticism, despotism: be this the case, it represents a permanent danger to the West, to its 
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social, political and cultural foundations. As noted by Said ‗the East has been considered for 
at least three decades to be in the need of modernization‘ (1981:ii). Historically, he argues, 
the Orientalist discourse was functioning as a self-fulfilling prophecy, through (a) 
constructing and defining the reality of an Eastern environment, and (b) raising the urgency 
for it to be treated accordingly: 
 
‗To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalisation of colonial rule is to ignore the 
extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after 
the fact‘ (ibid:39) 
 
Paradoxically, the technology of constructing and cultivating the otherness of the East, the 
Orient, according to Said, assisted in its deprivation from progress and modernization, which 
supposedly represented an ideological aim behind the establishment of oriental studies. Thus, 
orientalist discourse became an antithesis to its hegemonic ideal: instead of studying and 
analysing the Orient with the aim to modernize (and, subsequently, exploit), it became 
circumscribed in re-defining and cultivating its otherness. Description of this technique of 
othering is well-documented through a graphic account of the European vs. the Oriental by 
Lord Cromer, England‘s representative in Egypt, Evelyn Barring, Egypt‘s master in the 
period 1882-1907: 
 
‗The European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; 
he is a natural logician, albeit he may not have studied logic; he is by nature sceptical 
and requires proof before he can accept the truth of any proposition; his trained 
intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the other 
hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is 
of the most slipshod description. Although the ancient Arabs acquired in a somewhat 
higher degree the science of dialectics, their descendants are singularly deficient in 
the logical faculty. They are often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions 
from any simple premises of which they may admit the truth. Endeavour to elicit a 
plain statement of facts from any ordinary Egyptian. His explanation will generally be 
lengthy, and wanting in lucidity. He will probably contradict himself half-a-dozen 
times before he has finished his story. He will often break down under the mildest 
process of cross-examination.‘ (1978:38-39) 
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In normative terms, orientalism was designed to not only shape the Europeans‘ perceptions of 
the East, but also to serve as an integral part of the colonial disciplining and normalising 
discursive machinery, notions employed by Said in Foucauldian context. It was – and largely 
still remains – an ideological beacon in the attempts to modernize remote regions of the 
globe; a well-structured system of cultural representation. Yet, as noted by Said in his 
response to the mounting criticism to his work, orientalism is not necessarily ‗evil, or sloppy 
or uniformly the same in the work of each and every Orientalist‘ although ‗the guild of 
Orientalists has a specific history of complicity with imperial power, which it would be 
Panglossian to call irrelevant.‘ (2003 (1978):342). Ultimately, it is indivisive from the 
tumultuous dynamics of contemporary society as an effort by the Western polity to identify 
and classify, to rationalise and functionalize the perception of the other as perpetually and 
irrevocably different. In time, according to Said, it evolved into a predominant formula for 
description of the East as its evolution and modification continues tirelessly to-date, driven by 
current events, news and their impact on both hemispheres. Such instability of the notion and 
definition of orientalism has been revisited by him almost three decades after the first 
publication of his work, in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror: 
 
‗I emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West 
has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, 
partly identification of the Other. That these supreme fictions lend themselves easily 
to manipulation and the organisation of collective passion has never been more 
evident than in our time, when the mobilisation of fear, hatred, disgust and resurgent 
self-pride and arrogance – much of it having to do with Islam and the Arabs on one 
side, ‗we‘ Westerners on the other - are very large-scale enterprises.‘ (2003:xii) 
 
However, one of the emphases of this research falls on the explanation and decoding the 
disciplining and normalising effects that an orientalist discourse as a system of representation 
could have on developing societies and nations; more precisely, on those nations and 
societies in the immediate geographic vicinity of the West and Europe, perceived as not-quite 
or not-yet European (Goldsworthy, 2002) in their developmental liminality (Bjelic, 2002): the 
nations of the Balkans. 
 
Specifically, the analysis of the effects of the orientalist discourse is relevant in studying the 
epistemological landscape that conditioned the formation of the national identity and 
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ideology in the non-Western societies. During the processes of modernization in the 18th and 
19th century, nationalist elites across the non-western or almost-western societies required 
from their communities to achieve resemblance with their western counterparts that were 
considered as the source of reference of ‗modernization‘ and ‗progress‘ (see Todorova, 
1997). And, as I will try to explain and expose in this research, the process of 
‗westernisation‘ of such societies entailed the simultaneous exercise of their ‗de-
orientalisation‘; in short, it meant that one‘s westernness can only be measured through one‘s 
non-easternness. I argue that this conforms with of the history of the ideological narrative 
that established and shaped the ethnonational identity of Albanians in the Balkans. In the next 
chapters of this research I will be looking into the epistemological process that led their 
nationalist elites into adopting orientalist views about society, culture, politics and national 
identity. I will try to explain the orientalist discursive technologies at work through which 
such views were (a) imported and imposed so that (b) they could be distributed locally and be 
defined as a new, modern, set of social norms that would, in turn, (c) enable the achievement 
of the aspired, western-modelled progress (at the outset of 20th century) and the democratic 
rule (by its turmoiled end). 
 
Balkanism 
 
‗In the past decade, the international community has regarded the Balkans primarily as a 
post-conflict region‘, writes the International Commission on the Balkans in its report The 
Balkans in Europe’s Future, published in 2004. Being the third such report by a third such 
Commission5 within a single century, it only repeated what seemed to have been the opening 
remark similar to those in previous reports: (a) stating of facts about horrible atrocities in a 
war-torn area which, in turn, (b) repeatedly fails to meet Western/European expectations of 
civility. Over time, an abundance of alike reports, essays and studies referring to the Balkans 
                                                 
5 The first such report on the Balkans has been compiled by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in 1914 under the 
t it le: ‗Report of the International Commission on the Balkan Wars‘, Published by the Endowment, 1914, Washington D.C. The 
chair of this first  Balkan Commission was the French Senator, Baron d‘Estournelles. The second report was published in 1996, by 
the Aspen Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, t it led: ‗The Unfinished Peace‘ (Aspen, 1996). The chair of the second 
Balkans Commission was the former italian Prime Minister, Giulianno Damato. Finally, the third report, ‗The Balkans in Europe‘s 
Future‘ was published in 2005 by Robert Bosch Stiftung, King Badouin Foundation, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. The chair of this, third, Balkans Commission was the former Prime Minister of Belgium, Leo 
T indemans. 
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in similar terms assisted in constructing a unique Western discourse that came to be known as 
Balkanism: 
 
‗(Balkanism and) ‗balkanisation‘ not only had come to denote the parcelisation of 
large and viable political units but also had become a synonym for a reversion to the 
tribal, the back- ward, the primitive, the barbarian. In its latest hypostasis, particularly 
in American academe, it has been completely decontextualized and paradigmatically 
related to a variety of problems. That the Balkans have been described as the ‗other‘ 
of Europe does not need special proof. What has been emphasized about the Balkans 
is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behaviour devised as 
normative by and for the civilised world. As with any generalization, this one is based 
on reductionism, but the reductionism and stereotyping of the Balkans has been of 
such a degree and intensity that the discourse merits and requires special analysis.‘ 
(Todorova, 1997:3) 
 
‗In the nineteenth century, Western-style nationalism imposed itself upon the multicultural 
traditions of the Ottoman world‘, notes Gallagher (2002:86). I argue that such an observation 
refers also to the period of the introduction of a new discursive practice for the ethnicities of 
the Balkans which were to become nations through—to paraphrase Rousseau—‘establishing 
a general will and a new, moral collective body‘. I argue that, among others, this period also 
marks the beginning of the construction of the sociocultural and sociopolitical notion of the 
Balkans through the discursive essentialisation and racialisation of its ethnicities by the 
western-European narratives, which almost regularly projected it through the concepts of 
‗oriental‘, ‗irrational‘, ‗savage‘, and, therefore, ‗un-European‘. 
 
As an illustration of historical trait of such representation, I will provide below two different, 
yet similar, accounts on Albanians written by Robert Curzon in 1834 and Hermann 
Neubacher in 1956—an English and a German scholar, as illustrations of the effects of such 
‗cultural ideology of the observer‘ (Bakic-Hayden, 2006) during the analysis‘ of essential 
characteristics of an ethnic community at Europe‘s backyard: 
 
They have none of the composure of the Turks, who delight to sit still in a coffee-
house and smoke their pipes, or listen to a story, which saves them the trouble of 
thinking or speaking. The Albanians did not scream and chatter as the Arabs do but 
they lounged about the bazaars listlessly, ready to pick a quarrel with anyone, and 
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unable to fix themselves down to any occupation. In short, they gave me the idea of 
being a very poor and proud, and good-for-nothing set of scamps.(Curzon (1834:254-
271)
6
;  
Since Roman times, the Albanians have had a traditional strategy to deal with 
occupations. It has been custom among this small but martial mountain nation, not 
wishing to be squashed by mightier plunderers, to seek gold and weapons from the 
strong and to seize them from the weak when they withdrew. They have maintained 
themselves in their mountains for centuries. (Neubacher, 1956:105-121) 
 
Such a simplified and reductionist way of defining an ethnicity whose volume and structure 
in reality exceeds that of a larger gang or tribe, tells sufficiently about the existence and 
deployment of a preconceived picture of them in the analysis. Here, Albanians are 
consciously and formally described as a ‗nation‘ but they are analysed as not-quite one; 
persistently, they are seen through a previously established opinion of them as an inert, static 
social category limited in its volume, comparable in its deliberations and predictable in its 
actions. The analysis places them on the level of a set of gangs, or of a larger tribe with no 
profilised social strata or any other, modern, manifestations of a nation. Undoubtedly, they 
are a nation—or, a specific, Balkan, sort of it—but certainly not modern, and definitely not 
‗European‘. As Sells would note, illustrating the external viewpoints on the region: ‗people in 
the Balkans are fated, by history or genetics, to kill one another‘ (1996: xiv). 
 
In fact, it is the group of statements, such as the ‗composure‘ ‗the Arab‘, ‗the Turks‘, 
‗mightier plunderers‘, ‗gold and weapons‘, ‗the strong‘, ‗mountains‘, etc., that speak about 
the cultural ideology of the observer: their order and the context in which they are invoked 
tells about the employment of a specific discursive practice with heavy orientalist features as 
it indulges in emphasizing the social/ethnic characteristics alluded to as remote and brutal – 
therefore, expectable – for a society seated in the realm of an ‗Eastern‘ empire. 
 
Since the discourse on the Balkans has a history that is at least century old (Todorova, 2002 
(1997)), an adequate analytical approach to it would require engagement in both historical as 
well as discursive analysis, as noted by Bjelic (2002). Such a combination of both approaches 
has been introduced with this study with the aim of contextual clarification of the topic of the 
                                                 
6 Selected fragments of this travelogue to be found also in http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts19/AH1834.html)  
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Balkans which, I argue, dwells within the discourse of Europeanness as either a mere 
geographical toponym or a disparate sociopolitical and sociocultural signifier. ‗The very 
terms ‗Balkan‘ and ‗Balkanism‘, as Todorova convincingly argues, cannot be divorced from 
the history of the place‘ (Todorova, 1997:7). 
 
She traces the origin of knowledge about the Balkans—the very genealogy of balkanism—
through written explorations of the area by the Western travellers and authors. She classifies 
the formation of the current, negative connotation that ‗Balkans‘ and ‗balkanization‘ into 
three stages: 
 
1. The Balkans were first ‗discovered‘ in the late 18th century by Western travellers. 
Although these first Western accounts of the Balkans contained some 
geographical inaccuracies, their treatment of the Balkans was primarily 
classificatory and descriptive. 
2. After a series of Balkan wars and with the advent of World War I, the Balkans 
were increasingly permeated with ‗political, social, cultural, and ideological 
overtones,‘ and ‗Balkan‘ was increasingly used as a pejorative term. 
3. Today the term ‗Balkan‘ has been almost completely disassociated from its 
object, as journalists and academics utilize the construct of the Balkans as a 
powerful symbol conveniently located outside any spatial or temporal contexts 
(1997:7-8) 
 
In the analysis of the historical events that surrounded the region and affected the meaning of 
the ‗Balkans‘ and ‗balkanization‘, Gallagher notes that ‗the Balkanization of the Balkans was 
the price Europe paid for preserving several decades of peace between suspicious and 
narrow-minded European powers‘ (2001:47). According to Todorova, such a notion was 
introduced and popularized as a means of adequate description of the relationship of the 
Balkans with the West. It was meant to describe an unclear status of a region, that was 
geographically European but oriental historically, politically and culturally. 
 
‗Balkanization‘ entered the dictionary as a result of actions by the great powers who, 
later on, would blame the unforeseen consequences on the immaturity and allegedly 
uncivilised nature of local peoples and their leaders (Gallagher, 2001:280) 
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Since the early 20th century, the term ‗balkanization‘ has been connoting one of the most 
negative paradigms in international politics and relations. 
 
Specifically, as noted by Todorova, the pre-1914 turmoil—the period of the Balkan Wars7--
was enormously important for popularizing its negative image. To Hammond (2006), the 
accusations of ‗discord, immorality, savagery, violence and congenital backwardness‘ 
(2006:8) have been the major focus of historians, writers, diarists and novelists who 
constructed the Balkans as one among the major ‗Others‘ of the Western civilisation.  
Such an estranged and troubled relationship between the western-European projections and 
the destiny of the Balkans‘ populations—who were perpetually ‗defined by geography‘ 
(Djurdjevic, 2008)—made the Balkanist discourse fall under the category of orientalism, 
‗even when not explicitly stated‘, notes Todorova (1997:8). 
 
It is at this point that the failed Western expectations towards the Balkans gain their 
Orientalist edge, as described by Timothy Garton-Ash in his parallel between Sarajevo as the 
launching pad of the Great War (1914-1918), and an arena of terror and ethnic cleansing by 
the end of the XX century (1992-1995): 
 
‗...Eighty years later, in the early days of the siege of Sarajevo in the mid-1990s, a 
photo of a half-ruined post office with three items of graffiti written on its wall 
captured the imagination of the world. The first graffiti read ‗This is Serbia!‘; the 
second stated ‗This is Bosnia‘. And someone scrawled underneath, ‗No, you idiots, 
it's a post office!‘ But a European historian of the present added a line of his own, 
‗This is Europe‘. Because all of the destruction in the Yugoslav wars has been done 
by Europeans to other Europeans in Europe. The line ‗This is Europe‘ embodies the 
European Union's moral imperative when it comes to overcoming the legacies of war 
and destruction in the Balkans. (1995:1) 
 
Historically, the genesis of such ‗moral imperative‘ of Europe—or the European Union, as 
contemporary institutionalization of the idea of common Western polity—can be traced from 
the outset of the XX century, following the demise of the Ottoman Empire and its retreat 
from the region. Ever since, the analysis of the Balkans entailed an observation of an 
                                                 
7 See Hall, Richard S.: ‗The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: A Prelude to First World War‘, Routledge, 2000. 
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irrevocably transformed social arena that could be considered European in the strictly 
geographic sense: Territorially, Balkans were part of Europe, but they were not European, or 
Europeanized for that matter. As I will analyse it later in the research, such ambiguous 
approach to the history and culture of the Balkans societies—their very social fabric—has 
been the major cause of representational instability both from the outside, as well as from the 
inside. As noted by Djurdjevic: 
 
At present, to designate which states belong to the Balkan Peninsula a single 
geographical criterion is not used. There is a tendency to regard as Balkan those 
countries which were under Ottoman rule between the 14th and 20th centuries, 
thereby linking anything Balkan to eastern cultural influences. Most of the countries 
in the Peninsula in question do not recognise themselves as ‗Balkan‘ and prefer the 
label ‗central European‘, which reveals the practice of stigmatisation applied to that 
peninsula and the East in general (Djurdjevic, 2008:157) 
 
Similar to the connotations of tribalism as a graphic description of the lack of civilised sense 
of social organising—or orientalism as a definition of an irrevocable cultural difference—
balkanism has historically functioned along the lines of Kipling‘s infamous ‗The White 
Man‘s Burden‘ (1899); a narrative on a lawless and backward territory engulfed in communal 
feuds which call for international/western intervention, mediation and—enlightenment. 
 
Such a conception of the Balkans, as a home to a geographically identifiable group of nations 
left half-way on the path to civilisation, evolved into an explicit Western discourse of 
political paternalism and sociocultural castigation. ‗It is hardly surprising that (even) parts of 
Southeast Europe deny a Balkan identity because of its association with unpredictability, 
lawlessness, and cruelty‘, notes Gallagher (2001:11). Be this the case, it became the source of 
endless opinions and definitions which, according to numerous contemporary scholars on the 
subject, assisted in shaping balkanism into an orientalist-like and yet, unique, system of social 
representation. And, as it evolved into a Western public discourse towards the Balkans, it 
became ideologically circumscribed within one single demand/expectation; to see it finally 
adopting and respecting its social norms of civility and, thus, becoming Europeanized: 
 
‗Far more interesting is the fact that the process of ‗Europeanization‘, 
‗Westernisation‘, or ‗modernization‘ of the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries included the spread of rationalism and secularization, the intensification of 
commercial activities and industrialization, the formation of a bourgeoisie and other 
new social groups in the economic and social sphere, and above all, the triumph of 
the bureaucratic nation-state. (Todorova, 1997:20) 
 
Balkanism: a variation of Orientalism? 
 
But, where does Balkanism differ from Orientalism? Or does it represent only its localized, 
geographically distinct, variation? According to Todorova, such technique of social 
representation of Balkan nations—as locked inside a continuous state of transition, of endless 
shift of power, ideology and rule—constitutes a specific approach in the process of its 
othering by the West. And, according to her this makes it fundamentally different from 
Orientalism: 
 
‗Unlike orientalism, which is a discourse about an imputed opposition, balkanism is a 
discourse about an imputed ambiguity (. . .) Here, ambiguity is treated as anomaly. 
Because of their indefinable character, persons or phenomena in transitional states, 
like in marginal ones, are considered dangerous, both being in danger themselves and 
emanating danger to others. In the face of facts and ideas that cannot be crammed in 
pre-existing schemata, or which invite more than a single interpretation, one can 
either blind oneself to the inadequacy of concepts or seriously deal with the fact that 
some realities elude them.‘ (1997:17) 
 
To Buchowski (2006), balkanist discourse represents a new form of European orientalism 
which he defines as ‗a way of thinking about and the practices of making the Other‘ 
(2006:465), and which after the 1989 and the anti-Communist awakenings across the Eastern 
Europe ‗managed to escape the confines of space and time‘ (ibid).  According to him, such 
orientalism serves as ‗a tool for concocting social distinctions across state borders as well as 
within them‘. Here‘s a relevant observation on the new dimension of such ‗European 
orientalism‘ by Buchowski, which extends its constructionist capacity beyond the 
formal/geographical location of the ‗Orient‘: 
 
The revolutions of 1989 created, at least in the European context, confusion, 
uncertainty, cognitive dissonance, symbolic disorder, a liminal stage in the rite of 
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passage (. . .) that needed to be worked out. Within the old paradigm the simplest 
solution that adjusted to the expansion of ‗the free market and liberal democracy‘ has 
been employed without shattering the entrenched orientalising mindset. The 
Occident‘s limes have simply been moved eastward (2006:465) 
 
According to Todorova, another fundamental component that makes balkanism to not only 
differ from orientalism, but to surface as far more radical, disciplining, discourse that defines 
the aspired Westerness as an unquestionable political aspiration and an overruling social 
norm is the ‗historical and geographic concreteness of the Balkans, as opposed to the 
intangible nature of the Orient‘ (1997:11). The location of the Balkans is distinct and 
territorially identifiable and so is the number, the names and the histories of nations 
inhabiting it; in fact, there is hardly any account in the recent texts in which Balkans is not 
considered clearly as a geographical part of Europe. However, regardless of its geographic 
concreteness there is another feature that continuously appears in most of the recent studies 
on the Balkans as a key reason for constituting the uniqueness of balkanism as a radical and 
impactful hegemonic discourse (in Gramsci‘s terms): its social, cultural inbetweenness or, as 
noted by Bjelic (2002), its liminality: 
 
‗What then is Balkan specifity? What were the historic  contingencies engendering 
the Balkan specifities? (...) Historically, the paradox may be explained, by 
acknowledging that the Balkan region was never colonized in the modern sense, as 
the Orient was, despite being subject to the Ottoman rule. Rather than exploiting 
natural resources and human labor, the Ottoman Empire introduced policies of re-
population, coupled with policies of religious conversion and polarization, 
underwritten by perennial military campaigns. Thus, Balkan people perceived each 
other as both colonial rulers and as colonial subjects. (Bjelic, 2002:6) 
 
The Balkans is neither here nor there, neither this nor that; it exists in two places at the same 
time. It is part of Europe but has an Eastern/Ottoman/Oriental history, tradition, legacy. As 
for the outsiders, Balkans ‗can not be told apart or put together‘, notes Bjelic as he refers to 
an observation by K. E. Fleming (2000) that the ‗discourse on the Balkans is one both of 
sameness and of difference.‘ (2000:15): 
 
The Balkans' liminal status—at the interstices between worlds, histories, and 
continents—is tantamount not so much to marginality as to a sort of centrality. To be 
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‗liminal,‘ after all, is to be between (and overlapping) two (or more) domains, while 
to be marginal is merely to be at the edges of one (2000:35) 
 
According to Bjelic, Fleming‘s observation about the centrality of the Balkans which is 
derived out of a sheer state of its non-belonging to either ‗east‘ or ‗west‘ can actually serve as 
possible pillars for its negative identification, i.e. the construction of identity through the 
process of what it‘s not. Thus, the Balkans may reclaim their representational concreteness 
because the liminal status will eventually cause its differences to melt into sameness. 
‗Simultaneously and tautologically, then, the Balkans are both fully known and wholly 
unknown‘ notes Fleming (2000:3), as she refers to a certain trait of North American and 
Western European discourse on the Balkans which focuses on overlooking the differences 
that exist between countries, regimes and peoples. Such process of systematic neglecting of 
the differences also entails the neglecting of the body of local, Balkan, knowledges about 
itself, its communities, culture, politics. The act of ‗overlooking‘, I argue, downgrades such 
local epistemologies onto the level of what Foucault defines as ‗subjugated knowledges‘: 
 
a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, 
beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity (1980:82) 
 
Such an approach makes balkanist discourse—and the relationship between the Western 
Europe and the Balkans—as ‗homologous to colonialism‘, notes Fleming (ibid:15), as it 
attempts to (a) discount the relevance of local, Balkan knowledge about itself, and (b) 
construct its own, external definition of it. Here, Bjelic invokes Foucault‘s notions of power 
and domination as he refers to the reasoning behind such systematic castigation of the 
Balkan‘s knowledge about the Balkans: according to him, such knowledges ought to remain 
concealed by the balkanist discourse for they originate from entities which are perceived as 
resistant to the discourse of universal rationality—simply, ‗their incorporation into that 
discourse would rupture it‘ (2002:7). As noted by Fleming: 
 
if, according to outside observers, it is difficult to distinguish between the Balkan 
states and peoples, it is still more difficult (say those same observers) for Balkan 
peoples themselves to stop making distinctions between themselves, and to stop 
killing one another senselessly over those distinctions. (2000:4) 
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To Bjelic, the people of the Balkans are not participators and constructors of the balkanist 
discourse: they are not allowed to correct or enrich it with their own narratives. Rather, they 
are being talked about, analysed and constructed through such assumed discourse of 
‗universal rationality‘ to which they can not claim co-ownership. Be this the case, another 
paradox of the Balkans looms: the intense internal polarities created by balkanism’s binary 
logic (Christianity/Islam, civilisation/barbarism, etc.) ‗infuses any reality imposed upon the 
Balkans by balkanism with dangerous instability‘ (2002:8). 
It is a discourse of informal, unstructured knowledge – produced through ‗travelogues, 
journalistic accounts and occasional history books‘ (ibid:9) as opposed to the ‗expert‘ 
knowledge that surrounds the orientalist discourse, in Said‘s terms.  
 
Internalisation of orientalism: making others from brothers? 
 
The ethnonational ideologies of the Balkan societies have been regularly based on the 
emphasis of one‘s ethnic uniqueness and authenticity of their geographical origin; however, 
at the same time they have been added a strong connotation of Europeanness and perceived 
cultural belonging with it, as both a referential and legitimation center. A brief excursion into 
the recent past of these societies reveals a distinct and common fear among them: that, if the 
liminality of their area—which in Fleming‘s terms (2000) defines them as a sort of an 
autonomous centre—would entail their expulsion from the sphere of influence of grander 
narratives (specifically, of European, western, modern) then their fragile existence would be 
endangered through perpetual local feuds. 
 
Therefore, the histories of adoption of the European principles of modernity—at least, of the 
sociopolitical mimic of its imagery—ought to be viewed as a consequence of inner societal 
fears about the unviability of autonomous and independent survival in an aggressively 
competitive and, mutually exclusionist environment. At their outset, the new Balkan nation-
states were swift in adopting constitutions modelled on Western forms; however, the 
establishment of the concept of the representative government was being attempted ‗in 
countries unprepared for self-rule, with borders that had been carved out arbitrarily by the 
great powers and populations whose sense of national awareness was often only dimly felt‘, 
notes Gallagher (2001:50). 
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In terms of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia by the end of the 20 th century, such 
balkanist discourse of rejection of existence of a potential for ‗Europeanization‘ can be traced 
as one of the discursive practices that fuelled the war-mongering rhetoric: 
 
The discourse of being or not-being European (civilised, modern, democratic, 
capitalist) preceded the Yugoslav wars. The secessions from ‗old-fashioned‘ 
communist Yugoslavia cannot be understood outside of global identity politics, 
outside of the attempt to escape the stigma of being in the backwards, non-European, 
communist Balkans. It encouraged a proliferation of highly dependable ‗client states,‘ 
fighting each other for Western recognition in domains of democracy, human rights, 
and economic reform (Hammond, 2004:149) 
 
To Kovacevic (2008), the balkanist discourse imposed upon the former Yugoslavia has a 
significant share in the manner in which the exclusionist ethnonationalism paved the road to 
the armed conflicts between the federation‘s republics and ethnicities. Attempts by various 
ethnic communities to exclude themselves from the generalizing western-European balkanist 
discourse transferred the ‗accusatory/self-defensive dialogue‘ (Aleksic, 2007) to an inter-
ethnic domain; it became a tool for projecting one‘s ‗Europeanness‘ while denying to the 
immediate, ‗non-European‘ neighbour. 
 
The attempt to escape the backwards Balkans and join Europe was articulated as a 
necessary disassociation from ethnicities seen as Balkan or Oriental (Serbs for 
Croatia, Moslems/Albanians for Serbia and Macedonia). The process of ethnic 
differentiation was encouraged both from the inside – through openly racist narratives 
about ‗us‘, Europeans, and ‗them‘, Orientals – and from the outside – through the 
more subtle narratives of cultural racism about, for instance, democratic, 
hardworking, tolerant Slovenians and authoritarian, shifty, corrupt, and narcissistic 
Serbs (Kovacevic, 2008:163) 
 
I argue that such differentiation that was produced through such clash of competing 
representational systems caused, on the one hand, the construction of national aspirations for 
the ‗modernity‘, ‗progress‘ and ‗Europeanness‘ (therefore reproducing a perception of 
oneself as a cultural periphery) and, on the other, the emphasizing of the ideologised 
postulates of ‗authenticity‘, ‗ancient past‘ and ‗ethnic culture‘ (reproducing the perception of 
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oneself as a cultural center). This complies with Todorova‘s observation on the inherited 
modernity/ancientness dichotomy of nationalism which is, on the one hand, a product of 
modernity—‘an unprecedented for of group identity made possible only within a modern 
regime with all its paraphernalia‘—while on the other ‗insists on the need for roots and 
tradition‘ (2005:143). 
 
However, in terms of the ethnonationalist discourse in the former-Yugoslav ethnic 
communities such dichotomies produce ambiguities which, in turn, raises social anxieties and 
uncertainties: Balkan societies are ‗semi-European‘ rather than ‗non-European‘; they are 
‗semi-developed‘ rather than ‗un-developed‘—‗semi-civilised‘, rather than ‗un-civilised‘. 
Undoubtedly, this brings to light a rather confused order of signifiers that constitute 
balkanism into a distinct variation of orientalism. One could argue that, while orientalism 
regards a system of socio-cultural representation of (a) geographically abstract, but (b) 
socially, culturally, ideologically distinct environment/object – balkanism on the other hand 
is about explaining (a) a distinct location with (b) highly ambiguous social, cultural and 
ideological environment. In short, everyone knows where the Balkans are; no one knows for 
sure what they represent. 
 
Unlike Said‘s Orientalism, which brackets Orient‘s historical concreteness in order to 
describe orientalist constructions, Balkanism as a critical study is a system of 
representation based on historical perception of the Balkans by colonial rulers. These 
perceptions took root as schemes of self-recognition for Balkan peoples, so their 
study must be based on historical as well as discursive analysis. The very terms 
‗Balkan‘ and ‗Balkanism‘ cannot be divorced from the history and the place.‘ (Bjelic, 
2002:8) 
 
Indeed, how do we know that the Balkans are utterly different from the rest of Europe? How 
different? What exactly are these differences about? How were they constructed and how did 
they become part of the current reservoir of definitions with the balkanism as a system of 
representation? 
 
As the Balkans does not represent a finite, homogenous space, whether geographically, 
culturally or conceptually, its ‗objective‘ external characterization was regularly preventing 
its self-differentiation, writes Bakic-Hayden (2006). Such an ‗objectivity‘ was far too often 
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conditioned with the ‗cultural ideology of the observer‘ and the specific idea of progress and 
standards that the observer held valid. I argue that in the context of external description of the 
Balkans, notions of ‗universal rationality‘, ‗objectivity‘ or ‗common sense‘ can hardly be 
considered as neutral epistemologies. They are proclaimed as ‗universal‘ and ‗rational‘ by the 
western-European discourse during the patronizing/self-defensive dialogic engagement on the 
Balkans, through which the Balkans is maintained as the Europe‘s other. Here‘s an 
observation by Bakic-Hayden: 
 
There is little doubt that the Balkans, either Byzantine or Ottoman, represented a 
cultural and religious ‗Other‘ to Europe ‗proper.‘ This older symbolic geography was 
reinforced in the post-war (cold-war) period by an ideological and political geography 
of the democratic, capitalist wets versus the totalitarian, communist East (1992:3) 
 
I argue that such technologies of othering the Eastern Europe and the Balkans through 
ideological, political—and, economic—‘geography‘ has enabled the establishment of the 
western-European discourse of universal rationality, objectivity and neutrality as an 
epistemological order and the ultimate referential system, which, in Bourdieu‘s terms, 
produces ‗the naturalisation of its arbitrariness‘ (1977:164). Through such technologies then, 
the views on the Balkans become the truth on the Balkans and, subsequently, the reference 
for the Balkans in which, eventually, no one wants to be from the Balkans. 
 
As Bakic-Hayden points out, such expectations can expose ‗the danger of unconscious 
acceptance of one‘s depiction as an ‗object‘ of historical events which lie beyond one‘s 
domain of responsibility and therefore, one‘s power and destiny‘ (2006:18). An interesting 
illustration comes from Ugresic (2006) and her ironic account about the tendency of escaping 
and rejecting the West‘s generalizing definition of ‗Balkans‘ by the Eastern European and 
former Yugoslav nations and societies: 
 
The Balkan stigma circulated within the Balkans too, and there nobody wanted to 
admit any DNA connections. The Slovenians saw themselves as a European 
protection shield against ‗balkanization‘; the Croats thought the same about 
themselves, and still do; the Serbs didn‘t mind shopping in Sofia, Istanbul or 
Thessalonica, but left ‗the Balkans‘ to Bulgarians. Bulgarians didn‘t have a way out. 
They could not move their Balkan mountain any further – over the Black Sea, to 
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Russia, say. After the disappearance of communist leaders with artistic aspirations 
such projects were no longer possible. So, who lives in the Balkans now? The 
Bulgarians do. (Ugresic, 2006:3) 
 
Analysis of the historical events in the area account for the continuance of such political and 
ideological renegade of the Balkan societies well beyond the demise and the disappearance of 
the Ottoman empire from the region, as they engaged in the process of combining respective 
ethnonational mythologies with the modern, externally induced, political aspirations. 
Expectedly, the next step led to the creation of the independent nation-states which, among 
others, were conceived and interpreted through a distinct orientalist discourse. 
 
This marks the point of evolution in the local histories of the Balkan societies when the final 
break-up with the diminishing Empire is introduced through adoption of a new discursive 
formation. Subsequently, a great competition was launched for organising one‘s ethnicity into 
‗modern‘, ‗advanced‘, ‗progressive‘ and ‗European‘ nation-state. In the early years of the 20th 
century, this set of power-words, lying at the core of the new ethnonational ideologies was 
indivisive from the discursive practice that had shaped the national anti-Ottoman (read: anti-
Oriental) sentiment and the political actions against its hegemony. In fact, I argue that their 
adoption as part of a linguistic arsenal of the ethnonationalist ideology—certainly, a new 
system of representation—constituted the very foundations of the anti-Ottoman discursive 
practice. The birth of the Balkan ethnonationalism through the construction of the anti-
Ottoman narrative as the basis of the national identity will be the focus of the chapters 6 and 
7 of this research. In the context of the history of the former Yugoslav region, Bakic-Hayden 
(1992) includes also the sociopolitical effects induced by the presence of the former 
colonizing powers, such as the Austro-Hungarian (northwest) and the Ottoman empire 
(southeast). Other than projecting the geographical delineation of the scope of influence of 
the two opposed empires, Bakic-Hayden finds such distinctions as hardly neutral, culturally 
or politically: 
 
They privilege the predominantly Catholic, formerly Hapsburg territories of Slovenia 
and Croatia over the predominantly Orthodox or Muslim, formerly Ottoman 
territories in the rest of the country. Strangely, this depiction sees the essences of the 
peoples of Yugoslavia as having been developed by foreign rulers who had departed 
from the various regions long ago, from 1867 (Serbia) to 1918 ((Bosnia, Croatia, 
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Slovenia), and had never completely conquered a few places (Montenegro). In the 
northwest the European character and apparent advantages of the Hapsburg empire 
are stressed, while the Ottoman oriental is blamed for the ills of the rest of the 
country. (1992:5) 
 
However, to scholars such as Buchowski (2006) the contemporary history of Europe accounts 
for transformative nature of the balkanist discourse which—with respect to the Balkans—is 
not necessarily always related to its othering due to the past Ottoman legacy. Very often, as in 
the case of the Eastern Europe and its grand sociopolitical leap from soviet-modelled 
socialism to western liberal capitalism, the orientalist/balkanist discourse is applied as a tool 
for connoting the failure to reform and to achieve westernness through internalising the 
political, economic and social norms stemming from the western institutional practices and 
their ‗capitalist set of values‘: 
 
Individuals have to be disciplined and educated, internalise a certain, in this case 
capitalist, set of values in order to become ‗normal.‘ In the socialist past they dropped 
out of any reasonable control and ‗landed in a moral vacuum.‘ Demoralized, 
corrupted and orphaned victims not of current practices but of the past, have to learn 
new standards, change their mentality in order to join the progressive part of the 
humanity. If they cannot do it, they remain ‗Easterners‘ and should indict themselves 
for being alienated. Any failure is ascribed to their ‗oriental nature.‘ (2006:475) 
 
According to Buchowski, through highlighting the sets of values as the identification tool, the 
Western discourses on the other have eliminated the category of space and location in their 
dealings with either orientalism or balkanism. The accession of the former Eastern European 
communist states into the European Union pushed the notion of European Orient further 
southeast, onto the Balkans and Russia, while the distinction between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ was 
defined through the degree to which ‗countries, social groups, authorities and individuals 
have embraced the free market and democracy‘ (2006:465). Thus, the battle for 
Europeanness and, subsequently, de-orientalness was to be waged between the societies and 
within the societies. 
 
The ‗new order‘ that emerged in the 1990s has allowed orientalism (. . .) to escape the 
confines of space and time. Orientalism is also a specter that haunts people‘s minds 
and serves as a tool for concocting social distinctions across state borders as well as 
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within them. In that sense, the new European orientalism is a refraction, a derivative 
or correlate of a phenomenon covered by such concepts as globalization, the 
expansion of multinational capital, flexible capitalism, transgressions, migrations, 
transnationalism or the media-covered global village. With these changes the 
meaning of orientalism acquires entirely new dimensions. (. . .) I contend that for 
those still thinking in ‗orientalising‘ terms a mental map has morphed into social 
space, or, that they have found ‗otherness‘ in their sisters and brothers. Similarities, 
analogies and connections can be traced between discourses concerned respectively 
with spatial and social issues (2008:466-7) 
 
In this respect, the history of the demise of the former federation of Yugoslavia accounts for 
similar sociopolitical effects that followed the process of internalisation of the 
balkanist/orientalist discourse among its rival nations. The ethnonationalist rhetoric of its 
nations was comprised of distinct balkanist features and served as political justifications of 
‗Europeanness‘ of clearly disparate ideological programs. Whether openly 
secessionist/independentist (Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo), hegemonic/unitarist (Serbia, 
Montenegro) or conformist/federalist (Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina), the political 
programs of competing ethnicities were equally highlighting the ‗Europeanness‘ and 
‗European belonging‘ as their ideological core (see Volcic, 2005). It appeared as if ‗Europe‘ 
seemed possible and justifiable through both separatism and unitarism; the struggle for 
‗returning to Europe‘ and, thus, disassociation from the Balkans became the underlying 
rhetoric that was generating the ethnic hatred and paving the road to armed conflict. The case 
of the former Yugoslavia is indicative of Todorova‘s claim that ‗the outside perception of the 
Balkans has been internalised in the region itself.‘ (2002:39). The balkanist differentiation 
was launched on the federal level—between the nations—but it continued to permeate and 
reshape the ethnonationalist narratives within the nations. 
 
‘Nesting’ orientalisms: a means to western legitimacy? 
 
The history provides exhaustive accounts on the period that followed the birth of the nation 
states on the ashes of the Ottoman hegemony: they were devised through regional feuds that 
have twice erupted into all-out wars (Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913). The latter were fought 
viciously in an arena of constantly shifting alliances and allegiances, fuelled by the discursive 
practices of othering, confronting and subduing the treacherous neighbour – that newly 
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invented oriental other – whether for the reasons of its perceived pro-Ottoman legacy, 
territorial aspirations or treacherous conversion to Islam that would construct their new 
definition of ‗primitive‘, ‗backward‘ and ‗anti-European‘ group. 
 
The majority of those involved in Balkan national liberation movements (including 
some of the leaders) understood their struggle essentially in terms of ethnically 
identified Orthodox Christians versus Muslims (most often inaccurately amalgamated 
into religiously defined ‗Turks‘)—a civilisational conflict with heightened emotional 
enmities (Hupchick, 2002:279) 
 
New wars were to be based on ancient mythologies as each nation would launch a great leap 
into its misty past, in search of evidence that would confirm the righteousness of its demands 
of the present: evidence of the lost lands of the forefathers, of the remnants of the ancient 
temples, proofs of their presence in the territories currently in control by the other. ‗Each of 
the Balkan national movements went through a long gestation phase that involved the 
creation of a literary language and a revival of interest in the pre-Ottoman history of the 
people‘, notes Gallagher (2001:32). Below is a juxtaposing account – itself bearing a heavy 
orientalist approach – written by Edith Durham (1905) that illustrates both the phenomenon 
of the ethnic conflicts fought under the flag of exclusive ethnonationalism, and the manner in 
which they were viewed by external observers: 
 
‗When after that long night they awoke—the Rip Van Winkles of Europe, animated 
only with the desire of going on from the point at which they had left off— they 
found the face of the world had changed and new Powers had arisen. Internally, there 
were the problems of the fourteenth century still unsolved. Externally, they were 
faced with those of the twentieth century, Western and insistent.‘ (1905:5) 
 
New histories were to revolve around newly constructed pasts and national mythologies; they 
were supposed to reconcile one‘s ancient ethnic origin and rites with the notions of Western 
modernity. Abruptly, Balkan societies were as ancient as they were modern; they were 
praising their authenticity and uniqueness as much as they were pointing out the similarities 
with the Western culture. The importance of their medieval kingdoms ‗had to be grossly 
inflated, their maximum size seen as being the natural and proper boundaries for new nations-
in-waiting‘ (Jelavich 1983a:27). In order to move from a Europe of kings and emperors to a 
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Europe of nations, disparate groups of people had ‗to be convinced that, despite their obvious 
differences, they shared an identity that could be the basis of collective action‘ (Thiesse, in 
Gallagher 2001:32): 
 
History had to be radically reinterpreted and made highly selective. For the sense of a 
nation enjoying a continuous past to be invoked, the intermingling of people, their 
constant migratory movements, and major changes of political culture or religious 
allegiance had to be ignored or concealed (Bringe, in Gallagher (2001:21)) 
 
I argue that such a collective action of writing-off the certain local knowledges about itself 
represent a critical side-effect in the process of domestication of the orientalist/balkanist 
discourse and its integration within their ethnonationalist political programmes. According to 
Bakic-Hayden (1992), such subjugation of epistemologies was followed with a localized 
process of othering that was applied against the immediate neighbourhood and, eventually, 
utilized for redefinition and re-emphasis of ethnic differences, regional enmities and 
ideological rivalries. 
 
In the east, Islam is generally less favourably viewed than Orthodox Christianity; 
while in the west, the Protestant tradition is generally seen more positively than is 
Catholicism. The entire hierarchy may be seen in terms of symbolic geography as 
declining in relative value from the north-west (highest value) to the south-east 
(lower value). In terms of cultural representations, of distinguishing disvalued Others, 
one might envision a system of ‗nesting‘ orientalisms, in which there exists a 
tendency for each region to view cultures and religions to the south and east of it as 
more conservative or primitive (1992:4) 
 
In short, nesting orientalisms represent a sort of a conditioned reflex of refusal by Balkan 
societies to be looked upon as objects of balkanist discourse by external observations. 
Through adoption of the ‗nesting‘ orientalist discourse, a nation or a social group from 
Europe‘s periphery attempts to exclude itself from such marginal treatment; it represents a 
manner in which such groups engage in re-organising the knowledge about themselves—and 
about immediate others—so that it becomes compatible with the perceived body of external, 
western knowledge and practices. Thus, they aim to achieve the aspired western, European 
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acceptance and association, which, in turn, redefines their local power and authority with 
respect to the immediate ‗other‘ in the vicinity. 
 
I argue that such an exercise of ‗nesting‘ and domesticating the external knowledge relates 
with the endemic presence of collective fears in those social groups of being excluded from 
the scope of the influence of grander, legitimizing, narratives – and thus be forever doomed 
in one‘s ‗authenticity‘ of non-belonging and expulsion. Therefore, the evidence of one‘s 
Europeaness is found through the process of differentiation from the imminent other who is 
presented as unfit to fulfil its requirements (see specifically chapter 7 of this research). This is 
in line with what Rastko Mocnik (2002) sees as a perplexed power-relations analysis of the 
Balkans – in the context of contemporary developments – which, I argue, can be applied in 
the analysis of the Balkan societies from the end of the 19th century, as well as the end of the 
20th and the beginning of the 21st. This is how he defines the two major structures of 
domination and subordination that govern conceptual formations: 
 
(a) the horizontal antagonism between the Balkan states and ethnic groups, in which 
each of them is a potential aggressor; 
(b) a vertical system of co-operation between each of these parties and the European 
Union (In Bjelic, 2002:8) 
 
I would add that the maintenance of such dichotomy of antagonisms on the regional level on 
one hand, and the cooperation on the global (Western-governed) level on the other – accounts 
for existence and influence of the fears and insecurity of being left in-between the worlds 
(albeit with a sort-of a cultural centrality). In fact, the interaction between antagonisms and 
aspiration for association with the western, ‗European‘ structures appears symbiotic, as one is 
perpetually fuelled by the other: in order to gain a respectable membership with those 
structures, an ethnic society must differ from the rest of the neighbourhood. This strategy of 
representation of one‘s ‗European‘ origin as opposed to other‘s ‗oriental‘ traits characterizes 
those societies with a genuine ‗propensity to construct internal orientalisms‘, as noted by 
Todorova as she refers to the feature of Bakic-Hayden‘s ‗nesting‘ orientalisms: 
 
‗A Serb is an ‗easterner‘ to a Slovene, but a Bosnian would be an ‗easterner‘ to the 
Serb although geographically situated to the west; the same applies to the Albanians 
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who, situated in the western Balkans, are perceived as easternmost by the rest of the 
Balkan nations‘. (1997:58) 
 
In her attempts to explain the geographical magnitude of such attitudes, Todorova recalls that 
this is certainly not an isolated phenomenon that regards the Balkans only. Bakic-Hayden 
shares a similar opinion as she defines balkanism as a ‗variation‘ of orientalism, which in its 
localized, nesting, mode occurs commonly among societies and nations of what is nominally 
defined as the Eastern Europe: 
 
‗This tension is, of course, a permanent feature of Russian identity and it exists also, 
with more subdued overtones, among Poles. East is a relational category, depending 
on the point of observation: East Germans are ‗eastern‘ for the West Germans, Poles 
are ‗eastern‘ to the East Germans, Russians are ‗eastern‘ to the Poles (...) Greece, 
because of its unique status within the European Union, is not considered ‗eastern‘ by 
its neighbours in the Balkans although it occupies the role of the ‗easterner‘ within 
the European institutional framework. For all Balkan peoples, the common 
‗easterner‘ is the Turk, although the Turk perceives himself as Western compared to 
real ‗easterners,‘ such as Arabs. (1997:58) 
 
In the context of this research, the feature of nesting orientalism is of particular relevance for 
it accounts for—often—desperate attempts by societies, nations, social groups and even 
individuals to (a) disassociate from what has been discursively ‗naturalised‘ as pejorative 
category of cultural, political belonging, and (b) to domesticate that ‗naturalised‘ discourse on 
the Balkans through addressing its accusatory and castigating aspect onto the immediate 
‗other‘ in the neighbourhood. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, such a chain-reaction 
for collective de-orientalisation and de-balkanization proved to have been critical for 
deterioration of the inter-ethnic relations and subsequent descent to war and hatred. However, 
such a rhetoric of castigation, racialization between and within the nations should also be 
understood as an aspiration to associate with the local projections of ‗the West‘ and ‗Europe‘, 
considered as beacons of progress, democracy and welfare. And, as noted by Todorova, to the 
nations of the Balkans democracy was introduced as a power-word with identical 
connotations as those embedded in the notion of progress at the close of the 20th century 
(1997:110) – as signifiers of western/European excellence. I argue that the introduction of 
these notions in the public discourse of Balkan societies represented an attempt to import and 
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domesticate western institutional and discursive practices, as part of one‘s ideological and 
political agenda of achieving ideological compliance with the aspired other through a 
technology of resembling that other in order to induce its legitimation and acceptance. In this 
respect, ‗Europe‘ was a destination: a geographic, cultural, economic destination and getaway 
from the despair of the Balkan‘s periphery and desolation. 
 
‗What did exist in the Balkan vernaculars of the nineteenth century and throughout 
the first half of the twentieth, and may still be encountered among a certain 
generation, was the phrase ‗to go to Europe‘.‘ (1997:43) 
 
In the chapters 6 and 7 I will analyse the ways in which the discourse about ‗Europe‘—as 
well as democracy—was employed in the context of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist 
narrative; ‗Europe‘ was thus achievable through either ‗going‘ to it, through enabling the 
local conditions for it to ‗come‘ and establish itself as a sociopolitical rule – which ultimately 
connoted the sociocultural and sociopolitical ‗returning‘ to it after centuries and decades of 
perceived, forceful separation. I argue that ‗Europe‘ represented an idealised endpoint of 
which the Balkan nations—including Kosovo Albanians and Albanians in general—believed 
that they are part of, both historically and culturally. It represents a projected centre of their 
primordial belonging from which they were deprived and expelled through the turmoil of 
foreign/eastern invasions and conquests—be that the Ottoman empire (until the 20th century) 
or the communist rule (during the 20th century). As noted by Sulstarova (2009), the 
idealisation of the interwar period by the Balkan societies – the years in the aftermath of the 
Ottoman retreat that preceded the communist regime—represent a frequent nostalgic feature 
in the discourse of the lost ‗Europeanness‘: 
 
The notion of ‗returning to Europe‘ has had a strong cultural appeal in the Eastern 
European countries during transitions and many East Europeans look nostalgically at 
the interwar period as the time when their country was part of—or at least was 
entering—Europe. In other words, ‗returning to Europe‘ is interpreted as ‗returning to 
history‘, after the long communist ‗pause‘. (2009:699) 
 
The Communist detour 
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The grand ideas of ‗progress‘, ‗modernization‘ and ‗nation‘ have had a turbulent and  rather 
unfortunate political journey with the histories of the Balkan societies during the 20 th century. 
Introduced as the power-concepts of an era – condensed ideological epistemes of the Western 
modernity, a roadmap to its legitimacy – they were soon to be adopted within a sociopolitical 
formation standing at the opposite semantic end of nationalism, nation-state and liberal 
democracy: the Communism. By the second half of the 20th century, they were to evolve into 
vestiges of a regime which was to develop and strengthen aspects of political culture in 
Southeast Europe ‗that was inimical to democracy-building‘ (Gallagher, 2001). The 
ideological narrative of Communism would drain the conceptual resources of modernity as it 
would channel and engage societies into redefining local views and knowledges about group 
identity, national history and political legitimacy. In the context of relevance to this research, 
communism as a specific discursive formation of the times (1945-1990) was shifting 
eastwards – both geographically and ideologically – as the centre of production of its 
meaning and interpretation as a political regime was transferred to the Soviet Union.  
 
In the next chapters, I will analyse in more detail the orientalist discursive technologies that 
were employed by the (Kosovo) Albanian ethnonationalist elites in the process of systematic 
‗easternisation‘ of communist rule as an alien, un-European and oppressive hegemony. 
Additionally, I will try to identify and explain the specific discursive feature of generalization 
and equalization of the Islamic Ottoman Empire (until 1912), the Soviet-modelled 
communism (until 1990) and the Christian-Orthodox Serbian domination (until 1999)—and 
their ultimate definition as the ‗oriental‘ ideological and institutional practices. 
 
Here, however, in a broader, regional context, I argue that such geographical, cultural and 
political journey of the modernist ideology of Communism, from the Western (inception) to 
the Eastern (application) hemisphere could be viewed as a grand discursive/paradigmatic 
shift that would, naturally, induce the dislocation of the very epistemological centre that was 
producing orientalism as a representational system. Interestingly so, it was not the case. 
Despite the fact that—as an ideology—Communism embroiled the conceptual quintessence 
of key principles of Enlightenment and modernity (reference to Thomas More‘s ‗Utopia‘ 
(1516), Eduard Bernstein‘s ‗Cromwell and Communism‘ (1895), writings of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau or biographies of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier), the Communism acquired the 
connotations of ‗easternness‘ quickly after the Russian Revolution in 1917. While already 
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perceived as dangerous to the sociopolitical order of the western European states at the outset 
of the 20th century, it became defined as ‗alien‘ and ‗foreign‘ in the aftermath of the birth of 
the Soviet Union, as noted by Hupchick (2001): 
 
Although rightly viewed by the West‘s traditional establishment as radical and 
dangerous, Marxism was not considered ‗Eastern‘ until Vladimir Lenin‘s Marxist 
Bolsheviks took control of Russia (...) Thereafter it acquired an overriding 
‗foreignness‘ and ‗Easternness‘ for westerners (...) Marxism was a foreign ideology 
imposed by force on an Orthodox European society (2001:382) 
 
Both as a narrative and as a political formation, Communism would be remembered as an 
‗eastern‘ invention, bearing ‗eastern‘ social characteristics and/or ‗barbarian‘ (Kovacevic, 
2010) collectivist features. ‗Industrialization‘, ‗agrarian‘ reform‘, ‗proletariat‘, ‗equality‘ and 
‗workers class‘ were the leading epistemes and signifiers of the Communist narrative which, 
in combination with an ideologically transformed connotations of ‗democracy‘, 
‗independence, ‗people‘ and ‗progress‘ engaged in a policy of aggressive detachment from 
the realm of civilisational interchange between states, nations and societies. Nationalist 
ideologies were to be replaced with Internationalist ideology—which Hatzopoulos (2008) 
defines as the combination of ‗communism, liberal internationalism and agrarianism‘—of the 
‗dictatorship of the Proletariat‘. Further, the nations ruled by the Communist institutions of 
power evolved to adapt within a self-centred and oppression-based sociopolitical formation 
and a system of knowledge, underpinned by application of the doctrine of inhibition of the 
(ethno)national identity and political mobilisation on nationalist grounds, as noted by Fowkes 
(2002): 
 
The period of Communist control, starting roughly in 1917 in the case of the Soviet 
lands and around 1945 in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, used to be seen as a 
time when the differences between nations were suppressed and a determined effort 
was made to eradicate nationalism. In this view, the course of history was diverted for 
a half century or more, only to revert to ‗normality‘ after 1989 or, in the Soviet case, 
1991. (2002:71) 
 
Although the limited space of this research will not allow for a deeper analysis of the 
influence, effects and consequences of the Communist discourse in the construction and 
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reconstruction of individual and collective identities, the confronting ‗East-West‘ 
epistemologies and so forth – nevertheless, for the purposes of this research we will focus 
briefly on few major features of its Yugoslav variant and its peculiar relationship with 
nationalism. 
 
According to Hupchick, the Communist regime of the former Yugoslavia that grew from the 
anti-fascist struggle of Partisan organisations maintained an ‗ideological flexibility with 
nationalism‘ (2002:372). This makes it differ a great deal from the nature and structure of 
Communist states in the rest of Eastern Europe. The utilization of nationalist sentiments of all 
stripes—overt embracing of every nationalist program—contributed to popular recruitment 
during the period of WWII and evolved into a widely-accepted political ideology in its 
aftermath. Its leader, Josip Broz-Tito ‗deftly tied the antifascist struggle to the old ‗Yugoslav‘ 
national problem by considering the two as one‘ (2002:373). A more thorough account is to 
be found in analysis by Hatzopoulos (2008): 
 
Communist rule in the region is assumed to adopt a nationalist guise, dominated by 
‗supposedly internationalist-minded leaders (who) continued to pursue the traditional 
objectives of their individual countries‘. Either playing the game of ‗false 
appearances‘ tout court, preserving appearances whilst ‗manipulating nationalism in a 
pragmatic way‘, or ‗making an open appeal to nationalist sentiment‘ communism, in 
the Balkans, was ‗deeply nationalist in nature despite its internationalist phraseology‘. 
. . Balkan communism underwent—necessarily—an, inner metamorphosis when it 
was forced to face the fact that the ‗nation rather than class has been the main 
political category throughout the region‘s recent history and still is today (2008:61) 
 
Yet, at its birth as a political regime, Communism was perceived as a formation that had 
induced major sociopolitical changes which some historians attributed to a ‗new spirit‘ that 
was created among the Balkan populations based on massive rejection of the traditional 
societal order. In the wider context of what is today defined as ‗Eastern Europe‘ it promoted 
the radical transformation of gender relationships and policies, industrialization of rural 
strata, the discrediting of traditional leadership models through sociopolitical presence of 
peasantry and youth – which altogether assisted in the reinvention and redefinition of a 
‗modern‘, ‗Socialist‘, society. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, the aim of the 
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communist leadership was to ‗get beyond the ethnic differences and produce ‗Yugoslavs‘ 
(Fowkes, 2002:87) as a supra-ethnic, modern national construction. 
 
In the context of Yugoslav nations under Communist rule, the technology of disassociating 
from the communist paradigm was stemming from the distinct ethnonationalist discourse that 
was re-emerging at the eve of its collapse, followed with a subsequent manifestation of 
orientalist features. I tend to agree with a number of experts in the field of Balkan studies, 
such as Hupchick (2001), Fowkes (2002), Hatzopoulos (2008), Ramet (2002) and others that 
the analysis of the Yugoslav demise ought to take into account the: 
 
‗parameters of competing nationalisms which ultimately brought the whole erection 
down. . . its constituent national groups sentenced to misperceive, distrust and 
ultimately turn against one another‘ (Hatzopoulos, 2008:63). 
 
I argue that the final moments of Yugoslavia—the launch of military aggression against 
Slovenia, Croatia (1991), Bosnia (1992) and finally, Kosovo (1998)—were preceded and 
followed by an unparalleled exercise of ethnonationalist and ethnoreligious rhetoric which, 
specifically, in the case of Kosovo Albanians (and Bosnian Muslims) developed traits of a 
distinct orientalist discourse. An excerpt from a commentary in the Serbian weekly ‗Duga‘ 
from 1990 provides an adequate example: 
 
The truth about Kosovo and Metohija has not changed much over time, so that even 
today Muslim fundamentalism, persistently knocking at the door of Kosovo and 
Metohija, is trying to approach Europe. It is hard to believe that Europe is not aware 
of this. Even those in Europe who do not hold Serbia close to their hearts know very 
well that this old Balkan state represents the last barrier to the ongoing onslaught and 
aggression of Islam (Saric, August, 18, p.67-69) 
 
Projection of religious divide and difference appears as a specific feature of ethnonationalist 
discourse across the former Yugoslav republics/nations. Communism was to be overthrown 
through emphasizing the national identity—and, subsequently, the nation-state—as the only 
acceptable norm of modern ‗Europeanness‘. However, the reiteration of such ‗Europeanness‘ 
was only seen possible through negative comparisons taken from the immediate vicinity; 
driven by the fears of their generalized depiction as ‗one among‘ the similar societies from 
102 
 
the ‗socialist bloc‘ by the western-European balkanist discourse ‗the orientalist paradigm 
gained prominence (. . .) as the old socialist paradigms have faded‘, notes Bakic-Hayden 
(1992:5): 
 
The new image of the ‗brother nations‘ of Yugoslavia was one of mistrust, threat and 
exploitation, each so characterizing the others. Thus, Serbs discovered that some 
Serbian industries had been transferred to Slovenia (. . .) Slovenes and Croats, on the 
other hand, complained that their money was going to Belgrade and that their sons 
were drafted to fight Serbia‘s battles against the majority Albanians in Kosovo 
(ibid:6) 
 
It is here that Mocnik‘s (2002) dichotomy of ‗horizontal antagonisms‘ between ethnicities 
and ‗vertical system of cooperation‘ between them and the ‗European Union‘ emerges as a 
useful guidance: for, the outburst of Yugoslav ethnonationalist rage was formally based on 
individual aspirations of its nations for the Western legitimacy. 
 
Such a feature was—and remains to-date—the fuel behind the ideological core of its post-
Communist discourse. I adhere to the view that, although manifested differently, there is a 
number of relevant similarities between the rise of ethnonationalism after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and its revamping after the collapse of Yugoslavia, as described by Henry 
Kissinger (1999) in his analysis on the war in Kosovo: 
 
...(it) is the product of a conflict going back over centuries. It takes place at the 
dividing line between the Ottoman and Austrian empires, between Islam and 
Christianity, and between Serbian and Albanian nationalism. The ethnic groups have 
lived together peacefully only when that coexistence was imposed – as under foreign 
empires or the Tito dictatorship (Newsweek, 5 April, 1999:12) 
 
It was, indeed, a struggle for ‗the return to Europe‘ through mutual annihilation of the 
neighbourhood; a symbolical—yet, tragic—exercise of one‘s ‗Europeanness‘ through 
resorting to medieval stereotyping of the oriental other constructed and rediscovered through 
the prism of ethnonational mythologies. In the context of this research—analysed in more 
detail in following chapters—the beginning of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia marks a 
specific discursive and representational ‗time-warp‘, as the anti-Communist public discourse 
103 
 
swiftly slipped into an arena of reviving and revising of ethnic myths highlighting the 
existence of the pre-Yugoslav ‗European‘ condition of its ideologically ‗subjugated‘ 
societies: a genuine sociopolitical and sociocultural back-to-the-future exercise. Similarly to 
the reinvention of their ancient ethnic worth at the sunset of the Ottomans, the majority of 
ethnic nations of the former Yugoslavia by 1990 indulged in expelling the formally supra-
ethnic communist decades from the collective memory of history. ‗In Serbia and Croatia, 
employment of political and historical amnesia, the past and the present of a nation—as well 
as of its each and every individual—enabled adequate reformulation which would be in 
harmony with the new political and nationalist practice of authoritarian regimes of Milosevic 
and Tudjman‘, writes Despotovic (2009:66). 
 
The aim of the revision of the imminent, pre-hegemonic past, remained the same with the one 
from the outset of the 20th century: confirmation of the pre-existing Europeanness‘ before the 
great sociopolitical shift (Ottoman and/or communist). It was the exercise of the ideological 
modernity in reverse: instead of reaching out to the future democracy lying imminently 
beyond the communist dictatorship—a general trait of Eastern-European post-communist 
public discourse—ethnic nations of Yugoslavia reverted to imagined returning to the 
perceived democratic ideal that allegedly existed in their imminent past: the alleged pre-
communist belle-époque of political pluralism, advanced national monarchies and 
parliamentarian democracy. Again, a competition was launched and it regarded the urgency 
of individual nations to invoke one‘s pre-communist (preferably, anti-communist) ‗European‘ 
legacy, that would enable it acquisition of a fast-lane ticket to the EU accession. Below are a 
few examples that illustrate the technology and manifestation of distinct ‗nesting‘ orientalist 
approach that became widely used in the inter-ethnic polemics with respect to one‘s 
‗Europeanness‘ and the other‘s absence thereof: 
 
We Slovenians have this problem of identifying with the pro-Asian an pro-African 
Yugoslavia. We cannot identify ourselves with such Yugoslavia which confronts with 
our character that was coined through a thousand-years of history. Symbolical fact 
that Slovenian rulers were Charlemagne, Charles V and Napoleon is of less 
importance: much more important is the fact that we personify a way of life that is 
devised in the Western Europe (in Bakic Hayden, 2006 (1987):42). 
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Croatian accession with the states of Middle Europe, region that it adhered to 
throughout its history – except for the recent past, when the balkanisms and the so-
called national representatives were constantly castigating Croatian state territory 
through an Asian form of governance – while the justified rage and protests of certain 
Croatians were labelled as terrorism, even fascism...(ibid:43) 
 
In India, the initial Sorabian or Serbian cradle, where, some 5000 years before the 
birth of Christ, existed two Serbian states: the great Sarbarian, in the region of Gang 
(river), and coastal Panovian . . . it turns out that the Serbs were such an ancient 
nation that, compared to the Old Testament, they appear older than Adam . . .(in 
Gavrilovic et al, 2009 (1994):19) 
 
The world will face a tectonic cataclysm of unparalleled proportions which will be 
survived by a group of people that can be sheltered under a single pear tree. . . Which, 
by the way, is a metaphor for the Serbs, descendants of Sorabs and predecessors of all 
Europeans. Serbian language will remain the only one in the planet, the only one 
capable of sustaining communication with civilisations from other planets. For, Serbs 
can trace their genesis beyond the bright, cosmic side with the face of the 
Atlantis...(Radic, 2003:83)  
 
These, by all means grotesque, excerpts should offer a glimpse of what used to be commonly 
encountered as the ethnonational—and, specifically in the context of Serbian and Croatian 
conflict—the ethnoreligious lingo of the exchange of extremist views between the political 
and (quasi)intellectual elites of two beleaguered nations in the period before, during and well 
after the armed conflict in 1990s. It appears almost pointless to emphasize the extreme, 
disparaging orientalist discourse employed from each of the parties in the conflict: here, the 
other is either ‗pro-Asian‘ (direct allusion to the ‗Eastern‘ roots of communism and the Serbs 
as its die-hard followers), either ‗pro-African‘ (racist tendency unhindered here) – or, simply, 
of divine descent and the source of all there is ‗European‘ (a Serbian response to regional 
rivals and Western criticism of its aggressive policies). 
 
A uniquely (former) Yugoslav phenomenon, this unprecedented slide of the short-lived anti-
communist discourse into the war-mongering ethnonationalist-chauvinist representational 
practice of castigating the immediate other was operating on Mocnik‘s ‗antagonisms‘ 
principle: it was about uncritical construction one‘s ‗Europeannes‘ through uncritical denying 
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it to the other. According to Bianchini, (1994b), such practices were about glorification of 
parts of the past praised in the present, so that they could be used to sketch out a different 
future: 
 
‗...This helped to keep alive, as time went by, a deep-seated sense of instability, 
which combined with the aspiration towards a ‗nobler mission‘ experienced, albeit in 
different ways, by all (...) The defence of Christianity or Catholicism, as well as the 
ideas of ‗bastion‘ and of ‗protection of Europe‘ (for example against Islam) have 
permeated the identities of these groups who have long been living on a geopolitical 
and cultural border since Diocletian times.‘ (1994b:101) 
 
As discussed earlier, the dramatic fall of Yugoslav Communism was due to the ingredient of 
‗the hidden syntax‘ (to quote Claude Levis-Strauss) of nationalism that was embedded in its 
fabric from the outset. Although formally an ‗internationalist‘, supra-ethnic and a ‗non-class‘ 
sociopolitical formation, the actual policy and actions of the Yugoslav Communist elites were 
either based on, or driven by, ethnonationalist tendencies; over time, the usage of 
ethnonationalist signifiers within its ideological realm—Serb ‗domination‘, Slovene 
‗detachment‘ Croatian ‗independentism‘, Albanian ‗separatism‘, Bosnian ‗Muslimness‘, and 
so forth—became part to the communist discursive practice which evolved from ethnic 
intolerance to outright hatred. In many ways, the story of Yugoslav Communism speaks 
about the impossible relationship between Marxism and nationalism, as its subsequent 
dissolution into ethnoreligious enmities produced a completely different post-Communist 
history of the area – as opposed to the rest of the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. 
 
Therefore, one can hardly argue for the existence of some mainstream variation of former 
Yugoslav post-Communist discursive practice that would bear similarities with the rest of the 
former Communist societies from the Eastern Europe. Moreover, the collapse of Yugoslav 
Communism in the sense of a state/political infrastructure was not applied linearly across the 
former federation, a fact that added to further worsening of mutual misperceptions as to the 
common goals of reformatory policies. Whereas the republican branches of the Communist 
League of Slovenia and Croatia (including Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina) saw their 
disappearance from the political scene during the period between 1989-1990, republics such 
as Serbia and Montenegro retained the party infrastructure throughout the most of the 1990s. 
In Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, communist apparatus and bureaucracy was 
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swiftly replaced in first parliamentary elections with the predominantly ethnonationalist cadre 
(Croatia, Bosnia) and reformatory/national-liberal (Slovenia). Such transitions in the 
republics of Serbia and Montenegro were merely cosmetic, confined to a performative level: 
in Serbia, the Communist League was renamed (the Socialist Party of Serbia) and had its 
political structure virtually intact while the former head of its Central Committee, Slobodan 
Milosevic, was elected as the party chairman. The same model was applied in Montenegro: 
its Communist League was renamed into the Democratic Socialists‘ Party under the same 
leadership and the party structure.8 
 
Such a disparate structural and ideological evolution within a still common federal state 
quickly set the stage for a ferocious war of words, a confrontation of epistemologies abundant 
in orientalist constructions and ethnic castigations; it plunged into the rhetoric of ‗Europeans‘ 
against ‗Asians‘, a war between ‗western servility‘ and ‗eastern despotism‘, between 
‗traitors‘ of the Yugoslav idea and its ‗saviours.‘ 
 
Perhaps the explanation about the title of her book, ‗Balkan Babel‘, by Sabrina Ramet (2002) 
could be used as an adequate illustration here: 
 
I have given this book the title ‗Balkan Babel‘ because I have felt that the biblical 
story of the Tower of Babel bears a certain allegorical resemblance to the Story of 
Yugoslavia. In the case of Babel, the people of the area had largely friendly and 
cooperative relations over a period of time . . . But as the Book of Genesis tells us, 
soon after they had embarked on the joint project (of tower building) they found 
themselves speaking different languages, with the result that work on the great project 
broke down. The story of Babel may be read, thus, as a story of the failure of 
cooperative action. (2002:3) 
 
The discursive equalization of communism with ‗easternness‘—even Ottomanism, in terms 
of an imposed, foreign derivation—induced the collective exercise of disassociation with it 
across the republics and nations of the former Yugoslavia. As discussed earlier in this 
                                                 
8 For exhaustive accounts on the chronology of the dissolution of the Socialist  Federation of Yugoslavia, see Meier, Victor: 
‗Yugoslavia, A History of Its Demise‘ (Routledge, 1999), Benson, Leslie: ‗Yugoslavia, A Concise History‘ (Palgrave 2001), 
Vladisavljevic, Nebojsa: ‗Serbia‘s Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of communism and Nationalist  Mobilisation‘ 
(Palgrave, 2008) 
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chapter, the new western, ‗European‘ knowledge that was castigating the communism as a 
failed doctrine was necessitating the need to conceal any relation that a society might have 
had with that unwanted sociopolitical formation. Jansen (2005) provides a brisk illustration of 
such collective subjugation of previous knowledge, legacy—even memories—by the 
Croatian nationalist elites during the last days of communist Yugoslavia: 
 
Sticking to the political amnesia, already perfected by the nationalists in other post-
socialist countries, Croatian nationalists were projecting the previous communist 
system as something that was imposed from the outside—namely, by the Serbs, 
rather than the Russians. Thus, the nationalism managed to collectively liberate 
Croatians from all traces of the daily routine of collaboration and conformism: 
innocent by birth, Croats were projecting themselves as forced to enter the Tito‘s 
(communist) Yugoslavia which represented an impossible combination of clashing 
cultures—and where they felt dreadful all the time. (2005:25) 
 
The subjugation of the communist knowledge—to paraphrase Foucault—was applied through 
the domestication of the new, western, anti-communist paradigm. I argue that such collective 
‗political amnesia‘ about life under communist rule became among the major conditions for 
achieving the ‗Europeanization‘ standards by the late 1980s for most of the former Yugoslav 
nations. To all Balkan societies that experienced the communist rule, it was the period spent 
under an alien political regime and ideological doctrine; without exceptions, the Balkan 
nations who aspire accession with the European Union, project the communist rule as (yet 
another) eastern hegemony that prevented them from the rightful ‗return‘ to their primordial 
European belonging. 
 
Ultimately, the debate about orientalism and balkanism shows that the discourses of 
constructing the other of ‗the West‘ and ‗Europe‘ continue to permeate the cultural, 
intellectual and political narratives in both European ‗proper‘ (including north America) and 
in its ‗eastern‘ mirrors, such as the Balkans. Functioning as distinct representational systems 
of identifying and measuring the differences of non-western societies with those western and 
European, both orientalism and balkanism affect the manner in which those societies 
perceived as marginal and peripheral adopt the knowledge about themselves. This chapter has 
attempted to explain the manner in which from Said, to Todorova, Bakic-Hayden, Bjelic and 
Buchowski, the orientalist narrative was modified, transformed and adapted with the aim of 
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maintaining the its fundamental purpose: to construct the Europe‘s ‗other‘ in both 
geographical and sociopolitical terms. 
 
The discursive practice of orientalism and balkanism have proven essential in the process of 
formation of the ‗modern‘ concept of nation in the Balkans. They were employed by the local 
nationalist elites as a means to redefine the national identity, its ‗westernness‘ and ‗European‘ 
origin. The following chapters of this research will analyse in further length the effects of 
such a discourse on the formation and the development of the Albanian ethnonationalist 
ideology in the periods of its introduction—by the end of the 19th century—and its of revival, 
by the end of 20th century. 
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Chapter 5. 
 
Methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the methodology applied with the research ahead—an analysis of the 
evolution and transformation of the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist narrative through the 
influences of the discourse of orientalism—as defined by the work of Edward Said (1978)—
and, subsequently, that of balkanism (Todorova, 1997) which Bakic-Hayden (1992) defines 
as one of its ‗variations‘. I argue that the internalised component—‗text‘—of the 
orientalist/balkanist approach within the ethnonationalist narrative constructed, shaped and 
modified the Kosovo/Albanian body of knowledge about its ethnic, historical and political 
identity; as noted by Jorgensen & Phillips, ‗no discourse is a closed entity: rather, it is 
constantly being transformed through contact with other discourses‘ (2002:6). Therefore, I 
understand this research in the context of ‗discursive struggle‘ (ibid) between the various 
systems of knowledge which influenced the notion, perceptions and projections of categories 
of ‗nationhood‘, ‗national identity‘, ‗democracy‘, ‗Europe‘ and the ‗West‘ among Albanian 
societies in both Kosovo and Albania proper. 
 
Through analysis of selected samples of a body of ‗text‘—indeed, ‗knowledge‘—I aim to 
identify the presence, form of manifestation and influence of the orientalist/balkanist 
discourse on the ethnonationalist Kosovo/Albanian narrative about the nation. Also, I 
examine the social situations that were affected/produced through such influence of power, 
i.e. the relations of dominance, discrimination and control within the Kosovo/Albanian 
society, as well as between Kosovo/Albanian societies (in both Kosovo and Albania), 
between them and the neighboring Balkan societies—and, ultimately, between them and the 
western and/or ‗international‘ political authorities. 
 
Here, the dualist formulation ‗Kosovo/Albanian‘ is intentional: it represents my attempt to 
illustrate the complex geopolitical condition and historical background of this 
society/societies. In short, ethnic Albanians were part of a single, homogenous community 
during the reign of the Ottoman Empire (15th-20th century). The process of its dissolution in 
the region was followed with Balkan Wars (1912-1913) during which a number of territories 
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inhabited by ethnic Albanians became integral parts of the upcoming, neighboring nation-
states. The territory of the newly-established state of Albania (1912) failed to include a 
sizeable number of ethnic-Albanians residing in surrounding areas—formerly known as 
‗Ottoman provinces‘ or ‗vilayets‘ (Vickers, 1995:x). Kosovo was one of them. In the new 
geopolitical reality that ensued in the aftermath of Balkan Wars, populations of former 
vilayets alike Kosovo became national minorities in the newly formed nation states, such 
Greece, Montenegro and the Kingdom of Serbia that would later evolve into a federalized 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia9. The largest concentration of Albanians in the latter was in the 
province of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians were imposed a status of a subdued national 
minority throughout various stages of transformation of Yugoslavia—from the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
The research ahead recognises the fact that the emergence of the narrative about the nation 
among Albanians took place few decades before the administrative partition of their lands by 
1912. Consequently, the first part of the research analysis (Chapter 4, the period beginning 
with 1880s) is compelled to treat the notion of ‗Albanians‘ within a framework of a 
geographically, politically and culturally homogenous ethnicity (for further reading on the 
subject, see Malcolm 1998, Vickers 1995). The second part of the analysis (Chapter 5, the 
period beginning with 1980s) focuses specifically on the ethnonationalist discourse of 
Albanians in Kosovo who, in time, developed an autonomous variation of this narrative due 
to different reality produced after geopolitical partition and life under the rule of another 
nation-state. Therefore, the research analysis is divided into two separate chapters defined 
through distinct temporal perspective: 
 
 1880-1930. Analysis of the construction of the common, unified Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse during the final days of inhabiting a distinct and 
homogenous geo-social space—i.e. the period prior to the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire. This period is of particular relevance to the study as it refers to the pivotal 
stage of formation of the Albanian national identity, otherwise known as the period of 
Albanian National Rebirth Movement (see Vickers, 1995, pp. 30-44) 
 
                                                 
9 For further insight, please refer to: Malcolm, Noel: ‗Kosovo, A Short History‘, Macmillan 1998, specifically pp. 239-264. 
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 1980-2000. Analysis of distinct, Kosovo Albanian, ethnonationalist narrative in the 
context of their political resistance as a national minority in the former Socialist 
Federative Yugoslavia (1945-1991) and, further, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(1991-1999). More specifically, the analysis covers the period of the final dissolution 
of the former Yugoslav federation which coincided with the anti-communist 
movements across the countries of then-Eastern European Communist bloc. 
 
A number of books, studies and research on the history of the region—and 
Kosovo/Albanians—has been employed with the research with the aim of establishing a 
stronger temporal context of the periods from which the analysed text had originated10. Also, 
numerous external accounts, studies and scholarly articles about Albanian history, their social 
reality and geopolitical conditions of the Balkans region are invoked with the research aiming 
the illustration of internal influence of such views on Albanian ethnonationalist elites which, 
consequently, influenced the construction and transformation of their ‗body of knowledge‘ 
about the nation, national identity and nationalist ideology. In line with Wodak‘s observation, 
I argue that such accounts have assisted in internalisation and naturalisation of the 
‗relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control‘ (2001:2) through the 
language which is detected and analysed in the diverse corpus of the text-sample that was 
selected for this research. 
 
A short history of a discourse? 
 
In this respect then, this research represents a combination of the historiographic accounts 
about the Balkans—both Albania and Kosovo Albanians—as well as the discourse analysis 
of a diverse corpus of texts illustrating their respective ethnonationalist narrative. Perhaps, in 
a more specified manner, it represents an analysis of the evolution/change of ethnonationalist 
narrative through particular historical periods with specific emphasis on the (external) 
influences and other discourses that triggered its continuous alteration. Indeed, I would 
expect this research to be understood as a brief examination of the pivotal effects of the 
orientalist discourse in both construction and reconstruction of the Albanian ethnonationalist 
narrative, whether in Albania or in Kosovo. 
 
                                                 
10 See section about sampling and sources methodology at the end of this chapter  
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The central hypothesis of this research appears two-fold: initially, I argue that along with the 
introduction—indeed, importation—of the western-modeled idea of the nation-state in the 
Balkans (circa 1870s), the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire produced the ideological core 
of the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative as we know it today. Subsequently, the demise of 
the former Socialist Yugoslav federation (circa 1990s)—and the communist era in general—
has been reintroduced through the discourse of, yet again, western-modeled idea of a 
democratic society based on the fundaments of an independent nation-state. I argue that, 
while during the 1880s the western narrative about the Balkans—and Albanians—could be 
classified as a general orientalist discourse, by the 1990s it evolves into its distinct variation, 
that of balkanism.  And, as noted by Todorova (1997) who coined the term, while in the 
1880s the discursive binary opposition was positioned in the relation of Western/progressive 
vs. Eastern/primitive, in the 1990s it was reinvented through the Western/democratic vs. 
Eastern/totalitarian. 
 
I was stimulated to apply such conjoined methodological approach—a combination of 
chronological/historiographic accounts and the analysis of the ethnonationalist discourse 
through a variety of sample texts—in accordance to an observation by Bjelic (2002) about the 
scholarly dilemmas regarding the adequate methodology for doing a critical analysis of 
balkanist/orientalist discourse: 
 
Balkanism as a critical study is a system of representation based on the historical 
perception of the Balkans by colonial rulers. These perceptions took root as schemes 
of self-recognition for Balkan peoples, so their study must be based on historical as 
well as discursive analysis. The very terms ‗Balkan‘ and ‗Balkanism,‘ (. . .) cannot be 
divorced from the history of the place (2002:7) 
 
The focus of the study in this research remains the language—specifically, the written form 
of ethnonationalist discourse; however, in few occasions I refer to particular relevance of 
visual images as an integral part of the analysed ethnonationalist ‗text‘, drawing upon 
observations by Norman Fairclough (1992) about extending the notion of the discourse ‗to 
cover other symbolic forms such as visual images and texts which are combinations of words 
and images‘ (ibid:4). In this context, the research represents an attempt to put together a 
language analysis and social theory as it focuses on combining of this ‗social-theoretical 
sense of ‗discourse‘ with the ‗text-and-interaction‘ sense in linguistically-oriented discourse 
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analysis‘ (ibid). Again, in line with Fairclough, the specific interest of this research is the 
analysis and the investigation of social change that—in the context of the Kosovo/Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse—followed the evolution/transformation of meanings established in 
earlier discursive structures. As observed by Jorgensen & Phillips, ‗concrete language use 
always draws on earlier discursive structures as language users build on already established 
meanings‘ (2002:7). In this respect, the research engages in detecting the intertextual 
analogies of the contemporary, 1980s, ethnonationalist narrative with those from the 1880s 
and the ‗Rebirth‘ period. Further, I adhere to Jorgensen & Phillips observation that changes in 
the discourse represent ‗a means through which the social world is changed‘, and that 
‗struggles in the discursive level take part in changing, as well as reproducing, the social 
reality‘ (2002:9). In this context, the research engages in a chronological analysis of the 
changes in the ethnonationalist discourse while juxtaposing them with respective social 
actions within a specific historical period. It examines the manners through which categories 
of knowledge and power embedded in certain discursive practice(s) have constructed and 
reconstructed the notions of ethno-national identity, nationalist ideology, political strategy 
and social action in the Kosovo/Albanian society. 
 
From this perspective, I adhere to the view that such notions, as well as the subsequent 
realities that they can establish, are socially constructed: I understand them as dynamic 
categories prone to constant influences, evolution and transformation. Therefore, the 
underlying principles that encouraged me to undertake this research ought to be seen within 
the theoretical framework and key premises that Viven Burr (1995) articulates as basic 
approaches in the social constructionist analysis: 
 
 It represents a critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge—more specifically, 
the knowledge about the nation, national identity and national history. Such approach 
entails that ‗our‘ knowledge of the world should not be treated as ‗objective‘ truth and 
that its representation is not the reflection of the reality ‗out there‘, but rather a 
product of ‗our‘ ways of categorising the world, the product of the discourse (Burr: 
1995:3, in Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:5-7) 
 It takes into account the historical and cultural specifity; in this context, it refers to 
specifities in which Kosovo/Albanian societies were situated during both historical 
periods, in the context of the history of their knowledge about the nation and their 
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nationalist narrative. The research adheres to the position that human beings are 
‗fundamentally historical and cultural beings‘ (ibid) and that their views and the 
knowledge of the world represent ‗products of historically situated interchanges 
among people‘ (Gergen 1985, in Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:5). Such view envisages 
human knowledge as culturally and historically specific and contingent, which, 
consequently, according to Jorgensen & Phillips, represents an anti-foundationalist 
position—as it opposes the view that knowledge can be based on ‗solid, 
metatheoretical base that transcends contingent human actions‘ (ibid). Moreover, such 
view is also anti-essentialist: this research takes into account that the social world is 
constructed discursively and that its character is not pre-given or determined by 
external conditions, therefore ‗people do not posses a set of fixed and authentic 
characteristics or essences‘ (ibid). 
 It attempts to construct a link between knowledge and social processes which 
ultimately entails that ‗knowledge is created through social interaction in which we 
construct common truths and compete about what is true and false‘ (ibid). Therefore, 
to paraphrase Wittgenstein (1961)11, ‗the limits of my language are the limits of my 
world‘, or vice-versa—the limits of one‘s world are manifested through the limits of 
one‘s capacity to articulate it. Hence the chronological/temporal perspective of this 
research: it attempts to detect and analyse the technology of the evolution of the body 
of knowledge about the nation and its transformation with respect to the external 
factors and processes which affected it; as noted earlier, it analyses the shifts of 
meanings in the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist discourse as it struggled with 
continuous influences from other discourses—from those orientalist at the turn of the 
20th century to those balkanist by its end. 
 Finally, this research attempts to create a link between knowledge and social action. 
In line with observation by Jorgensen & Phillips (2002), some forms of action within 
a particular historical period—and/or, a worldview—become ‗natural‘ while others 
unthinkable. In this respect, in Chapter 5, analysis is focused on the sociopolitical 
processes that caused the transformation of the major Kosovo/Albanian 
ethnonationalist paradigm: from that based on the idea of unification with the 
motherland Albania, to that of conceptualizing an independent state Kosovo as the 
                                                 
11 Wittgenstein, Ludwig: ‗Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus‘, trans D.F. Pears & B.F. Guinnes, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul , 
1961 
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fundamental ideological goal. The shift of paradigm ensued the shift in the strategy of 
social/political action and this was, I argue, made possible through the ‗naturalising‘ 
power of the transformed discourse. Further, Jorgensen & Phillips argue that different 
social understandings of the world lead to different social actions: in this context, the 
research ahead explores the manner in which an ethnonationalist ideological fabric is 
changed over time through making some social actions—specifically, nonviolent 
resistance and/or armed struggle—both acceptable and unthinkable, dependently on 
the historical period, available information and discursive practices. 
 
This research understands the concept of representation through adhering to the 
constructionist approach to meaning in language, by recognising its ‗public, social character‘ 
(Hall, 1997:25): 
 
(Constructionists) do not deny the existence of the material world. However, it is not 
material world which conveys meaning: it is the language system or whatever system 
we are using to represent our concepts. It is social actors who use the conceptual 
systems of their culture and the linguistic and other representational systems to 
construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and communicate about that world 
meaningfully to others‘ (1997:25). 
 
Ultimately, this research is about a description, interpretation and explanation of a history of 
an idea about a nation; yet, it is not so much about the articulation and formulation of that 
idea—as it is about the underlying structures, conditions, that formed its discursive basis and 
constructed the social context for its conceptualization, dissemination and institutionalization. 
 
Discourse and its analysis 
 
According to Ruth Wodak (2008), one of the leading scholars in the field, the definition of a 
discourse can range from ‗a historical monument, a lieu de memoire, a policy, a political 
strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related 
conversations, to language per se‘ (2008:1). One could perhaps say that it entails a particular 
way of writing and speaking about something or someone. 
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In the structuralist/poststructuralist debate about whether ‗language determines thought‘ and 
whether ‗our shared lives happen through language‘, Matheson (2005) argues that it is 
difficult ‗to refute the notion that certain patterns that we find in a language shape rather than 
determine what speakers can experience or think‘ (2005:5). The language then, represents ‗a 
store of values and ideas‘ and scholars from both camps study it ‗not so much as part of 
everyday lived activity but more as a structure which shapes the way people can experience 
the world‘ (ibid:4). In this respect, the language is, according to Jorgensen & Phillips ‗a 
machine that generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world‘ (2002:9). 
 
Norman Fairclough proposes the use of the term discourse ‗as a form of social practice rather 
than a purely individual activity‘ (1992:63). He envisages the ‗three-dimensional conception 
of discourse‘, which, according to him, is connected to three analytical traditions: 
 
(a) the tradition of close textual and linguistic analysis within linguistics 
(b) the macrosociological tradition of analysing social practice in relation to 
social structures, and 
(c) the interpretivist or microsociological traditions of seeing social practice as 
something which people actively produce and make sense of (1992:72). 
 
Below is an illustration of such three-dimensional conception of discourse as devised by 
Fairclough (1992:73): 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Three-dimensional conception of the discourse 
 
To Salkie (1995:ix) ‗text‘ and ‗discourse‘ represent ‗a stretch of language that may be longer 
that one sentence‘. According to him, the text and/or discourse analysis is about the manner 
in which the text is produced through the combination of sentences. In other words, as 
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Jorgensen and Philips observe, a discourse ‗is a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)‘ (2002:1). Language then, does not 
represent a mere channel through which the mental states or facts about the world are 
communicated. In line with the definition of the discourse by Michel Foucault, language 
contains the rules that determines which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a 
particular historical moment, period or epoch: 
 
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same 
discursive formation (…Discourse) is made up of a limited number of statements for 
which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not 
an ideal, timeless form (…) it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of 
history (…) posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific 
modes of its temporality. (Foucault 1972: 117) 
 
The functioning of the discourse then represents a discursive practice, which, in turn becomes 
a social practice that, consequently, shapes the social world. In this context, the discourse 
represents a set of practices that ‗systematically form the objects of which they speak‘ 
(Foucault, 1972:49). Therefore, as Fowler notes, discourse represents both speech and writing 
which is seen from the perspective of ‗the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies‘. 
Such beliefs then constitute a way of looking at the world—‘an organisation and 
representation of experience‘ (in Mills, 1997:6) 
 
Language then, is ideological, Matheson (2005) argues as he draws upon Foucault‘s 
understanding of the notion of the discourse as a means to ‗production of knowledge through 
language‘. He notes that an analysis of the language that attempts to go beyond the ‗simple 
sentences‘ enters the realm in which the science of linguistics ‗is not very equipped to 
explain‘ (ibid:9). Therefore, an inter-disciplinary approach becomes a necessity, and that, 
Matheson argues, would involve sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy and 
further disciplines: 
 
The term ‗discourse analysis‘ is used by researchers in this tradition rather than terms 
such as ‗linguistic analysis‘ or ‗textual analysis‘ to signal that language is being 
situated within these wider frameworks on the nature of thought, experience and 
society (2005:3) 
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The analysis of discourse then builds on the tradition of textual analysis when it draws upon 
sociological, anthropological and philosophical heritage (ibid:7). 
Hall (2001), in his analysis of Foucault‘s understanding of discourse and discourse analysis 
notes that the discursive processes ‗govern‘ the manner in which ‗a topic can be meaningfully 
talked about and reasoned about‘ (Hall, 2001:72). The process of ideologization of language, 
according to Foucault is shaped through the formation of the ‗enunciative modalities‘—types 
of discursive activity such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, 
teachings and so forth (in Fairclough, 1992:43). 
 
I argue that the analysis of the discourse in the context of this research reveals the complex 
relationship between differing and, often, contradicting narratives and knowledges about 
nationhood, national identity, political ideology and/or cultural affiliation. The transformation 
of these narratives accounts for the influence of external, hegemonizing discourses which 
adoption induced substantial social changes in respective societies such Kosovo/Albanians. 
One of the major impact of such externally induced knowledges has been the internalisation 
and naturalisation of the condition of national awareness, a feature which occurrence 
coincides with the adoption of the discourse on the nation, national identity and nation-
building which spread across the Balkans during the 19th century from the Western European 
societies (Greenfeld, 1992). 
 
In this respect, the research ahead views the condition of ‗national awareness‘ as an outcome 
of the process of adoption and naturalisation of an external system of knowledge about 
‗nationhood‘ which had transformative powers on both individual and collective level. In the 
context of Kosovo/Albanians, I argue that the ‗awareness‘ about the ‗existence‘ of the 
nation—more specifically the ‗perenniality‘ of its being (Smith, 1981; Anderson, 1983; 
Todorova, 2005)—ought to be examined as indivisive from the discursive practice about its 
‗ancientness‘, ‗autochtonousness‘, ‗Europeanness‘ and, finally, ‗Westernness‘. In the ensuing 
chapters I attempt to expose the causality between the process of ‗discovery‘ of the Balkans 
by the western historiographers, authors and travellers in the late 18 th century—as defined 
brilliantly by Todorova (1997)—and the subsequent introduction of the discourse on the 
‗nation‘ among the Balkans societies, namely Kosovo/Albanians. I understand such causality 
through the prism of the operation of power and domination of discursive processes in which 
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a certain discursive practices—in this case, orientalist/balkanist—succeeded in producing a 
particular system of knowledge about the Balkans—and, Kosovo/Albanians—and, in time, 
became a commonly shared social practice through the processes of naturalisation and 
internalisation. 
 
Intertextuality, interdiscursivity 
 
‗There can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others‘, notes 
Foucault (2002 (1972):98) as he discusses the interweaved nature of knowledge and 
discourse between and within the specific time periods, fields and practices. According to 
Hall (1997:232) intertextuality represents an ‗accumulation of meanings across different 
texts, where one image refers to another, or has its meaning altered by being ‗read‘ in the 
context of other images‘. 
 
In the context of this research, the intertextuality is highlighted as the vehicle in the discourse 
through which knowledge—e.g. the ‗knowledge‘ about the past, the nation, national 
identity—is transferred, transported, influenced or modified through various historical 
periods and contexts. I would recall here Bakhtin‘s (1981 (1935)) observation about the 
notion of the ‗meaning‘ as a process that is produced through the dialogue between two or 
more speakers, arising through ‗give-and-take between speakers‘ (in Hall, 1997:235) 
 
The word in language is half someone else‘s. It becomes one‘s own only when (. . .) 
the speaker appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic expressive 
intention. Prior to this (. . .) the word does not exist in a neutral or impersonal 
language (. . .) rather it exists in other people‘s mouths, serving other people‘s 
intentions: it is from there that one must take the word and make it one‘s own‘ 
(Bakhtin (1981) in Hall, 1997:235-6). 
 
The components of intertextuality and Bakhtinian definition of the meaning as ‗dialogic‘ are 
of specific importance to this study: they represent the processes through which the 
ideological narrative about the nation, the national past and national mythology have been 
passed on, reconstructed and reshaped so that they could serve the political action undertaken 
at the given historical period. 
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As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the temporal transportation of the ethnonationalist 
narrative, its re-invention and reprocession during the specific historical periods represents 
the major reason behind the selection of these two distinct moments in the Kosovo/Albanian 
history of ethnonationalism: the 1870s and the 1990s. The research attempts to expose the 
manner in which the Kosovo Albanian political resistance at the end of the 20th century 
(1989-1999) has been discursively constructed through powerful analogies and fervent 
rearticulation—indeed, re-branding—of the ethnonationalist discourse from the age of 
National Rebirth (1878), a century earlier. In this respect, the research traces the power of 
ideological inertextuality in the ethnonationalist discourse which is capable of: 
 
 Construction of a perception about the temporal continuity of the nation—i.e. the 
narrative of nation‘s ‗perenniality‘ (see Smith, 1981). In case of Kosovo/Albanians 
the research demonstrates that the rearticulation and reproduction of the 
ethnonationalist narrative through intertextuality enabled the strengthening and 
naturalisation of ideological claims about ‗autochtonousness‘ and ‗ancientness‘ of the 
nation. 
 
 Production of a powerful symbolism of ‗perpetual‘ victimisation – i.e. the narrative of 
continuous—even, ‗perennial‘—oppression under the foreign, alien, and, ultimately, 
‗eastern‘ rule. In terms of the focus of this research, the intertextuality between the 
ethnonationalist discourses from different historical periods enabled the establishment 
of parallelisms about the ‗Easterness‘ and ‗anti-Europeaness‘ of the Ottoman Empire 
(until 1890s) and the communist rule (until 1990s). 
 
 Rearticulation of claims about ‗Europeanness‘, and, more importantly, the ‗non-
Easterness‘ of the nation. Intertextuality between the ethnonationalist discourses 
produces important perceptions about political, ideological and cultural ‗continuity‘ 
with respect to its ultimate ‗return to Europe‘, to use Todorova (1997). Recollection 
of the discourse on ‗Europe‘ and ‗nationhood‘ from a century ago and its 
contemporary re-invention as the discourse on ‗democracy‘ and ‗independence‘ 
assisted in establishing both internal and external perceptions of ideological continuity 
of sociopolitical aspirations of the nation. 
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Further, the research views the transformation of the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist 
discourse—and its capacity to accommodate and adapt to the influences of other, competing 
discourses—through the notion and definition of interdiscursivity. According to Jorgensen & 
Phillips, the interdiscursivity occurs when different discourses and genres are ‗articulated 
together in a communicative event‘ (2002:73). It is a form of intertextuality, they argue, 
which itself refers to the ‗condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier 
events‘ (ibid). On the other hand, the interdiscursivity depends on the power relations 
between the discourses and their capacity to produce a respective social reality through 
endorsing a different set of social practices and actions. To this research, the concept of 
discursivity appears relevant in the context of discursive struggle between the 
ethnocentric/irredentist narrative and the liberal nationalist/independentist one—or, indeed, in 
the context of the former eventually evolving  into the latter (see Chapters 4-5). I argue that 
such transformation occurred through the influence of the orientalist discourse about 
Kosovo/Albanians and the Balkans in general by the West‘s political authorities and, 
subsequently, through the intense process of its adoption, internalisation and naturalisation. 
 
Ideology, power and hegemony of discourse 
 
The term ‗ideology‘ often bears pejorative, negative connotation. Initially coined as a word 
that would promote the initiative about establishing the ‗science of ideas‘ by Destutt de Tracy 
(in van Dijk, 1998), the notion of ideology has been commonly attributed to ‗wrong, false, 
distorted or otherwise misguided beliefs‘ (ibid:2). Historically, since its introduction, the 
notion of ‗ideology‘ was related to particular systems of belief which formed the base and 
justification for exercising certain social action. In this respect, the term ideology denoted the 
set of values behind sociopolitical or sociocultural positions and schools of thoughts, such 
‗communist ideology‘, ‗capitalist ideology‘, ‗imperialist ideology‘, ‗nationalist ideology‘, etc. 
Its common usage as a term that connotes negative, threatening views of ‗others‘ has been 
well-defined by Van Dijk (1998): 
 
(a) ideologies are false beliefs; 
(b) ideologies conceal real social relations and serve to deceive others; 
(c) ideologies are beliefs others have; and 
(d) ideologies presuppose the socially or politically self-serving nature of the 
definition of truth and falsity. (1998:2) 
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I adhere to the more inclusive views about the notion which have been developed during the 
second half of the 20th century and which that define ‗ideology‘ as social or political ‗systems 
of ideas, values and prescriptions of groups or other collectivities, and have the function of 
organising or legitimizing the actions of the group‘ (ibid:4). I argue that, to this research,  
such ‗neutral‘ definition of ideology appears versatile for describing the process of 
imposition, adoption and legitimation of ideas about the ‗nationhood‘ and ‗national identity‘ 
among Kosovo/Albanians which, in turn, shaped and reorganised their social relations and 
the knowledge about their political ‗reality‘ and position. 
 
According to Fairclough (1992), the theoretical base for the debate on ideology is comprised 
of three important claims: 
 
1. The claim that (ideology) has a material existence in the practices of 
institutions, which opens up the way to investigating discursive practices as 
material forms of ideology. 
2. The claim that ideology ‗interpellates subjects’, which leads to the view that 
one of the more significant ‗ideological effects‘ (. . .) is the constitution of 
subjects. 
3. The claim that ‗ideological state apparatuses (institutions such education or 
the media) are both sites of and stakes in class struggle, which points to 
struggle in and over discourse as a focus for an ideology-oriented discourse 
analysis (1992:87) 
 
Fairclough also highlights the multiple meanings that have been attached to the notion of 
ideology through various discursive and social practices—to the extent that, often, it is 
described as ‗a meaningless word‘ (1989:93). He classifies the meaning of the ‗ideology‘ in 
two families: the first relates to its definition in the USA in the aftermath of the Second 
World War: ‗any social policy which is in part or in whole derived from social theory in a 
conscious way‘. He refers to the second family as the ‗Marxist tradition‘: ‗ideas which arise 
from a given set of material interests‘ in the course of the struggle for power‘ (ibid:93). 
 
In the context of discursive practices and text-production, ideologies are also understood as 
‗significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities) 
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which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings (ibid:87). Fairclough prefers 
the view of ideology as ‗located in the structures (the orders of the discourse) which 
constitute the outcome of the past events and the conditions for current events, and in the 
events themselves‘ (1992:89). In this respect Eagleton (1991) points out that a dominant 
power can ‗legitimize and promote beliefs and values that are in agreement with it‘ (1991:5-
6). Further, it can ‗naturalise and universalize such beliefs, making them appear inevitable 
and denigrate ideas which might challenge it‘ (ibid). This claim is accepted by Fairclough 
who observes that the ideologies are linked to power ‗because the nature of ideological 
assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions 
themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions…‘ (1989:2). 
 
The relations between ideology, power and society have been conceptualized through the 
notion of ‗hegemony‘ by Antonio Gramsci (1971) in his analysis of capitalism and 
revolutionary strategy in western Europe. As noted by Ives (2004) ‗temporal 
contextualization‘ of Gramsci‘s definition of hegemony in the period of revival of ethno-
nationalism during in the western Europe of the early 20th century is of particular relevance to 
this research which deals with the analysis of the evolution of an ethnonationalist discourse. 
Despite all possible meanings that are attached to this concept, notes Ives, there is one 
common element to all definitions of hegemony and it helps to: 
 
...explain why large groups of people continually acquiesce to, accept and sometimes 
actively support governments – and entire social and political systems – that 
continually work against their interests (2004:6) 
 
I find such observation essential for this research as it hints on the puzzling phenomenon of 
acceptance and internalisation of external—often discriminatory—discourses and 
knowledges by a large group of peoples, societies and nations about themselves. This process 
of ‗localizing‘ the ‗external‘ body of knowledge relates closely with the main focus of the 
research: the adoption of orientalist/balkanist features within the Kosovo/Albanian 
ethnonationalist narrative and their political programmed of action. 
 
In its common usage ‗hegemony‘ is often considered as a synonym for ‗suppression‘ and 
‗domination‘. In her observation about Gramsci‘s understanding of the notion, Smith (1998) 
highlights the two dimensions that a political authority holds in (and/or over) contemporary 
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societies: ‗force, and the organisation of consent‘ (ibid:162). Smith sees the organisation of 
consent as a cultural dimension within political projects, aimed at ‗its promotion of popular 
identifications in terms of its corresponding imaginary‘. This corresponds with Louis 
Althusser‘s understanding of a structural relationship in social formations that are structured 
by domination which is established through the operation of the ‗repressive State 
Apparatuses‘ and ‗Ideological State Apparatuses‘ (ibid:165). Also, of particular importance 
to this research is Fairclough‘s observation that, for the discourse, the concept of hegemony 
‗provides both a matrix—a way of analysing the social practice within which the discourse 
belongs in terms of power relations, in terms of whether they reproduce, restructure or 
challenge existing hegemonies—and a model, a way of analysing discourse practice itself as 
a mode of hegemonic rule, reproducing, restructuring or challenging existing orders of 
discourse‘ (1992:95). 
 
Hegemony can thus be understood as the outcome of the power in the discourse—or the 
power that is operated through the discourse, as noted by Foucault and his theory of 
power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980). The meaning of power as employed by Foucault should 
not be understood as necessarily oppressive, but rather as productive; power constitutes 
discourse and knowledge, bodies and subjectivities:  
 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does 
not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, 
it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered 
as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than 
as a negative instance whose function is repression. (1980: 119) 
 
Laclau and Mouffe‘s (1990) approach to the definition of the power in discourse is similar to 
Foucault‘s: it is ‗not something that people possesses and exercise over others‘; rather, they 
argue power produces ‗the social‘ (1990:30). An important momentum in formation of the 
hegemonic discourse is the ‗struggle over the creation of meaning‘, note Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002:47) as they emphasize that ‗no discourse can be fully established as it is 
always in conflict with other discourses that define reality differently and set other guidelines 
for social action‘ (ibid:47). The act of collision of discourses produces antagonisms, they 
argue, which can only be dissolved through ‗hegemonic interventions‘ (ibid:48). In this 
context, hegemony could be understood also as the aftermath of the ‗conflict‘ between 
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discourses; a state that follows after a discourse overpowers and dominates another: i.e. 
hegemony becomes the condition, manifestation of the ruling discourse: 
 
For instance, when people from different nations actually went to war against one 
another in the First World War, this was a sign that the hegemonic articulation of 
people as  ‗Germans‘ and ‗Frenchmen‘ had succeeded at the expense of the 
articulation of people as ‗workers‘ (2002:48) 
 
One could argue that the language mirrors and shapes the power struggles and ideological 
influences of those competing for power in a human society. In this respect Van Dijk (1998) 
classifies two trajectories of language operation—the micro and macro level. According to 
him, ‗language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the micro-
level of the social order‘. On the other hand, their influence in shaping of social practices, 
such ‗power, dominance, and inequality between social groups‘ represent the terms that 
belong to a ‗macro-level of analysis‘ (1998:354). 
 
The ‘naturalising’ power of the discourse 
 
As noted earlier, the analysis of the operation of power, ideology, hegemony in/on the 
narrative about the nation, national history and ethnonationalist politics is the focus of this 
research. Through methods provided by the discourse analysis this research intends to 
examine and highlight the manner in which the orientalist/balkanist discourse has succeeded 
in naturalisation of the knowledge about (Kosovo/Albanian) difference with the ‗western 
civilisation‘ in sociopolitical, sociocultural and historical aspect. In time, such process of 
naturalisation, I argue, produced various social conditions, perceptions and political actions 
aimed at ‗westernisation‘ and ‗modernization‘ of their ethnonationalist narrative and, 
consequently, their social reality. Conditions of ‗collective ressentiment‘, ‗social anomie‘ and 
‗mimicry‘ are revealed and discussed in the research as the outcomes of the antagonistic 
situation between the local/Balkan discourses and the external/western discourses about the 
Balkans and—of importance to this research—about Kosovo/Albanians. 
 
In the context of this research the various sample-texts have been used with the intention of 
encompassing the effects of the constitution of knowledge and power in the discourse on the 
‗micro-level of the social order‘, as defined by van Dijk (1998). I argue that the selected 
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sample-text from diverse sources and genres, ranging from various political manifestos, 
literary works and poems have shaped certain beliefs among Kosovo/Albanians about their 
national identity and political ideology on the micro-level which, in turn, influenced a range 
of social actions on the macro-level social order. Invoking and analysis of such variety of 
texts was done with the aim of illustrating the multi-dimensional influences that constructed 
the ethnonationalist narrative in the context of what Michael Billig (1995) sees as the 
capacity of nationalism to naturalise the nationalist condition as ‗something which is 
psychologically general, or endemic to human condition‘ (1995:17). According to him, the 
loyalty to the concept of the nation or the nation state can be theoretically transmuted into 
‗needs for identity‘, ‗attachments to society‘ of ‗primordial ties‘ which are theoretically 
posited to be universal psychological states. Therefore, Billig argues, ‗an infinite variety of 
psychological acts is required for the reproduction of nationalism (ibid). 
 
I found this observation particularly important in the context of the analysis of 
Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist narrative which has been initially rooted in the tradition of 
local folklore, songs, epic poetry (1880s) that was later conveyed, ‗naturalised‘ and/or 
‗institutionalized‘ through political manifestos, ideological pamphlets, scholarly studies and 
newspaper articles. Specifically, the works selected from the body of Albanian literature and 
epic poetry account for such a psychological transmutation of the nationalist condition: the 
chapters ahead will identify and analyse phenomena such ‗the trauma of national partition‘ 
(1880s) and/or ‗the national ressentiment‘ (1980s). In this context, this research also becomes 
an analysis of a history of a social cognition—of what Jorgensen & Phillips define as ‗the 
mental processing of information about the social world‘—about the ways in which a spoken 
or a written language is seen as a ‗reflection of an external world or a product of underlying 
mental representations of this world‘ (2002:96). In this respect it also touches upon the 
definition of discursive psychology in the context of understanding the written or spoken 
language ‗as constructions of the world oriented towards social action‘ (ibid). 
 
As noted by Fairclough, ‗the ideologies embedded in discursive practices are most effective 
when they become naturalised and achieve the status of ‗common sense‘ (1992:87), a 
position which is shared by Mouffe (2006) who observes that  the ‗common sense‘ is 
regularly a result of political articulation. According to her: 
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Reality is not given to us; meaning is always constructed. There is no meaning that is 
just essentially given to us; there is no essence of the social, it is always constructed. 
The social is always the result of a hegemonic articulation; every type of social order 
is the product of a hegemony as a specific political articulation‘ (2006:4) 
 
Ultimately, as Hall argues, the process of ‗naturalisation‘ is a ‗representational strategy 
designed to fix ‗difference‘ and thus secure it forever.‘ (1997:245). Through becoming a 
‗common sense‘, the process of naturalisation of a discourse attempts ‗to halt the inevitable 
‗slide‘ of meaning, to secure discursive or ideological ‗closure‘.‘ (ibid:245). In Billig‘s 
words, such process of discursive naturalisation ‗makes existing conditions of consciousness 
appear natural, taking for granted the world of nations‘ (1995:17) and the nationalist 
discourse. 
 
In this respect, (a) the naturalisation of the knowledge about the nation (nationalist 
discourse), (b) the naturalisation of knowledge about the differences between the nation‘s 
culture and the projected Western culture (orientalist discourse) and, finally, (c) the 
naturalisation of the knowledge about the necessity to adopt and, indeed, adapt the nation to 
the projected international/western norms and requirements (internalised/orientalist 
discourse)—represent the major analytical targets in this study. As noted by Said (1978), the 
western institutions of power—political, economic, cultural and military authorities—have 
for centuries spoken on behalf of the rest of the world. I argue that in the case of Balkans—
and, specifically, Kosovo/Albanians—such an attitude as the ‗final authority‘ has been 
essential in constituting collective identities of social groups. Almost every Balkan society, 
whether defined as an ethnic community, national minority or a nation accounts for a history 
of attempts to modify and reshape the knowledge about itself, its worth, its past, present and 
future in order to fit the imposed—and, consequently, internalised—western discourses about 
‗progress‘, ‗nation‘, ‗Europe‘, ‗democracy‘ and so forth. 
 
This is in line with Fairclough‘s (1992) observation that a dominant discourse will not be 
detected as autocratic or oppressive, despite its overpowering dominance and subjugation of 
other discourses/knowledges. Rather, it will be accommodated as natural and legitimate—
specifically as a form of a cultural hegemony. In this context, the capacity of a naturalising 
discourse is related with the definition of both ideology and hegemony; through 
naturalisation, the content of a discourse becomes the ideological fabric and—ultimately—is 
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defined as the ‗common sense‘. In the context of orientalist discourse, as noted by Said, it is 
primarily based on the intention to create for itself ‗a solid and homogenous theoretical 
terrain‘ through the application of power stemming from ‗supporting institutions, vocabulary, 
scholarship, imagery, doctrines even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles‘ (in Ezzaher, 
2003:5)—a strategy which enabled orientalists to group together numerous differences that 
existed between and within the ‗oriental‘ societies into one homogenous sociocultural 
identity. Through such ‗institutionalization‘ and generalization the orientalist discourse 
achieved its ‗naturalisation‘ which effectively produced a hegemonic relationship through 
emphasizing a representational binary opposition which produced the East/Orient as the 
West‘s ‗other‘: ‗primitive‘, ‗non-western‘, ‗non-European‘, ‗third-world‘. This corresponds 
to what van Dijk understands as the ‗discourse strategies of mind control‘ (1998): 
 
Contextually based control derives from the fact that people not only understand and 
represent text and talk, but also the whole communicative situation. People are not 
merely influenced, persuaded or manipulated by properties of discourse, but also by 
those of speakers or writers, such as their (perceived) power, authority or credibility 
(1998:10). 
 
In the discussion about ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism, nationalism and racism van Dijk notes 
that the strategy of such discourses—in the context of this research, the orientalist/balkanist 
discourses—fluctuates ‗between the emphasis on exotic difference on the one hand, and 
supremacist derogation stressing the Others' intellectual, moral and biological inferiority, on 
the other‘ (1998:11). In this context, the research represents an attempt to illustrate the ways 
in which such external discourses about the Balkans and Albanians—applied through a 
simplified binary opposition ‗progressive Europe / primitive Balkans‘, ‗modern Christianity / 
savage Muslims, ‗democratic West / despotic East‘—constituted a hegemonic order of 
discourse of ‗the West‘ and ‘Europe‘. Therefore, I found a combined methodology of 
historical/temporal analysis of the ethnonationalist discourse through a diverse range of texts 
as a necessary approach in order to reveal the stages in which such work of discursive 
hegemony became accepted, internalised and, finally, naturalised as the body of knowledge 
of the Balkans about itself—more specifically, the knowledge of Kosovo/Albanians about 
themselves, their past, present and their future. 
 
Sampling of text: sources 
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The analysis of the orientalist features within the ethnonationalist narrative is examined 
through identifying and highlighting the sample-text from various fields of its production, 
such: 
 
 Political/ideological pamphlets and manifestos that discuss and construct the notion 
of (Albanian) national, cultural, political and ideological identity. 
 Works of literature: novels, poems, tales, which serve as the literary vehicle for 
popular distribution of the conceptual fabric of the ethnonationalist narrative and 
enable its naturalisation with larger strata of the targeted social group 
 Various historiographic accounts, scholarly books and studies, excerpts from 
local/international newspapers, travelogues and novels produced by historians, foreign 
observers, ethnographers and journalists on the Kosovo/Albanians and the region that 
they inhabit—the Balkans. In their attempts to depict the social realities surrounding 
the geographic region Balkans this significant number of authors—predominantly 
western-European (British, French, German)--assisted in construction of a certain 
sociocultural definition of the peoples, their ethnic characteristics and identities, as 
well as the nature of their social actions and interaction. 
 
The research analysis is divided into two chapters that discuss and examine two different 
historical periods: the period of the Albanian National Rebirth (1870-1900) and the period of 
Kosovo Albanian political resistance (1989-1999). Below I provide the detailed description 
of the publications, books, articles and travelogues which samples were employed with this 
research and its analysis of the ethnonationalist discourse. 
 
I. National Rebirth: 1870-1900 (samples) 
 
Political/ideological pamphlets and manifestos 
 
 ‗Albania - What It Was, What It Is and What Will Become of It? Reflections on 
Saving the Motherland from Perils which Beset It‘. 
o This long political essay/manifesto comprises the major body of analysis in 
the first part of the research analysis—the period between 1870-1900—and 
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represents the major work of Sami Bey Frasheri (1850-1904) a renowned 
intellectual and ideologist of the Albanian National Rebirth Movement (1878). 
It was written in Bucharest in 1899 and represents ‗the highest degree of the 
development of political and social thought of the Albanian National Rebirth‘ 
(Grillo, 1997:12). In both Albania and Kosovo—as well as in ethnic Albanian 
communities elsewhere in the region—this political essay is widely considered 
as the cornerstone of the awakening of the Albanian national identity. The 
115-pages version of the essay/manifesto employed with this research was 
published in 1999—a symbolic centennial which coincided with the liberation 
of Kosovo through the international military intervention. Otherwise, the 
publication represents a compulsory literature with the late primary and early 
secondary schools curriculum, as well as the academia—particularly History 
and Albanian studies. 
 
 Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey. A renowned political figure, Ismail Qemali (in 
Albanian) is considered the founder of the modern state of Albania in 1912. 
o The compilation of memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey has been written in 1924 by 
Somerville Story, a British journalist with ‗Daily Mail‘, and represents a 
biographical account and political views of another seminal figure in the 
Albanian National Rebirth Movement. The content of the book has not been 
used extensively with the research analysis, although it deals with one of the 
most important personality of the Albanian National Rebirth Movement; the 
reason to this is the fact that it was only available to the Albanian public 
during the second half of the 20th century (after its translation) and has not 
been part of the active construction and influence of the ethnonationalist 
narrative of this period. However, few excerpts which reflect Ismail Kemal 
Bey‘s common views with those of the rest of the National Rebirth 
ideologists, such Sami Frasheri, Naim Frasheri and Wassa Effendi have been 
taken into account and presented in the discussion about ‗ancientness‘ and 
‗Europeanness‘ of Albanians and their ethnic genealogy. 
 
 Memoirs of the Albanian National Movement, by Faik Konitza (1875-1942). 
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o Excerpts from the biographical essays and writings Konitza have been used 
with the research with the aim of providing an additional, critical views on the 
National Rebirth romantic discourse about the nation and national identity. 
The English version of the memoirs has been translated from French 
(‗Mémoire sur le Mouvement National Albanais‘, Brussels, January 1899) and 
is part to the compilation ‗Faik Konitza: Selected Correspondence 1896-1942‘, 
published by the Centre for Albanian Studies, London (2000). Also, few 
excerpts have been used from the compilation of republished essays and 
articles by Konitza under the title: ‗Albania, The Rock-garden of South 
Eastern Europe‘ (Buzuku Publishing, Prishtina, 1996). 
 
 Oriental or Occidental. A longer essay written in 1937 by Krist Maloki (Plejad, 
Tirana, 2003). 
o I have selected Maloki‘s article because of its binary-opposition approach: in 
his writing, Maloki, an ethnic Albanian Catholic priest, discusses the great 
division that he sees as existing between the ‗oriental‘ and ‗occidental‘ 
Albanians—between the Ottoman ‗backwardness‘, ‗slyness‘ and Western 
‗modernity‘ and ‗civility‘. I find his views quite striking in their castigating 
tendency towards the assumed ‗oriental‘ part of Albanians who, according to 
him, epitomize the legacy of everything evil that beset the, otherwise western 
and European, Albanian nation. Maloki‘s polarizing approach appears 
indicative of the tendencies of ideological and historical disconnection with 
‗the East‘ that permeated numerous works of Albanian writers and 
intellectuals throughout the 20th century. 
 
Works of literature, poetry 
 
 The History of Scanderbeg by Naim Frasheri (1846-1900), published in 1899. 
o Excerpts from this voluminous poem have also been part to the analysis of the 
internalised orientalist traits within the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist 
narrative. Naim Frasheri—a brother of Sami Bey Frasheri—represents another 
important figure of the Albanian National Rebirth Movement. His influential 
poetry expresses strong beliefs on the ‗orientation of Albanians towards 
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Western modernity as their natural path to civilisation‘ (Sulstarova, 2007:35). 
The version of Frasheri‘s epic that was used with this research has been 
published in 1986 in Kosovo as part to a wider compilation of works from the 
Albanian romanticist period (Naim Frasheri, Vepra, Rilindja, 1986). 
 
 Lahuta e Malcis by Gjergj Fishta (1871-1940) 
o This is another important work from the corpus of the Albanian 
ethnonationalist narrative. Written in 1902 as a voluminous folk-epic poem, 
‗Lahuta e Malcis‘ describes the period of the retreat of the Ottoman Empire 
from the Balkans and the encroachment of the Albanian-inhabited territories 
by upcoming nation-states in the region, such Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia 
and Greece. Its author, Gjergj Fishta, is today acclaimed as an important 
author, poet and ideologist of the Albanian nationalist discourse. Himself an 
ethnic Albanian Catholic/Franciscan priest from northern Albania (Dajç, 
Albania), Fishta‘s epic deals primarily with the heroic resistance of Albanians 
against the Serbian/Montenegrin territorial pretentions of the times. I find 
Fishta‘s ethnonationalist discourse of particular interest to this research due to 
its capacity to re-articulate and thus perpetualize the ‗anti-easterness‘ of the 
National Rebirth movement—predominantly expressed through the anti-
Ottoman sentiments—into anti-Slavic (and, subsequently, anti-communist) 
symbolic. In this respect, Fishta‘s poetry represents an important addition to 
the ‗nesting-orientalist‘ approach which assisted in the revival and revision of 
the discursive features of castigation of the Ottoman ‗easterness‘ and 
reconstructed them into ideological signifiers that were to denote the 
immediate ethnic/national rival, such the ‗easterness‘ of the Slavs, Russians, 
Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and so forth. 
 
 Oh, Albania, poem written in 1880 by Wassa Effendi (1825-1892) a renowned ethnic 
Albanian intellectual, politician and statesman (known in Albanian as Pashko Vasa or 
Vaso Pashë Shkodrani). 
o Selected parts of the poem have been used to depict and analyse the important 
trait of supra-religiousness of the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse. Wassa 
Effendi‘s verses on the ‗Albanianness‘ as the ‗Albanians‘ religion‘ have had a 
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powerful impact on the ethnonational cohesion and political actions that 
followed throughout the 20th century and to-date continue to permeate the 
Albanian ethnonationalist discourse. Its underlying message about the 
ethnic/national belonging as a supreme category of individual/collective 
identity gave to the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist discourse a distinct, 
non-religious, approach that made it differ from the more religiously-affiliated 
ethnonational narratives in the region, such e.g. Serbian (Christian Orthodox) 
or Croatian (Roman Catholic). 
 
External sources: historiographic accounts, travelogues 
 
A range of travelogues, articles and books written by foreign authors have been consulted 
during this research. Few excerpts have been used in the course of the analysis and I will 
mention them here briefly: 
 
 Fanny Janet Blunt: ‗The People of Turkey, Twenty Years‘ Residence among 
Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Turks and Armenians, by a Consul‘s Daughter and 
Wife‘. Edited by Stanley Lane Poole (London: John Murray, 1878). 
o The chapter that was used with the study regards Blunt‘s depictions and 
encounter with Albanians (chapter ‗The Albanians‘) during her journey 
through the territories of contemporary Greece, Albania, Macedonia and so 
forth. 
 
 Aubrey Herbert: ‗Ben Kendim, a Record of Eastern Travel‘ (London: Hutchinson & 
Co. 1924) 
o The fragments from this travelogue that were used with this research deal with 
Herbert‘s journeys through Montenegro and Kosovo in 1912 and his 
impressions from the meetings with various Kosovo Albanian brigands and 
guerilla leaders, as well as his overall views on ethnic Albanians in the context 
of their political/military resistance against the Ottoman Empire and the 
encroaching Serbian military on the eve of the first Balkan War (1912). 
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 Edith Durham, ‗High Albania‘ (London: Edward Arnold 1909, reprint London: 
Phoenix Press, 2000), p. 232-300. 
o Probably the most influential foreign ethnographer to the Kosovo/Albanian 
public, Durham‘s views have been employed in several occasions in this 
research with the aim of describing and analysing the perplexed approach of 
the western/European scholarly circles to the Balkans and its societies. While 
a great sympathizer of ‗the Albanian cause‘, Durham engages in detailed 
analysis of ethnic Albanians as ‗the most savage peoples in the Balkans‘ 
(1905), impressed by their remoteness and tribal way of life. The excerpts that 
were used with this research come from her volumes ‗High Albania‘, ‗In the 
Debatable Lands‘ and ‗The Burden of the Balkans‘, written between 1905 and 
1909. 
 
 Leo Freundlich: ‗Albaniens Golgotha: Anklageakten gegen die Vernichter des 
Albanervolkes. Gesammelt und herausgegeben‘ (Vienna 1913). Translated from the 
German by Robert Elsie (2000) 
o The version used with this research is published in Robert Elsie, ‗Gathering 
Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia‘, Dukagjini 
Balkan Books, Peja 2002. Freundlich‘s accounts of atrocities committed 
against ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo by the Serbian military and 
paramilitary troops during the period of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) 
represent an important description of the feature of national victimisation. 
Such feature will be invoked and employed steadily by the Kosovo/Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse throughout the 20th century as one of the major 
mobilisatory component of their narrative about the nation. 
 
 Leon Trotsky, ‗Balkany i Balkanskaya Voyna‘, in Sočinenia, vol. 6 (Moscow & 
Leningrad 1926), reprinted in German in ‗Leo Trotzki: Die Balkankriege 1912-1913‘ 
(Essen: Arbeiterpresse 1996), p. 297-303 
o Excerpts from this compilation of articles have been translated by Robert Elsie 
(2000, www.elsie.de). Similar to Freundlich, Trotsky‘s accounts of atrocities 
and mass-killings of Albanians during the Serbian military conquest of 
Kosovo (1912-1913) are employed as part of the foreign, external narrative 
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about Albanians and Kosovo. I argue that such views have assisted in 
constructing the ideological base of national victimisation on the one hand, 
and the demonization of the imminent ‗other‘ (e.g. Serbs) as inherently 
‗criminal‘ and ‗eastern‘. 
 
II. Kosovo, 1989-1999 (sources and samples) 
 
Political/ideological pamphlets and essays 
 
 ‘Democracy and Independence’ by Ibrahim Rugova, published in 1990. This 
publication represents a compilation of interviews with Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006), 
a public intellectual, chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo and, later, the 
President of Kosovo (after the conflict of 1999). 
o Fragments from this compilation have been used with this research with the 
aim of tracing and identifying the early attempts to construct the so-called 
discourse on ‗democracy‘ and ‗independence‘ among Albanians in Kosovo. 
Rugova‘s views are essential to the topic of the research because they 
introduce a new angle of analysing the historical past of Kosovo Albanians, its 
distinct ‗ancientness‘ and ‗Europeanness‘. In the research, Rugova is 
examined as the epitome, the personification of the ‗ideological turn‘ of 
Kosovo Albanians from ‗irredentist‘ to ‗independentist‘ nationalism during the 
1990s, as well as of the widely accepted strategy of non-violence and ‗passive 
resistance‘. 
 
 ‘Albanian Question: History and Politics’ written in 1994 by Rexhep Qosja, a 
renowned literary critic, author and contemporary ideologist of the Kosovo Albanian 
political resistance. 
o This ambitious book/analysis has been published by the Institute for Albanian 
Studies, Prishtina, Kosovo of which Qosja was both the founder and director. 
This publication has been widely acclaimed by the Kosovo Albanian public of 
the time as the major ideological work and a contemporary political manifesto. 
I find Qosja‘s voluminous analysis critically important for its strong 
resemblance with the similar manifestos written in the period of the National 
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Rebirth, a century earlier (namely, Sami Bey Frasheri‘s). The feature of 
discursive intertextuality, reinvention and rearticulation of the ‗old‘ 
knowledge from the Romantic period and its application onto the ‗new‘ 
political realities in Kosovo of 1990s bears a specific importance to the overall 
analysis in this research. 
 
 ‘Self-Understanding of the Albanians in Nonviolence’, (1994); ‘Conflict or Dialogue: 
Serbian Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans’ (Subotica, 1994) and 
‘Kosova/Kosovo—Separate Worlds: Reflections and Analyses’ (MM/Dukagjini, 
1998). 
o These titles represent a compilation of longer articles, essays and books 
written by Shkelzen Maliqi, a renowned Kosovo Albanian scholar and 
political commentator. The selected text-samples have been written during the 
period between 1990 and 1997. Their importance to this research lies with the 
discussion and analysis about the sociopolitical and sociocultural conditions 
that enabled the wide acceptance of the new ethnonationalist discourse of 
‗democracy‘, ‗non-violence‘ and ‗independence‘ during the early 1990s. 
 
 ‘Europe and Albanians: Past and the Present’, excerpts from the academic 
conference held on 24-27 May, 1991 in Prishtina, Kosovo. 
o Speeches and documents from this conference were published in ‗Bujku‘, the 
only Albanian (semi)daily newspaper that was published in Kosovo as a 
replacement for the prohibited ‗Rilindja‘ which was closed down on July 1990 
by Serbian authorities. The excerpts from the conference are used with the 
research to illustrate the ‗academic‘ approach to the revival of Kosovo 
Albanian political resistance in 1990s. In a condensed form, the conference 
provided an overview of positions, views and opinions about national identity, 
origin, resistance, ideology and political strategy. The specific importance of 
the event lies with the attempt of the Kosovo Albanian academia to resemble 
and recreate the sentiment of the National Rebirth in the context of Kosovo 
Albanians‘ oppression by Serbian/Yugoslav authorities. 
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 National Cause and Critical Awareness. This compilation of presentations and essays 
on the state of the Kosovo Albanian political strategy and programme was written and 
published in 1998 by the members of then-Forum of Albanian Intellectuals. 
o The time-span of the writings encompasses the period between 1991 and 1998 
and it engages in a critical approach to the widely-accepted strategy of 
nonviolence as the preferred course of political action by then-Kosovo 
Albanian political elite, led by the Democratic League of Kosovo and its 
chairman, Ibrahim Rugova. Specifically, the works cited question the 
‗independentist‘ course of the Kosovo Albanians during the 1990s and the 
strategy of non-violence—often interpreted as a ‗do-nothing‘ politics. Below 
is a list of few of the works that were selected for the analysis with this 
research: 
 Rexhep Qosja: ‘Strategjia e Bashkimit Shqiptar’ (Eng. The Strategy of 
Albanian Unification), published by the Institute of Albanian Studies, 
Prishtine, 1992 
 Agim Vinca: ‘Bashkimi Kombetar – e Vetmja Zgjidhje e Drejte e 
Çeshtjes Shqiptare’ (Eng. National Unification – the Only Just 
Solution to the Albanian Question), published by the Forum of 
Albanian Intellectuals, (FISH), Prishtina, 1997. 
 Masar Stavileci: ‘Atomizimi i Çeshtjes Shqiptare—Pozicion Politik i 
Paqendrueshem’ (Eng. Atomisation of Albanian Question—An 
Unviable Political Position), a paper presented with the conference 
‗Pozicioni i Shqiptareve ne Aktualitetin Ballkanik dhe Evropian‘ (Eng: 
The Current Position of Albanians in the Balkans) held in Prishtina, 
August 1993. 
 
 ‘The Albanians—A Divided Nation’. A compilation of writings/analysis by three 
authors: Giuseppe Catapano (Italy), Nermin Vlora-Falaschi (Italy) and Skender Rizaj 
(Kosovo), published in 1996. 
o At best, this compilation of ‗analysis‘ and ‗studies‘ could be defined as a self-
styled historical approach to the origin, history and genealogy of Albanian 
nation. Nevertheless, this compilation of pseudo-historical and pseudo-
anthropological arguments aimed at re-discovering and representation of the 
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origin of Albanians as ‗the oldest of the old‘ nations of the world has had a 
major ideological influence on the Kosovo Albanian public in the period of its 
publishing, in 1996. To this research, this compilation has been selected as 
relevant from the point of view of ‗invention‘ of the national tradition and 
construction of ‗ancientness‘ and ‗sacredness‘ of the national origin. 
 
 ‘Pavaresia si Kompromis’ (Eng. Independence as Compromise) by Jakup Krasniqi, 
published in 2010. (Buzuku Publishing, Prishtina). 
o Few excerpts from this compilation of various essays on the Kosovo Albanian 
past and present political thought have been used for analysis in the discussion 
about the great ideological turn of the ethnonationalist discourse—from 
‗irredentist‘ to ‗independentist‘ model. Specifically, Krasniqi‘s views about 
the acceptance of the independence of Kosovo as a mere political 
‗compromise‘ aimed at respecting the demands of the ‗international 
community‘ have been highlighted as features of the induced, internalised 
‗orientalist‘ content of the ethnonationalist narrative. 
 
 ‘Realiteti dhe Perspektivat e Çeshtjes Kombetare’ (Eng. Reality and Perspectives of 
the National Cause) by Muhamet Kelmendi, published by Albin, 1998, Tirane, 
Albania. 
o A highly critical book/publication that opposes the discourse of ‗democracy‘ 
and the political course of non-violence and passive resistance that was 
applied in Kosovo through the democratic League of Kosovo and its leader, 
Ibrahim Rugova. Specifically, the book is highly critical of the ‗international 
community‘ as it retains a strong feeling of ressentiment towards the 
international ‗indifference‘ and ‗ignorance‘ of Kosovo/Albanian history of 
suffering and oppression under the foreign and ‗eastern‘ rule. 
 
Newspapers / articles 
 
 ‘Bujku’, Albanian daily newspaper (4 days a week) was published from 1992 as a 
substitution for the traditional ‗Rilindja‘ (Eng. Rebirth) which has been closed down 
in July 1990 by then-Serbian/Yugoslav authorities. 
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o Articles and commentaries with this newspaper have been employed with the 
analysis of the construction of the new ideological paradigm of ‗democratic‘ 
ethnonationalism, particularly during the period of formation and 
popularization of the Democratic League of Kosovo, and its leader, Ibrahim 
Rugova. 
 
 ‘Flaka e Vellazerimit’, Albanian daily from Skoplje, Macedonia. 
o A number of extensive interviews with Ibrahim Rugova, the chairman of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo have been published in this newspaper during 
the period 1991-1994. Being a Macedonian newspaper, ‗Flaka e Vellazerimit‘ 
was not subjected to censorship and potential harassment by Serbian/Yugoslav 
authorities, therefore a number of important interviews and commentaries of 
the period were published in this paper. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Discourse analysis of the Albanian orientalist ethnonationalism: the National Rebirth 
(1880-1930) 
 
‗That the modern Albanian is the more or less direct descendant of the primitive 
savage people of the Balkans is a fact which, I believe, no one now disputes‘ 
Edith Durham, 
‗The Burden of the Balkans‘ (1905:9) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In simple terms, there are four major ideological principles or premises on which the 
construction of the contemporary, post-1990, Kosovo Albanian nationalist discourse is based: 
 
 Albanians are one, single autochthonous nation of the Balkans; 
 Albanians descend from ancient Illyrians and were part of the Christian/European 
civilisation before the Ottoman conquests; 
 Their predominantly Islamic heritage represents an involuntary consequence of the 
hegemonic past; 
 Albanians belong to the realm of Western, European civilisation. 
 
None of these premises are of a recent history, as I will show in this chapter: they are at least 
century old, originating from the period known as Albanian Romanticist Period characterized 
by the Movement for National Rebirth (1878-1912) – the so-called ‗League of Prizren‘12. 
Adopted and employed to this day as key principles that define the national identity of 
                                                 
12 Due to a substantial list  of local literature references for this subject, I will confine in highlighting Malcolm, Noel: ‗Kosovo: A 
short History‘, 1998, University Press New York; Riza, Skender: ‗Lidhja e Prizrenit ne Dokumentet Britanike‘, (Publ ic Record 
Office, London F.O 78/2784; F.O. 195/1186, 1367; The British Museum, London, Accounts and Papers (38), 1878 -9, 461-477‘ 
(Rilindja, Prishtina, 1978); Frasheri, Kristo: ‗Lidhja e Prizrenit‘, T irana, 1956.  
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Albanians from both sides of the border – Albania and Kosovo – they continue to shape the 
inner perceptions and manners by which Albanians experience themselves. Such ontological 
claims assisted in constituting their political being; they defined their geographic (spatial) and 
historical (temporal) context and produced the ideological edge of their national awareness, 
uniqueness and aspirations. In short, the idea of nation among Albanians has been shaped 
through the discourse that was produced during the National Rebirth Period, as noted by Pula 
(2008): 
 
Historically, in our academic life – as well as in politics – the categories of the nation, 
state and identity have been formed predominantly on the basis of interpretations of 
nationalism of the Albanian Rebirth Movement (. . .) From this nationalism, for 
various reasons, a concept of ethnic nation was created and put to work (2008:109) 
 
This chapter represents a combination of historiographic and discourse analysis of the 
narratives that have constructed these major features of Albanians‘ ethnonationalist 
ideological base. They are analysed through the prism of their perplexed history of political 
and cultural transformations, evolution of discursive practices and representational systems 
that assisted in the constitution of their perceptions about the nation, nationalism and 
nationhood. 
 
The analysis of the text in this research will cover selected samples produced in the periods of 
major sociopolitical changes in their national history and the history of the Balkan region, 
such as: 
 
(a) The retreat of the Ottoman Empire (1870-1920) that was followed by the 
appearance of ethnonational movement and, subsequently, the process of 
reconstruction of complementary ethnic histories in the region 
(b) Dissolution of the Federal Yugoslavia and the subsequent period of military 
aggression and ethnic conflict (1990-1999) 
 
The chapter will be confined to an analysis of the first period (1870-1920), which also marks 
the process of initiation of the ideas of Albanian national identity, nationhood and the nation-
state and is thus considered among Albanians as the most important period of their political 
and ideological history. Malcolm (1998) observes that, to Albanian historians, setting up of 
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the nation-state of Albania was not only seen as the ‗culminating achievement of the whole 
period‘, but that they projected its preceding history as a mere part of ‗a national striving 
which always had independence as its goal.‘ (1998:217): 
 
Albanian history books refer constantly, when dealing with this period, to the national 
movement or ‗the national liberation movement‘, phrases that conjure up the idea of a 
single political force, at once historically continuous, socially cohesive and 
ideologically consistent (1998:217) 
 
At the heart of this ‗national liberation movement‘ and its nationalist discourse lies the 
projection of Albanian nation as both an ‗autochthonous‘ Balkans ethnicity and an integral 
part of the ‗western culture‘ and ‗western civilisation‘. Yet, its affiliation with ‗westernness‘ 
inevitably draws upon the idea of the nation as a new and ‗modern‘ invention—for, as noted 
by Todorova, ‗the link between modernity and nationalism appears to be consensual‘ 
(2005:142). In the case of Albanian ethnonationalism from the late 19th century, this 
approach, I argue, has been introduced as a means to reject and abandon the sociopolitical 
dependence on the old hegemonic structure, deemed ahistorical and ‗primitive‘, such the rule 
of the Ottoman Empire. According to this logic, the Albanian ethnonationalist ideologists 
produced an idea, a new narrative of their nation which was both ‗new‘ and ‗ancient‘ at the 
same time. Thus, it was ancient in its quest for constructing the historical, geographical and 
ethnic legitimacy over the Ottoman Empire as an intruding, foreign and – above all - ‗eastern‘ 
hegemony; on the other hand, it was sufficiently new and ‗modern’ to be able to mobilise and 
revolt against the Ottoman Empire as ‗old‘, ‗ahistorical‘ and anti-European. A relevant 
explanation on such conceptual dichotomy comes from Todorova (2005): 
 
When nationalism spread to Europe in the nineteenth century, history as a discipline 
had been formally constituted, and the secular and sequential notion of time it 
produced and employed made it impossible to experience the nation as new. Instead, 
it was reinterpreted or rather reinscribed as ancient or as eternal. Hence the 
anthropomorphic metaphor of the nation being awakened from a slumber, revived, 
reborn. (2005:141) 
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According to Todorova, such projections of nationalism – ‗its tendency to narrate and 
legitimize itself through history‘—explain the ‗essentialising‘ discourse on the nation as a 
‗perennial biological entity‘ (2005:142). 
In line with such an explanation, in this chapter I will engage in the analysis of the discursive 
technologies that were employed with the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse where such 
dichotomy—and, indeed, the ‗anthropomorphic metaphors‘ of revival, rebirth—was justified 
and employed in the process of the construction of Albanian ethnonational identity through 
the phenomenon of ‗differentiating oneself from what one is not‘ (Benhabib in Wodak, 
DeCillia et al, 1999:2). 
 
I will argue that, in the context of the history of Albanian ethnonationalist ideology, this 
differentiation has been prevalently manifested through the discursive construction of 
arguments that would underpin claims for a genealogical, cultural and political dissimilarity 
of ‗Albanian nation‘ with the ‗East‘ or ‗the Orient. Historically, such technology of ‗othering‘ 
of the imminent political rival – the ‗national enemy‘ – has been perpetuated as a major 
component of the ideological power of the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse across the 20 th 
century. Specifically, it connoted the discursive construction of ‗essential‘ dissimilarities 
between the projected Albanian national identity and the influence/legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire. Further, I argue that, to-date13, the obsessive reiteration of such dissimilarity 
comprises one of the major ideological rituals in the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse: it 
connotes the ‗European‘ and ‗Western‘ origin of Albanian nation, which, it believes, can only 
be possible through the process of cultural differentiation, as noted by Said: 
 
European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient 
as a sort of surrogate and even underground self. (1978:3) 
 
                                                 
13 The next chapter of the research will focus entirely on the orientalist/ethnonationalist  discursive practices of the Kosovo Albanian 
society as a separate geopolitical entity within the definition of ‗Albanian nation‘. The post -Ottoman developments in the region 
produced the formation of nation-states of Albania, Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro – and, later the federation of (the 
former) Yugoslavia (see Malcolm, 1998; Jelavich, 1984, Vickers, 1995). Subsequently, in this new geopolitical reality the chi efly 
Albanian-inhabited territory of Kosovo became part of the new nation-state of Serbia (1912-1918), the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
(1918-1945) and, further, an autonomous province within the Socialist  Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (1945 -1991). The next 
chapter will analyse the enduring nature of (Kosovo) Albanian orientalist  ethnonationalism and the discursive construction of the 
‗easternness‘ of the Serbian/Yugoslav hegemony during the period of organised political resistance (1989-1999). 
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The history of the ethnonationalism in the Balkans has been a focus of numerous scholars, 
historiographers and authors, whether local or international. From the historiographic aspect, 
specific relevance to this study bear references from a variety of international authors, such 
Gingeras (2009), Gallagher (2001), Hupchick (2002), Hall, Kolev & Kolouri (2009), Jelavich 
(1983), Kaplan (1993). On the other hand, the contemporary history of Albanians has been 
widely accounted for in the works of Malcolm (1998), Vickers (1995, 2006, 2007), Bieber 
(1993), Pettifer (1996, 1997, 2001, 2006), to name just a few that will be referred to in this 
and the following chapters. 
 
I argue that the major reason that makes the period of the retreat of the Ottoman Empire an 
essential point of departure of analysis in this research is related to historical events that 
occurred during that period and which marked the end of existence of Albanians as a 
common and unified ethnicity under the realm of a single Empire, in both geopolitical and 
cultural context (Feraj, (1998); Rizaj (1982, 1991), Bajrami (1997), Qosja (1994). 
Historically, the Ottoman retreat would mark the beginning of the ethnonational awakening 
of the regional ethnicities of the Balkans, a process that would be initiated through local 
rebellions against regimes under the Ottoman servitude and would escalate into regional 
ethnic conflicts that became known as the Balkan Wars (1912-1913; see Hall, 2000). To 
Albanians, the ultimate consequence of the Balkan Wars was their geopolitical partition. 
From then on, the Albanians would continue to reside separated in different states: in 
Albania, in the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro (later, Kingdom/Federation of 
Yugoslavia) as well as in parts of northern Greece. Here, it is important to note that one of the 
major achievement of the orientalist ethnonationalist discourse was the production of the 
ideological analogy about the ‗Eastern‘ origin of both the Ottoman Empire (late 19th century 
ethnonationalist discourse) and that of the Communist regime (late 20th century 
ethnonationalist discourse) as externally imposed hegemonic rules. 
 
I argue that the adoption and dissemination of such analogy had a major impact in the revival 
of ethnonationalist discourse in the last decade of 20th century, particularly in its capacity to 
reconstruct and reproduce the sociopolitical syntax of the 19th century. I argue that such 
practice is not confined to Albanians only: the nationalist revival in the former Yugoslavia 
after the collapse of the Communist regime (see Volcic, 2005) would not have been possible 
without an aggressive adoption of orientalist views as an ‗epistemic field‘—to paraphrase 
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Foucault—which at its core represented an internalised, applicable, perception of projected 
principles of ‗western‘ modernity. 
 
According to Sulstarova (2005), the ‗official‘ high culture of Albanians always contained 
orientalist traits which persevered in the efforts to disrupt national links with the Orient: 
‗contemporary Albanian orientalists project onto ‗the Turk‘ everything that they dislike in 
their society‘ (ibid:59). To-date, a number of influential Albanian authors and scholars 
continue to explain the national history as a continuous confrontation with the East which 
wants to cut Albania‘s ties with Europe and the West. And, in the context of Albanian 
ethnonationalist ideology, in time, ‗the East‘ came to connote a signifying field that was 
wider than the notion of the Ottoman Empire. Here‘s an account by Feraj (1998): 
 
Albanian nationalism represents a specific political stream which, on one hand, was 
in a conflict with the Ottoman Empire and, on the other, was in an even deeper 
conflict with the rest of the Eastern peoples, such as Slavs and the Orthodoxes. In 
such a situation, it appears understandable for the Albanian nationalism to turn to 
Western Europe for support. (Feraj, 1998:104) 
 
Whether in the 1870s or the 1990s, such orientalist features in the ethnonationalist discourse 
carried an ideological appeal, a strategy that is embedded within the ‗second-order 
semiological system‘ (Barthes, 1964)—a political message within its ‗hidden syntax‘ which 
pledged for acceptance and legitimation of Albanian nationhood, history and culture by the 
Western sociopolitical systems and influential institutions of power. I argue that such features 
have been constructed and articulated as fundamental principles of (Kosovo) Albanian 
ethnonational political programme, and have, as such, endured unchanged connotations for 
more than a century. To-date, those features represent the manner in which Albanian political 
and academic elites attempted to establish the ‗missing link‘ between their ethnic history and 
their assumed western, ‗European‘ legacy. Ultimately, I argue that from the very outset, the 
Albanian ethnonationalist discourse represented an orientalist exercise. 
 
1870s: Sami Frasheri—Enlightenment, Albanian way 
 
‗Since the Albanian Rebirth Movement, orientalism has been the integral component of all 
modernizing processes in Albania‘, writes Sulstarova (2006:21). According to him, the 
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signifiers such ‗west‘ and ‗east‘ were regularly employed by the political and intellectual 
elites, ‗in accordance to the needs and interests of historical agents in the power/knowledge 
relational circumstances‘ (ibid: 22). 
 
In the context of the history and evolution of Albanian ethnonationalism, I view its orientalist 
feature as instrumental in the process of representing the Albanian national identity as a 
‗separate‘, ‗unique‘ and ‗autochthonous‘ culture of the Balkans. And, its point of departure 
marks also the early days of the national rebirth movement from the 1870s, when the 
emphasis on the ‗uniqueness‘ and ‗autochthonousness‘ of national identity was articulated 
with the aim of connoting both its pre-Ottoman (or, pre-oriental) existence, and therefore its 
‗Europeanness‘. According to Feraj (1998) it was important to Albanians to project 
themselves as a ‗historical‘ nation, rather than an ‗ahistorical‘ group of people who become a 
nation due to a certain set of political circumstances. Feraj also observes that in the period 
prior to the Albanian National Rebirth, the major European conceptions about the nation were 
divided into two definitions: ‗there was a rigid difference between the ‗historical‘ and ‗non-
historical‘ nation‘, and that, according to him, only the ‗historical‘ nations were entitled the 
existence; the ‗non-historical‘ ones would, he argues, ‗have to assimilate and become 
included within a larger nation‘ (1998:90) 
 
Historically, the Balkans has been considered the integral part of the European civilisation 
and culture, particularly before the Ottoman conquests by the late 13th century. However, to 
paraphrase Todorova (2005), the arrival of the Ottomans did not only change the name of this 
part of southeastern Europe—their elements have assisted in invoking the stereotype of the 
Balkans.  
 
The discourse of autochthonousness underpins the claim to ‗Europeanness‘ in its quest to 
oppose the foreign, ‗eastern‘ cultural and political derivations such Ottomanism—the 
stereotype that was constructed during (and through) the Ottoman reign. The political value 
of projection of such European ‗ancientness‘ was seen as all the more utilizable for 
ethnonational ideologies, considering the archaeological and historical claims about the 
Balkans as the cradle of Hellenic—therefore western—civilisation. The major pillars 
employed to support the attempts to highlight the uniqueness of the Albanian identity are ‗the 
myth on the origin and the myth on the ancientness‘, notes Kullashi (2004:110), an 
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observation which I find particularly relevant in the context of the ‗naturalising‘ capacity of 
the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse about the national identity and origin. This approach 
is apparent in the following excerpt from the ‗Memoirs‘ of Ismail Kemal Bey, also known as 
the founder of the contemporary state of Albania (1912), and his formulation of the 
ancientness of the Albanian ‗race‘: 
 
Between the Adriatic, the Pindus, the range of the Balkans and the Dinaric Alps, on 
the dividing line between East and West, where history has witnessed the meeting of 
so many wandering peoples and so many nascent civilisations, Albania stands like a 
formidable rampart (. . .) Though not strangers to the civilisation of the Greeks, this 
race nevertheless preserved its own character and the pride of its pre-Hellenic origin.  
(1920:353) 
 
Here, Kemal Bey, a cult-personality of the Albanian national history, produces a projection of 
ancientness which will become essential for establishing the ‗historical preciousness‘ of 
Albanian ethnonational identity: its primordial, ‗pre-Hellenic‘ origin. While acknowledging 
the tumultuous history of the region which is permeated by ‗so many nascent civilisations‘, 
Kemal Bey highlights the longevity of Albanian ‗race‘ as a ‗formidable rampart‘ that was 
capable to endure and prevail. With this, he argues for the primordial origin of Albanian 
ancientness and the perenniality of its ethnonational identity—the perennial origin of the 
nation, as defined by Smith (1984, 2009). 
Later in this chapter I will demonstrate that the projection of Albanian autochtonousness as 
pre-Ottoman, Illyrian/Aryan origin were specifically aimed at emphasizing its ancient 
worth—a testimony of its non-easternness—through othering of the imminent territorial 
rival. As noted by Wodak, DeCillia et al (1999), such quest of proving one‘s ancient presence 
in the region represents a re-interpretation of one‘s ethnic uniqueness through ‗dynamic, 
relational complexity of identificational process‘ (ibid:11). This has been also noted by  
Lubonja (2002) who sees the process of ‗exalting the antiquity‘ of Albanian people and 
language as a major component of the mythology of national identity: 
 
Since it was necessary to distinguish the Albanians from the Greeks and the Slavs – 
even to stress their superiority – the origin of the Albanian people was found to be in 
Pelasgian people, which, according to mythology, were the inhabitants of the Balkans 
before the Greeks (later the Pelasgians were replaced by the Illyrians). (2002:92). 
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Due to its political importance for the future Albanian ideological programme, 
strategy and political aspirations this research focuses on the analysis of the orientalist 
features in the ethnonationalist discourse that was employed during the compilation of 
a pamphlet ‘What Will Become of Albania14‘, written in 1899 by Sami Bey Frasheri 
(1850-1904), a writer, publisher and ideologist of the Albanian Movement of National 
Rebirth (1878)15. Additional text-samples will be used and analysed from the 
respective period – or related to it. However, Frasheri‘s pamphlet will remain the 
centrefold object of the analysis, for it has been commonly accepted within the 
Albanian political and national literature as the ‗most sublime political programme of 
the National Rebirth movement‘ (Bajrami, 1997:21). 
 
The structure of this chapter is divided into three sections that deal with the following issues: 
 
1. Albania, What it Was, What it Is and What it Will Be. This is the introductory 
section that provides the general overview of the central sample-text that was used for 
the analysis in this chapter, i.e. Frasheri‘s political pamphlet/manifesto. Briefly, I will 
highlight the discursive arguments with the pamphlet that construct and underpin the 
major ideological principles that (to-date) govern the production and application of 
the Albanian orientalist ethnonationalism, as listed at the beginning of this chapter. I 
have chosen Frasheri‘s pamphlet due to the impact that it had on the subsequent 
development of the Albanian national identity and political thought. To-date, it is 
considered by contemporary Albanian scholars as the major ‗programmatic essay‘ of 
Albanian ethnonationalist ideology which managed to ‗clearly express the dualism 
between European Albanians and Asian Turks‘ (Sulstarova, 2006:40). 
 
2. Demonizing the Turk. This section analyses the discursive construction of ‗historical‘ 
justification that underpins the idea of Albanian ideological, cultural and political 
                                                 
14 The translation employed is by Robert Elsie (http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts19/AH1899_1.html). The verbatim translation 
in English would be: ‗Albania, What it  Was, What it  Is and What it  Will Be (Alb. Shqiperia, c‘ka qene, c‘eshte dhe c‘do te be hete) 
15 The pamphlet ‗Shqipëria - Ç'ka qënë, ç'është e ç'do të bëhetë? Mendime për shpëtimt të mëmëdheut nga reziket që e kanë 
rethuarë‘, was firstly published in Bucharest 1899, and later reprinted in numerous Albanian editions. The edition used with this 
research is reprinted in Kosovo (1999) and is part of the elementary school textbooks, published by the Libri Shkollor, public 
company under the auspices of the Kosovo Education Ministry.  
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difference from the realm of the Ottoman hegemony. Specifically, I will analyse the 
discursive technologies and the strategy of denunciation of the influence and relevance of 
the Ottoman culture and its political system in the Albanian society. Also, I will analyse 
the impact of literary works and political essays by the leaders of the Albanian Rebirth 
Movement in constructing the projection of historical ancientness, ethnic 
autochthonousness and cultural uniqueness of Albanians in the Balkans. This formed part 
of the discursive strategy of ideological denunciation and distancing from the realm of a 
hegemonic structure defined as ‗eastern‘ and opposed to values of ‗Europe‘ and 
‗Europeanness‘. Also, additional text samples written by Albanian and foreign authors 
and historiographers will be used and analysed with the aim of enriching the context of 
the research, as well as introducing an external, orientalist, perspective. 
 
3. Europe Loves Us, Europe Loves Us Not. This section highlights the confused 
relationship of the ethnonationalist narrative with the concept of ‗Europe‘ as an idealised 
projection of the post-Ottoman social system. Here, I analyse the evolution of the 
Albanian ethnonationalist discourse and its orientalist traits in the aftermath of the events 
such the Berlin Congress (1878) and World War I. The discourses of ‗western betrayal‘, 
of inner-Albanian discontent with its oriental/Ottoman, un-European cultural legacy are 
analysed through juxtaposing the sample-texts from the period of the National Rebirth 
from both local/Albanian writers and foreign historiographers. 
 
4. Albanianism, nation as religion. This section focuses specifically on the state of 
‗religious fluidity‘ in Albanian societies (Dujizings, 2004). I analyse the discursive 
technologies that affirm such ‗fluidity‘ and present it as the evidence of ideological 
‗versatility‘ of Albanian sociopolitical culture with the ‗secular‘ and ‗western‘ norms. 
Here, among others, one of the major examples in the context of relativizing the religious 
divide among Albanians the poem ‘Oh, Albania’, written in 1898 by another exponent of 
the National Rebirth movement, Vaso Pasha (Eng. Wassa Effendi) – and addresses 
specifically the tendency of gelatinization of the religious belonging as a base for forming 
the national awareness. I argue that this specific feature of Albanian ethnonationalist 
discourse – as a supra-religious construction – makes it unique and different from its, 
predominantly ethnoreligious, variations in the region. 
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5. Scanderbeg, the narrative of cohesion. This section focuses on the narrative of 
ethnonational cohesion through the applied version of history and biography of Gjergj 
Kastrioti-Skenderbeu (Eng. George Castrioti–Scanderbeg (1405-1468)) as a 
personification and the epitome of distinct, non-Ottoman (therefore, Christian/European) 
legacy of the Albanian nation. The personality of Scanderbeg will be analysed through 
the text-sample originating from Albanian and foreign authors, and will point out the 
construction and usage of the ‗Scanderbeg narrative‘ in the representation of historical 
cohesiveness of Albanian ethnic culture as the core of the orientalist/nationalist narrative 
of ethnoreligious cohesion and political ideology. 
 
As noted, a number of sample texts written by foreign observers and historiographers on 
Albanian-Ottoman relations from the same period have been selected to extend further the 
insight and scope of this  analysis. Accounts from foreign writers, historiographers and 
travellers to the region such as Edith Durham (1905), Leo Freundlich (1913), Aubert Herbert 
(1912), Lord Byron (1809) are selected with the aim of illustrating the external-internal 
interaction of orientalist discourse. I argue that the manner in which Albanians were 
constructed in the foreign, western public assisted greatly in the manner in which they would 
define themselves and their ethnonationalist ideology in the future. 
 
Albania – What it Was, What It Is, What It Will Be16 
 
‘The fate of small nations passes through the gates of great tragedies’, wrote Ismail Kemal 
Bey in his memoirs (1920) as he was describing the position of Albanians at the outset of the 
20th century. He was the leader of a national movement launched in 1870s that proclaimed 
the independence of Albania after the Ottoman retreat from the region in 1912 – but left out 
Kosovo and other Balkan territories that were inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Ever since, the 
latter would develop a projection of themselves as part of a nation divided at the intersection 
of the Great Powers‘ geopolitical interests, entrenched between the ever-changing frontlines, 
partitioned through regional feuds and international treaties ‗that awarded Kosovo to 
Yugoslavia‘ (Vickers 2001:96). The trait of national loss, the ‗lost land‘, the ‗lost glory‘ that 
ought to be revived to its worldly acclaim, surfaces as the key element in all of the works 
                                                 
16 The verbatim translation of Sami Bey Frasheri‘s pamphlet: (Alb. ‗Shqiperia, ç‘ishte, ç‘eshte dhe ç‘do te behete‘), Libri Sh kollor, 
Prishtine, 1999. 
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written by Albanian scholars during the period of the National Rebirth Movement and after, 
such as  Gjergj Fishta, (1923 (1958)), Wassa Effendi (1890), Naim Frasheri (1886) or Sami 
Bey Frasheri (1899). Here is an example from the Wassa Efendi‘s poem, ‗Oh Albania‘: 
 
But now, Albania, you‘re a sight of woe 
Just like an oak tree brought down low! 
All step on you as if you were dead,  
And not one kind word to you is said.  
Once you dressed well, like a woman high-born,  
Today, your fine robes are badly torn  
 
Later in this chapter (see ‗Demonizing the Turk‘), I will analyse the discursive linkage that 
enables the projection of the connection between the feature of national calamity – the 
territorial partition, destruction caused by the immediate neighborhood and/or assisted by the 
political interests of stronger rivals – and the emphasis on the great national and historical 
sacrifice by Albanians done for the ends of European causes. I argue that the subsequent 
feeling of national ressentiment and betrayal towards ‗the west‘ and ‗Europe‘ that permeates 
the ethnonationalist discourse was employed by the ideologists of the Rebirth Movement to 
produce an idea of Albania as the civilisational scapegoats, a nation sacrificed for Europe‘s 
wellbeing and safety – whose sacrifice was, ultimately, neglected, ignored and forgotten. 
 
‗Europe has a debt to pay to this nation; today is that day as this nation is with one foot in the 
grave‘, writes Visarion Dodani, an Albanian journalist and activist in 1898 (in Sulstarova, 
2005:38). According to him, other than being a mere, subdued, part to the Ottoman Empire, 
Albanians have nothing to do with its culture – and everything to do with Europe. As such 
they are to be acknowledged their ‗Europeanness‘ and their sacrifice for Europe. Such 
specific trait of ressentiment remains one of the most important features of orientalist trait in 
the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse: it projects the sentiments about their ignored cultural 
ancientness, their forgotten sacrifice for Europe and their present sufferings in the hands of 
‗eastern‘ hegemonies. I argue that the pamphlet written by Sami Bey Frasheri compiled such 
sentiments within a single, political manifesto that gave birth to the Albanian ethnonationalist 
discourse. Below is an excerpt from the opening sentences of the pamphlet: 
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Albanians have always fought and died, but it was others to gain from their spilled 
blood (. . .) Many Albanians became famous in knowledge and crafts; yet, others take 
pride in them, not Albanians – not Albania (. . .) Other than ancient Greeks, Romans 
profited from Albanians; their bravery and honour was hailed by Romans, not 
themselves. Many of our brave men rose in those times, but the world remembers 
them as Romans – not Albanians (. . .) After the Romans came the Turks. Albanians 
fought with them in all wars; their bravery made many victories but they were 
carrying the name of the Turk, not of the Albanian. . . (1999:37) 
 
Known in Turkish as Semseddin Sami, Sami Bey Frasheri (1850-1904) was a writer and an 
ideologist of the Albanian Rebirth movement (Qosja, 1984). Educated in both Greece 
(Ioannina gymnasium) and Istanbul, Frasheri spent most of his life as a high, carrier official 
and bureaucrat with the Ottoman Empire. During his stay in Istanbul he worked briefly as a 
journalist, but also a devoted linguist involved with the advancement of the modern Turkish 
language as well as Albanian (Grillo, 1997). His writings and works include a wide range of 
interests, from academic compilations, such as the ‗Alphabet of Istanbul‘ (1879), 
‗Grammatical Work‘(1886), ‗Encyclopedia of General Sciences‘ (1889-1898) to various 
novels, poems and plays. Finally, his political pamphlet ‗What Will Become of Albania?‘ 
(1889) has been widely adopted as the ultimate ideological manifesto of the Albanian Rebirth 
Movement. ‗It was written with the aim of recreating the national pride and to incite 
Albanians to regain the lost glory of Albania that once was—a free and proud country‘ 
(Grillo 1999:9). Sami was the second of the three Frasheri brothers: Abdyl Frasheri (1839-
1892), Sami Frasheri (1850-1904) and Naim Frasheri (1846-1900). As noted by Malcolm 
(1998) the Frasheri brothers represented the Ottoman-educated elite of Albanian society who 
cherished ‗progressive ideas‘ about education, law and social policy (ibid:220). This research 
will also employ a number of selected sample texts from their work as it represents the 
cornerstone of Albanian literature from the Rebirth/Romanticist Period (Hamiti, 2004). 
 
Also, it is important to note that the edition of the pamphlet that was used in this research has 
been published by the public company Libri Shkollor (part to the Kosovo Education 
Ministry) and is used as a required literature with the Kosovo elementary schools curriculum 
in Albanian language. 
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Below I will provide a brief insight and introduction into the structure and the content of the 
pamphlet – and the manner in which it corresponds with the orientalist postulates that were 
listed at the beginning of this chapter. I argue that from the outset Frasheri‘s pamphlet sets 
the stage for employment of the reconstructed pre-Ottoman national roots as the major 
component of rationalisation of the ideological basis, as well as the discursive naturalisation 
of the knowledge about the historical legacy of the Albanian nation: 
 
(a) Illyrian/ancient roots. The claim about nation‘s ancientness represents the first, 
opening chapter of the pamphlet, ‗What Was Albania?17‗ followed by the sub-section 
‗Pelasgians‘ who Frasheri sees as the great ancestors of modern Albanian nation: ‗Our 
ancient race, our forefathers have been called by the world as the Pelasgians.‘ The 
Pelasgians are employed here under the context of ‗a hold-all term for any ancient, 
primitive and presumably indigenous people in the Greek world‘18. Frasheri refers to 
the Pelasgians as a pre-Hellenic, thus autochthonous, civilisation of the region which 
linkage to Albanians would prove beyond any doubt their historical ancientness in the 
region and also underpin their political claims for statehood (see also Grillo, footnote 
2, 1999:13). 
 
The relations between Illyrian/Albanians and Epirotes/Greeks (1999:15-18), the Albanians 
and the Roman Empire (1999:18-21) and the Albanians‘ Kingdoms and Byzantium (1999:21-
26) will come back throughout this chapter, as it is central to the discourse.  
 
(b) Adherence to the pre-Ottoman, European civilisation. Frasheri provides the 
ideological base that argues for the ‗European ancientness‘ of Albanians before the 
arrival of the Ottomans. It builds up the claim that the ‗natural‘ Albanian 
Europeanness was interrupted through Ottoman conquests (sub-sections ‗Albania in 
the times of Scanderbeg‘, ‗Albania Under the Turks‘), as it reveals the strong feature 
of ressentiment nationalism (Greenfeld, 1992) in the ending sub-section ‗Albanians: 
Always for the World, Never for Themselves‘.  Through such ressentiment Frasheri 
highlights for the sacrifice that the Albanian nation endured for the preservation of the 
                                                 
17 The original tit le of the pamphlet in Albanian is ‗Shqiperia, ç‘eshte, ç‘ka qene dhe ç‘do te behete? (literal translation would be: 
‗Albania, What it  Was, What It  Is and what It  Will Be?‘)  
18 Reference from ‗Apollonius Rhodius‘ (t rans. Peter Green). The Argonautika (Expanded Edition). University of California Press, 
2007, p. 223 (Commentary on I.987). Found in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pelasgian#cite_note -0  
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European, civilisation and mourns over the misfortune of Albanians as a people who 
‗died and fought do that others would profit from their spilled blood‘ (1999:35): 
 
(c) Islamic legacy as a historical misfortune . The fall under the Ottoman rule as a great 
historical disruption of Albanians‘ ‗natural‘ development under the realm of ‗Europe‘ 
remains the major argument of Chapter 2 ‘What Is Albania?’. Here, Frasheri refers to 
the contemporary grievances of Albanian nation and their, once glorious, state that 
lies ‗in tatters, with the name of Illyria forgotten‘ (1999:44), yet still among the ‗most 
beautiful countries of the entire Europe‘ (1999:45). Here, simultaneously, Frasheri 
glorifies the Albanian ‗peoples‘ who remain a unified nation regardless of the 
religious divide ‗into two-thirds of Muslims and one-third of Christians – with the 
latter divided in half between (Roman) Catholics and Orthodoxes‘ (1999:45). To 
Frasheri, ‗Albanians today are slaves, suppressed, humiliated and reduced more than 
any other peoples under the Turks‘ (1999:50). The orientalist features surface with the 
section 8, ‘Friends of Albanians’ where Frasheri projects the ‗nations of the entire 
Europe‘ as friends and allies to the Albanians – as opposed to the ‗insane nations‘ of 
Greeks and Turks with their attempts to devour it. ‗French, Allemans19, English and 
others – all love and respect our nation‘ notes Frasheri, reiterating that ‗they all 
recognise us as the most ancient and noble nation of Europe (ibid)‘. 
 
(d) Adherence to the (post-Ottoman) European civilisation. This is the last chapter of 
the pamphlet and encapsulates the political programme and reasoning behind the 
writing. Its sections such as ‘Can Albania Remain As It Is?’, ‘Are Albanians Capable 
To Protect and Maintain Themselves?’, ‘Salvation or Vanquish of Albania is in the 
Hands of Albanians’, ‘Aims of Albanians’ – have been devised as both an explanation 
of the existing state of affairs of Albanian nation, as well as the roadmap to creating a 
future, modern, independent nation state of Albania. 
 
But what have we done to them (the Turks) that, in their fall, they want to take us 
down with them? What do we have in common with them? Did we arrive with them? 
No, not at all. We are not Turks, nor did we arrive from the wilds of Asia. We are the 
                                                 
19 Archaic Albanian adaptation of  ‗Allemagne‘ (Fr. German).  
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oldest people of Europe. We have more rights to live in Europe than any others. 
(1999:76) 
 
I argue that, in any other given historical period, be it the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-
Hungary, or the Communist Yugoslavia, the technology of accelerated, almost competitive, 
othering and repudiation of the worthiness of a dissolving hegemony by the Balkans 
ethnonationalist discourse will inevitably bear two major discursive features: 
 
a) The ability to relativize and transcend the temporal aspect of the social/political 
influence of respective hegemonic power; i.e. its longevity and contribution in 
shaping the social practices of that ethnicity is, simply, evaded—or, at best, 
relativized. Here, in the context of the discursive operation of demonizing the 
Ottoman Empire at the end of their rule, ‗the Turk‘ was being looked upon with a 
sense of hideousness that one would express at an abrupt, novel, therefore shocking 
sight. ‗The Turk‘ is ‗primitive‘, ‗savage‘, ‗filthy‘ and ‗alien‘—all of a sudden. His 
presence in the region that went beyond half a millennia is to be downplayed or 
outright excluded from the ethnonationalist discourse; his existence and influence is 
preferred to be discussed in the present tense only, for ‗the Turk‘ must have no history 
in an ethnonationalism‘s purity of origin. At least, no history that can relate to any 
vital influence of the constitution, features and qualities of a new—yet, in other 
senses, ‗old‘—native, nation. 
 
b) The ability to construct ‗scientific‘ arguments for  differentiation from possible 
historical, cultural, political, ideological, even racial, relations and influences with the 
diminishing hegemony: ‗the Turk‘ and his rule cannot and shall not be remembered, 
as his heritage must not contaminate the purity of the recently (re)discovered 
ethnonational identity. The origin of the latter must be sought away from the current 
history of the hegemonic ‗episode‘, in the misty past of antiquity that is 
(re)constructed to represent a social excellence intact from interaction with the 
former. I argue that, ultimately, according to Frasheri and leaders of the Albanian 
Rebirth, the legitimate and durable membership of Albanians with the western, 
European civilisation can only be possible if the political discourse of the former‘s 
elites can produce convincing evidence – historical, cultural, ideological, political – 
that would prove their profound civilisational difference with the East, the Orient – 
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‗The Turk‘. In this case, it meant the production of statements and proofs about their 
geographical autochtonousness, historical uniqueness, ideological and ethnic 
resilience to foreign (eastern) rule and devotion to the European (western) civilisation 
(see also Sulstarova, 2009:694). 
 
Demonizing the ‘Turk’ 
 
Frasheri‘s pamphlet is important for different reasons, amongst which its linguistic simplicity 
and bluntness, abundance of metaphors and comparisons. One of its major features, though, 
is its technology of constructing the arguments for the denunciation and demonization of the 
Ottoman hegemonic construction, namely ‗the Turk‘. Frasheri appears to understand such 
discursive projections as the first and necessary step to construct, emphasize and 
institutionalize the separate ethnonational identity—its autochthonousness, uniqueness and, 
above all, its projection of ‗Europeaness‘. The feature of autochthonousness—‘Albanians, are 
the oldest of the old nations of Europe‘ (1999:13)—rich in its severity and bluntness of 
representation, historical validations, ethnic rationalisations and even racial justifications, is, 
of course, not limited to the Albanian nationalist movement of the time, as one can encounter 
an abundance of alike anti-hegemonic depictions across the literary heritage of region‘s 
ethnicities/nations, such Serbian, Macedonian, even Slovenian and Croatian. Abundance of 
similar illustrations can be found with works of (Bakic-Hayden (1995), Perica (2002), Pesic 
(2009)) and Despotovic et al (2006) as follows: 
 
(Serbian romanticist historians) were grounding their idea of multi-millennia old 
ancientness of the Serbian nation on etymology, similarly to their romanticist 
colleagues in the rest of the world. (2006:15) 
 
Part of the Croatian scientists saw the pre-historic residents of the present Iran as the Croatian 
ancestors; others believed that those should be the Ostrogoths, which was particularly popular 
during the World War II (. . .) Slovenians were no strangers to extending of the national 
existence on the multi-millennia scale. Representatives of their autochthonous school of 
thinking believe that Slovenians have to be linked to Venets, insisting that their linkage is of 
genetic nature and that it represents a continuing developmental stream that enables 
Slovenians to exist as a nation for 2000 years (2006:20-21) 
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For the purposes of this study, the emphasis on autochthonousness remains exemplary of an 
important ideological trait with the rest of Balkans‘ ethnic nationalisms: its capacity to 
negative construction of one‘s ethnic identity. We can recognise Benhabib‘s (1996) account 
on the process of differentiation ‗from what one is not‘. In short, the political value of the 
claim to historical autochtonousness is expressed in the ability of the ethnonationalist 
discourse to render inexistent any foreign (read: eastern) influences in the process of 
construction of the national identity. 
 
In Said‘s terms (1978), the feature of denunciation of ‗the Turk‘ and its legacy relates to the 
negation of the power political, power cultural, power intellectual and power moral that the 
diminishing Ottoman Empire exercised over Albanians—a claim that is also heavily 
underpinned through projections of the empire as an oppressive and hegemonic rule. Such 
tendencies of denunciation of historical linkage or heritage can be detected in the Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse during both periods covered by this research. As such, they 
represent an important feature of intertextuality in the discourse which underpins and 
maintains the key principles of ethnonationalist ideology on Albanian nationhood, statehood 
and political independence. They permeate the works of early representatives of the Albanian 
Rebirth Movement, such as Wassa Effendi (1879) or Sami Bey Frasheri‘s pamphlet (1889), 
but also those from succeeding generations by the mid-twentieth century, such Rexhep Qosja 
(1990) from Kosovo, or Ismail Kadare (1978, 1986 and others) who will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
Below are two accounts, written in respective periods that provide a chronological context 
and insight into the intertextuality of the feature of the denunciation and othering of ‗the 
Turk‘ within the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse. The first one is an excerpt from an 
Albanian newspaper, ‗Shkopi‘ that was published in Cairo, Egypt – written in 1908. The 
second is an excerpt from the interview compilation with Albanian author, Ismail Kadare, 
‗Barbaric Times: From Albania to Kosovo‘, written in 1999: 
 
I will not bother calling it good or evil – only the Western civilisation can save the 
Albanian nation and country and ensure our existence at the Europe‘s belly-button; 
for, it is only this civilisation that is existing in the right way, preparing its peoples for 
the needs of the times that change unstoppably. The world prospered enormously due 
to this civilisation; just remind yourselves about what Europe used to be, and what it 
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is today... Take a look at the Turkey and see at what (low) scale it dwells, for it 
wanted to pave its road through the midst of Europe... (‗Shkopi‘, nr. 4, 15.11.1908, in 
Sulstarova, 2007:33) 
 
The only thing that interests me is the orientation and anchoring of Albania in the 
West. Albania is fed up with the East... The East is for Albania worse than it was for 
the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, for the East was, to Albania, the soviet East, the 
Chinese East – the Ottoman East... In short, the East is a misfortune, a disaster. All 
this time, the Albanian culture, Albanian aspiration, attempted to cut the ties with the 
East (Kadare, 1999:58) 
 
I argue that, historically, such operation of political, cultural and ideological denunciation has 
been viewed by the Albanian intellectual nationalist elite as a critical signifier in the 
discourse that would maintain the projection of the nation‘s Europeanness through the 
technique of its persistent reiteration and affiliation with the notion of ‗progress‘.  
 
In the context of external depictions of the Balkans – and Albanians, for that matter – both 
accounts go very much along the lines of the advice by George Miller, a British 
historiographer from the 1890‘s, to his government in regard to the Balkans: that the Great 
Britain ‗ought to seek the friendship of those (Christian) states which, in spite of their 
obvious faults, contain at least what Turkey does not contain, the germs of progress.‘(in 
Todorova, 1997:110). Undoubtedly, the accounts listed above demonstrate a certain level of 
understanding—and acceptance—of Miller‘s observation and advice. In both cases, there is 
an obsessive trait for identifying as inseparable the notions of ‗progress‘ and ‗the west‘, 
inasmuch as ‗the east‘ or ‗Turkey‘ becomes inseparable from connotations such ‗misfortune‘ 
and ‗disaster‘. Above all, I argue, both accounts manifest an obsessive trait to advertise the 
civilisational difference—and, differentiation—of Albanians with ‗the East‘. The 
preoccupations of the Balkan societies about external perceptions is also noted Sulstarova 
(2007): 
 
Balkan intellectuals from the 19
th
 century onwards were persistently worried about 
the manner in which their societies and nations would be seen and perceived by the 
westerners (. . .) Therefore, orientalist approach was employed by the local elites as a 
technique in applying the modernist reforms and in coining of new identities that 
would be compliant to western models (2007:20) 
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Moreover, the Balkan ethnonationalist ideologists, such as Sami Bey Frasheri, appear to have 
a significant degree of understanding that ‗Europe‘ certainly represents a mere variant of 
cultural, political hegemony that—providing it succeeds in establishing its rule in the 
region—would inevitably influence the postulates on which one‘s ethnic uniqueness in based. 
This is the period in the region‘s history when greater powers such Austro-Hungary and 
Tzarist Russia, as well as Italy, France and Great Britain had already made themselves 
critically present on the ground (Vickers (1983), Durham (1905, 1908)). ‗The international 
machinations associated with the Eastern Question deepened the mistrust between Serbs and 
Albanians during the last quarter of the 19th century‘, writes Gallagher (2001:48) while 
pointing out the consequences of the Western ‗realpolitik‘ approach to the emerging 
‗ethnonationalisation‘ of the Balkans. But, in the political and cultural context of the period, 
‗the Europe‘ had been already labelled as the vestige of ‗progress‘ and modernity, with the 
institutionalized concept of nationhood seated at its core. Nationalism was an incoming, 
revolutionary novelty according to Vickers (1995) for it was ‗the first time the Ottoman 
Empire had encountered nationalism among Muslims. The growing Albanian movement 
directly challenged Ottoman rule and created conditions that invited foreign intervention‘ 
(ibid:41). 
 
In the case of Frasheri‘s pamphlet, the language that was used for writing (and disseminating) 
the pamphlet is also indicative of the tendency to cultural distance from the Ottoman Empire. 
At the time, it was among the very few Albanian writings of the time that were written in a 
Latin alphabet – which was itself a novelty, considering the fact that the standardization of 
the written Albanian was yet to take place (1908). In the period when the pamphlet was 
produced, Albanian was written – if at all—using Ottoman or Greek alphabet. Therefore, its 
practical usage with the Frasheri‘s pamphlet represents in itself a major component of its 
ethnonationalist content—as it connoted the reconstruction and the revival of a nation away 
from the cultural dependency on foreign hegemonies. As noted by Faik Bey Konitza, a 
renowned Albanian scholar and intellectual of the period:  
 
Until 1877, very few Albanians had any idea that there should or could be a written 
language. It is true that in Northern Albania (. . .) a number of merchants did make 
use of the Albanian language in corresponding with each other; and the Roman Office 
of Propaganda had published a number of religious books in Albanian, but this 
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initiative did not pass beyond its own narrow scope, and was not related to any 
national idea
20
. 
 
Ever since, the adoption of the Latin alphabet by the Albanian elites of the 19 th century has 
been praised as one of the major successes in the progressive and ‗modernizing‘ attempts—
an ultimate paradigmatic shift of the ways in which the young ethnonationalist ideology 
would be shaped with respect to perceived ‗eastern‘ and ‗western‘ models. Below is an 
illustrative account on the issue of the Albanian language and alphabet that comes from 
Albania of the 1930s and illustrates the importance with which such shift was perceived and 
demonstrates the type of internalisation of orientalism taking place: 
 
A new page was introduced on 21 October and our history began to be written no 
longer in Arabic letters – but Latin. The band of Levantine mehmurs21 was sacked 
from the management and their place was filled by the group of youngsters led by a 
brightest and the most liberal elder that we have. Since that day, a harsh polemics has 
ensued between those who perceive Albania as an Afghanistan and those engaged to 
make a Switzerland out of it. (Maloki, in Sulstarova, 2007:67) 
 
Also, an important feature to note is the applied degree of skilfulness through which the 
discursive construction of ‗Europe‘s‘ liminal definition enters the scene—as a generalized 
sociopolitical structure that differs substantially from its concrete manifestation through 
diplomatic and political actions conducted by its members. Pamphlets such Frasheri‘s are 
quite blunt in applying a double-standarded representational strategy: on the one hand, they 
see no difficulty in reducing, personifying and epitomizing a complex, supra-ethnic content 
of the Ottoman Empire with the simple ‗Turk‘; on the other, they demonstrate a somewhat 
irrational readiness to generalize ‗the Europe‘, regardless of the fact that its political actions 
on the ground were accounting for a fragmented structure with the history of ethnic 
exclusiveness and national rivalries: 
 
Albania is a part of European Turkey. Its existence today is linked to the survival of 
European Turkey. Will Turkey survive much longer in Europe? Either it is not 
possible to give an answer to this question or the answer is no. (...) We do not know 
                                                 
 
21 A Turkish/Osman name for overtly old and out -of-touch person. 
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how much longer it will survive in Asia, and it is beyond the scope of our 
deliberations to speak of this, but in Europe it will certainly not be for much longer. 
Albania itself has not yet laid its own foundations and taken hold. It is languishing in 
the crumbling foundations and rotten roots of Turkey (Frasheri, 1899 (1999):70).  
 
As noted by Robert Elsie (1995), such views coming from a Balkan pathos are indicative of 
the awakening of Albanian national identity at the end of the 19th century: ‗The immediate 
goal of the manifesto was full autonomy with the Ottoman Empire, although it served to 
promote the ideal of full Albanian independence.‘22 Such observation appears clearly with the 
first paragraph about Albania as part of the ‗European Turkey‘: it is really not about a pre-
meditated and already organised armed rebellion against a political establishment. Quite the 
opposite, a communicative strategy at work reveals for a certain difficulty of the author to 
construct the major ideological pillar for any similar manifesto: the component of hostility 
and brutality of the foreign oppressor. Here, it is not about ‗thousands of innocent victims‘ or 
‗massacres of women and children‘; the reasoning behind the compilation of the pamphlet is 
clearly pragmatic, as it wants to justify the necessity of a smaller and weaker society to 
disassociate from the ‗inevitable‘ destiny of collapse of the grand hegemony. 
 
If the Albanians have always been so courageous and heroic, why do they have their 
hands tied and why do they allow their foes, who have neither might nor right on their 
side, to divide them and cause their downfall? They have their hands tied because the 
Turks are holding them prisoner and their foes are decimating them with the help and 
assistance of the Turks. But are the Turks strong enough to hold the Albanians down 
with one hand and assist their foes with the other? No, we know they are not, but they 
are cunning. Albania is being held captive by a sly and cunning fox. I would even go 
so far as to say that the Albanians have tied themselves down because of their 
ignorance and blindness. (Frasheri, 1899 (1999):76-77) 
 
Frasheri‘s logic at work is political and pragmatic; in his depictions, Albanians are 
‗prisoners‘, victimised by their foes who take advantage of their subdued position. Although 
he acknowledges the existence of the periods of ‗bygone glory‘ under the Ottomans, ‗when 
Albania became richer than it had ever been‘ (1999:29); when ‗over 25 grand Veziers‘ were 
of Albanian origin—he justifies strongly the contemporary necessity to part with them. The 
                                                 
22 For further reading, please visit: http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts19/AH1899_1.html 
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ressentiment towards the ailing Empire increases in its intensity, thus beginning to shape the 
basis of the future ideological justification for disowning from its legacy. The abundance of 
earthly metaphors such those equalizing the Ottoman Empire with ‗the sly and cunning fox‘ 
account for the pamphlet‘s intended target audience—the common Albanian masses, the 
peasantry and remote mountaineers, the strata to be mobilised through the notions of 
‗honour‘, ‗bravery‘ and ‗betrayal‘, and to whom is also addressed the criticism on ‗ignorance‘ 
and ‗blindness‘. 
 
Finally, it is the ‗the Turk‘, not the Ottoman Empire: personification and personalization are 
employed here as the tools for discursive downplaying of the opponent‘s relevance and 
worth. In time, such a label will become the major signifier in the orientalist practices in the 
Balkans, particularly in the process of application of its ‗nesting‘ variation: ‗The Turk‘ would 
come to mean (a) cultural backwardness (b) unworthy, ‗barbarian‘ hegemonic power (c) anti-
progressiveness, ultimately, anti-westernness. Here, it also represents the adoption of the 
label under the influence of the western discursive practice and its representational policy 
regarding the Ottoman Empire: ‗the Turk‘ was specifically used in the political discourse of 
the Austro-Hungarian establishment of the times. 
 
Who are the Turks? They are a savage folk come from the wilds of northern Asia 
with goads in their hands. In their savagery, they have seized the fairest and most 
civilised countries on earth. (...) Poor Albania is one of these countries that has been 
suffering for hundreds of years and putting up with tyranny, indeed with more 
suffering than the others due to the negligence of the Albanians. The Turks are like 
those ancient peoples who blotted out the dearth like a hailstorm or a snowstorm. 
 
Where are the Huns, the Vandals, the Mongols, the Avars, the Goths and other savage 
peoples now, who once seized half the globe, marauding, pillaging and spilling 
blood? The Turks do not have any more right to live like this than these other savage 
peoples, yet even today they continue to live as freeloaders. They no longer have such 
rights. Up to now, they have created neither a state nor a government, as other 
countries have. They prefer to live in savagery. They will fall and must perish so that 
humankind can survive. (1999:76-78) 
 
The pamphlet continues on the same note of highlighting the relevance of para-political 
notions of individual and collective worth of ‗pride‘, honour‘ and ‗betrayal‘—as it closes in 
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on the construction of ‗the Turk‘ as the national and historical arch-enemy. Its—or his—
comparison with the description of the ancient tribes accommodated within (western) 
colloquial lingo as ‗barbarians‘ makes the point of their a-historical, anachronic existence in 
the region. ‗The Turk‘ belongs to the barbarian history, there is no place for it/him in the new, 
upcoming realm of modernity and progress. The last paragraphs of this fragment become 
more concrete in revealing its ideological goal through placing a global emphasis on the 
necessity for the ‗perish‘ of an empire that preferred to live in ‗savagery‘, so that ‗the 
humankind can survive‘; an alien hegemony from the remote ‗wilds of Asia‘ with whom 
Albanians cannot relate to—for they belong to ‗Europe‘ more ‗than any others‘. Clearly, ‗the 
many others‘ addresses the competing, regional nationalisms, at the time well into armed 
rebellions against the Ottoman Empire: the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians.  In the 
context of the pamphlet this allusion bears the hallmarks of a nesting orientalist approach 
which emerges during the juxtaposing exercise between ‗us‘ (Albanians), ‗them‘ (aspiring 
nationalisms of the region) and ‗Europe‘. 
 
Frasheri sees Albania as an indivisible part of the ‗civilised‘ (or, civilising) societies 
subjugated under the wrath of the ‗savages‘. The fact that the Ottoman Empire served as the 
only center of knowledge and development for the entire region for some 500 years (roughly 
from 1400-1900) is of no apparent value nor interest to this pamphlet or the author, himself 
coming from the ranks of Istanbul-educated Albanian intellectual elite of the time. The 
centuries-old tradition of co-governance and ‗millet‘23 are downplayed and ignored (Feraj, 
1998:94-95) as Frasheri unfolds the political motives of this ideological denunciation of the 
Ottoman Empire. According to Jelavich (1984) ‗the millet system and the community 
governments allowed most Balkan people under Ottoman rule to run their own affairs on the 
personal and local level‘ (ibid:135). 
 
Frasheri‘s discursive technology of retrospective rendering of its further presence as 
unwanted, useless and/or damaging to the region – even the world - bears particular 
importance, as it hints on the feature of its victimisation ‗for the protection of Europe‘ as part 
of Albanian ethnonationalist discourse: 
 
                                                 
23 Turkish, for ‗population‘ and/or ‗community‘  
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Turkey cannot survive much longer, nor will it or should it. If the Albanians cannot 
tear themselves away from Turkey, they will perish with it. It is like a dead man. 
Although we must show respect for the dead, we must also bury them in the ground. 
If we cannot bring ourselves to say farewell to them, we have no choice but to jump 
into the grave with them. That which is rotting will decompose. We cannot hold it 
back, for its stench will poison the globe. (1999:72) 
 
The dangers coming from ‗the Turk‘ are no longer confined to Albanians only, according to 
Frasheri: ‗its stench‘—if not halted immediately—will inevitably ‗poison the globe‘. Here, 
the usage of the ‗dead man‘ metaphor appears as a local variation of its more internationally 
acclaimed phrase about ‗the sick man of Europe‘24, a common, castigating definition of the 
Ottoman Empire during the 19th century. In his observation, Frasheri wants to project 
Albanians as aligning with the common, global, views on the empire which find it 
dysfunctional and decomposing. The Ottoman Empire, thus, is not to be considered part of 
the new, ‗progressive‘ world that Frasheri aspires for Albanians. Moreover: 
 
Albania cannot continue to exist as it did in the past simply because Turkey is dead 
and cannot be lived with. Even if the empire could be revived and continue on for a 
certain time, Albania would still not survive with it. The revival of Turkey means 
death for Albania (1999:73).  
 
I argue that such uncompromising language itself represents a vestige of ethnonationalist—
even, modernist25--discourse that was domesticating within the Balkan national elites 
throughout the 19th century. A break-up with the old and ‗regressive‘ was an imperative, and, 
as noted by Sulstarova, ‗the modernizing elites in the non-western societies demanded from 
their societies  to engage in resembling the West‘ (2006:20), as well as the perceived western 
discursive practices. 
 
                                                 
24 A description attributed to the Russian Tsar Nicholas I by the British envoy to St. Petersburg, Sir G.H. Seymour in 1853: ‗(the 
Tsar) is reported to have referred to the Ottoman Empire, not as legend has it , as the ‗sick man of Europe‘, but as a ‗man‘ who ‗has 
fallen into a state of decrepitude‘; in de Bellaigue, Christopher, ‗Turkey‘s Hidden Past‘, New York Review of Books, 48:4, 8 
March, 2001.  
25 ‗Modernism‘ is here employed in the context of revolt against conservative values with the broader reference to its definitio n as a 
term that ‗encompasses Western history from the Renaissance or the epoch that began with the 17th century scientific revolutions of 
Galileo, Hobbes, Newton, Leibniz and Descartes‘, in Childs, Peter (2000:16)  
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Frasheri goes on unfolding—and escalating—his orientalist approach as he notes ultimately 
the impossibility of any further ideological compromise: there can be an either ‗dead‘ Turkey 
or ‗dead‘ Albania, for the revival of the former is projected as the ultimate perish of the latter.  
 
In order to illustrate the enduring nature of such anti-Ottoman projection in the Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse, I find it relevant to state here the content of a footnote in the 
edition of Frasheri‘s pamphlet used for this research—an explanation by Odhise Grillo, editor 
with the 1999 publication—on the last sentence in the paragraph stated above: 
 
Pay attention on the clarity and courage by S. Frasheri in his attempts to define things 
with their real name and to reveal to Albanians the road to their salvation (1999:73). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the edition of Frasheri‘s pamphlet used with this research is part to the 
obligatory literature – textbook – in the Kosovo Albanian elementary schools curriculum. In 
this context, I find the content of the footnote/clarification by the editor of the publication 
quite striking: its formulation about defining things ‗with their real name‘ speaks out for a 
profound acceptance and undisputedness of Frasheri‘s century-old views about Ottoman 
Empire—or, even more critical, the state of Turkey—that to-date continues to permeate the 
Albanian nationalist discourse in both Kosovo and Albania. It appears as a proof of a century 
old heritage of naturalisation of the discourse of castigating ‗the Turk‘ and/or ‗the Ottoman‘ 
through the binary opposition: ‗the Turk‘ is thus constructed as the negative mirror, the 
absolute other to Albanian, Europe and ‗progress‘ (see Sulstarova, 2006).  
 
The logic at work in Frasheri‘s discourse extracts the ideological strength through features of 
reiteration and excess: the more aggressive the process of othering – the higher the chances to 
project the Albanians to the West as a nation devoted to the principles of civility and 
‗progress‘. Here is a verse written by Naim Frasheri (1886), a renowned romanticist poet 
from the Rebirth Movement, a brother of Sami Bey Frasheri: 
 
Hail, you glorious day (sun), 
That rises from where it sets 
You set that part alight 
Why forget about us? (1886 (1986):184) 
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I argue that, in this short verse, Naim Frasheri encapsulates most of the key features of 
Albanian orientalist ethnonationalist discourse: 
 
 the aspiration to ‗progress’ symbolized in the feature of the ‗day‘—allusion to 
light/sun and, ultimately, Enlightenment; 
 the Europe and ‗the West‘ as the center of progress: the light/sun ‗rises where it sets‘ 
entails a poetic analogy with ‗the West‘; 
 the emotion of ressentiment about the western rejection and abandonment – about 
‗forgetting‘ the Albanians. 
 
Finally, the cultural and historical denunciation with ‗the Turk‘ could only be fully achieved 
with the construction and projection of the pre-Ottoman ‗Europeanness‘ of the Albanian 
history and culture. ‗The Albanian Rebirth (movement) has raised the issue of returning to 
Europe long before the final liberation of Albania from the Ottoman rule‘, wrote the 
internationally-acclaimed Albanian writer Ismail Kadare in 2005, as he was referring to the 
period of publication of Frasheri‘s pamphlet. I argue that it is the views such as Kadare‘s that 
make the discursive intertextuality of orientalist ethnonationalism all the more relevant to the 
contemporary projections of national history and identity. For, as noted by Sulstarova, ‗to 
Kadare, the European identity of Albanians appears as a natural, primordial fact that is given 
and unchangeable‘ (2008:75)—a fact that is easily detected with a simple glance through 
history and literature textbooks in all levels of Albanian education, either in Albania or 
Kosovo. As an illustration, I will provide below a verbatim translation of the only description 
of the Ottomans (or ‗Osmans‘, as used often in Albanian) that can be found with the History 
textbook for the 5th grade of Albanian elementary schools in Kosovo: 
 
Osmans (i.e. Ottomans) were ferocious Turkish tribes that descended from the Asia 
Minor. Their leader was called ‗the Sultan‘ which had the meaning of the king. Their 
first Sultan was Osman, which afterwards became the name for both the state and the 
military. (2010:33) 
 
Situated under the section ‗Albanian Lands Attacked by Osmans: The Battle of Kosovo‘ this 
paragraph represents the only statement and explanation in the textbook that refers to the 
origin, content and influence of the Ottoman Empire in the history of the region and, 
specifically, Albanian society. The rest of the publication is devoted in its entirety to the 
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description of Albanians as a nation that originated in the pre-history ‗from the 
Pelasgians/Illyrian culture‘—defined unequivocally in the textbook as the ‗most ancient 
peoples in the Balkans‘ (2010:7-10)—and who began their ‗centuries-long‘ struggle for 
national liberation since the arrival of ‗barbarians‘, and ‗Slavs‘ in the 4th and 5th century 
(2010:23-27). Subsequently, one-third of the book discusses at length the Albanian Rebirth 
Movement, biographies of its major exponents, the continuous struggle for national liberation  
and its influence on the Albanian national identity. Throughout the textbook, the hegemonic 
structure that Albanians fought against is referred to simply as ‗Osman government‘. 
 
I argue that such contemporary approach of castigating the historical presence and cultural 
influence of ‗the east‘ – indeed, its thorough depreciation and de-personification—represents 
an enduring and aggressive feature of orientalist ethnonationalist discourse. As such, it has its 
origin in the discourse of the National Rebirth and, with the relevance to this research, the 
Frasheri‘s pamphlet26. 
 
The feature of naturalisation of this discourse is revealed and accompanied by the views 
shared by Kadare and the majority of the contemporary Albanian academia from both sides 
of the Kosovo/Albania border: it engages in the construction of ‗undisputable‘ historical 
‗facts‘ about the Albanian anti-Ottoman struggle as the mere outcome of the national 
aspiration to ‗return to Europe‘, to defend the (Illyrian/Pelasgian) autochtonousness and, 
therefore, their original ‗Europeanness‘. The work of the naturalisation of knowledge through 
this discourse appears three-fold: 
 
(a) it establishes the ethnic ancientness, 
(b) it ‗perennializes‘ the national struggle against ‗the Turk‘ and 
(c) through these two claims, it argues successfully for the Albanian commitment to 
‗Europeannes‘ 
 
Views such as Kadare‘s that engage in the temporal displacement of major signifiers in the 
ethnonationalist discourse—such ‗nationhood‘, ‗national aspiration‘, ‗national culture‘—
                                                 
26 In more detail, the contemporary features of Albanian ethnonationalism will be discussed in the chapter 7 of this research that 
deals specifically with the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist  narrative and its transformation through the internalisation of the 
orientalist  discourse as an essential component of their political ideology in the per iod 1989-1999. 
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account for the ‗validating‘ and ‗normalising‘ capacity of the orientalist approach. They 
naturalise the discursive exercise of the reconstruction of both pre-Ottoman ethnic history and 
the anti-Ottoman sentiment through the claims about ‗undeniable‘ and ‗perennial‘ existence 
of a common ‗European‘ legacy in the region in which—eventually—Albanians represent 
‗the oldest of the old‘ nations. 
 
Such projections have often constructed and reduced the narrative of Albanian past into a 
perpetual quest for preservation of their ancient ‗Europeanness‘ – a mere compilation of wars 
and conflicts that were waged on behalf of preserving the Albanian ethnic/national identity, 
as well as the European/western civilisation. Later in this chapter, I will return to analyse this 
specific discursive feature related to the history of struggles for ‗Europe‘ in the Balkans in the 
context of the concept of ‗Antemurale Christianitis‘ (the Bulwark of Christianity‘) and the 
defenders of Christian civilisation. But,  let us return to Frasheri and observe his idealised 
projection of ‗modern‘ Europe of independent nations: 
 
If Albania should succeed in saving itself from the perils that surround it and in 
embarking upon the path of security and well-being, it could become one of the best 
and fairest countries in Europe. Though it is not a large country, it is not much 
smaller than Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Denmark, Belgium, Holland or 
Switzerland, etc., which are all independent nations of their own. (. . .) It is on the 
threshold of Europe and is a neighbour of Italy and Austria. It could very soon 
become a civilised country and become part of Europe. It has everything it requires, 
as we have seen. The Albanians are clever and intelligent people. They have a great 
longing for civilisation and knowledge of all kinds (Frasheri, 1899 (1999):78-80).  
Here, we go back to Todorova‘s observation of a century-old Balkan feature of ‗going to 
Europe‘ or ‗returning to‘ it, in Kadare‘s terms.  The pamphlet draws developmental 
comparisons between the future state of Albania and the existing—western—Europeans 
(Denmark, Belgium, Holland), highlighting the potential and the hope for ‗becoming 
civilised‘ due to its geographical vicinity and eventual political good fortune. I argue that 
Frasheri admits the existing sociocultural shortcomings of Albania and Albanians who have 
yet ‗to become‘ civilised though apparently lagging behind in ‗progressive‘ actions, as 
opposed to the immediate neighbors ‗which are all independent nations‘(1899 (1999):79). 
Misha notes that, at the time, for various sociopolitical reasons, ‗Albanian national movement 
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remained embryonic at a time when most of their neighbors (after succeeding in creating their 
own national states) strove to extend their national territories‘ (2002:34). 
The Albanians have no need to take to arms, to take up positions on mountain tops 
and in caves, to kill and ravage as other nations have done to gain their freedom. The 
Albanians are not as trodden upon and broken that they need to involve themselves in 
such ventures. They need do nothing but unite, swear a common oath to one another 
in manly fashion, keep their oath steadfastly, and demand their rights from Turkey 
and of Europe. Turkey will listen and will cede to their demands, willingly or 
unwillingly. Europe will help as it has helped other nations, and will compel Turkey 
to grant them their rights (Frasheri, 1899 (1999):78-80). 
Aware of this disadvantageous situation, Frasheri makes a clear linkage between Europe, 
progress, nation-state and independence and projects them as the ultimate objectives that will 
ensure both its survival and legitimation by Europe through its engagement to ‗compel 
Turkey‘ to grant rights to Albanians. This belief and expectation about the ‗help‘ and the 
sociopolitical legitimacy that would generated by (and through) Europe—namely, the west—
has been a recurring ideological feature and political demand from Albanian political elites 
throughout the most part of the 20th century. In this respect, Vickers ironically notes that 
Albanians were repeatedly engaged in creating ‗conditions that invited foreign intervention‘ 
(1995:41). Sulstarova takes a generalizing view on such narratives of expectation of a 
‗righteous‘ foreign/European intervention. According to him, this feature comprises the 
recurring topic in respective political programmes and nationalist ideologies in the Balkans 
during the first decades of the 20th century: 
(This period) is deemed essential for the national identity of these peoples, because it 
is a time when the national and political and cultural elites in the new states of 
Eastern Europe were looking up to the West to provide legitimacy, moral inspiration 
and guidance, security and assistance to their countries. (Sulstarova, 2009:689) 
Frasheri‘s fluctuating discourse between ‗perennial‘ Albanian Europeanness and the anxiety 
of not being accepted as ‗European nation‘ is striking. Simultaneously, he highlights both 
claims—which at first sound rather paradoxical. Quite the contrary, I argue; the reason to 
such paradox is Frasheri‘s attempt to utilize the emotion of ressentiment which is triggered 
here: according to him, Albanians are and have always been ‗European‘: still, he hints, ‗the 
Europe‘ remains in denial to such ‗fact‘. The next chapter of this research will also be 
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analysing this feature in the context of Greenfeld‘s (1992) ‗ressentiment nationalism‘, as a 
recurring feature in the ethnonationalist narrative of Kosovo Albanians during the late 20 th 
century. 
 
Further, Frasheri‘s unbound optimism with respect to Albania‘s resources is openly marketed 
and offered in a prize-like manner, as an economic merchandise that possesses everything ‗it‘ 
(Europe) ‗requires‘. Again, the ending conclusion clarifies that Frasheri shares no doubts that 
‗Europe‘ represents yet another, external and, inevitably, hegemonic order, but as it is 
commonly accepted as being on the expanding, ‗progressive‘ end—as opposed to the 
‗savage‘ Ottoman Empire—he believes in the prudence of a modest, Balkan ethnicity 
engulfed in local feuds to rush forward to it and accommodate within the new, supreme rule. 
The matter of hegemonic struggle is well-explained in Mouffe (2006): 
Hegemony is positive in the sense that, if we accept that there is no order, if we did 
not have any kind of hegemony, we would be living in complete schizophrenia. There 
would not be any form of meaning, any form of order. In other words, the question is 
not to get rid of power. Power is constitutive for the social; there is no social without 
power relations. Now, any form of order is a hegemonic order, but of course there are 
some forms of order that are more democratic than others. (2006:4) 
I argue that Mouffe‘s ‗schizophrenia‘ or a social ‗anomie‘ and normlessness is precisely what 
Frasheri fears: he engages in establishing a ‗common‘ understanding about the need of 
national re-positioning towards a new, progressive hegemony. According to him, such 
‗common understanding‘ and its naturalisation would be possible through the process of 
discursive denunciation of common heritage with the Ottomans, which is, in turn, followed 
by the projection of Albanians as a geopolitical victim of the Empire because of their 
‗perennial‘ western orientation. Through Frasheri‘s pamphlet these principles became an 
ideological imperative and a widely employed discursive practice in the ethnonationalist 
narrative. Below is another, complementing account that comes from the weekly ‗Liri e 
Shqiperise‘ 27 (Eng. Albania‘s Freedom) written a decade later, in 1912, and which depicts 
the ‗victimisation‘ argument as a means to justify the pragmatic decision on the ideological 
denunciation of Ottoman/Turkey rule: 
                                                 
27 ‗Mbi Aleancen Ballkanike‘ (On the Balkan Alliance), in ‗Liri e Shqiperise‘ (Albania‘s Freedom), 12 October 1912, page 1.  
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This program of the four united Powers (United Kingdom, Austrian Empire, France 
and Russia) is a desirable one, therefore the Albanian nation must not unite with 
Turkey and fight together with the one who is sentenced to death. It should raise its 
voice and demand its rights from the Great Powers. It should be presented all over the 
world that the Albanian nation is under slavery and for four years now it has been 
fighting and asking for Albania‘s autonomy. 
 
Albanians in the foreign eyes: the noble savages 
 
The denunciation of the Ottoman empire at its deathbed – and, moreover, annulling the worth 
of its past legacy – appears as a common trait among foreign observers as well. I will focus 
specifically on those interested and involved in the affairs of the Albanian community. Such a 
historiographic account is of value not only because of their ‗European‘ orientalist approach 
to the region and its societies—a common feature of ‗outlandish‘ writings of the era—but for 
their local employment in the revival of ethnonationalist discourse well after their first 
publication.  
 
The following blunt account by Edith Durham (1905, 1909) complements the demonizing 
tendency towards ‗the Turk‘ as expressed through Frasheri‘s note on its ‗savagery‘. It 
embarks on personifying the diminishing empire through an illustration of individual, 
personal appearances of its direct subjects, such as a random ethnic Turkish family in 
Kosovo, as it compares negatively Turkish women with the native Albanian ones: 
 
Being kept mainly for breeding purposes (Turkish women), their conversation was 
much like what that of a cow might be, could it talk. They were most friendly, plied 
me with coffee and pieces of all the eatables, and pressed me to stay the night - there 
was plenty of room for another - or come tomorrow. And I tore myself away with 
difficulty. 
 
I give the above details because I invariably find that gentlemen of all nations are 
consumed with curiosity about the secrets of the harem. I thought of the bright, tidy 
Vlah women, of the civilised Serbs, of the poor (Albanian) Catholic women in 
Djakova, their clean rooms and intelligent questions; and I asked myself if they were 
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not after all right when they said, ‗The Young Turk is the son of the Old Turk.‘ Islam 
has, so far, done nothing but evil in Europe. 
 
Durham is clearly under the sentiment of the political momentum here, as she witnesses the 
fevers of upcoming national(ist) awareness of communities in a territory dwelling in fears of 
uncertain future. Such feature has been noticed by Vickers in her description of Durham as ‗a 
friend of the Albanian cause with an attitude towards her chosen people that, though 
benevolent, could not conceal a typically European sense of superiority‘ (1995:54). 
 
In line with the emerging orientalist discursive practices of the time—such as Frasheri‘s 
disparaging parallel between the Ottoman Empire and ‗the Turk‘—it is interesting to note 
here the intensity of Durham‘s expressive escalation. She starts the account with animalistic 
parallel about the Turkish women, continues with their comparison to their apparently more 
superior—therefore unjustly subjugated—local counterparts, wraps it up with the proverb on 
the futility of reforming the ‗old Turk‘ into the ‗young Turk‘ and concludes with a general, 
repudiating statement about the impact of Islam in Europe. 
 
She, too, goes with the flow of the ever-popularizing local discourse of emphasizing—and, 
naturalising—respective ethnonational identity claims at the ultimate expense of a foreign, 
eastern hegemony at the deathbed. Similarly, an earlier account from 1878, written by Fanny 
Janet Blunt, regards the Ottomans as unworthy of oppressing the ‗proud‘ Albanian: 
 
The Mohammedan Albanians on their side deeply resent the loss of their liberty, and 
the forfeiture of their privileges, and reciprocate to the full the ill-feeling and abusive 
language of the Turks. The Turk calls the Albanian Haidout Arnaout! (Albanian 
brigand!) or Tellak! (bath-boy!).The Albanian regards the Turk as a doubtful friend, 
and a corrupt and impotent master (Blunt, in Elsie, 2000);  
 
A number of British, French, German and Italian historiographers would publish accounts on 
Albanians as ‗wild mountaineers‘, ‗proud brigands‘, ‗restless warriors‘ obsessed with the 
freedom—and its lack thereof. Similar accounts are produced by Hubert (1912), Durham 
(1905, 1909), Freundlich (1913), and earlier by Byron (1825) whose poem ‗Child Harold‘s 
Pilgrimage‘ and various travelogues about Albania influenced heavily the external/western 
constructions about a race of ‗fierce brigands‘. Yet, in such similar romantic depictions, 
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Albanians were regularly attached the shortcomings and collective inability to comprehend 
contemporary, ‗progressive‘ and ‗modern‘ developments around them—and about them. As 
noted ironically by Vickers about Durham‘s ‗typically European sense of superiority‘ the 
feature of ‗naturalising‘ the Albanians‘ ‗primitiveness‘—and, thus, the unbound exoticism as 
a unique, un-discovered people—resonates with van Dijk‘s argument about ethnocentric and 
racist discourse: 
 
Fluctuating between the emphasis on exotic difference, on the one hand, and 
supremacist derogation stressing the Others' intellectual, moral and biological 
inferiority, on the other hand, such discourses also influenced public opinion and led 
to broadly shared social representations. (1998:13) 
 
In numerous, similar accounts and travelogues, Albanians were depicted as primitive, savage, 
unable, suppressed, exotic—even romantic—and thoroughly remote from any ‗civilised‘ 
center or influence. Therefore, they needed help and—enlightenment. I argue that, in a 
simplified context, such an approach comprises the common denominator for most of the 
novels, travelogues and descriptions that dealt with the Balkans region and Albanian peoples 
of the times. I also argue that, in time, such external orientalist depictions have been 
naturalised through the hegemonic power of the discourse and became the major component 
in the process of the ‗nesting‘ orientalist narrative among Albanians (see the next chapter). 
This approach was adopted and internalised with the ethnonationalist discourse through the 
reiteration of the external perception of the victim, as a ‗fact‘ that was gaining ‗international‘ 
legitimacy and recognition through accounts such as Durham‘s.  
 
In addition to this, another reason that disabled foreign observers to define and ‗classify‘ their 
projection of Albanians as either ‗European‘ or ‗eastern/Ottoman‘ was also the latter‘s 
sociocultural ambiguity: they represented an ethnicity from the Balkans that was dwelling at 
the crossroads of different—and often clashing—epistemologies, cultures and discourses. 
According to Todorova, such ‗ambiguity‘ of the Balkans has been treated almost regularly ‗as 
an anomaly‘ (1997:17). In this context, Albanians, their history and their sociopolitical 
situation represented no exception from the established ‗orientalist/balkanist‘ stereotype of 
their geographic, cultural and historical ‗liminality‘ and ‗inbetweenness‘, as discussed in 
previous chapters. This inherited ambiguity assisted in their external perception as both 
‗exotic/romantic‘ and ‗primitive/dangerous‘. According to Todorova (1997), due to their 
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‗indefinable character, persons or phenomena in transitional states, like in marginal ones, are 
considered dangerous, both being in danger themselves and emanating danger to others‘. 
(ibid:17) 
 
In this respect, George Miller, a British historiographer from the period describes the Balkan 
Peninsula as ‗a land of contradictions‘ where ‗everything is the exact opposite of what it 
might reasonably expected to be‘ (in Todorova, 1997:18). Views such as Durham‘s and 
Miller‘s account for what van Dijk (1998) highlights as the features of the discourse on 
ethnocentrism, nationalism and racism. According to him, they often fluctuate between ‗the 
emphasis on exotic difference on the one hand, and supremacist derogation stressing the 
Other‘s intellectual, moral and biological inferiority‘ (1998:11). 
 
In the context of external representation of Albanians, a handful of foreign historiographers 
and observers depicted them as the lost and ‗unsung heroes of the medieval Balkans‘. Such 
descriptions and discourses would, in time, get a life of their own and naturalise within the 
pillars of the orientalist approach in the contemporary Kosovo/Albanian nationalist narrative. 
Above all, such accounts appear essential in the attempts to confirm and convince external 
audiences of the major merchandise of Balkan slaughter: the national victimisation. 
 
Part of this pattern is the syndrome of 'historical victimisation' (. . .) which to this day 
constitutes an important element in the Albanians' vision of their relations with 
history. The use of history by nationalism to project the image of a people as 
permanent victims constitutes an obstacle to a critical confrontation with the past 
(Misha, 2002:44) 
 
Yet, to many others, Albanians were seen as being the right nation in a right place but 
suffering from a constant failure to choose the right side. A community that, in the words of 
Konitza ‗is capable of showing great understanding, but incapable to understand anything at 
all‘ (Konitza, 2000), and thus position itself more effectively in a broader political 
perspective within the great, ever-changing, constellations of power between the forces and 
cultures that were using the Balkans as their frontier battlefield. 
 
As history shows, the retreat of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent ethnic turfs in the 
Balkans brought severe political misfortune to Albanians. Torn between the centuries-old 
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Islamic heritage, the lack of ethnonational cohesiveness in political organising combined with 
the regional threats and the involvement of the Great Powers interests, Albanians ended up in 
establishing a short-lived nation-state (1912) surrounded by parts of Albanian nation whose 
territories were to remain in possession of the greater regional alliances, such as Serbia and 
Montenegro, Greece and the present Macedonia. 
 
Europe loves us, Europe loves us not: the ressentiment 
 
At least since the times of the Rebirth movement and the 1870s until the present, almost 
every written account on the Albanian national history – be it a textbook, a personal 
recollection or a newspaper article – would not miss an opportunity to resentfully cite two 
historical events that are to be considered decisive as to the national tragedy of partition and 
subsequent collective perish in the late 19th and throughout the 20th century: The Berlin 
Congress (1878) and the London Ambassadors Conference (1908). While the former, in its 
attempts to find a solution for the ‗Eastern Question‘ (Vickers, 2001) remained indifferent to 
Albanian demands for unification of their provinces (Turk. Vilayets), the latter rubber-
stamped the state of facts on the ground in the aftermath of the first Balkan War—thus 
partitioning the then-Albanian state: 
 
Although it was agreed in principle to support the establishment of Albania as a new 
political entity, the (London Ambassadors) Conference nevertheless awarded the 
Balkan allies large areas of Albanian-claimed territory, regardless of its ethnic 
composition. A major part of northern and western Albania went to Serbia and 
Montenegro, while Greece received the large southern region of Chameria. (Vickers, 
1995:70) 
 
Ultimately, these events and their subsequent treaties are represented as inextricably linked 
with the calamities to follow. To Albanians, the post-Ottoman geopolitical reality of the 
Balkans was experienced as the major national calamity that reorganised irrevocably their 
perceptions about their position in the region and also about the external, western, 
perceptions of them. In the post-festum of Balkan wars, after the formation of the new nation-
states and geopolitical partitions, Albanian ethnonationalist discourse would produce a strong 
sentiment of regional victimisation and western ressentiment, caused by the international 
betrayal and indifference. 
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In time, I argue, the widely distributed feeling of ressentiment assisted in radicalisation of the 
process of internalising the orientalist approach, as Albanians became convinced that their 
Ottoman/Muslim heritage was the major reason that caused the Western indifference towards 
their national aspirations. An account by Rexhep Qosja (1994), a renowned literary critic 
from Kosovo has summarized this sentiment as follows: 
 
The ultimate reason that made Albanians experience the great, tragic, damage from 
the politics of the Great Powers is the fact that two-thirds of its population were of 
Muslim religion – that they were part to an empire that spread this religion through 
the sword and blaze. In the times when, for the Christian Europe, the religion and 
nationality meant one single thing, Albanians, under the grip of a practically Islamic 
empire, could not have been perceived otherwise, other than someone who does not 
belong to Europe neither by his religion, ethnicity, therefore neither by his destiny; he 
was to be treated as someone who has been expelled from Europe! (1994:8) 
 
Similar accounts on the misfortune of western rejection of Albanian ‗national cause‘ have 
been fuelling the Albanian ethnonationalist discourse throughout the most part of the 20 th 
century. Often, they represent a mixture of confused sentiments towards the projected West—
as both deeply resented and obsessively longed for. Also, a handful of works, writings by 
external observers went along the lines of constructing the idea of western indifference 
towards the ‗Albanian question‘ along the lines of civilisational—east/west division—and 
religious differentiation. Below I will provide an account on the atrocities against Albanians 
from the early 20th century, written by Leo Freundlich in ‗Albanian Golgotha‘, a compilation 
of news reports on aggression of Serbian army in Kosovo during 1911-1913: 
 
A courageous people full of character is being crucified before the eyes of the world 
and Europe, civilised Christian Europe, remains silent! 
Tens of thousands of defenceless people are being massacred, women are being 
raped, old people and children strangled, hundreds of villages burnt to the ground, 
priests slaughtered. 
And Europe remains silent! 
Serbia and Montenegro have set out to conquer a foreign country. But in that land 
live a freedom-loving, brave people who despite centuries of servitude have not yet 
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become accustomed to bearing a foreign yoke. The solution is obvious. The 
Albanians must be exterminated! 
A crazed and savage soldateska has turned this solution into a gruesome reality. 
Countless villages have been razed to the ground, countless individuals have been 
butchered. Where once the humble cottages of poor Albanians stood, there is nothing 
left but smoke and ashes. A whole people is perishing on Calvary cross, and Europe 
remains silent!
28
 (1913) 
 
The recorded history of the times bears sufficient data that can point to the rise of xenophobia 
and the sentiment of national victimisation. For the purposes of further illustration of 
accounts about Balkan slaughter, I have chosen an observation by Leon Trotsky written in 
1912, while working as Balkans war correspondent. During his trip to the Balkans, Trotsky 
witnessed the turn-of-the century pillages of Albanian-inhabited territories in Kosovo, during 
the Serb military invasion in the aftermath of the demise of the Ottoman Empire from the 
region: 
 
The atrocities began as soon as we crossed the old Serbian border (...) There were 
fires everywhere. Whole Albanian villages had been transformed into columns of 
flames – in the distance, nearby, and even right along the railway line. This was my 
first, real, authentic view of war, of the merciless mutual slaughter of human beings. 
Homes were burning. People‘s possessions handed down to them by their fathers, 
grandfathers and great-grandfathers were going up in smoke (1996:297-303) 
 
I argue that that there are three significant psycho-social traumas generated during the 
difficult period of the shift of power in the region, and which were employed in the 
constitution of the orientalist trait within the ethnonationalist discourse among Albanians in 
general—whether in Albania, Kosovo or the territories they presently inhabit in countries 
such Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro or north-western Greece. In the context of modern 
history of the Balkans, they can be traced with the final days of the downfall of the Ottoman 
Empire and the subsequent period of the rise of ethnonational awareness, followed by ethnic 
conflicts, historically known as the Balkan Wars. The aftermath of the Balkan Wars 
introduced the new landscape of ethnic/nation states in the region which establishment was 
                                                 
28 Taken from Albaniens Golgotha: Anklageakten gegen die Vernichter des Albanervolkes. Gesammelt und herausgegeben von 
Leo Freundlich (Vienna 1913). Translated from the German by Robert Elsie. First published in R. Elsie, Gathering Clouds: The 
Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia, Dukagjini, Balkan Books Peja 2002, p.11 -46. 
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made possible through political (but also military) interventions by greater, external powers. 
Such a major reorganisation of Balkan societies, fundamental paradigm shifts and 
redefinition of the notions of ‗East‘ and ‗West‘, ‗Ottoman‘ and ‗Christian‘, ‗Progressive‘ and 
‗Primitive‘ would become part to the local epics, literature and storytelling. In a simplified 
categorisation they would highlight the following discursive features:  
 
 the trauma of, externally induced, territorial partition of the ‗homeland‘ the regional 
hatred towards their origin, language and culture; 
 the failure of Great (Western) Powers to understand their history and situation, and act 
accordingly upon it; 
 the failure to convince the European Great Powers to accept its calls for establishing a 
modern nation-state. 
 
These features appear inextricably linked in the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative as they 
are reproduced at any stage of its historical evolution. I argue that the partition, the hatred of 
neighborhood and the western indifference to its ‗European‘ determination became the 
hallmarks, the key signifiers of the discursive practice that constitutes to-date the ideological 
base of Albanian nationalism. Its usage in public communication, literature and other cultural 
products is calibrated to induce and reconstruct the feeling of immense, unifying grief that 
would initiate and enforce the call for political nationalist mobilisation. Devised in times of 
national confusion and inability to cope with the ruthlessness of regional feuds fought under 
the flags of competing ethnonationalism, it is manifested as a discourse of internal insecurity 
and external suspicion as it embraces fatalist connotations. It constructs analogous emphasis 
to its major ideological/programmatic epistemes, as it speaks about a nation thwarted by a 
disappearing empire, exposed to regional carnage and betrayed by the ‗civilised‘ world: 
 
The Great Powers, through the decisions of the Berlin Congress (1878), did enormous 
injustice to Albanian nation: they have treated as Ottoman property the ethnic and 
historical Albanian lands; they have acknowledged the results of the agression by the 
Balkan neighbors – those conducted by Serbia and Montenegro upon Albanian lands  
(. . .) Under the slogan of Europeanization, the Great Powers have shown that they 
want to reorganise the Balkans according to their interests – or the interests of the 
some of them – and the interests of a handful of Balkan nations! (Qosja, 1994:54) 
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Similarly, the following excerpt focuses on ethnic partition, coming from the powerful epic 
poem ‗Lahuta e Malesise‘ (1902), written by Gjergj Fishta (1871-1940), a renowned 
Albanian Catholic priest, scholar and author: 
 
. . . The black bread of the Albanian 
That he earned in blood and fight 
The damned are about to tear apart 
Piece by piece 
 
The combination of fear from pogroms and partition, the difficulties of deciphering the new, 
western, ‗power political‘, ‗power cultural‘, ‗power intellectual‘ and ‗power moral‘—to 
paraphrase Said (1978)—have undoubtedly ushered Albanians from each side of the 
Kosovan/Albanian border into hasty construction of the national cause and the nationalist 
discourse. Such hastiness, that in time initiated the state of recurring internal quarrel and 
division, improvized ‗East/West‘ self-representation, unclear ideological allegiances with 
greater powers has been effectively accounted by authors, such as Hupchick (2002). He notes 
that ‗without the very real threat of Greek, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian territorial 
encroachment into their lands, Albanians most likely would not have adopted Western-style 
nationalism—at least not when they did. (2002:303) 
 
I argue that such western-style Albanian nationalism carries a dichotomic condition of both 
anxiety towards a foreign rule as well as the recurring feature of longing to align with it. Such 
dichotomy has ultimately shaped and constituted the features of Albanian orientalist 
ethnonationalism as a variation of defensive, reactive nationalism. The fear from foreign 
hegemony appears to stream parallely with a collective demand for it: such, seemingly 
absurd, narrative is rationalised through projections about ‗progressive‘ and ‗considerate‘ 
European/western rule which, once introduced, would prevent the destructive tendencies of 
neighbouring, competing ethnonationalisms. In other words, a common and larger (possibly, 
imperial) sociopolitical order imposed over the region would control and manage local inter-
ethnic feuds, thus ensuring the preservation of a smaller nation‘s distinct existence. 
Ultimately, in Frasheri‘s terms, the ‗Europe‘ would be projected as an incoming ‗progressive‘ 
substitution to the outgoing and ‗savage‘ Ottoman Empire. As the history of the early 20th 
century Balkans shows, Albanians failed to enter the realm of another, ‗positive hegemony‘ 
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in Mouffe‘s terms (2006), and were thus destined to develop a schizophreniac ethnonational 
narrative under the new geopolitical reality of partitions and inter-ethnic atrocities. 
 
Such form of a defensive narrative—often contradictory and inconsistent—has been devised 
as a protective ideological platform that would assist in generating a representation of 
Albanians as ‗progressive‘ and ‗European‘ so that, in Qosja‘s (1994) terms, they would not 
be expelled ‗from Europe‘, and ‗by Europe‘. I argue that, as such, it represented a desperate 
attempt by the handful of its educated elite to react and respond to the developments in the 
region – the liberation struggles and independence movements in Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Romania and so forth. Frasheri, himself a major representative of that tiny elite of scholars, 
was very much aware of the difficulties in interpreting those developments to a society with a 
history of severe social and cultural isolation from what was perceived to be the ‗western‘, 
‗European‘ civilisation. To Misha (2002), the 19th century found Albanians as one of the 
most backward and isolated peoples, ‗with a number of disadvantages compared to their 
immediate neighbours‘ (ibid:36). He notes that Albanians were cut off from contacts with the 
rest of the world ‗even if judged according to the standards of the Ottoman Empire‘ (ibid). 
 
Albania continued to remain a mysterious country, an image that pursued it for a very 
long time. Even as late as 1913 the French journalist Delaisi wrote: ‗I don't know of 
any other country which is so closed to civilisation: even the Sahara is better known 
to us, even Tibet I cannot say is more mysterious.' (2002:36) 
 
Such a state of affairs in the society is referred to by Frasheri as the consequence of the 
internal, Albanian legacy of ‗political ignorance‘ and ‗historical blindness‘ which he lists 
among the ‗greatest dangers‘ faced by the nation. Here, his aggressive orientalist approach 
should be analysed as inseparable from the emancipatory, enlightement-based influences 
which at the time formed the basis of the Albanian National Rebirth (or, ‗renaissance‘, for 
that matter). I argue that, indeed, the Albanian orientalist discourse represents the manner in 
which the ideology of enlightment/modernity has been articulated. The former represents the 
discursive technique of disseminating the latter. ‗This is now the war of the pencils and 
letters, of schools and nationhood‘, notes Frasheri in the chapter ‗Albania‘s Dangers‘ 
(1999:54), thus assisting in the construction of yet another, critically important, binary 
opposition between the ‗primitive East‘ and the ‗progressive West‘. To Frasheri and Albanian 
ethnonationalist elite of the time, Albania was facing a civilisational challenge, entrenched 
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between the two essentially different hegemonic structures that had essentially different 
demands from Albanians: 
 
(Turkey) takes Albanians only for soldiers, tortures them, requires them to learn the 
skills of war. . . It does not educate the poor (Albanian), but mocks him; exploits him 
for three years, ten years, forces him under arms – away from his homeland. . . For 
five hundred years, the Turks as their masters, have not taught Albanians any crafts, 
skills or wisdom – they taught them only to fight and plunder. . . (1999:50) 
 
According to Frasheri, this treatment ought to change, and Albanians ought to realise that 
qualities other than those that served ‗the Turk‘ will be required by them from the incoming 
‗progress‘ and ‗Europe‘. A useful illustration of this epistemological crossroad and challenge 
comes from Naim Frasheri: 
 
Albanian men 
Let us gain knowledge 
For the past is no longer 
Today is in a need of light (1986 (1995):88) 
 
The main sentiment of the time was that a great civilisational dilemma was looming, and 
Albanians needed to understand and decide which hegemonic system they would to adhere 
to. I argue that the orientalist ethnonationalism of the 19th century has been constructed as a 
discursive practice that could induce public support for that national decision. As such, it 
came to represent both a cultural ideology and a programme of political action. It is the 
Frasheri‘s pamphlet and the engagement of the educated elite with the Albanian Rebirth 
Movement that produced the analogy (even parallelism) between the definition of the 
‗educated‘, the ‗intellectual‘ and the political activist. In the next chapter of this research I 
will try to analyse and underpin this claim about the inseparability of the ‗intellectual‘ and 
political activist that was coined during the period of the National Rebirth and has 
resurfaced—specifically in the case of Kosovo, as sociopolitically distinct Albanian 
community—during the last decade of the 20th century and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
 
Below, in Table 1, I provide a list of such parallelisms, presented through the orientalist logic 
in terms of causes and consequences—a juxtaposing of fundamental ideological postulates 
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about the Albanian national identity and the negative analogies/traumas acquired during 
various stages of region‘s history. 
 
Table 6.1. Projection of causes and consequences in the narrative about Albanian national identity 
and the ‘trauma of partition’ 
 
Key ideological epistemes Negative analogies / traumas 
(what is presented as the cause or 
rationalisation) 
Albanians are autochthonous and 
homogenous nation of the Balkans 
Partition of Albanian lands and its 
nation by external hegemonies 
Albanians are descendants of ancient 
Illyrians, part of the Christian 
civilisation before the Ottoman 
conquests 
Constant regional hatred and 
hostility towards their origin, 
language and culture 
Their predominantly Islamic heritage 
represents an involuntary 
consequence of oppressive past 
Failure of Great Powers to 
understand their history and 
situation, and act accordingly upon 
it 
Albanians belong to the realm of 
European/Christian civilisation 
European realm of institutional 
power could continue to deny 
acceptance of this historical and 
ideological fact 
 
The table aims to illustrate the symbiotic relation between the ideological epistemes and 
traumas, that to-date continues to remain an open-ended process: it reveals the quest for a 
decisive, external (western) authority that would legitimize Albanian ethnic victimisation by 
the immediate, competing neighbourhood and, subsequently, preside in its favor. Whether the 
Great Powers from the period of the London Ambassadors Conference, The Berlin Congress 
or the Versailles Treaties from the early 20th century, or the Dayton Accords (1995) and 
Rambouillet Conference (1999)—the orientalist ethnonationalist discourse manufactured a 
national political strategy based on pursuing local, ethnic goals through the identification and 
alliance with external sources of legitimation, perceived as capable of presiding over the 
deadlocked and irreconcilable history of regional feuds. 
 
Here is an illustrative excerpt from the memoirs of Hasan Prishtina, another important figure 
from (Kosovo) Albanian nationalist movement from the turn of the 20th century: 
 
While waiting for the reply of Mr Pavlof, I went to see the British Consul in Skopje 
and informed him of the following: ‗In order to put an end to Turkish massacres in 
Albania and to overcome impediments in the alphabet question and issues of our 
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national culture, we Albanians have decided that the only way out is an armed 
uprising against Turkish rule. In this perilous situation, we are in great need of 
England‘s support. I would therefore ask you to inform the Foreign Secretary about 
this statement of mine.‘ (Hassan Bey Prishtina (1921) in Elsie, 2000) 
 
Thus, the longing for ‗the West‘—for ‗going to Europe‘ as noted by Todorova (1997)—was 
both the source of persistent ideological envy and detestation of Europe. Europe and the West 
have been persistently presented in a two-fold way: as a rightful place of civilisational (not 
only geographical) belonging, and as a source of their national plight. In their eyes, the West 
represented a set of former imperial powers with a history of turning a deaf ear to cries for 
cultural and political acceptance and legitimation. Such a perplexed perception is well 
explained by Misha (2002): 
 
Nothing is simple when we speak of the relations between the Albanians and Europe. 
The Albanian collective imagery of these two entities (with the Orient close by 
adding a further complication) incarnates the numerous contradictions and 
ambiguities that characterise the Albanians‘ identity process. Europe is for Albanians 
the land of aspiration, the incarnation of civilisation, power the dream of wellbeing, 
the shelter in which to feel secure and protected. Yet, there are contrasting images of 
‗Europe the faithless‘, Europe the inimical cause of many wrongs done to Albanians 
including their partition, Europe the immoral, ‗the old whore‘ etc. (2002:44) 
 
Although the focus of Misha‘s study describes the general attitudes among Albanians in 
Albania at the outset of the 20th century, there is an abundance of studies and literature that 
confirm the existence of similar attitude among Kosovo Albanians as well. Below is one of 
the most popular verses from the Albanian folk epics ‗Lahuta e Malcise‘ (1923) by Gjergj 
Fishta, referred to by Misha, and which became the major symbol in discursive 
manifestations of political ressentiment with the ‗Europe‘: 
 
Uh! Europe, you old whore, 
Who turned its back on God and honor 
Is this, then, the sign of civility: 
To devour the land of Albania 
And feed the hounds of Russia? (Fishta, 1991:211) 
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According to Misha, ‗Albanians were among the last to enter to enter into this scene of 
seething nationalistic passions and ambitions, combined with the intrigues and interest 
politics of the European Great Powers‘ (2002:34). In particular, the intertwined, yet dialogic 
relation of admiration vs. ressentiment towards ‗The West‘ and ‗Europe‘ reappeared in 
Kosovo‘s public discourse during 1990s and contained all of the major features of an 
orientalist or, for that matter, balkanist, discourse, as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
 
‘Albanianess’: nation as religion 
 
Another important feature of Albanian orientalist-ethnonationalist discourse relates to the 
construction of a historically validated irrelevance of the religious factor in the constitution of 
its national and political ideology. In the works of the authors of the Albanian Rebirth 
Movement, such approach was imposed as an ideological necessity, considering the religious 
divide between Muslims, Catholics and Orthodoxes that was permeating the Albanian 
ethnicity. In the period of ethnonational awakening in the Balkans, the religious belonging 
was an integral component of newly-adopted national identities with the Greek, Serbian, 
Bulgarian, Montenegrin and Macedonian mobilised under the support of the respective 
Christian Orthodox church. An important explanation on the intertwined nature of Balkan 
ethnonationalism and religious affiliation—i.e. the ethnoreligious national identity—is 
provided by Hupchick: 
 
Among the Ottoman Balkan non-Muslims, Ottoman theocracy and its millet traditions 
which provided an Orthodox group identity to the illiterate masses, made religious 
affiliation an inescapably crucial component of their ethnonational identities. 
Imported Romantic ideals not only laid the foundation for their ethnic national 
identities but fired the intensity of national emotions in their liberation struggles 
against an (Ottoman) empire perceived as completely ‗alien‘ in culture because of its 
different religion. By the time Berlin confirmed the existence of Balkan national 
states, the ‗nations‘ in all of them were consciously self-identified as Orthodox 
Christian as well as ethnic (2002:279) 
 
The internal religious divide between Catholic, Christian Orthodox and Muslim Albanians, 
coupled with the threat of incoming ethnoreligious mobilisation in the neighborhood as noted 
by Hupchick, pressed the leaders of the Albanian Rebirth Movement to construct the idea of 
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ethnic and national belonging as the supreme identity signifier in the ethnonationalist 
discourse. Albanians were thus primarily ‗Albanians‘ while their religious affiliation ought to 
be considered of secondary importance. Such supreme value of supra-religious, national 
identity was projected as both historical and sociopolitical: its ethnic ancientness and 
perenniality spoke about its pre-religious origin, while, in contemporary terms the nationhood 
was projected as inextricably linked with the notion of ‗progress‘—a key signifier of a 
modern society. To Frasheri, the religious divide would ultimately decrease the chances for 
any western legitimacy of Albanian nation and state: 
 
Once they (Europeans) see us divided into three religions – and, chiefly, Muslim – 
they will not be convinced that we can comprise a united and common nation that can 
be able to govern itself (Frasheri, 1899 (1999):61) 
 
Ultimately, it is the external projection of the nation—how are Albanians perceived by the 
west and Europe—that, Frasheri believes, will preside over the political destiny of Albanian 
nation in the time of turmoil. Their projection as a society which carries, ‗at least the germs 
of progress‘—to paraphrase here George Miller (in Todorova, 1997)—was seen possible only 
through radical adoption of the orientalist approach in the ethnonationalist narrative. While 
the nationalist discourse was able to construct the base for a new collective identity, its 
orientalist approach was providing for its civilisational orientation: it was not about mere 
creation of a nation, but about the creation of a western-modelled nation as the only possible 
model, according to Frasheri: 
 
Such (religious) divide has not caused any cost among Albanians. Religious quarrel 
which, not only in the countries of the East—but also in Europe and its enlighted 
countries—has many times caused great torment and murder; Albania has never 
known such quarrel between Muslims and Christians, between Catholics and 
Orthodoxes – or between sunnis or bektashis. Albanian is an Albanian before he 
becomes a Muslim or Christian. Whatever he was in the times of Pelasgians, he 
remained the same under Christians or the belief of Mohammad (Frasheri, 1899 
(1999):45) 
 
Nevertheless, the predominantly Islamic heritage of Albanians—approximately 70 per cent of 
Albanians are Muslim (in Kosovo, the percentage is higher, app. 90 percent)—constituted 
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them as the ‗easternmost‘ in the eyes of their Balkans neighbors, and generated the internal 
sentiment about it as an obstructive feature in the process of displaying their ‗Europeanness‘. 
Subsequently, the orientalist approach was adopted to reconstruct ‗their own image in 
interaction with an ideal vision of Christian, enlightened European civilisation that is a 
constant reproach to their backwardness and primitivism and does not recognise their 
contribution to history‘, as noted by DiLellio (2007:25). I argue that, among others, to-date 
the wide perception of themselves as victims of the Ottoman legacy maintains collective 
feelings of lagging behind Europe, of anxiety and ambivalence about the level of their 
‗Europeanness‘ and—presently—low chances for institutional membership to contemporary 
structures such European Union. A harsh self-criticism on such ambiguous behavior comes 
from Mustafa Nano (2002), a journalist from Albania—a part of a longer, contemporary 
polemics on the subject of Albanian ideological ‗pro-westernness‘ and alleged ‗anti-
easterness‘: 
 
No other nation from this continent is more vocal in expressing such ‗strong‘ 
European mentality (. . .) I have the feeling that such vocation is not natural; it is not 
derived out of the desire to confirm to the Occident our occidentalism. It comes from 
our weakness, insecurity, lack of awareness and the lack of national identity. 
Similarly, part of our predecessors, during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, due to their 
weakness, insecurity and low religious awareness chose to proclaim themselves 
Muslims, although they essentially remained crypto-Christians; today, we have 
chosen to proclaim ourselves western although we essentially remain crypto-Eastern 
(in Sulstarova, 2007:245) 
 
In her analysis of the period before and after the National Rebirth, DiLellio notes that 
orientalism represents a ‗recurrent‘ and ‗prominent‘ trend in Albanian intellectual discourse 
and it presided over the ‗split of the society into west and east, defined as fundamental 
categories of modernity and backwardness‘ (2007:32). Throughout the last century, this 
recurrent trend was taking place, with varying intensity, on both sides of the border and was 
characterized with downplaying of their overwhelming acceptance of Islam vis-à-vis their 
Islamic civilisation. Islam has been seen as an historical parenthesis – an adaptive strategy to 
difficult circumstances—but it appears secondary to the Christian/European essence of 
Albanians. According to DiLellio, the identification with Europe is elaborated through the 
recognition of an existing ‗lateness that needs to be overcome‘ (ibid).  
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Were they to be considered ‗sufficiently European‘? Was there a sufficient feature of some 
former, assumed ‗Europeaness‘ still left in their social order now that a non-Western rule has 
departed from the region? Historically, such questions reveal a recurrent dilemma over the 
past century—for, according to Sulstarova (2006), the fears of being automatically attached 
the label of ‗oriental‘ society by the Western Europe were well-based due to latter‘s common 
pattern of defining the Balkans as ‗the Near East‘ in its political discourse until the beginning 
of the 20th century: 
 
While the Balkans, until the early 20
th
 century was perceived as ‗the Near East‘ by 
the Europeans, the national identities that were established in the region during the 
19
th
-20
th
 century were profoundly orientalist. This was due to the fact that their 
‗other‘ represented one or more neigboring nations which were supposedly located in 
the East and their elements defined as ‗oriental‘: history, culture and tradition were to 
be cleansed from oriental elements. (Sulstarova, 2006:21) 
 
In his pamphlet, Frasheri appears aware of the argument of ‗European‘ Christianity as 
opposed to ‗eastern‘ Muslimness that will, eventually, arise by the regional nations in the 
political competition of winning over the sympathies of the Great Powers. In the section 
‗Albania‘s Dangers‘ he lists the threats that are posed by the rising ethnonationalisms in the 
neighborhood that were also influenced by the religious mobilisation: specifically, the Greek, 
Serbian/Montenegrin and Bulgarian nationalist movements and their encroachment 
tendencies. Frasheri takes into account the sociopolitical relevance of the Christian label of 
those nationalisms: 
 
(Greeks) are trying to make them (Albanians) to forget their language; to learn to read 
and write in Greek – to become Greek. They think that, once they would become 
Christian Greeks, their lands, when the time comes, would become part of Greece – 
for Muslims would never be accepted by Europe. (Frasheri, (1899) 1999:56) 
 
According to Todorova, ‗because of the crucial division between Islam and Christianity, 
ideas in the Balkans came exclusively from the Christian West and Russia‘, notes Todorova 
(1997:179). In such a situation, Frasheri and ideologists from the National Rebirth Movement 
were compelled to produce an idealised depiction of Albanians as being too ancient and too 
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autochthonous to be identified with any religious belonging—although aware that, in their 
case, ‗autochthonousness‘ also accounted for the legacy of political and cultural isolation; it 
could be interpreted as an indication of ethnic remoteness to any structured civilisation with a 
strong religious doctrine at its center. 
 
‗It was only Albanians who preserved their nationality as they refused to mix with the 
foreigners and lived separated from the world – in the wild‘ (Frasheri, 1899 
(1999):54). 
 
The challenges of religious divide were too strong; glorification of the nationhood was to be 
employed as the decisive action—indeed, seen as the only one possible—for the physical 
preservation of the community: 
 
Albanian men! Join hands and arms together in the unity – for this will save you! 
Otherwise, you are lost. Do not look aside for religion and faith: Muslims, 
Orthodoxes, Catholics – all Albanians, wherever they are – are brothers. They must 
all unite under the sacred flag of Albania! (Frasheri, 1899 (1999):80) 
 
Hence the myth of Albanian ‗indifference to religion‘ which, according to Malcolm, 
represents one of the ‗essential characteristics imputed to the Albanians, that deserves special 
mention‘ (2002:84). And, there is some truth in this, Malcolm notes, as he invokes 
observations by Lady Mary Wortley Montagu from 1717: 
 
‗These people (Albanian soldiers)... declare that they are utterly unable to judge 
which religion is best; but, to be certain of not entirely rejecting the truth, they very 
prudently follow both, and go to the mosques on Fridays and the church on Sundays, 
saying for their excuse, that at the day of judgement they are sure of protection from 
the true prohpet; but which that is, they are not able to determine in this world.‘ (in 
Malcolm, 2002:291) 
 
Downplaying religion and its impact in shaping the social order appears indivisive from the 
general discourse of national identity and their political strategy. As noted by Jelavich, 
obtaining of the independence by the Christian states of the region during the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire, compelled ‗some elements of the Albanian leadership to develop programs 
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that were more in line with the contemporary European nationalism‘ (1984:84). Their 
nationalist narrative and political programmes were ‗emphasizing the cultural and linguistic 
unity, rather than religious divisions‘ (ibid).  
 
In this context, the poem ‗Oh, Albania‘, written in 1880 by Vaso Pasha29 (Eng. Wassa 
Effendi, (1825-1892)) represents the cornerstone of the supra-religious discourse on the 
Albanian nation, written by another important exponent of the Romantic period of Albanian 
National Rebirth Movement. At the time, the poem was disseminated as a major work within 
the body of nationalist narrative and literature, as it complements Frasheri‘s pamphlet with its 
main emphasis placed on the damaging role played by the religious difference in the process 
of construction of ethnonational identity: 
 
Albanians, you are slaying one another,  
Some shout for country, some against sin,  
One says I‘m Turk, another Latin,  
Others Greeks or Slavs profess to be,  
Fools! You are brothers can‘t you see?  
Priests and mullas have made you mute  
To keep you split and destitute.  
Foreigners sit by your fireplace,  
Your wives and sisters they disgrace,  
And if money comes knocking on your door  
The faith of your father you ignore,  
You become slaves of alien boors,  
Whose race and tongue differ from yours (. . .) 
 
Can we allow aliens to smother  
And trample on our cherished Mother?  
 
Awake, Albania, it‘s time to rise  
And bind yourselves with brotherly ties;  
                                                 
29 See Vasa, Pashko: ‗The Truth on Albania and Albanians: Historical and Critical Issues‘, by E. St. J. Fairman (ed.) B. Destani, 
London, LBTH Learning Design, 1999. 
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Look not to church or mosque for pietism,  
The faith of Albanians is Albanianism!
30
 
 
Written in a Romantic, mobilisatory style this poem gained a life of its own as one of the 
most effective ideological texts as it places a unyielding emphasis on the supra-religious 
feature of nationalist discourse—as a major ‗disciplining‘ component in the narrative. 
Clearly, the poem attaches two important negative connotations of the religion: (a) it is of an 
alien extract (b) it is the source of ethnic/national divide . Once again, the tendency of 
causing an immense, personal, grief about the fate of the imagined ancestry—the ‗Mother 
Albania‘—is employed with a belief that the sacralization of the nationhood would induce 
‗modernization‘ of public‘s perception of its sociopolitical condition in the context of 
geopolitical developments in the region. Undoubtedly, the practical reasoning behind such 
structure relates to specific religious history of Albanians, comprised of three religious 
belonging: Muslim, Catholic and Christian Orthodox. Placing the national belonging ahead of 
any religious belonging was a political act witht the aim of popular mobilisation. Similarly, 
the following excerpt from Frasheri encourages the idea of Albanian national identity as both 
supreme and perennial: 
 
In our eastern parts, people always place religion ahead of nationality; if a Greek, for 
instance, changes his religion – and becomes a Catholic – he will call himself a 
Frank; if he would turn Muslim, he will call himself a Turk. Only Albanians will put 
religion behind the nation. An Albanian, whether Muslim, Orthodox or Catholic, will 
always be an Albanian. (1999:53) 
 
Repeatedly, Frasheri invokes the argument of ‗perenniality‘ of the Albanian nation (for these 
concepts, see Anderson, 1983; Todorova, 2005) which is presented as both a modern, 
advanced feature of identity, but also as a timeless and supreme historical/biological quality 
of the community. The discourse that he employs constructs the sedimentation of ‗Albanian‘ 
identities accordingly to the political requirements of the nation-building—with the emphasis 
on the supremeness of ethnic/national belonging as the overruling factor. In this context, I 
argue, the downplaying of the importance of the religion was employed as a normalising 
feature, in Foucault‘s terms: ideologically, it was a quintessential ingredient for establishing 
                                                 
30 The English translation is provided by Robert Elsie in ‗History of Albanian Literature, East European Monographs‘, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1995 
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the national cohesion. Complementary to Frasheri‘s pamphlet, the political programme 
embedded in Wassa Effendi‘s poem closes in on several ideological goals that, ever since, 
remain as the major highlights of contemporary Albanian ethnonationalist discourse: 
 
(a) Albanians are autochthonous; 
(b) Nationhood is ancestry; Albanians are brothers; 
(c) Albanians have been divided through external hegemonies; 
(d) Religion and religious divide is an external, imposed condition; 
(e) Ethnic belonging is supreme; 
(f) Albanians must unify within a single nation-state. 
 
This feature of downplaying the importance of religion in the nation-making process creates 
the major difference between Albanian ethnonationalist discourse and the rest of its regional, 
competing, counterparts. Specifically, it regards its manifestation among the Slav nations—
Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian, Montenegrin—including the Greeks. The Slav and Greek 
nationalist narrative is seen indivisive from the Christian Orthodox religious fabric; it 
comprises its ideological core and provides for the interpretation of its political programme. 
And, whereas the Slav and Greek nationalist discourse highlights the feature of Orthodoxy as 
the civilisational evidence of its ‗European‘ authenticity and antiquity—the Albanian 
variation places an emphasis on its ‗secularist‘ tendency through diminishing the role of the 
religious fabric as anti-modern and anti-European. Here is another example from Fishta‘s 
epic, along the same lines of ethnonational, supra-religious mobilisation and unification: 
 
I have joined the army, Sir 
Not for Turks, but for Albanians 
For they, be Christian or Mohammedan 
Are jointly but one Albanian 
Thus together we will stand 
And fight ‗till the very end 
Until we all get torn apart 
Priests, mullas and vicars 
 
As noted by Gilles de Rapper, ‗it is common in Albania to say that all Albanians, whether 
Christian or Muslim, are brothers, and that their only religion is their common Albanian 
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nationality‘ (2002:191). Historically, the dogma of national unity which is in direct 
opposition to religious heterogeneousness remained at the core of Albanian ethnonationalist 
narrative. Of specific relevance to this study is the analysis of its discursive technology of 
projecting and transforming the feature of its supra-religiousness into a valuable indication of 
‗modernity‘ and ‗Europeanness‘: its alleged eclectic origin and inclusivist nature. Indeed, 
looked upon from this perspective, Albanian nationalist discourse has been devised as a 
‗secular‘ variation of the phenomenon, and could thus easily pass for—or, be confused 
with—a civic, north-western-European definition of it. However, as discussed previously, its 
specific focus on ethnic origin and bloodline ancestry—and its projection of Albanians as a 
society on the margins of ‗Europe‘—makes it differ substantially from the rest of the 
spectrum. 
 
Scanderbeg: the epitome of ancientness, national cohesion and Europeaness  
 
The downplaying of the importance of religious background as a means to establishing an 
overarching, ‗Albanianist‘ identity as a supra-religious category has been a continuous 
political project of Albanian ethnonationalist discourse. And, as noted by Misha, as with 
almost every Balkan nationalist project, ‗an episode taken from medieval history and 
mythology would become central to its ideological semantics‘(2002:43). In the absence of a 
medieval kingdom—as opposed to historical narratives of the existence of medieval 
kingdoms in the neighbouring nations, such as Serbia, Croatia—Misha argues that the 
Albanian nationalists chose as their symbol the figure of Scanderbeg (also known as 
Georg/Alexander Castrioti (1405-1466)), ‗who in his heroic tragedy had all the necessary 
ingredients for building up a myth‘ (2002:43). 
 
Here, Scanderbeg‘s personal history was essential for the construction of national identity 
through overriding importance of the religious: Scanderbeg represents an acclaimed historical 
personality, a Christian-born ethnic Albanian who was by the age of 10 reportedly compelled 
to be recruited as a future servant with the Ottoman Empire. A skillful youth, he grew within 
the ranks of then-Ottoman army and reached the level of one of its major field 
commanders—after his subsequent conversion to Islam under the new name of Scander Beg 
(Turk. Iskender Bey; Eng. Lord Alexander). A significant number of historiographic accounts 
emphasize the moment when, at the height of his glory and power, Scanderbeg dramatically 
193 
 
switched the allegiance from the Ottoman to the Christian Vatican, as he proclaimed himself 
as ‗the avenger of his family and country‘. As noted by a vast number of authors31 and 
historians of the medieval Balkans, his successful defence of the region from the Ottoman 
conquests (present day Albania, parts of Greece, Macedonia and Montenegro) earned him 
fame and acclaim with the Catholic church and the Vatican: Pope Nicholas V (1447–55) 
named Scanderbeg ‗Champion of Christendom‘; Pope Callixtus III (1455-64) made him into 
a Captain General of the Holy See ; Finally, Pope Paul II (1464–71) promoted him into the 
‗Athleta Christi‘ (Defender of Christ). 
 
Expectedly, the tales and the history of Scanderbeg would occupy the center role in the 
Albanian Rebirth/Romanticist literature and works. The figure and the myth of Scanderbeg 
had it all: it was able to merge all the historical, political and cultural requirements for 
producing an enduring Albanian ethnonationalist narrative. One of the major works on 
Scanderbeg from the Rebirth period comes from Naim Frasheri (1886), the ‗History of 
Scanderbeg‘ (Alb. ‗Istori‘ e Skenderbeut‘), which, according to Sulstarova (2007), represents 
the ‗central figure of the National Rebirth due to the volume of the works, the popularity with 
the (Albanian) readership, the support in advancing of the Albanian literary language—as 
well as the nationalist-illuminist ideas that permeated his work‘ (2007:44)32. Lubonja (1995) 
writes about the exercise of ‗retaking‘ of this, essentially Christian hero, ‗by Albanian 
nationalists‘ who reconstructed and redesigned his narrative for the purposes of producing a 
projection of Albanian national identity as both anti-Ottoman (his legendary struggle against 
‗the Turk‘), as well as pre-Ottoman (his Catholic childhood). Lubonja notes that ‗its deeds 
were gradually scraped their religious context and attached the struggle for the liberation of 
the homeland‘ (ibid:35). 
 
In this light, his figure was treated by Naim Frasheri in his epic ‗History of Scanderbeg‘. I 
argue that this work of literature—a voluminous, versed epic—has been instrumental in the 
                                                 
31 Books and reference on the topic: Edward Gibbon, 1788, ‗History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire‘, Volume 6,  
Chapter LXVII, ‗Birth and Education of Scanderbeg, Prince of Albania‘; Frashëri, Naim; Cipo, Kostaq ( 1953) (in Albanian), 
‗Histori e Skënderbeut‘; Godo, Sabri (1983) (in Albanian), ‗Skanderbeg, a novel‘;  Hodgkinson, Harry (2005), ‗Scanderbeg: Fro m 
Ottoman Captive to Albanian Hero‘, I. B. Tauris; Drizari, Nelo (1968), ‗Scanderbeg; his life, correspondence , orations, victories, 
and philosophy‘; Noli, Fan Stilian (1947), ‗George Castrioti Scanderbeg‘ (1405 –1468), International Universities Press; Barletius, 
Marinus (1508) (in Albanian), ‗Historia de vita et gestis Scanderbegi Epirotarum Principis‘.  
32 Quotation refers to Xholi, Zija: ‗Mendimtare te Rilidnes Kombetare‘, 8 Nentori, T irane, 1987. P.187 -188. 
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process of naturalisation of the ancient, supra-religious narrative about the Albanian nation. 
‗The History of Scanderbeg‘ encompasses and defines the basis of the key claims of the 
Albanian ethnonationalist discourse, stated at the beginning of this chapter: the pre-Ottoman 
idyllic depiction of Albanian ‗European‘ autochthonoussness, the struggle against the 
‗eastern‘ oppression and the defense of the ‗European‘ values and civilisation as a proof for 
contemporary worth of Albanian nation in the process of external, western political 
deliberations. 
 
For the purposes of this research, I will confine the analysis of Naim Frasheri‘s epic to 
highlighting the construction of the features of ethnonational autochthonoussness – therefore, 
Europeanness – and the feature of Albanian sacrifice and devotion to Europe and ‗the West‘ 
through Scanderbeg‘s struggle. Naim Frasheri‘s opening verses introduce Albanian 
ancientness and autochthonousness, as they engage in appropriation of, and self-identification 
with, the region‘s glorified mythology: 
 
When he spread the Universe 
The true and great God 
made the land Albania 
and gave life to Albanians 
 
It was the land of God 
Albania, first of all 
The homeland of wisdom 
the heart of goodness 
The Great and proud Alexander (Scanderbeg) 
Matched by no man 
Nor he will ever be 
Pyrrhus the brave and many others 
Who once were 
And were never forgotten 
Were all Albanians 
Sons of Albania 
They were no Greeks or Bulgarians 
But came from the land of God. (Song 1, verses 65-80) 
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Frasheri gives a strong basis for the reinvention of ‗Albanianness‘ as supreme identity in 
historical, cultural and ethnic levels. The operation of ethnic appropriation of the local, 
ancient mythology is swiftly employed in contemporary processes of national 
‗differentiation‘; there, the legendary heroes, the signifiers of the Albanian nationhood are 
‗no Greeks or Bulgarians‘—revealing thus the process of negative identification through 
‘what one is not’ as a major feature of ethnonationalist discourse. Let us look into the manner 
in which Frasheri introduces the Ottoman conquest and the subsequent subduing of 
‗perennial‘ Albania: 
 
And, as Albania was dwelling 
Under the serene prosperity 
the reign of goodness and peace 
A fierce monster 
Was rising from Asia 
To spread like a darkness 
And cover the world in a shadow 
It was a nation cursed 
With slyness on its tongue 
the stern in the eyes 
the demons in the heart 
 
Civility sank in the seas 
Darkness rose as a cloud  
Ignorance beset upon the lands 
Blood, death and desolation (Song I, verses 85-112) 
 
Naim Frasheri‘s Scanderbeg epics mark an important momentum in the manner in which the 
ethnonationalist discourse was coupled with orientalist features. The offensive introduction of 
the Ottomans as the ‗fierce‘, ‗Asian‘ ‗monster‘ is constructed in the binary opposition to ‗the 
Enlightment‘ and ‗the west‘. Xhaferi33 notes that the Albanian Rebirth leaders have employed 
‗with ingenious simplicity the major concept of national strategy which notes that for 
Albanians, ‗the sun rises in the West‘(2004:65). Xhaferi was referring to Naim Frasheri‘s 
verse about the sun that ‗rises where it sets‘ (quoted earlier in this Chapter), a poetic allusion 
                                                 
33 Xhaferi, Arben: Sfida e Identitetit , in Identiteti Kosovar, Java, 2004, Prishtine.  
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to Enlightement, west and modernity. Thus, ‗the rise‘ of the Ottomans is displayed through 
the discursive logic of the binary opposition—‗goodness‘ and ‗peace‘ versus ‗slyness‘ and 
‗demons‘; ‗civility‘ and ‗prosperity‘ versus ‗darkness‘ and ‗ignorance‘. 
 
More importantly, through such apocalyptic depiction of the incoming ‗eastern‘ hegemonic 
rule, Frasheri sets the scene and the tone for introducing the figure of Scanderbeg as the 
merging point between the Europe and Albanians; through his legendary struggle against the 
Ottomans, Scanderbeg will reveal the Albanians‘ national sacrifice for Europe‘s wellbeing, as 
well as the emphasize Europe‘s worst fears from the ‗Eastern‘ threat:  
 
If there wasn‘t for Albania 
The whole, blind Europe 
Would‘ve been swept by Turkey 
Nothing would be saved (Song 14, verses 265-268) 
 
And also: 
 
Europe, the poor, back then 
In tatters and turmoil 
Awaiting for Voltaire and Rousseau 
To awake them from slumber (Song 4, verses 9-28) 
 
In general, the Scanderbeg narrative provides for the sophisticated representation of the 
victimisation component: he devoted his life defending Europe and Christendom at its gates, 
fighting against its perpetual and civilisational archenemy. I argue that such trait of the 
‗unsung‘ heroic victim permeates the Albanian ethnonationalist discursive practice as it raises 
a specific condition of ressentiment towards ‗Europe‘ for its failure to recognise such 
major—and historically critical—accomplishment by a small nation guided by a glorious 
personality, acclaimed and legitimized by the Holy Chair itself. Albania and Albanians were 
in the role of Antemurale Christianitatis, of martyrs and defenders of Christianity at its very 
borders – fighting and dying for its freedom, safety and welfare. Here is another, 
complementing view, in Sami Bey Frasheri‘s pamphlet: 
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All European powers that were in existence back then were placing their hopes on 
Scanderbeg; they were expecting the salvation of Europe from Albanians. They were 
not as brave as Scanderbeg, nor had the faith of Albanians. Many a time, the 
Hungarians and the Pope sent Scanderbeg to combat – and then abandoned him, 
watching from the distance. Nevertheless, Scanderbeg endured: through him, Albania 
endured its decency with honor. (Frasheri, (1899) 1999:26-27) 
 
To-date, the life and deeds of Scanderbeg are envisioned as the blueprint of the Albanian 
ideal: (a) his autochthonous, noble ancestry, (b) the cruel destiny of abandoning the homeland 
and servitude with the hegemonic Ottoman conqueror, (c) his decision to turn against it, 
driven by self-awareness about his ethnic (and, cultural) roots, (d) glorious defense of his 
people and country at the gates Christian/European civilisation from the Eastern, ‗barbarian‘ 
conquest. To Misha (2002) ‗Scanderbeg‘s myth became the argument proving Albania‘s 
cultural affinity to Europe. This identity construction had a double function: on the one hand, 
it served to convince Albanians to turn their backs as soon as possible to their Ottoman past, 
where most nationalists saw the source of all evils had beset the Albanians‘ (ibid:43). The 
figure of Scanderbeg was also meant to win the sympathy and support of the European Great 
Powers. Accordingly, Misha argues, ‗in the national narrative, Skanderbeg symbolized the 
sublime sacrifice of the Albanians in defending Europe from Asiatic hordes.‘ (ibid) 
 
The Scanderbeg narrative is of essential importance: not only that it tends to confirm the 
European roots of Albanians, but it also emphasizes their martyrisation for Europe. Again, 
there is a strong perplexion of analogies at work between the essential pillars of the Albanian 
ethnonationalist narrative and the highlights of the epitome of Scanderbeg, as I illustrate in 
Table 2: 
 
Table 6.2: Discursive complementarity between ideological epistemes about Albanian national 
identity/origin and the narrative about Scanderbeg 
 
Key ideological epistemes  Scanderbeg analogy, cohesion 
narrative 
Albanians are autochthonous and 
homogenous nation of the Balkans 
Autochthonous, noble ancestry  
Albanians are descendants of ancient 
Illyrians, part of the Christian 
civilisation before the Ottoman 
conquests 
Born as a Catholic Christian 
Their predominantly Islamic heritage Forceful servitude under the 
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represents an involuntary 
consequence of oppressive past 
Ottoman 
Albanians belong to the 
European/Christian civilisation 
His life as the Defender of 
Christendom (and European 
civilisation) 
 
The reconstruction of the Scanderbeg narrative through a combination of historical fact and a 
nationalist myth remains multi-faceted and, undoubtedly, multi-functional. The reproduction 
and maintainance of the narrative of Scanderbeg enables and justifies the pragmatic acts of 
downplaying the religious component within the nation-building discourse. The following 
verse from Fishta‘s epic illustrates this in a careful wording with respect to religious 
belonging—and its relativization thereof, whilst at the same time using a strong emphasis on 
Scanderbeg as a unifying signifier: 
 
Maybe we are divided amongst ourselves 
But when the King calls upon us 
And when the Serb rises upon our soil 
For the God‘s word, the Albanian seed 
Turkish or Christ‘s – one must know 
Will gather at once – all as one! 
 
Rise now, Sons of Scanderbeg 
Turkish, Christian – none divide 
Rise and die on the field of Truth 
Let your roar of thunder be heard! (1923:258) 
 
Ultimately, it is the feature of ‗progressiveness‘ that the figure of Scanderbeg is supposed to 
induce and highlight; for it is his capacity to choose the ‗right‘ side and to fight against the 
‗wrong‘ that reveals the simplistic, yet ‗modern‘ ideological binary opposition: Scanderbeg 
(i.e. Albanians) is right/good while the Ottomans (i.e. the Turk) are wrong/evil. The narrative 
leaves no doubt that Scanderbeg ‗knew‘ where the ‗right‘ side was: he recognised the face of 
‗evil‘ and ‗goodness‘ and acted accordingly. Its life is a testimony of Albanians‘ capacity to 
recognise and accept progress, or so it is argued, thus pledging for their acceptance by its 
very producer: Europe and ‗the West‘. In this respect, Albanian national identity was to be 
constituted, among others, as the other of ‗the Turk‘ (or, ‗the Serb‘, ‗the Slav‘, ‗the Greek‘, 
dependently). 
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In the context of the ethnonationalist discourse that was produced in the works from the 
National Rebirth Movement, Scanderbeg represents the major signifier for the idealised 
(unified) Albanian state and, therefore, the primal producer of the narrative on the Albanian 
national identity. The myth of Scanderbeg represents the centerfold ingredient of the 
discourse about the nation, its history, culture and, specifically, its future political aspirations. 
Reinforcing this myth, Kadare writes: ‗Albania shares this western aspiration since the times 
of Scanderbeg, since the National Rebirth, since centuries‘ (2001:86-87). Ultimately, the 
narrative of Scanderbeg as both a historical personality and as an ethnonationalist myth 
represents an enduring and highly versatile orientalist discourse—a mythistorical narrative of 
the nation, as defined by Aleksic (2006): it fulfils one of the major ingredients of the 
timelessness of the Albanian nation—its ‗perenniality‘, its sacrificing struggle against ‗the 
East‘—the very testimony of its unquestionable ideological ‗westernness‘.  
 
Of course, one should note here that the major point of religious downplaying regularly had 
the underlying message of downplaying specifically its Islamic heritage, rather than pre-
Ottoman, Christian legacy. As noted readily by Plasari (1994) during a harsh polemics on the 
cultural identity of Albanian ‗Europeanness‘, ‗the Latin Christianity represents the common 
denominator or all the peoples that claim to be Europeans‘(1994:4). Plasari was thus himself 
accounting for an advanced orientalist view of Albanian identity—a more radical and 
reformed version from Frasheri‘s supra-religious exercise. I argue that a simple analysis of 
Albanians‘ social fabric accounts for two intertwined reasons to such claim: 
 
 Demographic; Albanians are predominantly Muslim34, particularly in Kosovo; in the 
context of contemporary ethnonationalist discourse, this fact has been often perceived as 
a difficulty in constructing a projection of Albanian legacy of ‗Europeanness‘; 
 Ideological/political; although the Islamic conversion gained pace as late of the 15 th 
century, the ethnonationalist discourse projects it as a pre-meditated strategy of the 
Ottoman hegemonic force – ‗Albanians were forcefully converted‘—as a process of their 
subjugation through violent imposition of an alien belief system. Such argument is in line 
                                                 
34 While there is no precise data on the percentage and profile of religious belonging, there is a commonly shared claim that 
Albanians—both in Kosovo and Albania are predominantly Muslim (app. 75%), followed by Christian Orthodoxes (south Albania) 
and Christian Catholics (in Kosovo and northern Albania).  
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with Plasari‘s view, that the Christianity—specifically, its Catholic extract—has been 
perceived as the ideological/religious basis of Europe. 
 
While the feature of Christianization of the ethnonationalist discourse was insignificant 
during the period of the National Rebirth (1870s), it will emerge as a notable discursive 
practice a century-later, in the aftermath of the fall of the Communist system in Albania, as 
well as during the subsequent process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, in the case 
of Kosovo. Such feature will be analysed at length in the next chapter of this research; 
however, here I will try to focus on analysing a sample-text from an intra-Albanian polemics 
that ensued in the period following the National Rebirth movement—on the ethnocultural 
content of the ‗Albanianist‘ ideology. In this context, an article written in 1937 by Krist 
Maloki, a Kosovo Albanian Catholic priest and intellectual has been considered as one of the 
first, open, attempts to question the vagueness of the ‗Albanianess‘ ideological discourse of 
authenticity, autochtonoussnes and – supra-religiousness. In his article with the title ‗Oriental 
or Occidental‘, Maloki sets out to define the Albanian ‗oriental‘, ‗easterner‘ through 
analysing and constructing his/her sociocultural incompatibility with the notions of ‗progress‘ 
and modernity: 
 
Albanian ‗easterner‘ (or, ‗oriental‘) expects all the benefits for himself as granted – 
from others; to him, the world represents an endless source of means and pleasures 
that he will consume in every way and method. . . Albanian easterner knows no 
shame; he is capable of any shameful act. He will sell his mother and father, his faith 
and honor. . . (2003 (1937):22-24) 
 
In his long listing of vice and wickedness of the Albanian ‗easterner‘, Maloki constructs a 
crucial religious/cultural analogy between the Islamic and Christian Orthodox concepts – 
defining them as hegemonic products of foreign extract that were forcefully imposed to 
Albanians and their ‗European‘ culture. To Maloki, the Ottoman/Turkish/Islamic and the 
Greek/Slav/Orthodox bear the common denominator, for they originate from a single 
sociocultural and political construction: The Byzantine Empire. 
 
Therefore, to Maloki, Balkan cultures and peoples who would adopt the civilisational traits of 
those hegemonies would, essentially, defect from the inherited ‗Europeanness‘. Specifically, 
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it is the Christian Orthodox base of the Byzantium that Maloki attaches profoundly negative 
civilisational characteristics: 
 
It is wrong to say that ‗Easterness‘ has reached us through Asia or the Mohammedan 
religion – or even the Turkish people. No. Our ‗easternness‘ is a fatal consequence of 
Euro-Asian Christianity. Some six hundred years before the Turk stepped in our 
Homeland, Albania became a province of Byzantium. . . Even the Great Schism was 
not as devastating, as was the evil spirit of the Byzantine Administration that beset 
the Albanian nation like a shadow of black death. . .(2003 (1937):22-24) 
 
Clearly, to Maloki the Europe, Enlightement, modernity and progress are related entirely to 
its western hemisphere and, eventually, Catholicism – which, to Maloki is already embedded 
in the notion of ‗westernness‘. Through employment of such binary opposition between the 
sinister, Byzantine East and the Enlightened West, Maloki provides an important tool to the 
Albanian ethnonationalist discourse: its capacity to widen, generalize—thus, ‗normalise‘—
the process of ethnopolitical identification through differentiation and othering. Views such 
Maloki‘s would enable it to expand and – even more importantly – to revive the definition of 
the ‗eastern‘ threat in the decades following the retreat of the Ottoman Empire. From now on, 
it will be the Greek/Slav/Orthodox ‗easternness‘ that would become the major signifiers in 
the orientalist ethnonationalist discourse. Such features would gain in popularity particularly 
among Kosovo Albanians, in the period following the aftermath of the Ottomans when their 
territory was accorded through international settlements (such, Versaille Conference, 1919) to 
the newly established Kigndom of Serbia/Yugoslavia. From then on, the Kosovo Albanian 
orientalist ethnonationalism would modify the ideological base that enabled the identification 
and construction of the ‗eastern‘ enemy; the values of ‗Christian Europeanness‘ would be 
enshrined within the political demands for ‗freedom‘, ‗democracy‘, ‗human rights‘ and 
‗market economy‘. On the other hand, the portrayal of the ‗eastern‘ hegemony would be 
produced through an all-encompassing definition of ‗Slavic-communist‘ rule, which, entailed 
not only the ‗orientalisation of the Soviet Union‘ (Sulstarova, 2007:174)—common to 
Albania-proper anti-communist discourse in the 1990s—but also the orientalisation of the 
slavic-Orthodox nations of the former Yugoslavia, perceived by Kosovo Albanians as both 
the carriers of the former Yugoslav communist rule and the anti-Albanian sentiment and 
ethnic hatred. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Albanian Orientalist Ethnonationalism: Kosovo and the discourse of democracy (1980-
2000) 
 
 
And at once it seems that I clearly see this Eastern Europe. It sits at my table and we 
look at each other as if in a mirror. I see twisted old shoes, neglected skin, cheap 
makeup, an expression of servility and impudence on its face. It wipes its mouth with 
its hand, it speaks too loud, it gestures as it speaks, it talks with its eyes. I see a glow 
of despair and cunning in them at the same time; I see the desperate desire to be 
‗someone.‘ . . . My sister, my sad Eastern Europe 
 
Dubravka Ugrešic, 
‗Zagreb—Amsterdam—New York,‘ 
Cross Currents, no. 11, 1992:251 
 
 
Introduction: the discourse of democracy 
 
The end of communism across the Eastern Europe by the fall of 1980s has been regarded as 
one of the most significant changes of the 20th century. It introduced major changes in the 
lives of its citizens as the Cold War ideologies were called into question. Societies from the 
communist states in the Balkans, such the former federation of Yugoslavia, were no different; 
there, calls for a change of regime were flagshipped under the notions of ‗democracy‘, ‗going 
to Europe‘ (Todorova, 1997)—or ‗returning to Europe‘ (Galasinska & Galasinski, 2010:2-6). 
 
‗Democracy‘ and ‗going to Europe‘ became the core signifiers of the new political ideology 
that was projecting itself into a society‘s future and was serving as its discursive roadmap. A 
definition of such a political ideology would comply with what Van Dijk (2006:138) 
describes as ‗a system at the basis of the sociopolitical cognitions of groups‘, a discursive 
practice that ‗organises group attitudes, consisting of schematically organised general 
opinions‘. In this context, the notions of ‗democracy‘ and ‗Europe‘ were introduced as the 
key signifiers aimed at the ‗disarticulation of the official discourse‘ (Salecl, 1994:207) of the 
communist regime and its hegemonic rule. Across the then-communist countries of Eastern 
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Europe and the Balkans, these notions entered the political discourse as a rearticulation of the 
demands for social change, drawing upon the categories such the ‗moral majority‘, ‗citizens‘ 
and ‗the people‘—which were automatically presumed to be democratic and anti-totalitarian, 
with ‗its voice as an oppositional one‘ (Salecl, 1994:226). 
 
Subsequently, the individuals and groups who would employ them would rise up to personify 
and represent the vestiges of the social order of the future. At the time, virtually any 
discursive projection of the future would have the notions ‗democracy‘ and ‗Europe‘ 
embedded at the core of its operational meaning. Their usage in the discourse was meant to 
produce a two-fold effect: to highlight the shortcomings of the present (communist rule) and 
to signify its prosperous alternative—a western-modelled sociopolitical formation. The 
following is an observation by Galasinska & Galasinski (2010) on the Polish experience with 
respect to such exercise of ‗disarticulation‘ with the official, communist, discourse as an 
exercise in epistemologic demarcation between the ‗bad East‘ and ‗good West‘: 
 
Many (Polish) scholars have naively believed that plain acceptance of ‗Western‘ 
patterns of behaviours and models of life will lead to desired positive changes, i.e. 
economic and social improvement. They perceived the world in a dichotomous way 
by drawing a picture in which (the eastern) socialism features as the epitome of 
economic backwardness and social anomy while (the western) capitalism as an ideal 
for human relations that inevitably leads to prosperity and happiness (2010:23) 
 
According to Galasinska & Galasinski, to a considerable extent, the post-communist 
transitions have been taking place discursively. The social change was initiated through 
changing of the language used to describe and interpret the social reality; in the ‗new 
language‘ of democracy the notions of ‗anti-communism‘ or ‗post-communist transition‘ 
appeared as ‗predetermined, fixed and almost always positive withini the context of a triumph 
of liberal democracy‘ (ibid:2). Such articulation of hopes, aspirations and anti-regime actions 
undertaken across the former communist societies were defined by Dryzek & Holmes (2003) 
as the ‗discourses of democracy‘. According to their study, such discourses were varying 
from one society to another; ‗democracy‘ was not perceived similarly in Ukraine and in 
Yugoslavia, in Moldova or in Kosovo. The discourses of democracy, they argue, were closely 
resembling Bourdieu‘s ‗discursive fields‘ and were ‗constituted by the positions that actors, 
often opposing one another, can occupy‘ (2003:5). 
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‗Democracy‘ became another name—a synonymous—for ‗Europe‘ and ‗the West‘ which, in 
turn, connoted the idea of free, welfare societies. The introduction of the signifier of 
‗democracy‘ as the embodiment of a political strategy of achieving the ‗going to Europe‘ 
carried the mythical capacity of discursive elevation beyond the liminalities and despair of 
the present. Dryzek and Holmes call it an expression of the ‗hoped-for democracy‘ (ibid:69), 
which, I argue, in the context of the former socialist Yugoslavia—bankrupted economies, 
massive despair and the legacy of the oppressive rule—produced a discursive practice with 
an unparalleled juxtaposing capacity to herald the possibility of accomplishing fundamental 
social change. Such emphasis on ‗the future‘ connoted the reorganisation of the ideological 
aimlessness of the societies during the early days of the post-communist power vacuum, and 
the subsequent uncertainties that that future holds. As noted by Papanagnou (2010) in his 
analysis of the social power of political discourses: 
 
Political discourses do not just describe social objects and reality in general. On the 
contrary, they construct it. They set limits to the possible, constitute identities, 
boundaries, and permissible pathways. They prescribe normative visions, promote 
certain (often vague) ideals and then set out in more detail the paths towards attaining 
these ideals. (2010:24) 
 
I argue that, in the context of a ‗tainted form of knowledge‘ (Cassels 1996:4), the discourse of 
democracy became an ideology—a formidable propagandistic vehicle that was invoked with 
the aim of accomplishing the public denunciation and ideological devaluation of the current 
sociopolitical order. In light of discussion about nationalism, orientalism and Balkanism in 
the earlier chapters of this research, I argue that the discourse of democracy was introduced 
through distinct orientalist interpretations—particularly in the societies of the former 
Yugoslav federation, namely Kosovo Albanians. Almost regularly, its production and 
dissemination was aimed at achieving of the ideological/cultural/political distinction of a 
particular nation or society from what was perceived as ‗the East‘—while struggling to 
reinvent and re-interpret itself as ‗western‘ or, at least, in the process of ‗westernisation‘. Yet, 
in the context of the the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent armed conflict that put an end 
to that federal state (1991-1999), discursive practices of othering the ‗eastern‘ backwardness 
in favor of the ‗western‘ prosperity were abruptly reduced to denunciation of the worth of the 
rival ethnic community. Accounts such those by Ramet (2005), Vladisavljevic (2008), 
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Schuman (2004) and others offer a wide array of explanations, descriptions and deliberations 
about the phenomenon of the Yugoslav descent into wars and ethnic hatred, while at the gates 
of the political liberalization and the demise of the communist rule. 
 
In the last decade of the 20th century, the usage of ‗democracy‘ and ‗Europe‘ was indivisible 
from the rest of the signifying arsenal within that political discourse: ‗human rights and 
liberties‘, ‗civil society‘, ‗civil disobedience‘, ‗peaceful movements and protests‘, ‗freedom 
of expression‘, ‗objective journalism‘, ‗independent media‘, ‗UN charters and covenants‘, 
‗international community‘, ‗international mediation‘, ‗western practices‘, ‗western models‘, 
‗western media‘, ‗western experience‘, ‗western democracies‘, ‗western governments‘ to 
name a few. They assisted in the constitution of a new communication practice—a distinct 
epistemic field—that was standing at the opposing end to the existing representational system 
of the communist knowledge. They were deployed as discursive weaponry in the anti/post-
communist war of epistemologies as they would attempt to devaluate the social importance of 
the ideological signifiers of the ‗workers class‘, ‗proletariat‘, ‗people‘s revolution‘, 
‗communist action‘, ‗socialist practices‘, ‗communist ideal‘, ‗capitalist threat‘, ‗imperialist 
hegemony‘, ‗socialist welfare‘, ‗class equality‘ and so forth. Below is a table by Buchowski 
(2008:472) that illustrates the confrontation of such epistemologies. It reveals the binary 
opposition between the major signifiers—or the key epistemes, to paraphrase Foucault—that 
produced perceptions about socialism/despotism and capitalism/democracy in the post-
communist discourse. 
 
Table 7.1 
Socialism vs. Capitalism and Post-Socialist vs. Capitalist Mentalities 
(source: ‘Specter of Orientalism in Europe’, Buchowski, 2008:472) 
 
Socialism Capitalism 
Cynicism  Realism  
Nepotism Efficiency 
Collectivism Individualism 
Egalitarianism  Subjectivism/Elitism 
Diffused individual responsibil ity Individual responsibil ity 
Impotence towards destiny Future oriented 
Mysticism and escape from social affairs  Involvement in society via democracy 
Learned helplessness Learned resoluteness 
Lack of trust Trust 
Apathy Innovative adaptation 
Waste of capital  Accumulation of capital  
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Lack of work ethic  High standards of work ethic 
Criminal adaptation Respect for the law 
Low productivity High productivity 
Dishonesty Honesty 
Passivity (waiting for manna) Activity 
Homo Sovieticus Homo Westernicus 
anti-intellectualism 
aversion to elites 
double standards for public and private l ife 
acceptance of meager performance 
intellectualism 
respect for elites 
unified standards for any sphere of l ife 
contempt for meager performance 
 
As I will argue in this chapter, the discourse of democracy was constructed by the emerging 
Eastern European anti-communist political circles during the process of importation of 
western political paradigms and subsequent attempts of their implementation on the formally 
communist societies. Its distinctively ‗western‘ content became part to the public image, 
social prestige and political influence of its articulators, interpreters and producers. They 
became ‗the ones holding power over the discourse‘ (Foucault 1970 (1984); Fairclough 
1992)—the ‗democrats‘, a different breed in the legacy of the anti-communist dissidents and 
ideological revisionists. Unlike their predecessors, the emerging ‗democratic leaders‘ 
wouldn‘t stop at the symbolic opposition to the current regime and in offering the superficial 
corrections to the ideological flaws in the—otherwise acceptable—political system. This 
time, they were engaged in the thorough devaluation of its ideological base through rendering 
useless the logic of the communication practices that were underpinning it. They were to 
outlaw its knowledge-base through public discrediting of its display as an alien, foreign, 
unnatural—above all, an ‗eastern‘ ideological derivation. Across the Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans, the ideological riffs and transformations were to be shaped and constituted 
accordingly. 
 
‘Return’ to Europe 
 
Similarly to the discourse on the ‗progress‘ from the early 20th century—to paraphrase 
Todorova (1997)—the discourse of ‗democracy‘ became the communicative practice of the 
upcoming sociopolitical ideology of democratisation and its emerging political elites by the 
end of that century. Here, I will examine the manner in which the political changes that 
occurred during the 1990s in the former-communist states of Eastern Europe and the former 
Yugoslavia—and, which produced a new political discourse based on the principles of 
207 
 
democracy, political pluralism and market economy—affected the ways in which the Kosovo 
Albanian ethnonationalism constructed and represented the national identity, ideology and 
political aspirations. 
 
Specifically, I will analyse the manner in which the introduction of signifiers carrying 
ideological importance in the political discourse, such as ‗democracy‘, ‗human rights‘, 
‗Europe‘, and ‗the West‘, shaped and reorganised the communication practices of Kosovo 
Albanian society. However, in the broader context of the discourse of democracy in the 
Eastern European political wrangling of that period, I argue that the initial reasoning behind 
its importation and deployment was to inflict a great epistemological fissure—a rupture in the 
existing communication practices of communist rule. Its aim of ‗westernisation‘ of the 
existing political thinking about the future of the society was perceived by the emerging 
political elites as the introductory phase in the process of legitimation and acceptance of such 
an ideological turn by the Western centers of political power: the final destination to social 
security and economic welfare. As noted by Galasinska & Galasinski (2010), for the context 
of Poland: 
 
The ‗return‘ to Europe meant a number of things. Politically, it meant the return to a 
family of democratic countries and the ability to lean westwards, rather than 
eastwards. (. . .) ‗We all‘ knew that we wanted capitalism, that capitalism was the 
only viable alternative to socialism. We wanted the full shelves, big cars, televisions 
and houses. Just like we saw on TV watching Dynasty, Columbo or even Kojak’s 
Chicago. There was never any debate as to where to go, nor, indeed, was such a 
debate possible. (2010:2). 
 
In this respect, the discourse of democracy engaged in inducing a transformation of the prism 
through which a society perceived itself. Such transformation of society was seen possible 
through the dissemination and accommodation of new knowledge inside a new discourse that 
would have the power to: 
 
(a) Defeat and render useless the existing epistemological prism (defined as 
‗eastern‘); 
(b) Introduce, promote, rationalise and justify the upcoming one (defined as 
‗western‘); 
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In simpler terms, the discourse of democracy represented the ideological platform through 
which the epistemological conflict was waged between the aspired capitalist/liberal 
‗westernness‘ and the communist ‗easterness‘. It represented what Papanagnou calls the 
‗conflict of political discourses‘ (2010:24) where the definition of ‗friends‘ and‘enemies‘ 
involved an exercise of internalised-orientalist representational system. And, as I will 
demonstrate later in this chapter, in the context of the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia 
from the end of the 1980s, the ideological generalisations in the discourse of democracy went 
beyond the strict anti-communist attitude as they entered the realm of ethnic and religious 
denunciation and segregation, where the ‗eastern‘ connotation of communism was to be 
replaced—indeed, identified—with ethnoreligious backgrounds of clashing societies. 
 
Across Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavia, the producers of the ‗democratic text‘ grew 
into the very personifiers of the new discourse. Under the labels of ‗democracy activists‘ or 
‗liberal intellectuals‘ their role was seen as pivotal in the process of discursive denunciation 
and degradation of the communist narrative. As mentioned earlier, the new language was 
aimed at assisting in internal bankruptcy of the ‗old‘ knowledge underpinning the current 
political system. , and external/international influencing of the ‗western‘ political centers on 
the essential importance of their active support to the emerging category of the anti-
communist ‗civil society‘ through invocation of the argument of historical ‗strength of 
classical Enlightenment ideas‘ (Tismaneanu 2010:4-6). 
 
Let us name here a few of the personalities that left a decisive impact on the ways in which 
the discourse of democracy was constructed, promoted and presented in the early days of 
post-communist Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia: 
 
 Former Czechoslovakia: Vaclav Havel, author, public intellectual and political 
prisoner.  
 Poland: Lech Valessa, trade union activist and political dissident; Adam Michnik, 
journalist, public intellectual and dissident. 
 Former Yugoslavia (Serbia): Milovan Djilas, former communist apparatchik turned 
dissident and political prisoner; Latinka Perovic, former communist apparatchik, 
author and political prisoner. 
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 Former Yugoslavia (Croatia): Franjo Tudjman, former Yugoslav Army general turned 
dissident and political prisoner; Stjepan Mesic, former communist apparatchik turned 
political dissident and political prisoner. 
 Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia & Herzegovina): Alija Izetbegovic, political opponent, 
(Muslim) religious activist and political prisoner. 
 Albania: Sali Berisha, physician and former communist apparatchik turned dissident; 
Ismail Kadare, author, writer and political dissident. 
 Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo): Adem Demaçi, author, political activist and long-term 
political prisoner; Ibrahim Rugova, author, public intellectual turned political 
dissident and activist. 
 
These personalities represent a few of the important figures who emerged by the fall of 1989 
across the societies of Eastern Europe and the Balkans as vestiges—and, personifications—of 
the discourse of democracy. To paraphrase Foucault, they represented the ‗subjects‘ who 
have been produced by the discourse, or, through the new discourse of democracy. They 
represented ‗the figures who personify the particular forms of knowledge which the discourse 
produces‘ (Hall, 1997:56). Among others, the common denominator that they shared was 
embedded in the general public perception about them as essential signifiers of anti-
communist action. I argue that such perception would, in time, translate into their definition 
of ‗westernised‘ political activists through a simplified binary logic (democracy=west; 
communism=east). Their turmoiled biographies of former political apparatchiks, authors, 
poets, public intellectuals and political prisoners were to become the living testimony of the 
history of political repression and social despair in the societies of their origin. The public 
emphasis on their personal experiences of the regime‘s brutality—confronting their (western) 
liberal views, unbound (western) intellectuality and (western) political opposition—would 
further enhance the signifying power of the new discourse, as it would assist in reshaping 
their societies‘ collective memory into a compilation of sufferings under communism. 
 
Tismaneanu‘s (1998) thorough analysis of the eastern-European ideological narrative of post-
communism and democracy examines the process of their construction into embodiments of 
their societies‘ past victimhood and the future hope. In the early days of the construction of 
the discourse of democracy their public function became that of the dominant, chief-
interpreters of the new knowledge—of what Foucault defined as the ‗regime of truth‘ 
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(1980:131). They visualised the future sociopolitical order, the ‗democracy‘; their new public 
identities were to be constituted and modified through a tireless process of interaction 
between them and their diverse local audiences comprised—and the international centers of 
political power. They became the ideological interface between East and West, capable of 
Bakhtinian ‗dialogic engagement‘ (in Dentith, 1995:15) during the process of interpreting 
each other‘s ‗east/west‘ specificities, often through highlighting the already stereotyped 
ideological and cultural differences. The newly-established discursive field of democracy 
would enable them an endless manoeuvring space for conceptual reinvention and political 
calibration of the operational meanings of its key epistemes, so that they would be able to: 
 
 Articulate the flaws of the existing sociopolitical reality; 
 Justify the opposition to the political establishment that was producing and governing 
that reality; 
 Formulate and disseminate appropriate ideological remedies through (democratic) 
political actions. 
 
The discourse of democracy endowed them with the capacity/power to transcend between the 
sediments of the rigidly differentiated ideological/political realms of the ‗democratic west‘, 
the ‗communist east‘ and the native audiences, the end-consumers of the ‗democratic text‘. In 
line with the ‗pactist‘ approach in the theories of democratisation (Pridham & Gallagher 
2000) their emergence and operation was based on the belief that individual actions ‗by 
leaders of groups engaged in strategic calculations and pragmatic choices‘, would achieve 
‗elite settlements‘ and thus enable regime‘s ‗transition by transaction‘ (2000:5). 
 
There are numerous examples that point out the pattern of the reshaping of the ‗democratic‘ 
social practices in accordance to the personal style, approach and ambition of such leaders of 
the democratic discourse. Whether from Walessa‘s ‗politics of emotion‘ and ‗perpetual 
confrontation‘, Vaclav Havel‘s or Andrei Sakharov‘s moral idealism about the ‗politics of 
truth‘ (Tismaneanu 1998:141-3)—or in the case of Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova‘s 
constructionist project of ‗the parallel state of Kosovo‘ that was based on the strategy of 
‗passive resistance‘ against the Serbian domination (Clark 2000, Malcolm 1998, Judah 
2008)—the respective sociopolitical movements opposing the Communist rule were attached 
appropriate personal imagery of their leaders. 
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I argue that such investment of personal imagery became a branding-formula for introducing, 
visualizing and interpreting the changing social realities in their respective societies. It gave a 
personal touch to the anti/post-communist ‗fantasies of salvation‘ through ‗unifying the 
public discourse and provide the citizen with an easily recognisable source of identity as a 
part of a vaguely defined ethnic (political) community‘ (Tismaneanu 1998:9). 
 
Kosovo: From irredentism35 to independentism 
 
In the context of Kosovo Albanian discourse of democracy as the distinct orientalist feature 
of the ethnonationalist ideology, this research will focus specifically on two major events: 
 
 The establishment of their first, official, political organisation in the fall of 1989 – 
The Democratic League of Kosovo (Alb. Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves - LDK); 
 The emergence of its first, democratic political leader, Ibrahim Rugova, as the 
chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo and the major producer of the 
discourse of democracy in the Kosovo Albanian political communication practice 
(1989-1999). 
 
I argue that the establishment of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) represents the 
point of departure for any analysis of the social conditions and discursive technologies that 
were employed to introduce the discourse of democracy among Kosovo Albanians at the 
outset of the 1990s. The events that led to its founding in December 1989 have been 
profoundly influenced by the dramatic political changes that occurred simultaneously in the 
political scenes of Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia. Those that set the scene and 
the tone for the new discourse were the waves of anti-communist movements across the 
Eastern Europe, symbolized with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of the East 
and West Germany. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, such ever-popularising anti-
communist sentiment quickly descended into the revival of ethnic politics and 
                                                 
35 Irredentism is about ‗reestablishing ethnic nations through the linking of all adjacent territories occupied by members of the 
ethnic group. Irredentism becomes an issue and a goal of ethnic groups and governments when national boundaries do not follow 
ethnic ones‘, in Levinson, David: Ethnic Relations: a Cross-Cultural Encyclopaedia, 1994, ABC-CLIO Inc. page 135-6. Also, on the 
irredentist form of nationalism, please see the theoretical discussion on nationalism in Chapter 2 of this research.  
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nationalist/secessionist tendencies as a reaction to the hardline ethnonationalist takeover of 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) headed by Slobodan Milosevic, its hardline 
leader from Serbia, the country‘s largest federal unit. 
 
Such dichotomic turn of events in the local and international scene had a decisive influence 
on the manner in which the Democratic League of Kosovo evolved from a ‗cultural/political 
society‘ to ‗political party‘ (Rugova 1991) and its final branding as the major ‗political 
movement‘ of Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s (Agani 1996, Buxhovi 2010). 
 
In this chapter I argue that the birth of the LDK induced a great discursive shift of the 
ideological paradigm of Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism. It transformed the manner in 
which it was constructed as a communication practice, and the manner in which it was 
applied as the social practice. This political organisation took on the role of the dissemination 
and accommodation of the new political discourse of ‗westernisation‘ of the Kosovo 
Albanian ethnonationalist ideology. Moreover, simultaneously, it engaged in the discursive 
representation of the ‗westernness‘ (or ‗Europeanness‘) of the Kosovo Albanian society and 
its political resistance to the political authorities of the ‗international community‘. I 
understand such exercises as distinct features of the orientalist approach in the Kosovo 
Albanian ethnonationalist discourse of the 1990s, as I place an emphasis on the conceptual 
inseparability between the notion of ‗democracy‘ and the two major ideological components 
of the Kosovo Albanian political struggle from this period: 
 
 The construction of the nonviolent civil resistance as the form of ‗democratic‘ 
political action; 
 The application of the project of the ‗parallel State of Kosovo‘ as a symbolic social 
practice of democratic resistance. 
 
However, prior to the analysis of the transformative effects that the establishment of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo induced on the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist ideology of 
irredentism, I will provide a brief historiographic account of its evolution during the post-
World War II Yugoslavia. 
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In the period between 1945-1990 any political activity directed against the rule of the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia was prohibited and severely punished. The former Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a one-party political formation and the 
outbursts of the political discontent–-particularly those organised by Kosovo Albanian 
groups—were followed with heavy crackdown by its large apparatus of security forces. 
Countless accounts were written by the local (Kosovo) authors and scholars on the subject of 
Kosovo Albanian suffering under the Yugoslav state hegemony; here, I will mention a few 
coming from the ranks of historiographers, public intellectuals and former political prisoners 
whose contributions were employed with this research: Rexhep Qosja (1980, 1986, 1990, 
1992), Shkelzen Maliqi (1995, 1998), Fehmi Agani (1996), Ibrahim Rugova (1991), Ethem 
Çeku (2005), Osman Ismaili (2001), Muhamet Kelmendi (1998), Selatin Novosella (1997), 
Syle Ukshini (2008), Mustafe Xhemaili (2009) and Jakup Krasniqi (2010). 
 
Kosovo‘s position in Yugoslavia was that of an autonomous province—the Socialist 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Its status was somewhat vaguely defined within the 1974 
(SFRY) Constitution which defined Kosovo as both an equal constitutional unit on the 
federal level and an integral part of the Republic of Serbia, on the republican level: 
 
Kosovo‘s Provincial Assembly could veto any decision made by the Serbian Republic 
Parliament, although Kosovo was still a province within Serbia. The Serbian 
Parliament did not have the same rights over decisions made in Kosovo. The unique 
Yugoslav patchwork seemed to function satisfactorily as the republics and provinces 
enhanced their influence vis-à-vis the federal government. (Nikolic in Bieber 
2005:59-61) 
 
Nevertheless, such ambiguity in the formulation of an—otherwise reformatory and liberal—
constitution highlighted the major flaws in the system. As noted by Benson (2001:127): ‗it 
conferred every right except the freedom of political association—the only thing that 
mattered.‘. The Kosovo Report by the International Commission on Kosovo (2000) observes 
that the status of the autonomous province was ‗almost the same as the status of republics‘, 
and that ‗the main difference was that provinces did not have the right to secede from the 
federation and were not considered the bearers of the Yugoslav sovereignty (ibid:35-36). This 
legal limitation became the source of frustrations for both Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs: 
both felt discriminated. Kosovo Albanians could not accomplish any form of sovereignty—
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not even within the federation---while Serbs could not govern Kosovo in its entirety, although 
it was legally part of Serbia. Such sentiments of frustration would fuel the rise of ethnic 
tensions which would, in time, incite the very dissolution of the federal Yugoslavia---and the 
subsequent descent in armed conflict and ethnic cleansing36. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. 1993: Political map, Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia  (SFRY)
37
 
 
The political opposition in the Socialist Yugoslavia was subjugated to that of an illegality and 
clandestine organising. In the context of the Kosovo Albanians, such organising continued in 
parallel, underneath the formal communist rule and the social reality that was produced by it. 
Albanians in Kosovo were—specifically—compelled to operate under such constraints as 
they shared a restless history of political discontent with the formal Yugoslav communist 
regime (Çeku 2005, Kosumi 2004, Xhemaili 2008). Popular protests, student demonstrations, 
workers‘ strikes—even a handful of armed clashes with the Yugoslav security forces—were 
organised periodically in 1950s, 1960s and particularly during the 1980s. Perhaps two 
                                                 
36 For further reading, please see: ‗Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned‘, a comprehensive political 
analysis on the topic, published by the International Commission on Kosovo, Oxford University Press, 2000.  
37 Map provided by the website of the University of Texas, Austin. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ europe/ former_yugoslavia.jpg 
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significant moments in this context were marked by the organisation of the massive anti-
establishment demonstrations by the students with the University of Prishtina in March/April 
1981, and Kosovo-wide wave of protests organised by the fall of 1989. Regularly, the 
crackdown by the state security forces against such attempts was of a distinct brutal nature. 
According to statistics, in the period preceding 1981, over 620 persons were accused and 
sentenced on charges related to ‗various nationalist and irredentist activities in Kosovo‘ (see 
Clark 2000:41)—while only between March and September of 1981 their number went 
beyond 2,000, mostly youth. By 1982, Clark notes, Yugoslavia police sources claimed to 
have uncovered the existence of at least 33 ‗illegal groups‘ with two of them described as 
‗massive‘. On the other hand, ‗from March 1981 to November 1988, some 584,373 
Kosovars—half the adult population—were arrested, interrogated, interned or reprimanded‘ 
(ibid 2000:42-3). 
 
The ideological base of such groups was diverse: they were ranging from hard line Marxist-
Leninists—resembling the applied political doctrine of then-communist regime of the 
Republic of Albania under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha—to outright national-democratic 
and ethnonationalist38. However, regardless of their—at times, diametrically opposed—
ideological views, virtually all of these groups shared a common perception about the 
ethnopolitical goal: the unification of Kosovo with the Republic of Albania. Again, common 
to all of them was the discursive definition of the latter as the ‗Motherland‘ that entailed the 
central ideological paradigm. Although technically and politically inaccessible during that 
period, the projection of Albania was discursively constructed as the supreme centre of 
ideological emanation—an idealised homeland of Albanians. To all of them, the unification 
with Albania connoted the final destination of the Kosovo Albanians‘ political resistance and 
their century-old journey through the political regimes of Yugoslavia. It was an 
unquestionable ideological principle and the core-idea of Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism. 
 
In terms of their volume and practical effects on the powerful and, internationally supported 
Yugoslav regime, the Kosovo Albanian irredentist groups were minute and rather ineffective. 
An exhaustive account on the size, nature and profile of such organisations is given in Çeku 
(2005). Their relevance to this research is limited to taking notice of their ideological 
                                                 
38 For further reading on the history, number, size, programs and ideological platform of Kosovo Albanian clandestine political 
organisations, see Ethem Ceku, ‗Shekulli i Ilegales - Dokumente‘, 2004, Brezi 1981, Prishtine  
216 
 
programme based on the idea of unification of Kosovo with the Republic of Albania—the 
cornerstone of their irredentist goal. Let us list some of the most important: 
 
 The Revolutionary Committee for the Liberation of Albanians (1960s); 
 The Kosovo National Liberation Front (1974); 
 The Kosovo National Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (reportedly established 
in 1982 through the merger of other illegal organisations, such the National Liberation 
Movement of Kosovo and Other Parts of Albanian Yugoslavia; the Kosovo Marxist-
Leninist Organisation; the Communist-Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Albanians, 
and so forth). 
 
I argue that the content of the irredentist programme of action has been shaped a great deal 
through the adoption and articulation of the concept of national trauma of ethnic partition that 
was developed in the early years of the 20th century—when the Ottoman retreat from the 
Balkans resulted in regional encroachment of then-Albania (see Vickers 1995, 1999, Kolev & 
Koulouri 2009, Malcolm 1998). By the end of the Balkan wars (1912-1913), the territory of 
the present Kosovo—along with other Albanian-inhabited regions in the present Montenegro 
and Macedonia—was officially deprived of becoming an integral part to the recently 
established independent Republic of Albania (1912). 
 
Kosovo‘s position in Yugoslavia was ambigous and, therefore, problematic. After the World 
War II, it evolved into an autonomous province under the rule of the Communist League of 
Kosovo, a branch of the federal communist organisation—the Communist League of 
Yugoslavia. By 1974 Kosovo had its own constitution which made it a constitutive unit of the 
federation; this also marked the culmination of its ambigious status as it was both constitutive 
part of Yugoslav federation and the Republic of Serbia (for further reading, see Meier 1995, 
Singleton 1989, Benson 2001).  
Ultimately, the decline of the communist rule in Yugoslavia was put in motion through the 
abolition of Kosovo‘s constitutional autonomy in 1989. It was conducted by the younger, 
upcoming nationalist elite of Serbia‘s communist apparatchiks, led by Slobodan Milosevic 
who utilized the Serbian constitutional discontent with Kosovo to create a completely 
different political momentum in the affairs of the federation: the convergence of the 
ethnonationalist narrative with the common, official communist discourse. 
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development of the discourse of democracy and led to the subsequent reformation of the 
Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist ideology. As noted in the Kosovo Report (2000:41): ‗the 
revocation of the Kosovo‘s autonomy spawned an increase in human rights abuses and 
discriminatory government policies designed to Serbianize the province‘. Specifically, these 
included the closure of Albanian language newspapers, radio and television—and, later, by 
1991, the closure of Albanian schools and the public University of Prishtina. This led to the 
severe deterioration of the sociopolitical situation in the Kosovo Albanian society: it was 
institutionally outlawed and ideologically aimless. Whereas the introduction of the discourse 
of democracy through the establishment of the Democratic League of Kosovo was seen by 
the Kosovo Albanians as a complementary attitude to the waves of the East-European 
processes of democratisation, the local situation of the Serbian state-oppression was making 
its usage paradoxical and anachronistic. 
 
National victimhood, the road to statehood 
 
The trauma of partition–or the inability of unification, thereof–combined with the 
deteriorating situation after the abolition of the autonomy, recreated the Kosovo Albanian 
self-projection of ‗historical victims‘ of the Balkans. It had entered the ethnonational memory 
of Albanians in Kosovo as an essential discursive signifier of their ethnonationalist ideology. 
Its root-causes and effects on the content of the nationalist discourse were elaborated in the 
earlier chapter of this research which dealt with the period of the Albanian National Rebirth 
Movement (1880-1920). In the context of Serbian hegemonic interventions in the period 
between 1989-1990 such trauma was re-generating another ideological self-projection—that 
of the national victimhood, a powerful element of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism. In 
fact, as noted by Ingimundarson (2007) ‗it is perhaps the fundamental component, in that 
sense that the victimisation—chiefly at the hands of the Serbs—precipitated the development 
of the Kosovar (Albanian) identity as discrete from that of the Albanian group at large‘ (see 
Ingimundarson, 2007:97). 
The projection of the perception of the national victimhood as a recurring historical feature 
remains one of the essential mobilisatory concepts in the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist 
discourse. From Frasheri‘s manifestos to Fishta‘s poetry (see chapter 6) the idea of Albanians 
as a nation engulfed in tragedies and pogroms has been permeating the narrative about the 
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nation-building and national liberation. During the 1990s and the introduction of the 
discourse of democracy and independence, the concept of national victimisation evolved into 
a discursive practice aimed at enhancing the logic of the binary opposition between the victim 
as ‗good‘ and the other, the perpetrator of such victimisation who is ‗evil‘. As it will be 
discussed later in this chapter, the automatic ‗goodness‘ of the victim in the Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse from the 1990s has been strongly related with the Christian—more 
precisely, Roman Catholic—religious connotations about moral imperatives of non-violence, 
endurance and peacefulness. I argue that in such context, the reiteration of the national 
victimisation ought to be analysed as an important component in the internalised-orientalist, 
‗westernised‘ communicative practice that was applied by the Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s 
during the period of political resistance against the Serbian/Yugoslav regime. The following 
is a quote by Dujizings (2000) which highlights the wide usage of such strategy by the 
Kosovo Albanian political representatives: 
 
The horrors visited upon the Kosovars in the latter half of the 1990s accordingly 
provided a legitimate basis upon which Kosovar leaders ‗presented their people to the 
outside world as a wronged and victimised nation‘—a sentiment shared pervasively 
by the populace (2000:203) 
 
The projection of victimhood does not necessarily project the weaker element in the victim-
oppressor relationship. As noted by Bieber (2003:326) ‗the victim also inevitably belongs to 
the group that is ‗just‘. I argue that such self-projection of a ‗just‘ and ‘proud‘ victimhood 
further propelled the self-perception of Kosovo Albanians as ‗western‘ and ‗civilised‘ in the 
light of state-sponsored brutalities. 
 
Although the victimisation and the ‗victim behaviour‘ was evident throughout the warring 
nations of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s—indeed, in as many forms of exclusive 
nationalism (Clark, 2000:135)—its manifestation and affirmation by Kosovo Albanians 
proved to be a successful propagandistic component in their reconstructed programme of 
democratic ethnonationalism. ‗Kosovo Albanians sometimes seemed to think ‗the more we 
suffer, the worse Serbs look, the better for us‘ (2000:136-7). I argue that the popular 
engagement in projecting the image of oneself as a victim represented yet another addition to 
the orientalist exercise-–for it enhanced the bi-dimensional definition of the civilised, (thus, 
western-modelled) notion of ‗us‘ as opposed to the brutal (thus, eastern) ‗them‘. 
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The narrative about the national victimisation was reinitiated through the Serbian state-
sponsored violence against Kosovo Albanian population that was formally launched in the 
aftermath of the abolition of Kosovo‘s autonomy in 1989. I argue that such systematic 
operation of bringing down the entire grid of political, administrative, cultural and 
educational system of Kosovo (for further reading, see Meier (1995), Clark (2000)) initiated 
the reinvention of the irredentist base of its ethnonationalist discourse. Confronted with the 
severity of the situation on the ground and the rising awareness of the post-communist 
discourse of democracy across the Eastern Europe, the emerging representatives of the 
Kosovo Albanian political resistance engaged in discursive delineation of the ethnonationalist 
ideology within the temporal boundaries of the ‗old‘ and the ‗new‘. As noted earlier (see 
chapter 6), whereas the irredentist strategy of action was considered as internationally 
acceptable norm at the time of its conception—the period of nation-building and geopolitical 
reshuffling after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (1890-1913)–irredentism represented 
a highly unpopular political strategy in the post-World War II geopolitical reality of the 
western Europe. In a nutshell, irredentism—such as that of Kosovo Albanian form—carried 
all the ingredients necessary to worsen and elevate any internal conflict into a regional 
disaster: it was poised on the redrawing of internationally recognised borders (such as 
Yugoslavia‘s) through their forced dissolution and reconstruction. As mentioned in chapters 1 
and 2 that discuss the theories of nation and nationalism, the Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalist narrative represented a combination of irredentist and separatist models—as 
presented by Hechter (2000). Therefore, irredentism—as well as separatism—were to be 
replaced with another ideal, deemed more ‗realistic‘ and ‗acceptable‘ to the political 
authorities of the ‗international community‘: the independent state of Kosovo. It certainly 
included the separatist component—the independent nation-state entailed Kosovo‘s secession 
from Serbia/Yugoslavia—but it would not affect the internationally recognised borders and 
the geopolitical balance of the region. 
 
Below I will analyse the discursive technologies that were applied in the Kosovo Albanian 
political discourse and accomplished the transformation of the key epistemes of the 
ethnonationalist discourse through the process of its internal revision and external 
dissemination, which was often called the ‗internationalisation‘ of the Kosovo Albanian 
political cause (see Rugova, 1994). 
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I argue that such a process has been conducted as a premeditated exercise of ‗teleological 
action‘ as defined by Habermas (1983): 
 
The actor attains an end or brings about the occurrence of a desired state by choosing 
means that have promise of being successful in the given situation and applying them 
in a suitable manner. The central concept is that of a decision among alternative 
courses of action, with a view to the realisation of an end, guided by maxims, and 
based on an interpretation of the situation. (1983:85) 
 
In short, the emerging ‗democracy‘ elites saw the shift of the ethnonationalist paradigm as a 
necessary—in fact, the only one possible—action that would ‗rationalise‘ its political 
demands in the context of ‗internationally-acceptable‘ norms of political action. Habermas 
notes that such ‗teleological‘ model expands into a ‗strategic‘ model as it is ‗often interpreted 
in utilitarian terms: the actor is supposed to choose and calculate means and ends from the 
standpoint of maximizing utility or expectations of utility‘ (1983:85). I argue that the 
transformation of the ethnonationalist ‗unification aspiration‘ was an outcome of a deliberate, 
utilitarian-based approach by the democratic elites while entrenched between two groups of 
social actors with diametrically opposed viewpoints: the local Albanian legacy of irredentist 
discourse on one hand, and the downright rejection of this idea by the international 
community, unwilling to accept any change of borders in the region, on the other. 
 
Through the analysis of an array of books, newspaper articles, interviews and additional 
public paraphernalia of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist ideology from the era, I will 
describe and explain the discursive technologies that produced the messages of its political 
elite which led to the establishment of a new strategy of action through such ‗telelogical‘ 
action as the display of its internalised orientalist communication practice. I argue that the 
public dissemination and the accommodation of the discourse of democracy has been 
instrumental in the difficult process of reformation, reorientation and rebranding of the 
historical fundaments of the ethnonationalist ideology and its strategy of political action. 
 
In this respect, similarly to the ‗progressiveness‘ of ‗going to Europe‘ (Todorova 1997, 
Galasinska & Galasinski 2010) embedded at the birth of Albanian ethnonationalism from 
1890s, a new, contemporary orientalist approach was seen as a sufficiently authoritative 
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component in the discourse that could induce and justify its ideological and programmatic 
transformation. Thus, ‗democratisation‘ and ‗westernisation‘ rose to become the notions of 
paralleling power, able to transport the identical demands from a century ago so that they 
complement with the new geopolitical realities of the West. They were the new words, 
carrying the old aspirations: the international acceptance, political recognition and 
legitimation of the reformed ethnonationalist ideology—and its strategy of action—by the 
presiding (western) international authorities. 
 
Also, in terms of practical objectives, the discourse of democracy was employed to produce a 
new strategic scheme that would be capable of producing an ideological compromise that 
would appease to the two diametrically opposed groups/doctrines in the period of the 
imminent dismemberment of the Yugoslav federation (1990-1991): 
 
a) International demands for a peaceful, non-violent solution to local grievances and 
state oppression that would eventually pave the way to negotiated political transition 
and acceptable settlement for the region; 
b) National strategy of armed resistance , based on the historical experiences of 
territorial partition and political oppression and devised through the prevalent 
irredentist/ethnonationalist discourses that constituted the notions of ‗national cause‘ 
and provided the ideological base of such action. 
 
Table 7.2. The process of reformation of the ethnonationalist ideology through the ‘teleological’ 
action of the discourse of democracy 
 
International Community 
Common position 
Historically inherited 
discourse of irredentism 
Discourse of democracy 
Rejection of irredentist strategy 
of action 
Demand for unification - the 
irredentist aspiration 
Strategic action of 
transformation of irredentist 
principle 
Objective Objective Teleological objective 
Kosovo remains part of 
Serbia/Yugoslavia  
Kosovo to secede from 
Yugoslavia and unite with 
Albania 
Kosovo, an independent state 
Action Action Teleological Action 
Political, negotiated settlement National l iberation through 
armed struggle 
Nonviolent resistance wins 
international support 
 
222 
 
The attempts by the emerging democratic elites to appease both the international and the local 
public with its new programme of political action, redefined the basis of the Kosovo 
Albanian orientalist ethnonationalist discourse during the 1990s. The reconstruction of the 
nationalist narrative was conducted carefully so that it would contain and deploy signifiers 
that would be relevant to both groups. In reality, it meant that the notions of ‗peaceful‘, 
‗negotiated‘ ‗settlement‘ had to be fitted within the traditional, ethnonationalist discourse that 
was based on ‗the legendary struggle‘, ‗armed resistance‘ and ‗national rebellion‘. The 
outcome of such tactical exercise produced a highly ambiguous and unstable ideological 
construction which set out to transform the very content of the Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalist narrative: 
 
(a) The key objective of the discourse: The all-national aspiration/objective for 
unification with Albania (the irredentist/separatist option) was to be redefined into an 
aspiration for independence and political self-determination which final aim would be 
the formation of the independent, nation-state of Kosovo; 
(b) The key signifier in the discourse : the national liberation through the armed struggle 
was to be replaced—indeed, reinvented—through the signifier of non-violent 
resistance, introduced as the ultimate strategy of political action that would quickly 
garner international support and recognition. 
 
Finally, such transformed ethnonationalist narrative would become in the words of Ibrahim 
Rugova—its iconic representative and leader during the 1990s—a genuine ‗philosophy of 
nonviolence‘ 39, a ‗non-violent struggle‘ (Rugova, 1991), a peculiar combination of 
traditional ethnonationalism and the emerging discourse of democracy. It was to become a 
manifestation of a ‗democratic nationalism‘ (Dvornik, 2009) that was meant to appeal to the 
already existing, prevalent irredentist narrative. 
 
LDK, the philosophy of nonviolence 
 
                                                 
39 Widely used notion to describe the strategy of the non violent resistance in Kosovo (see Agani (1996)), conducted by the LDK 
and its leader Rugova. Naming of such strategy as a ‗philosophy‘ is in itself quite indicative of the discursive tendency to present it  
as an elaborate and structured system of knowledge and social action.  
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As noted earlier, the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation was followed with an 
unprecedented outburst of military aggression, ethnic cleansing and mass killings (1991-
1999). It has been the subject of a vast number of publications, books and studies of which I 
will mention only a select group of English works, employed as an external reference source 
to this research: Malcolm (1998), Judah (2008), Clark (2000); Lampe (1996), Ramet (2005), 
Kaplan (2005), Benson (2001); Singleton (1989), Lee (1983), Udovicki & Ridgeway et al 
(2000), Carmichael et al (2002), Kecmanovic (2002), Kostoviceva (2005), Pesic (2009), 
Vladisavljevic (2008), Petrovic (1997), Bieber & Daskalowski (2005), Dragovic-Soso 
(2004). 
 
While I will try to avoid the extensive historiographic accounts and statistical data on the 
tragic process of Yugoslav dismemberment, I find it important to emphasize that virtually all 
of these studies listed here highlight the eccentricity of the introduction of the Kosovo 
Albanian non-violent political strategy in the face of diametrically opposed reality of conflict 
and aggression. A few of them (Malcolm 1998, Judah 2008, Clark 2000) point out its 
emergence as a ‗rationalised‘ policy of action that was aimed at successful acquiring of 
international legitimation of the ethnonational programme. Others, such as the Kosovo 
Report compiled by the authoritative Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
(2000) admit that the introduction of the strategy of non-violence was ‗something that was 
quite contradictory to Kosovo Albanian traditions‘ (2000:43). While I agree with this 
observation, I argue further that the Kosovo Albanian non-violent, civil resistance of the 
1990s was aimed at the deliberate production of representational delineation between 
‗peaceful‘ (Kosovo Albanian) resistance and ‗aggressive‘ (Serbian/Yugoslav) 
ethnonationalist discourses and actions. Such tactics were in line with the observation by 
Salecl (1994) on the opposing types of ethnic nationalisms in the process of the Yugoslav 
dissolution: 
 
Two views of nationalism were, and have remained, predominant in official Yugoslav 
politics since the outbreak of national conflict. The first tried to distinguish 
'progressive' nationalism (non-aggressive, defensive, civil) from 'regressive' 
nationalism (aggressive, promoting hatred, directed at the re-establishment of 
homogeneous national communities). (Salecl, 1994:210) 
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‗Nobody knows how or exactly when the Kosovo Albanians decided to adopt a policy of 
nonviolence‘, writes Clark (2000:46) while describing their ‗unusual‘ change of the strategy 
of political action in the early days of the post-communist Yugoslavia. Here, I argue that such 
structural change should be analysed as indivisible from the act of establishment of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo40 (LDK), itself a unique political body in the context of its 
programmatic—and ideological—vagueness. Yet, before we proceed, I will provide below an 
account that I find relevant for illustrating the public communication strategies that were 
initiated during those early days of the formation—and formulation—of LDK as ‗something 
different‘ to the earlier forms of ethnonational political organising: 
 
Q: Recently, a different, unofficial political association was established: The 
Democratic League of Kosovo. Its appointed chairman is Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, a well-
known Albanian scholar who will provide us with details about this initiative. 
 
Rugova: At the moment (the LDK) is a political and cultural society. Once the 
Yugoslav legislation on political pluralism is regulated, it might evolve into a 
political or cultural party, and so forth... (VOA Albanian Service, 30
th
 December 
1989) 
 
This is an excerpt from the interview conducted by the Albanian Service of the Voice of 
America (VOA) with the LDK‘s chairman, Ibrahim Rugova. Whereas we will discuss and 
analyse at greater length the personality of Rugova later in the research, it is relevant to note 
that the selected fragment is extracted from his first-ever interview in the capacity of the 
LDK leader—in December 1989. What is relevant to the research here is the feature of 
semantic ambiguity—indeed, a communicative strategizing—that is revealed during the 
attempts to formulate and define this new entity. 
 
What is LDK here? Is it a ‗political association‘ or a ‗political and cultural society‘ pending 
its transformation into a ‗political or cultural party‘ through eventual institutional, 
legitimizing, permission by the Yugoslav institutions of power? I find such communicative 
strategy rather sympathetic in the confusion that it causes as it sets out to articulate an 
‗acceptable‘ definition of the object of discussion. A simplified Bakhtinian analysis of the 
                                                 
40 In Albanian : Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves - LDK 
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‗historical moment of performance‘ of such ‗utterances‘ (in Dentith, 1995) tells us a great 
deal about the communicative strategy at work—for it encapsulates the point of departure of 
the long process of ideological reformation. Something new is just being introduced—
whether a ‗society‘, ‗association‘, ‗political‘ or ‗cultural‘ party—and its coming to life will be 
subject to a complex relational process between social actors and the effects of sociopolitical 
transformations taking place around them. Here, a short historiographic account of the 
structural and ideological evolution of the Democratic League of Kosovo might serve as an 
appropriate illustration of such ‗dialogic engagement‘ manifested in Rugova‘s statements in 
the early days of its constitution as a future political organisation. 
 
Founded in December 1989 by a group of members of the Writers‘ Association of Kosovo, 
the LDK quickly became the centerfold political organisation that was considered an 
‗alternative‘ to the existing, dysfunctional, Kosovo branch of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia—LCY (Ismaili 2001:60-72). By March 1990, the LDK membership was 
estimated to have reached the astounding number of some 250,000 members (Clark 2000, 
Malcolm 1998) as it evolved into an ideological umbrella for individuals and groups from 
virtually all profiles of political activity. Former communist apparatchiks, former political 
prisoners, exponents of illegal irredentist/revolutionary organisations, hardline Enver Hoxha-
modelled marxist-lenninists, student youth, liberal intellectuals and general citizenry were 
massively enmembering the LDK in an act of revolt against the Serbian state-sponsored 
repression and political uncertainty of the moment. Over time, Ibrahim Rugova as its 
chairman would rise to become its cult-leader and the personification of its programme that 
was based on the discursive practice of the perceived ‗western-modelled‘ democratic 
values—namely, civil, nonviolent political resistance. 
 
I argue that, such an approach to political action—until then deemed utterly un-traditional—
was interpreted by the LDK as the optimal course that would enable Kosovo Albanians to 
join the ‗European‘ standards of polity. Moreover, according to the LDK such international 
standards demanded the rationalisation of ethnonational goals and their categorisation into 
‗realistic‘ or ‗unrealistic‘. This entailed the ideological detour from the strategy of 
irredentism to that of independentism---and the LDK set out to achieve it through the 
application of a fierce monopoly over the interpretation of the ethnonationalist ideology: 
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The LDK exercised a dominance over Albanian political life that the LCY in Kosovo 
never had. Moreover it had assumed the position not only of rightful heir to the 
former authorities, but also to those outside the Party who had expressed the 
aspiration for a republic. Unfortunately, its style of operation was increasingly akin to 
that of other one-party states. As well as questions about the organising style of the 
LDK, and indeed the personal style of Ibrahim Rugova, this raises strategic issues 
about the role and structure of leadership in the conduct of a nonviolent struggle---
especially in a context where self-restraint is so central (Clark, 2000:84) 
 
The new, reformed Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism spearheaded by the LDK was to 
continue to be based on the orientalist fundaments of ‗going to Europe‘ (or, ‗returning to 
Europe‘)—rooted in the period of the National Rebirth Movement and Frasheri‘s pamphlet 
from 1890s—but it was poised to achieve this through its strict repositioning in accordance to 
the routinized contemporary views of the western governments on the ‗internationally 
acceptable‘ forms of political action. In the context of the early 1990s this entailed an 
essential transformation and the reconstruction of both its ideological goal and the strategy of 
action: ‗motherland‘ Albania was to be replaced with the new-found ‗motherland‘ Kosovo. 
The epic tradition of armed struggle, ‗mountaineer warriors‘ and ‗Albanian brigands‘ would 
be matched and replaced with that of the nonviolent resistance and a rather peculiar form of 
‗political Gandhism that became interpreted as waiting‘ (Clark, 2000:138). As mentioned 
earlier, its aim was to accelerate and emphasize the process of ideological othering on two 
levels: 
 
 Internal/local level, implying the ideological reorganisation—i.e. reconstruction of 
the fashion in which Kosovo Albanians would ‗normalise‘ the differing perceptions 
about the historical legacy of national liberation struggle. This entailed a discursive 
reconciliation of the narratives about the armed rebellion (past) and the nonviolent 
resistance (present); 
 External/international level, implying the transformation of the Kosovo Albanian 
image of the political resistance—i.e. how were they to be seen from the external 
social actors in the region and in the ‗international community‘. 
 
Shkelzen Maliqi (1995), a Kosovo Albanian public intellectual and a ‗democracy activist‘ of 
the period notes: ‗The key to the sudden shift (towards nonviolence) might be sought in the 
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process of structuring of an identity in contrast to ‗the Other‘, in this case a rival and enemy 
nation‘. I argue that this ‗sudden shift‘ represented a direct impact of the nesting-orientalist 
approach in the manner in which the reformed ethnonationalist discourse was to be 
constructed and disseminated. Such an approach was aimed at both projecting and 
highlighting the differences between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ (Kosovo Albanians/Serbian regime) in 
the fashion that would favor Albanians in the international political scene. The account below 
from the early days of displays of the nonviolent strategy invokes a similar reasoning. It is an 
observation about the hunger-strike conducted by Kosovo Albanian miners in 1989 in 
response to the abolition of Kosovo‘s autonomous status: 
 
Trepca miners – who inspired hundreds of thousands to repeat their brave deed in 
cold and snowy weather for five full days, so that the roads of Kosovo were day and 
night full of protest columns – in all aspects of their conduct, attempted to prove that 
the Albanians were not as the Serbs presented them and, still more importantly, that 
the Albanians were different and better than the Serbs. This entire manifestation, 
which involved the participation of some 400,000 people, went without a single 
incident, a single act of vandalism or destruction, and even without a single broken 
window. (Maliqi, 1998:140-141) 
 
A retrospective analysis of the transformative logic of the (ethnonationalist) discourse of 
democracy in the context of distinct orientalist trait accounts for an ambitious reconstruction 
of social categories of morality, key principles of ethnonational ideology and strategies of 
political action. In this respect, Maliqi‘s observation accounts for the ‗new‘ approach in the 
ethnonationalist representational logic: the recategorisation of the morality of social actions 
within a simplified binary scheme: 
 
peaceful => (internationally) acceptable => right 
violent => (internationally) unacceptable => wrong 
 
I argue that such moral categorisation in the context of the collective strategy of action 
represents an outcome of relational process of deciphering the external/international norms in 
terms of ‗acceptable‘ form of display of political discontent – as opposed to what was locally 
perceived as ‗acceptable‘ and necessary. Whereas such categorisation would appear as clearly 
self-evident to an external observer, it is noteworthy in the context of the Kosovo Albanian 
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legacy of anti-establishment opposition—in light of this legacy—this strategy was not 
necessarily the most obvious. 
 
This is the reason why I find Maliqi‘s emphasis on the nonviolence important; its underlying 
message is ideologically charged in its praising tone as he sets out to encourage the 
nonviolent approach through illustrating its immediate benefit—it made Kosovo Albanians 
different (i.e. better) than the Serbs. The hidden syntax of Maliqi‘s statement is about the 
encouragement of the disconnection with the historical legacy of active/armed struggle, as it 
hints on the potential external representations of such acts as ‗vandalist‘ and ‗destructive‘. 
 
In short, the strategy of nonviolence was introduced as ‗right‘ because of the 
external/international acceptance—it made Albanians more ‗European‘. On the other hand, 
an active/violent resistance was re-projected as ‗wrong‘ because of its international 
rejection—it made the Serbs and their repressive state look less ‗European‘. Here, the scheme 
of such logical causality and judgement is intentionally presented in an overtly simplified 
manner: it is done with the aim to illustrate the essentially utilitarian core of a political 
strategy that was publicly marketed as a product of society‘s high standards of morality. I 
argue that, quite the contrary, rather than any moral consideration, the logic at the basis of 
this reconfiguring of ‗right‘ and ‗wrong‘ is the formal Western discourse on violence as an 
action that is politically unacceptable and morally/culturally deplorable. 
 
Ultimately, I argue, it was the perceived external/international judgment on the image of 
Kosovo—the image of its emerging, ‗democratic‘ elite and its actions—that presided over 
such re-categorisation of sociopolitical morality, not the local legacy of moral imperatives. A 
certain social action was only ‗good‘ and ‗right‘ if it was internationally recognised as such, 
and this is where I see the essential relevance of the internalised-orientalist discourse: it 
assisted in a ‗top-down‘ imposed re-categorisation of the public morality of such actions, thus 
further simplifying its future definition. In short, this meant that from then on a certain action 
was ‗right‘ and ‗good‘ if defined that way by the ‗international community‘, and the LDK 
claimed to be the only valid interpreter of such ‗international‘ definitions. Such 
‗interpretative power‘ quickly elevated the LDK from the position of the communicative 
interface between Kosovo Albanians and ‗the world‘—to that of personification of both 
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Albanians and ‗the world‘ (to Kosovo Albanians). It became both the producer and 
interpreter of the new knowledge. 
 
Further, vested with such powers, it set out to project the historical value of its practice of 
nonviolence as the integral part of the legacy of the nation‘s ideological fabric. The build-up 
of the new ethnopolitical imagery in the context of the ‗nesting orientalist‘ approach (Bakic-
Hayden, 1992) was also noted by Natasa Kovacevic (2008), as she describes the changes of 
the strategy of political action across the former Yugoslav nations before and during the 
period of conflicts in the 1990s: 
 
The attempt to escape the backward Balkans and join Europe was articulated as a 
necessary disassociation from ethnicities seen as Balkan or Oriental (Serbs for 
Croatia, Moslems/Albanians for Serbia and Macedonia). The  process of ethnic 
differentiation was encouraged both from the inside through openly racist narratives 
about ‗us, Europeans‘, and ‗them, Orientals‘ while, from the outside, through the 
more subtle narratives of cultural racism about, for instance, democratic, 
hardworking, tolerant Slovenians and authoritarian, shifty, corrupt, and narcissistic 
Serbs. (2008:163) 
 
Thus, with the emergence of the LDK, the key battle between the political imageries was to 
be launched from its moral field: Kosovo Albanians were to be constructed as peaceful, 
nonviolent, rational, as opposed to the repressive, brutal and irrational Serbian/Yugoslav 
regime. The great patriotic aspiration of staging an all-national armed rebellion—until then 
considered as traditionally preferable and historically expectable—was discarded as 
damaging to the new ‗westernised‘ imagery and, eventually, harmless to the regime. 
Moreover, to LDK and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, a matching strategy of action to that of the 
firm security grip conducted by Serbian authorities against Kosovo Albanian political 
opposition was considered as outright disastrous—both in the context of failing to achieve an 
‗internationally acceptable‘ image, as well as in its practical uselessness. The military 
presence and might of the Serbian/Yugoslav security apparatus was overwhelmingly more 
superior to virtually powerless Kosovo Albanian civil groups. 
 
‗It was not pacifism (principled rejection of lethal force) but strategic nonviolence—a 
practical alternative to war or submission‘, notes Garton-Ash (2009:280) in his observation 
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on the Kosovo Albanian nonviolent resistance during the 1990s. Below are three excerpts 
from different interviews of Rugova that illustrate the discourse adopted within this approach: 
 
We (the LDK) believe that this must be resolved through political means. Our people, 
understanding the positions of Euro-American public opinion, have faith that the 
problems will be solved through democratic means (. . .) Its politics of patience and 
peace is being acknowledged from international diplomatic circles. (‗Flaka e 
Vellazerimit
41
 in Rugova, 1991:148-157) 
 
We are not certain how strong the Serbian military presence in the province actually 
is, but we do know that it is overwhelming and that we have nothing to set against the 
tanks and other modern weaponry in Serbian hands. (. . .) We would have no chance 
of successfully resisting the army. In fact the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack 
the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay 
alive than to be massacred. (Rugova (1992) in Judah 2008:71) 
 
By means of this active resistance based on non violence and solidarity, we ‗found‘ 
ourselves. Today, we have succeeded in touching this point of the spirit of the 
Albanian people . . . Oppressed, but organised . . . this is the first time (Kosovo 
Albanians) feel that they have a power. . . that they feel citizens despite the 
occupation. (Rugova (1994) in Garton-Ash 2009:281) 
 
Here, in a chronological fashion (1991, 1992, 1994) Rugova‘s discursive strategising 
accounts for the efforts to sustain a ‗dialogic engagement‘ between the challenges to which 
the Kosovo Albanian society is exposed—as it displays the employment of the ‗democratic 
imagery‘ of political action as a consequence of a mere compromise with the unfavorable 
reality of power-relations on the ground. Certainly, I argue, this does not account for anything 
unusual in the history of civil resistance of smaller ethnicities that were up against much 
larger and powerful autocracies. However, its dubious position—entrenched between minute 
possibilities of action and ambitious demands—threatened to weaken the viability of the 
discourse of democracy as an effective strategy of representation. Therefore, its strengthening 
was dependent on the ability of the new discursive practice to reorganise the collective 
                                                 
41 ‗Flaka e Vellazerimit‘, Albanian daily from Skoplje, Macedonia. At the time of the int erview, Macedonia was a constituent 
republic of the Federative Socialist  Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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memory of national resistance, for, the strength of any political ideology can only be 
measured by its capacity to reconstruct its ‗ancientness‘. As mentioned earlier, the challenge 
of the new political discourse was its ability to: 
 
 Project the nonviolent resistance as a historical continuity of Albanian 
ethnonationalist strategy of action. Whereas the strategy of non-violence was 
introduced as ‗internationally acceptable‘ mode of action, its projection into the 
nation‘s past was deemed necessary for gaining the popular support. It was an 
exercise of the naturalisation of the transformed ethnonationalist discourse. 
 
 Project the idea of independence—the independent state of Kosovo—as a historically 
underpinned aspiration of Albanians. Whereas the unification with Albania was 
introduced as an ‗internationally unacceptable‘ demand, projection of independent 
Kosovo into the nation‘s past was also seen as crucial for gaining the popular support. 
Again, the projection of a newly-constructed ideological aspiration as ‗perennial‘ 
accounts for the naturalisation power of the discourse. 
 
Below, in table 7.3, I illustrate the chronological impact of such orientalist trait from the 
period of the birth of the modern Albanian ethnonationalism at the outset of the 20 th century 
to the period of its revival and revision—a hundred years later--and its subsequent 
transformation from an irredentist to an independentist model. 
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Table 7.3. Irredentist/Independentist model 
Key ideological 
epistemes 
Negative analogies / 
traumas 
Strategy of action (until 
1990s)—Irredentist 
Strategy of action 
(in 1990s)—
Independentist 
Albanians are 
autochthonous and 
homogenous nation of 
the Balkans 
Partition of Albanian 
lands and its nation 
by external 
hegemonies 
Unification of all  ethnic 
Albanian territories 
within a one, single 
nation-state (irredentist 
ethnonationalism) 
Establishment of the 
independent state of 
Kosovo as a rational 
choice in line with 
the standard of 
political self-
determination  
Albanians are 
descendants of 
ancient Il lyrians, part 
of the Christian 
civil isation before the 
Ottoman conquests  
Constant regional 
hatred and hostil ity 
towards their 
origine, language and 
culture 
Active resistance, armed 
struggle against foreign 
and regional occupiers 
(waves of rebellions 
between 1890-1945) 
Peaceful, nonviolent 
resistance to 
contrast the 
regional 
aggressiveness of 
political and military 
domination (1989-
1998) 
Their predominantly 
Islamic heritage 
represents an 
involuntary 
consequence of 
oppressive past 
Failure of the Great 
Powers to 
understand their 
history and situation, 
and act accordingly 
upon it 
Political exposure and 
building of all iances with 
the Great Powers as a 
strategy for successful 
pursuing of ethnopoitical 
strategy 
Internationalization 
of political struggle 
in the context of 
‘international 
community’, 
European Union, US 
Government, NATO, 
etc. 
Albanians belong to 
the realm of 
European/Christian 
civil isation 
European realm of 
institutional power 
could continue to 
deny acceptance of 
this historical and 
ideological fact 
Deciphering, adoption 
and internalisation of key 
European demands of 
‘civil ised’ polity 
Advertising of 
political, cultural 
and historical 
‘Europeanness’ 
through the non-
violent resistance 
and independentist 
strategy as a 
rational 
compromise. 
 
The table 7.3 offers a chronological illustration of the historical periods which 
induced the transformation of the ethnonationalist discourse—indeed, its 
epistemological ruptures—and which account for the effects of the orientalist features 
in shaping the representational system of the ethnonational identity, political ideology 
and programme of action. Also, the table reveals the coincidental occurrence of the 
‗sudden shift‘ from the tradition of armed struggle to the strategy of non-violence, and 
the ideological alteration from the irredentist paradigm (unification with Albania) to 
the independentist (Kosovo, a nation-state). I argue that such swift and essential 
transformation of the key principles of a political discourse with a history dating since 
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the period of Albanian National Rebirth Movement (1878, see previous chapter) 
produced a yet another trauma in the public perceptions about the ideological goal of 
the nationalist political resistance. Subsequently, it resulted in the construction of a 
new—and utterly different—landscape of power operations inside the Kosovo 
Albanian society. 
 
However, at the time of its conception, the strategy of the nonviolent resistance was 
prevalently adopted by the major exponents of the Kosovo Albanian political elite. I 
argue that such readiness for complete reorientation of the core of the ethnonationalist 
programme confirms the powerful effect of the employment of the orientalist 
approach. The concept of the peaceful resistance was introduced in the Kosovo 
Albanian political discourse as the ‗only one acceptable‘ by the international 
community which was fearful of any critical geopolitical change in the region and/or 
redrawal of administrative/state borders along the ethnic lines. On the other hand, the 
‗international community‘ was introduced as the entity with the supreme political 
power that was able to preside and decide over the destiny of small Balkan societies—
an ultimate point of reference to the ethnonationalist discursive practice. Therefore, 
the strategy of political communication with the international community—and/or its 
representatives—entailed the presentation of political actions and ideology that would 
be defined acceptable and supportable. Here, the concept of peaceful resistance was 
perceived and introduced as the major component of the new, reformed Kosovo 
Albanian ethnonationalist programme of action: its primary value was embedded in 
the belief that it represented an approach that will be acknowledged and appreciated 
by the international community. Be this the case, it would qualify the Kosovo 
Albanian political leadership to interact with its exponents and representatives, and 
thus be able to construct a new, democratic imagery of Kosovo‘s movement for 
national liberation and political self-determination. The possibility to sustain contacts 
with the (western) international community was perceived as a critical achievement to 
the new political movement. As noted by Judah: 
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In this period, the problem was that Yugoslavia enjoyed huge prestige around the 
world. Calling for its destruction and the creation of a Greater Albania was hardly the 
way to win friends and influence people, nor for that matter an idea that sounded 
anything other than simply crazy. (2008:76) 
 
‗Initially a counsel of realism‘, the discourse of democracy and nonviolence ‗became 
not only a necessity but also a choice‘, Garton-Ash cites Rugova (2009:281) and the 
latter‘s explanation on the ways in which the non-violent resistance made Kosovo 
Albanians to ‗find themselves‘ and mobilise. It was accepted as an ideological novelty 
of enormous relevance and support among the Kosovo Albanian public, because from 
its outset it was capable to produce two major political effects: 
 
 Attract attention of the international community about the political oppression 
of Kosovo Albanians, and;  
 Avoid direct, armed conflict with the Serbian regime.  
 
The nonviolence—or ‗passive resistance‘, as noted by Clark (2000)—was interpreted 
as the ultimate formula of the strategy of action that would, in time, achieve the 
international recognition and western acceptance of the seceded, independent state 
Kosovo as a geopolitical fact on the ground. Above all, it functioned as the discursive 
breakout from the ideological deadlock imposed by the ‗unification aspiration‘ that 
was maintaining an impossible relation between the triangle of (a) Kosovo Albanians‘ 
historical demands, (b) the overwhelming political/military power of 
Serbia/Yugoslavia and (c) the prerequisites of the ‗international community‘ for 
peaceful conflict resolution and political settlement. Ultimately, it became a useful 
justification for the new political elite to curb the unrealistic ethnonationalist goal and 
avoid the confrontation with the hardline groups that were functioning based on the 
legacy of armed struggle and clandestine organising. It was now able to construct the 
public perception of Kosovo Albanians‘ readiness, political maturity and civil 
complementariness with the perceived ‗European‘ standards of civilised polity. 
 
In the period following the establishment of the LDK, ideas of democratisation, 
nonviolence, ethnic/religious tolerance, self-determination and independence became 
the core signifiers of the reformed ethnonationalism. Their usage and popularisation 
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amidst the ever-increasing Serbian state repression on Kosovo was also aimed at 
producing a countering imagery, believed to be decisive for acquiring a favorable 
interpretation of Kosovo Albanian political struggle—as that of a civilised victim of a 
chauvinistic hegemony. Specifically, the practice of nonviolence within the discourse 
of democracy served ‗to validate the self-worth of Kosovo Albanians at a time when 
they were being vilified‘ (Clark, 2000:68). I argue that adoption of the strategy of 
nonviolence and its linkage to the notion of a ‗civilised‘ act of political resistance was 
also meant as a practical opposition to the stereotyped depiction of the Kosovo 
Albanians in the Serbian culture, as is outlined in Salecl: 
 
In Serbian mythology, the Albanians are understood as pure Evil, the 
unimaginable: that which cannot be subjectivized—beings who cannot be 
made into people because they are so radically Other. The Serbs describe 
their conflict with the Albanians as a struggle of 'people with non-people' 
(Salecl, 1994:212). 
 
By 1991, the establishment of The Democratic League of Kosovo was quickly 
followed by the emergence of an abundance of additional entities: political parties, 
trade unions, human rights councils, women party branches and cultural clubs—a 
whole network of societal engagement aimed at enhancing further the image of a 
‗westernised‘ vitality of an ethnic community in the face of state-sponsored 
repression. Let us name the most important ones, as listed in Ismajli (2001): 
 
 Albanian Demo-Christian Party (PSHDK); 
 Kosovo Socialdemocratic Party (PSDK); 
 Kosovo Parliamentary Party (PPK); 
 Albanian Popular Party (PPSH); 
 Popular Movement for National Unification (LPSHBK); 
 Kosovo Democratic Action Party (PSDAK, gathering Muslim Bosnian 
minority); 
 Kosovo Peasants Party (PFK); 
 Albanian Party of the Democratic Unity (PSHBD); 
 Albanian National-Democratic Party (PNDSH); 
 Kosovo Green Movement (LGJK); 
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 Albanian Liberal Party (PLSH); 
 Albanian Republican Party (PRK). 
 
The non-political segment was also impressive: 
 
 The Union of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK 
 The Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (KMDLNJ) 
 The Forum of Albanian Intellectuals (FISH) 
 Kosovo PEN Club (Writers Association) 
 Mother Theresa Charity Organisation 
 
At least during the first half of the decade, the social and political grid that was 
produced through the emergence of these organisations was aimed at supporting and 
widening the political logic and discourse that was spearheaded by the LDK. 
Regardless of their formally different names and programs, these political and civic-
society groups were following in their entirety the basic principles of the new 
discourse of democracy, non-violent resistance and demand for the independent state 
of Kosovo. 
 
The period from 1989 until 1998 marked the chapter of such intense performative-
level actions conducted by Kosovo Albanian political actors. The establishment of a 
large array of organisations and associations—often existing only in the form of 
published communiqués—was an attempt to formally apply the essential principles of 
the discourse of democracy and the ‗westernised‘ ethnonationalist ideology in the 
context of society‘s daily routines. It was a rather unusual and controversial practice,  
considering the fact that by the fall of 1990, Kosovo Albanians were systematically 
expelled from virtually all walks of public life through an orchestrated campaign by 
the Serbian authorities, aimed at paralyzing society‘s functionality. 
 
Accounts in Kostoviceva (2005), Clark (2000), Malcolm (1998), Judah (2008) and 
others provide detailed description on the firm security grip over Kosovo by the 
Serbian authorities. Hundreds of thousands lost their workplaces; schools and 
university were closed down for Albanian students, while the handful of Albanian 
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media outlets such as national radio-television (RTP), Albanian daily ‗Rilindja‘ (Eng. 
Rebirth) were shut down and their publication officially banned. While such actions 
damaged severely the living standard of the community, they also resulted in 
amassing of the newly proclaimed ‗democratic‘ political organisations, seen as public 
sanctuaries to an outlawed nation. In a matter of months, this turn of events would 
usher Kosovo Albanians into establishment of a distinct social practice—coronated 
through the formal proclamation of a semi-clandestine, self-governed system of 
political organising, schooling and education—a genuine landscape of parallel 
structures or what has been commonly called during the 1990s: the ‗parallel, 
independent Republic of Kosovo‘. 
 
I argue that the establishment of such institutional parallelism represented a 
combination of the effects of indiscriminate repression by the Serbian regime and an 
effort by Kosovo Albanian political elites to practical demonstration of the adoption 
of the discourse of democracy and nonviolent resistance to the international/western 
audiences. Moreover, the establishment of such an institutional grid was necessary for 
enabling the wide, multi-dimensional social practice that would enforce, naturalise 
and normalise the new discourse and political strategy. Such a grid was essential for 
inducing what Jorgenson and Phillips (2002) call the ‗hegemonic intervention‘, 
necessary to confront the collision of discourses—in this case the discourse of 
irredentism and that of independentism. 
 
‗Now a virtual state, the Republic of Kosova came into being‘, notes Tim Judah, 
‗existing in a weird, parallel form to the Serbian authorities who were very much in 
charge‘ (2008:69). As the ultimate demonstration of practical, political readiness to 
accept democratic norms of ‗European‘ behavior and action, the idea of the (parallel) 
state of Kosovo remains the essential object of the analysis in this chapter, as its 
construction and application embraced the key orientalist traits of the ‗democratising‘ 
Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism, such as: 
 
a) The establishment of the cult of the national leader whose image would 
embed and personify the reformed concept of a ‗westernised‘ and 
internationally acceptable ethnonationalism. 
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b) The systematic and thorough detachment of the Kosovo Albanian community 
from the structural dependence to the opposing, ruling regime—deemed anti-
western, anachronic and repressive. This entailed the introduction of the 
‘parallel State of Kosovo’ which formal functioning would highlight the 
repressive reality through the nesting orientalism juxtaposing exercise. 
c) Internationalisation and advertising of the imagery of nonviolent, democratic 
resistance  through the adoption of the ‗parallel state‘ as a signifier and a 
tangible product of the great internal ideological shift of the strategy of action. 
Here, the emphasis is placed on the Kosovo Albanians‘ readiness to 
demonstrate the internalisation of required international standards and norms 
of ‗acceptable‘ political organising – with the ‗parallel state‘ serving as the 
performative level dry run of their institutional maturity. 
 
The parallel political structures of the so-called ‗Independent Republic of Kosovo‘ 
lasted for the most part of the 1990s. Their existence and development never went 
beyond symbolical, performative-level display of a moderate opposition and quickly 
became reduced to one major engagement—schooling/education42 and, partially, a 
ring of humanitarian makeshift clinics ran by the local charity ‗Mother Theresa‘ 
(Demolli 2007). A large network of clandestine high schools, including the faculties 
and the Rectorate of the banned University of Prishtina was set up in private houses 
across Kosovo and its capital, Prishtina (Malcolm 1998, Kostoviceva 2005). The 
education received in these parallel structures ‗was rudimentary but it was a system 
that worked‘ (Judah 2008:73). 
 
Such an unusual exercise of political opposition in the context of the former Yugoslav 
conflict has been both heavily criticised and praised while it lasted, since 1991 until 
1999. Whereas widely praised in the international political scene as the evidence of 
political rationality and patience of Kosovo Albanians, to exponents of the more 
radical, irredentist camp the ‗democratic performance‘ that was staged by the 
emerging elite was seen as the mere maintenance of the negative status-quo with the 
Serbian regime through a damaging compromise to Kosovo Albanian society. 
                                                 
42 For a detailed account on the ‗parallel education system‘ in Kosovo between 1991 -1999, please see Kostoviceva, 
Denisa: ‗Kosovo, The Politics of Identity and Space‘, Routledge 2005. 
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(‘Unrealistic’) Irredentists Vs. (‘Realistic’) Independentists  
 
The exponents of the Kosovo Albanian democratic political discourse took on the role 
of the producers of the ‗democratic text‘—guided by the belief that construction of the 
image of a peaceful popular resistance in a region engulfed by the ethnic mobilisation 
and hatred could enhance its external perception as that of an ‗acceptable‘ 
representation of a ‗westernised‘ rationality and societal logic. They were driven by 
interpretations that the breakup of the former Yugoslav federation was to be 
officially—and, specifically—recognised along the administrative borders of existing 
republics. Therefore, any potential separatist/irredentist action from provinces such 
Kosovo would be confronted with an outright rejection by the international political 
authorities. In that case, they feared, the whole discursive exercise of projecting the 
national will for independence-through-democratisation could bankrupt, while the 
national struggle would be reduced to the definition of the ‗internal issue‘ of 
Serbia/Yugoslavia and dealt with in accordance with the limited context of human 
rights and civil liberties (Wodward 1995:395-9). 
 
Therefore, the unification aspiration was to be presented to the local public as a 
demand that was already rejected as ‗unrealistic‘ and ‗maximalist‘ by the major actors 
of the international community. On the other hand, to the latter, the project of the 
independent Kosovo was persistently presented as both the major political concession 
by the Kosovo Albanians—and, indeed, the only ‗realistic‘ solution to Kosovo in light 
of the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. Such representational tactics created an 
unstable and misty political landscape that was lingering between the diametrically 
opposed local and international concepts about what exactly are the ‗maximalist‘ and 
‗realist‘ demands. I argue that such strategy reached the point of a genuine 
communication deadlock between parallel epistemologies, in which the discourse of 
democracy was entrenched in attempts to construct a communicative middle-ground 
that could reconcile such opposing views (see also the earlier discussed Table 7.3). 
The following excerpt from Krasniqi (2010) illustrates the local, post-festum, 
sentiment of ‗independence‘ as a ‗historical compromise‘: 
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Throughout these years, the Albanian nation went through numerous injustice 
in all walks of life; it has given up many demands—political and social—as it 
patiently awaited the establishment of the Sovereign, Democratic and 
Independent State. (2010:108) 
 
Clearly, to Krasniqi, the independence of Kosovo is ‗the least‘ that could be done for 
‗the Albanian nation‘ which has given up many demands—a direct allusion to the 
‗unification aspiration‘. According to him, the statehood of Kosovo is a non-debatable 
issue, a historical compromise that demands ultimate esteem by the international 
community. However, Clark (2000) offers a completely different and problematic 
observation of slightly different positions shared at the time by the ‗international 
community‘ with respect to such ‗historical compromise‘ of Kosovo Albanians: 
 
For some, independence was a step towards the unification of Albanians. For 
others, it was the natural consequence of the break-up of Yugoslavia (. . .) 
However, internationally, this was seen as a maximalist demand (. . .) In 
Washington in May 1993, the foreign ministers of the USA, Russia, Britain, 
France and Spain stated their determination that Kosovo should have a high 
level of autonomy within Serbia. Foreign powers refused to accept that---if 
FRY continued to refuse international mediation and continued to abuse the 
Kosovo Albanians---they should reconsider the insistence that Kosovo 
remain inside FRY. (2000:92-95) 
 
However, during the early days of the formation of the independentist discourse, the 
deep ideological divisions occurred within the Kosovo Albanian political community 
confused by the swiftness of the discursive transformation of the major 
ethnonationalist principles. Almost overnight, the new political discourse of 
democracy, non-violence, self-determination and independence generated the 
temporal delineation of the ‗old‘ and the ‗new‘ knowledge. The ‗sudden shift‘ found 
political activists in a difficult position: while eager to continue the pursuing of the 
ethnonationalist programme, they were unsure about which political strategy of action 
they should embrace. In the wider, regional context it was the period of disintegration 
of the former federal Yugoslavia, as well as the entire former Soviet bloc; Albania‘s 
communist dictatorship was nearing its demise and the region was in a confused state, 
torn between the re-emergence of ethnonationalism, armed conflict and adoption of 
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the social practices of democratic behaviour. The below account by Muhamet 
Kelmendi (1998), a Kosovo Albanian former political prisoner and activist, echoes the 
discontent among the traditional/irredentist block with respect to the new ideological 
course: 
 
The all-national mobilisation has been declared as alien to those political 
entities (LDK) which emphasize the theories that ‗Europe does not allow the 
unification‘, or ‗the CSCE43 and Helsinki are against the forceful change of 
borders‘, that ‗the United Nations is now the supreme authority‘ and so forth. 
In fact, what they did was to sanction the partition and the occupation of our 
nation, as they justified their existence through phrases such as ‗Europe is 
helping us in our ‗peaceful‘ struggle‘, ‗the EU will never allow an armed 
conflict in its soil‘; they even go as far as to claim that this or that 
international organisation ‗will award the Albanians for the patience that they 
demonstrated‘ (1998:22) 
 
In his statement, Kelmendi encapsulates the ideological discontent with the manner in 
which the orientalist features have been re-introduced into the ethnonationalist 
discourse of national liberation. ‗The rejection of territorial totality of Albanian nation 
by the new political parties is conducted through the ideas of ‗democracy‘ (ibid:111), 
notes Kelmendi as he attaches the anti-patriotic connotations to the emerging 
discursive practice and its threatening, hegemonizing power. To Kelmendi, all of a 
sudden, a certain type of knowledge—and sociopolitical power that it produced—
became outdated in Kosovo. An invisible hand was at work among Kosovo 
Albanians, and it was set to reorganise and reinvent the norms of ‗acceptable‘ and 
‗unacceptable‘ behavior and thinking. The new discourse of ‗democratic‘ 
ethnonationalism was threatening the fundaments of political hierarchies that were 
produced in the decades of anti-Yugoslav clandestine organisation. Another similar 
and slightly earlier account comes from the National Movement of Kosovo (LPK): 
 
‗If we, Albanians, will not take the matter in our hands, as for the foreign 
entities (international community) our nation is already divided and 
                                                 
43 CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; the earlier acronym of the contemporary OSCE – the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
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partitioned. We must not allow for this situation to get out of control. It needs 
to be utilized so that our nation will unite and liberate itself (. . .) Therefore 
we need to organise professionally and to employ all forms, methods and 
means of combat – including the national liberation struggle. (2008 
(1993):116) 
 
My understanding of his blunt account on the manner in which the emerging 
‗democratic‘ elites are ‗justifying their existence‘ reveals the very action in which 
‗knowledge is put to work through discursive practices in specific institutional 
settings to regulate the conduct of others‘, as noted by Hall (1997:47). As an active 
witness of the period, I found such effects striking in terms of communicative 
powerfulness as I was stunned with the practical impact that they exercised on the 
structural transformation of social hierarchies and political elites. Views such 
Kelmendi‘s, calling for national unity and liberation struggle through rejection of the 
dependency on the vague definition of the ‗international community‘ were 
increasingly—indeed, abruptly—becoming isolated and outdated for they were no 
longer part of the ‗new‘ knowledge about the nation and its political cause. Let us 
recall Foucault here: 
 
‗Each society has its regime of truth, its ‗general politics‘ of truth; that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned... (1980:131) 
 
To-date, the effects of the discourse of democracy as a semantic interface—invoked 
as a means of reconciling the international ‗expectations‘ and ‗limitations‘ with the 
local ‗aspirations‘ and ‗demands‘—continue within Kosovo Albanian political 
communication practice. Much of its content and approach is still permeated by the 
discursive practices that were introduced more than two decades ago, when such 
dramatic shift of the course of action (and thinking) was applied swiftly, almost 
overnight, during the last days of the year 1989. Back then, a seemingly different 
landscape was forming on the global scene: it was the time when the ‗Spring of 
Nations‘ and the revival of nationalist politics was bringing to an end the ‗Autumn of 
the People‘ and the communist discursive paraphernalia of non-class, supra-national 
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ideas of society (Dryzek 2009; Tismaneuanu 1998). Political organisations carrying 
the ‗democratic‘ adjectives were mushrooming all around the region, impacting 
profoundly the logic of action of Albanian political elites. They set out to establish the 
independent state of Kosovo through the new strategy of action: the nonviolent 
resistance and political appeasement of the ‗international community‘.  
 
As Clark observes, even ‗without foreign support for independence, the Kosovo 
Albanians nevertheless decided to internationalise the issue‘ (2000:93)—while, at the 
same time, the process of dissemination and adoption of the new discourse of 
democracy and independence was already causing severe misunderstanding across the 
social strata. The ideological confusion and collision presented above highlights the 
radical transformation of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse and, 
subsequently, its political strategy of action. Whereas the components of 
‗international acceptance‘ remain intact, the strategy of action takes a completely 
different turn: rejection of the major principle of unification with the ‗motherland‘ 
Albania, as well as the rejection of the epic ingredient of armed struggle. Below is a 
rather blunt account on this volatile ideological departure: it is an excerpt from the 
communique issued after a meeting of the Kosovo Inter-party Council (1993), a 
makeshift surrogate of a national assembly that was gathering the representatives of 
newly-established Kosovo Albanian political parties: 
 
We, as the Council are officially abandoning the option of the unification of 
our nation—which we invoked as a possibility in the case of the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia—because the international factors are not in favor of the 
Albanian question (. . .) Our nation is unprepared for war (. . .) Nevertheless, 
through our peaceful politics we will accomplish the realisation of our 
national aspirations. (Rilindja/Bujku, 12 February 1993:3)  
 
This was an uneasy task, considering the fact that the irredentist/unionist trait of 
Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism was at least a century old, dating from the trauma 
of the Ottoman retreat at the turn of the century. One should note that the rejection of 
the ideology of unification of Kosovo with Albania has been a matter of numerous 
debates and political quarrel: Qosja (1992), Kelmendi (1998), Nushi (1992), Vinca 
(1997), Stavileci (1995) to name just a few of the texts that were consulted during this 
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research as points of reference to this ideological division. To most of them, the great 
shift of ideological paradigm was perceived as fundamental disruption of the ‗order of 
discourse‘—to paraphrase Foucault (1970)—which constituted the Kosovo Albanian 
society; such disruption/rupture would, eventually, affect the power relations inside 
the Kosovo Albanian community and the social hierarchies that were devised through 
them. The rejection of ‗unification with the motherland‘ accounted for two critical 
ideological contingencies that would confront Kosovo Albanians: 
 
 Abandonment of the ‗Motherland Albania‘ as the ideological center of 
reference 
 Construction of concept of ‗the independent state Kosovo‘ as the 
ethnopolitical/ideological principle of reference for any future political action. 
 
Abandonment of the ‘Motherland’ 
 
in the irredentist ethnonationalist discourse, perception of ‗Albania‘ connoted the 
ultimate signifier, address and goal of the struggle for secession/liberation from the 
former-Yugoslav rule. Within such teleological exercise, ‗Kosovo‘ and ‗Kosovo 
Albanian‘ entailed the notion of the ‗separated‘, ‗partitioned‘ part of ‗the center‘. The 
irredentist discourse, in this context, represented an ethnonationalist discourse of the 
periphery – the discourse of the ‗peripheral nationalism‘ (see Hechter, 2000:16)—
aimed at the ‗reunification‘ and not the acceptance of partition as a geopolitical fait 
accompli and a starting point for a new political ideology of national independence. 
This an account by Rexhep Qosja illustrates how this was at the centre of the 
discourse: 
 
We have allowed, in our attempts to internationalize the Kosovo Albanian 
cause, to reduce ourselves into being presented as merely a group of 
associations: political parties, institutions, provinces and territories; as 
‗Kosovo‘ Albanians, ‗Montenegrin‘ Albanians, ‗Macedonian‘ Albanians—
indeed, as ‗Albania‘ Albanians—but never as a one nation of 9 million 
people (1998 (1992):21) 
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Views similar to Qosja‘s were based on the idea that the damage to the territorial and 
national unity of Albanians was being inflicted through radical epistemological 
change that was conducted through a new discursive practice. As such, they could 
lead to termination of the sociocultural and sociopolitical dependence from the 
perceived ‗center‘ that was formally and historically aspired through the 
ethnonationalist discourse—the state Albania. I argue that, whether ‗real‘ or 
‗perceived‘, such dependence has been an essential ingredient in shaping the Kosovo 
Albanian national identity throughout the 20th century; the interpretation of 
‗Albania‘—language, culture, history—formed the basis of the ‗national knowledge‘ 
or the knowledge on the nation. At the heart of that knowledge was the definition of 
Albanians as a single, ‗homogenous and autochthonous‘ nation with common 
ancestry, common past, language and common political aspirations. In Kosovo, the 
chief interpreters of such national knowledge were coming from the ranks of 
academics, intellectuals and ethnonationalist political activists and dissidents who 
were placing such—often idealised—representation of ‗mother Albania‘ at the very 
core of the ethnonational ideology and discourse.  
 
‗Albania‘ represented the unquestionable teleological objective of Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalism—the very reason of its existence: any alteration of that key 
ideological signifier would inevitably cause the dillution and castigation of the entire 
body of knowledge on the ‗nation‘ and the ‗national cause‘. Subsequently, it would 
affect and alter the positions of those ‗holding power over the discourse‘. In this 
context, the great ‗discursive turn‘ from irredentism to independentism entailed a 
great, internal sociopolitical reorganisation of Kosovo Albanian society: it entailed the 
formation of new elites, of a new political leadership based on the discourse of 
democracy and on the demise of the ‗old‘, traditional that was based on the 
irredentist/separatist/peripheral ethnonationalist narrative. The discontent with such 
dramatic change is voiced clearly in Qosja (1998): 
 
We have allowed to see our new political elite that was derived after 1981
44
 
to articulate our national cause through the language of our oppressors. On 
                                                 
44 Qosja refers to the landmark events of massive anti-Yugoslav demonstrations organised by Prishtina University 
students and youth in March/April 1981 (for further reading, see Clark, 2000). 
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behalf of what principles is this taking place? On behalf of what justice?! On 
behalf of the principles and the justice that is thrown in the archives of history 
or those who appear in the international political scene? On behalf of the New 
World Order! On behalf of New Europe! (1998 (1992):20) 
 
The feeling of ressentiment—in terms of its definition employed by Greenfeld (1992, 
see discussion on Nationalism, Chapter 1)—appears clearly in Qosja‘s argument. As I 
mentioned earlier in the theoretical discussion about nationalism, such combined 
sentiment of envy/hate has been permeating the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist 
narrative in the period following the ‗sudden shift‘ of the ideological discourse, 
specifically in the years following 1990 and the establishment of the Democratic 
League of Kosovo as the institutional flagship of the discourse of democracy and 
independence. To Qosja, Kosovo Albanians performed a grand sacrifice, by 
abandoning the century-long unification aspiration as the major signifier of their 
nationalist (and, nation-building) narrative. However, now that such sacrifice is not 
being compensated—direct reference to the international community‘s rejection to 
recognise the independence of Kosovo—Qosja openly questions the worth and 
validity of the totality of western political actions in the post-communist Europe. The 
phrases ‗New World Order‘ 45 and ‗New Europe‘ are invoked as metaphors and an 
allusion to such actions which Qosja sees as insignificant and insufficient, as weighed 
against the national(ist) sacrifice; yet, above all, Qosja addresses his criticisms on the 
‗importing party‘ of the New World Order discourse—the LDK and its 
personification, Ibrahim Rugova. It is a parallel critique of both ‗orientalist‘ approach 
by the West and the ‗internalised orientalism‘ by LDK and Rugova. 
 
Construction of ‘the state Kosovo’ 
                                                 
45 ‗New World Order‘ a notion that was revived through the speech held by the former US President George Bush Sr. on 
6 March, 1991. Although the speech was focused on the US-led action against Iraq invasion of Kuwait (1991), the fact 
that it  represented the first  such multi-national military action against a political dictatorship in some decades became a 
reason for enormous optimism in societies such Kosovo Albanians—who were drawing parallels between the Iraqi 
dictator, Saddam Hussein and Serbia‘s Slobodan Milosevic. Here‘s one of the most important quote from the speech:  
‗We will succeed in the Gulf. And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring 
warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggression. The world 
can therefore seize this opportunity to fufill the long-held promise of a new world order - where 
brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.‘ (http://www.al-
bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm) 
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The notion of the ‗independent state of Kosovo‘ became the point of departure of the 
new discourse of democracy and ‗independentism‘. Through the process of 
acceptance and adoption of the perceived requirements of the ‗international 
community‘ on the limitations of geopolitical aspirations of the nations of the former 
Yugoslavia—with the rejection of redrawal of administrative borders along ethnic 
lines being at the top of the list—the new democratic elite set out to reorganise the 
teleological objective of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist ideology. An excerpt 
from an interview with Ibrahim Rugova, LDK‘s leader, illustrates such new objective 
which places the idea of an independent Kosovo at the center of the political action: 
 
(We demand) that Kosovo is recognised as an independent, neutral and 
demilitarized state under the protection of the United Nations, or NATO; it 
should become an international protectorate that would be open to both 
Albania and Serbia (. . .) Albanians in Macedonia should be defined as a 
constitutive component/nation (of the Republic of Macedonia) (. . .) 
Albanians in Montenegro should be entitled to a political and territorial 
autonomy (Rilindja/Bujku (April, 1995), in Kelmendi 1998:23) 
 
The independent state of Kosovo was to become the main signifier with the 
ethnonationalist discourse and, thus, elevated to its major teleological objective. I 
argue that the major effect of this shift was the termination of the ideological 
dependency on the projection of the ‗motherland Albania‘ and, subsequently, 
termination of the discourse of the ‗peripheral nationalism‘. The process of coupling 
some of the major ingredients of the historical ethnonationalism—the independence 
of Albania, the perception of the nation as a ‗modern‘ identity, the importance of the 
power of the international political actors—with the post-communist discourse of 
democracy and internationalization, produced the projection of ‗modern‘ Kosovo 
which could only be independent. As mentioned earlier, such a new vision of the 
future of Kosovo Albanians affected heavily the power-relations, social hierarchies 
and ideological viability of the irredentist elites in society. This new discourse was 
producing a new knowledge on the state of the society, a new approach to defining the 
national identity, as well as a new iconography of independence and a western-
modelled nation state of Kosovo. This delicate exercise has been spearheaded by the 
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Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK, whose political ideology was relying heavily on 
the intertextual relation with the historical legacy from the period of the Albanian 
National Rebirth from 1878, as noted by Ismajli (2001): 
 
The founding members of the LDK have thought hard with respect to the 
name of this political organisation. Its name—the ‗league‘— accounts for 
their aspiration to muster as many members as possible within its ranks: the 
‗league‘ was meant as a general, massive ‗movement‘ for democracy. 
However, the idea also draws its roots from the Albanian League of Prizren 
from 1878. (2001:62) 
 
According to Ismajli, the political ambition behind establishment o the LDK was to 
resemble similarities with the League of Prizren from 1878 (see chapter 6) that 
subsequently produced the National Rebirth Movement. While the Rebirth Movement 
from the 19th century concluded with the proclamation of independent state of 
Albania, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was aspiring the realisation of the 
independent state of Kosovo a century later. It is important to note that the discourse 
of ‗democratic‘, orientalist ethnonationalism that was pursued by the LDK engaged 
also in the re-interpretation of the Kosovo Albanian political history, which had to be 
re-presented in a manner that would justify and comply with its modified, 
‗independentist‘ demands. Its current political strategy was articulated through a set of 
ideological signifiers borrowed from the National Rebirth period namely ‗the 
League‘, ‗the Movement‘, ‗independence‘ as well as the ‗self-determination‘ (or self-
governance) which were highlighted as the major programmatic points from the 1878 
(see Chapter 6). More specifically it re-engaged in producing a personification of the 
new ideological iconography which would be able to produce and disseminate the 
modified ethnonationalist narrative: a modern, ‗westernised‘, political leader, found in 
Ibrahim Rugova. 
 
Ibrahim Rugova: the cult of the ‘westernised’ leader 
 
Similarly to the exercise of Albanian ‗Europeanness‘ at the turn of the 20 th century 
through Frasheri‘s pamphlet‘s, Fishta‘s epic poetry or the reconstruction of the 
Scanderbeg mythology, the new parallel state of Kosovo was to project its existence 
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deep into the historical past of the region. The notions of ‗democratic‘ self-
determination, independence and statehood were to be redefined as ancient 
ethnonational demands while the region‘s history was to be reinterpreted to 
accommodate the present political actions as the evolutive outcome of past activities. 
 
However, first and foremost, the power of the new discourse was to be amplified with 
the construction of its personification. The introduction and appointment of a new 
leader of the new strategy was considered essential and was found ‗almost by 
accident‘ (Judah 2008:72) in the personality of a low-profiled, public intellectual and 
literary critic—Ibrahim Rugova (1942-2006). As noted earlier in this chapter, by early 
1990 Rugova was appointed the chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK) and this move marked an essential momentum in the representational 
evolution of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism. It was the first time in the 
society‘s recent history that two essential political aspirations were seemingly 
converging: that of having a massive, internationally complacent political 
organisation, headed by an internationally acceptable intellectual figure. 
 
Rugova‘s image as the major signifier with the Kosovo Albanian discourse of 
democracy during the period of the ‗parallel state of Kosovo‘ bears essential 
relevance to this research. His biography of a literary critic, author and poet quickly 
earned him the necessary aura of a contemporary ethnonationalist leader. He seemed 
to make both worlds meet: his knowledge of Albanian literature and history made him 
sufficiently ‗patriotic‘, while his personal style of a ‗westernised‘ modernizer made 
him sufficiently ‗collaborative‘ to the political authorities of the international 
community. 
 
‗We have learned that nonviolence is the modern European preference‘, Clark quotes 
Rugova and his elaboration about the existence of linkage between the nonviolence 
and modernity in the minds of the younger generations of Kosovo Albanians ‗in their 
aspirations towards being contemporary Europeans‘ (Clark 2000:67). His image of a 
fragile, chain-smoking, scarf-wearing, coffee-house moderniser—and, in particular, 
his dependency on the views of the ‗international community‘ about Kosovo‘s 
position—influenced profoundly the manner in which his role as a political leader was 
seen. Moreover, it shaped the manner in which Kosovo Albanians would engage in 
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reconstructing their new, nonviolent ethnonationalism in accordance with the imagery 
of its proclaimed leader, as this image painted by Bujku indicates: 
 
‗With one step into the future and the other into the abyss – digged by our 
ancient enemies – with the legs of every Albanian who walks freely and 
thinks boldly for the return of his people‘s dignity, raising the firm demand 
that the Albanian under the foreign yoke will also voice the precious words: 
‗Kosovo, Homeland‘ – Ibrahim Rugova starts his heroic journey of 
liberation...‘ (Bujku, May 25, 1992:3) 
 
This is an excerpt from a solemn commentary about Ibrahim Rugova with a heavy 
poetic emphasis, published in ‗Bujku‘, a makeshift semi-daily (4 days a week) 
newspaper that informally succeeded the traditional 45-years running ‗Rilindja‘ that 
was prohibited in early 1990. It demonstrates an unreserved support to Rugova‘s 
‗quest‘ as it accounts for a combination of popular fears and hopes surrounding the 
unclear course of political resistance and the ever-deteriorating situation in the region. 
 
Ultimately, Rugova‘s image was that of a complete antipode to the traditional ethnic 
heroes such as the medieval Scanderbeg, or legendary rebels from the more recent 
past such Issa Boletini (detailed account of his ‗brigand‘ personality in Herbert 
(1908). I argue that precisely this anti-warrior imagery—and its persistent 
affirmation—illustrates a great deal the logic behind the ‗sudden shift‘, as defined by 
Maliqi (1995), of the ethnonationalist discourse and its internalised orientalist 
approach. His stature was the personification of the great rupture in the 
ethnonationalist discourse and its signifying practices. Now, there was a soft-spoken, 
fragile, French-speaking intellectual that was to push further the limits of the national 
cause. Inasmuch as such an image ran against the traditional ethnonationalist pattern, 
it was also looked upon as a hopeful portrayal of a new, ‗westernised‘ paradigm of the 
nation‘s political ideology. Here is an account by Judah (2008) that highlights the 
peculiarity and controverse surrounding Rugova‘s image: 
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Especially after he was elected president of Kosovo in 1992
46, Rugova‘s life 
settled down into a very strange pattern. His office was a small wooden 
bungalow close to Pristina‘s football stadium. He was driven there in a black 
presidential-style Audi, and his office issued daily communiqués about whom 
the ‗President of the Republic‘ had seen and what he had done. Ordinary 
people came to pay court and ask favors of the man they increasingly came to 
regard as the father of the nation. Oddly for a national figure, he was 
extraordinarily boring to talk to or to interview, and his lack of charisma 
made his popularity all the more unusual. (2008:72) 
 
Nevertheless, in time, Rugova‘s personality grew into that of an unquestionable 
political personality with a charisma that continues to-date, five years after his death 
in 2006. Criticised heavily by some for his ‗do-nothing politics‘ and the ‗policy of 
inaction‘ (Surroi 2006, Kelmendi 1998, Maliqi 1995), yet simultaneously praised by 
many others for placing Kosovo on the international political map, Rugova spent his 
political carrier with the label of the ‗legendary‘ President of the Republic of Kosovo 
since 1992. Whether during the ‗parallel‘ period or after the Kosovo conflict in 1999 
and subsequent international administration, he remained a widely acclaimed 
‗presidential‘ figure to the majority of Kosovo Albanians until his death in 2006. 
 
To this research, Rugova‘s personality is primarily important in terms of a discursive 
‗vessel‘ through which the reformed orientalist feature was visualised within the 
Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse. In his numerous interviews and press-
conferences conducted in the combined capacity of the nation‘s political and 
intellectual leader, Rugova gave countless accounts of his preoccupation with the 
reconstruction the Kosovo Albanian history and presentation of its origin as rigidly 
compatible with the realm of the (western) European civilisation. Himself prone to 
social constructionism and aware of the role of the myth in the ethnic identity—a 
                                                 
46 The first clandestine parliamentary (and presidential) elections for the institutions of the Independent Republic of 
Kosovo were held on May 24th, 1992 across Kosovo (Judah, 2008:72). The turnout in the voting process was immense; 
reportedly, Rugova, the only candidate for the Kosovo‘s future President, won with 98 per cent of votes. The response of 
the Serbian government to such parallel, clandestine elections organised by the Kosovo was ambiguous: they were 
tolerated but not recognised. I argue that Belgrade saw their tolerance as a means to ensure the popularity of Rugova‘s 
policy of non-violence in Kosovo, which would, in turn, maintain a peaceful situation in then-province. On the other 
hand, the 1992 elections cemented Rugova‘s personality as the President of a new country —a position that he held 
unquestionably until his death in 2006. 
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former MA student of Roland Barthes in Paris (Rugova, 1991:203, Judah 2008:72)—
he engaged in institutionalisation and political promotion of three major claims which 
he saw as essential for the ‗westernisation‘ of the Kosovo Albanian civilisational 
image: 
 
 Christian (more precisely, Catholic) legacy of Kosovo Albanians. Until his 
death, Rugova maintained a peculiar relationship with the Vatican and the 
Catholic Church. He was a frequent visitor to the Holy Chair and met with the 
Pope John Paul II on a few occasions. The topic of ‗catholicization‘ of the 
ethnonationalist narrative will be discussed at length in the next section. 
 The construction of the myth of ‗Dardania‘ as an ancient-Illyrian distinct 
province situated in the territory of Kosovo. To Rugova, this claim ought to be 
underpinned with scientific/archaeological evidence that would, in turn, enable 
the projection of the current political demands for Kosovo‘s independence—
and not unification with Albania—as a historical continuity of ancient 
aspirations; Dardania was to be introduced as the primordial culture and 
spiritual homeland of contemporary Kosovo Albanians as its direct 
descendants (see Judah, 2008). 
 Introduction and maintenance of the practice of the ‗parallel Republic of 
Kosovo‘. Rugova believed that an internationally-convincing image of Kosovo 
Albanians‘ readiness and maturity for self-governance was a matter of their 
routinized, symbolical exercise of statehood. His answer to the dilemmas 
about the practical viability of the ‗parallel state of Kosovo‘ became anecdotal: 
‗Kosovo needs only a formal recognition by the international community for it 
already exists and functions as an independent state.‘ (Maliqi 1995:56)  
 
Catholicism, signifier of ancient Europeanness? 
 
The image of ‗Christianised‘ civility of the political resistance during the Eastern 
European waves of the anti-communist ‗velvet revolution‘ left deep impression on the 
Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist elite of the 1990s. ‗The idea of a parallel system or 
a ‗shadow‘ government was deeply influenced by the notions of autonomy and self-
organisation developed among Central European intellectuals, and especially Polish 
Solidarity‘, notes the Independent International Commission on Kosovo in its 
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‗Kosovo Report‘ (2000:44). Media depictions of the ‗the moral crusade‘ of the 
Catholic Church during the 1980s for the ‗reconquest of Poland‘ in order to ‗wrench 
the country from the hands of leftists (Tismaneanu 1998:61), and the employment of 
the Catholic church clerics and religious paraphernalia during the Croatian revival of 
ethnopolitics in 1990 became the distinct images of a new, civilised and, thus, 
westernised approach to communist opposition. 
 
I argue that there are several reasons that induced the former Yugoslav secessionist 
movements (including the Kosovo Albanian nationalist elites with the LDK) to add 
the ‗catholic‘ connotation to their renewed ideological narrative. As mentioned by 
Perica (2002), the conflict in former Yugoslavia—launched in 1991 through military 
aggression of the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav army against Slovenia and Croatia—
evolved into a ‗war of the churches‘ (2002:145). Within the post-communist discourse 
of the times it was described as the war between the ‗western/European‘ 
Catholic/Protestant church (Croatia, Slovenia) and the ‗eastern/communist‘ Christian 
Orthodoxism (Serbia). The below illustrative excerpt comes from a paper by Dimitrij 
Rupelj, former Slovenian foreign minister and one of the main leaders of the anti-
Yugoslav political movement in Slovenia during 1990s: 
 
The most visible politicians in contemporary (1989) Yugoslavia are the Serb 
Slobodan Milosevic and the Slovene Milan Kucan. . .Milosevic who comes 
from the Orthodox Christian background. . .(and whom some journalists have 
called an outright fascist) believes in a strong (Serbian run) state. . .In 
Slovenia, Kucan (whom some journalists have called the Slovene 
Gorbatchov), and who comes from a Protestant background initiated a debate 
about political pluralism a year or two ago, and he even proclaimed the 
(Comunist) Party‘s secession from power (1992:10) 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter (and in Chapter 4), across the eastern European 
anti-communist and post-communist political discourses, the term ‗communism‘ has 
been equalled to the label of ‗easterness‘; in the context of the former Yugoslavia—
and, specifically, in the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse—the communist 
‗easterness‘ was swiftly replaced with the ‗easterness‘ of the Serbian Christian 
Orthodoxy which was during the 1990s was being introduced as the new, post-
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communist ideological backbone of the Serbian ethnonationalism (for further reading, 
see Gavrilovic et al, 2009) 
On the other hand, Kosovo Albanians were accused by Serbia for their assumed 
Islamic ‗fundamentalism‘, due to their predominant Muslim background—which, in 
turn, they saw as an obstruction in their attempts for ‗westernisation‘ and 
‗Europeanization‘. The following observation by Perica (2006) provides a brief 
chronology about such religious divide during the last years of the former Yugoslavia, 
which was, I argue, later on developed along the binary opposition logic of 
Orthodox/East and Catholic/West: 
 
The Kosovo crisis (. . .) widened the rift between the Serbian Orthodox 
Church and the other two major Yugoslav religious institutions. Both the 
Islamic Community and the Catholic Church came under the Serbian barrage. 
The orthodox clergy, Belgrade media, and Serb scholars argued that Islamic 
fundamentalism was the driving force of Albanian separatism (. . .) The 
Kosovo crisis also affected Catholic–Orthodox relations negatively. The 
Croatian church press, Radio Vatican, and some Catholic churchmen 
expressed support for the 1981 Kosovo movement and backed the Albanian 
quest for greater autonomy in Kosovo. In 1982 Vatican Radio broadcast a 
series of programs in the Albanian and Croatian languages supportive of the 
Albanian struggle against the Serbs. (Perica, 2006:145-6) 
 
The Democratic League of Kosovo and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, demonstrated 
great zeal in the efforts to reconstruct the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse 
along the Catholic religious traits introduced and represented as the civilisational 
legacy of the place. In the early stages of the affirmation of the orientalist features of 
the discourse of democracy, the promotion of the Vatican as a global political center 
of power and the personality of the Pope John Paul II as the ‗crusader of democracy‘ 
were considered as an effective countering exercise to the rising Christian-Orthodox 
ethnoreligious mobilisation in Serbia under Milosevic‘s dictatorship. I argue that such 
ideological ‗catholicisation‘ was considered by Rugova and the LDK as a discursive 
exercise of othering the Kosovo Albanian society from Yugoslavia‘s ‗eastern‘ legacy 
of communism. Here, an observation by Clark holds relevance in describing the 
prevailing mood among the new Kosovo Albanian political elite from the era: 
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In 1990, some Kosovo Albanian Muslims even discussed the idea of a 
collective conversion to Catholicism as a demonstration of their Western 
orientation. They rejected the suggestion as opportunistic, but repeatedly the 
movement rallied around Catholic symbols, above all Mother Theresa 
(herself an Albanian), observing Catholic holy days and attending Catholic 
ceremonies, forming a Christian Democratic Party (with a majority 
membership of Muslims) – a demonstration that they were not the Muslim 
fundamentalists portrayed in Serbian ‗hatespeak‘ (2000:66). 
 
In her observation on such ideological deliberations of the Albanian political elites 
from the 1990s, Todorova points out the ‗naiveté and straightforwardness of new 
Albanian political discourse that had not yet mastered the ennobling façade of the 
pluralist vocabulary‘ (2002:46). However, there seems to have been a ‗sound political 
instinct‘ in place: the emerging ‗westernised‘ politicians—including Rugova—were 
doing ‗what others before him had practiced: externalising undesired qualities on 
some imputed Balkanness‘ (ibid). Although, as noted ironically by Bakic-Hayden 
(1992) ‗the association of Roman Catholicism with industriousness and economic 
development might have surprised Max Weber‘ (ibid:11), the views about 
Catholicism as the central narrative of ‗Europeaness‘ appeared not only inside the 
former Yugoslavia, but also in the international press. Bakic-Hayden cites a New 
York Times article47 that referred to the political dispute in Yugoslavia in the 
following maner: 
 
(Slovenes represent) an industrious Roman Catholic Slavs whose culture was 
shaped by centuries spent under Austrian rule and to whom southern 
Yugoslavia where the religion is either Muslim or Eastern Orthodox, is a 
foreign country—strange and threatening. (1992:10) 
 
In the new landscape of the ‗democratising‘ societies of the former Yugoslavia, no 
one wanted to be seen as ‗eastern‘. More specifically, in the context of the New York 
Times article, association with Islam or ‗Eastern Orthodox‘ was becoming highly 
unpopular  for aspiring republics of slovenia and Croatia. And, as the Serbs were 
                                                 
47 New York T imes, 6 April 1990, A8. 
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comfortable within their re-emerging ethno-religious narrative, the Kosovo Albanian 
political elites with the LDK believed that the new political momentum could enable 
them to apply profound changes on their assumed external image of ‗Muslim‘, i.e. 
eastern, image. The simple binary logic at work that was underpinning such nesting 
orientalist trait among the Kosovo Albanian political elite was based on the perception 
that ‗Christianity‘—specifically, Roman Catholicism—equals to ‗the West‘ while 
‗Islam‘ and the Christian Orthodoxy equal to ‗the East‘, a perception enforced further 
by views such Samuel Huntington‘s theories about the ‗clash of civilisations‘ and the 
new, cultural divisions (as opposed to ideological) in the aftermath of the Cold War 
and the collapse of the communist ‗Iron Curtain‘: 
 
The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological 
division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between 
Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, 
on the other, has reemerged (Huntington, 1993:35) 
 
I argue that this logic describes the core of an internalised-orientalist pattern of 
representation that I will describe as the ‗aspirational model‘. Intentionally simplistic, 
it illustrates the discursive strategy of action by Kosovo Albanians that was aimed at 
the practical deployment of ‗westernising‘ signifiers within a simplified orientalist-
ethnonationalist ideological scheme (Catholicism => west => democracy). Below is 
an illustration of what I call ‗the aspirational model‘ which defines the simplified 
logic within the Kosovo Albanian orientalist ethnonationalist narrative, driven by the 
binary opposition mode of elucidation: 
 
Aspirational model48: 
 
If: Christianity => Catholicism => the West  
If: The West => Democracy 
Then: (Kosovo Albanian) Catholic imagery => Democracy 
Then: Discourse of Democracy => Western acceptance 
Therefore: (Kosovo Albanian) Catholic imagery + Discourse 
of Democracy => Western acceptance 
 
                                                 
48 The sign ‗=>‗ is intended to mean the causal/logical implication; i.e.  ‗implies‘  
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I argue that the effects of such ‗aspirational‘ discursive strategy, introduced by 
Rugova and the LDK, were two-fold: 
 
 Such strategy induced the discursive reformation of the ethnonationalist 
ideology by attaching to the notion of ‗the West‘ the visible and concrete 
signifyer of the catholic religion. Such a definition was a representational 
novelty in itself as it enabled a necessary simplification of Kosovo Albanians‘ 
understanding of ‗the West‘ as a political entity with a clearly delineated 
ideological/cultural/religious agenda. 
 It reduced the speculative, facultative definitions of ‗the West‘ by a largely 
politically illiterate population of Kosovo Albanians in terms of practical 
comprehension of emerging signifiers such ‗international community‘, 
‗advanced democracies‘, etc. The discursive ‗catholicisation‘ of ‗the West‘ 
would reduce the endless debates on what the notion of the West ‗really‘ 
represents; also, such finite definition would assist in discursive re-orientation 
of the ethnonationalist strategy of action which, from then on, should be 
introduced as a catholic-compatible ideological set. 
 
On the other hand, such odd importation of the feature of Catholicism within the 
Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist system of representation would not go unnoticed 
by the Serbian counterparts. Its ethnoreligious exponents such as Milorad Ekmecic 
considered such representations in Croatia—but, also in Kosovo-–as outbursts of 
‗Catholic nationalism‘ which he believed to stand for the ‗Serbs‘ worst enemy in the 
history‘ (in Popov, 1993:89). Amfilohije Radovic, a Serbian Orthodox metropolitan 
was also quoted as saying that ‗the lightning and thunder of the Catholic and 
Protestant West and the Ismaelite Islamic Middle East clash over the Serbian people‘ 
(ibid:89-90). Moreover, Bowman (2005) notes that according to Slobodan Milosevic, 
then-Serbia‘s president, Kosovo Albanian political resistance was exposing itself as 
the ‗Vatican-Comintern conspiracy‘ which he presented as a linkage between ‗the 
communist state (which had ‗stolen‘ the Serbian homeland of Kosovo from Serbia) 
with the Catholic Church (which was said to have sponsored the Ustasha)‘ (in 
Panizza, 2005:136) 
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I understand the introduction of the ‗aspirational‘ model and its representational 
strategy as an attempt by Rugova to challenge and oppose the ‗Balkanist‘ approaches 
to defining the nature and identities of the nations of the former Yugoslavia within the 
pejorative generalisation of ‗the Balkan people‘ (Todorova 2002:38-45). Such 
discursive strategy is in line with the attempts aimed at the ‗essentialisation of 
religious differences‘ which were, eventually, considered as necessary steps towards 
‗internalisation of the cultural code of politically correct liberalism‘ (ibid:152). 
Therefore, such an ‗aspirational model‘ of the ‗western-compatible‘ representation of 
the nation supposed to confront another, diametrically opposed system that I call ‗the 
stereotypical model‘: 
 
Stereotypical model: 
 
If: Islam/Muslim => East 
If: Albanians = Muslim/Islam 
Then: Albanians => Eastern 
 
If: Christian Orthodox => East 
If: Serbs => Christian Orthodox 
Then: Serbs => Eastern 
 
The ‗stereotypical model‘ clearly envisages the representational inseparability of 
Albanians and Serbs as it categorises them within the generalized interpretation of the 
Balkans as ultimately ‗East‘. Such constructions rely heavily on the ‗balkanist‘ system 
of representation discussed in the earlier chapters of this research. And, in line with 
the technologies of the discursive construction of ‗historical‘ and ‗civilisational‘ 
differences as the process of differentiation with the ‗immediate other‘, I argue that 
the confrontation between the two models illustrates the logic of application of the 
‗nesting orientalism‘ (Bakic-Hayden 1995:917-931) by the Kosovo Albanian political 
elites. In short, it represents the process of establishing differences with ‗the Balkans‘ 
which could, in turn, highlight the similarities with ‗the Europe‘. The stronger the 
differences with the rivalling ‗neighborhood‘, the greater the likelihood of 
international acceptance or rejection. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a similar logic gave birth to the discursive strategy of 
‗orientalisation‘ of the imminent ethnopolitical rival during the conflicts in the former 
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Yugoslavia. In the context of the discursive technologies that were employed in the 
transformative process of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism, its political elites 
set out to project the validity of such claims as part of the nation‘s civilisational 
legacy. I argue that such a process was conducted in line with the Kolakowski‘s 
observation on the reconstruction of the ‗collective memory‘ by the ‗young nations‘ 
through the ‗invention of ad-hoc artificial relations to the past without the existence of 
the real, verifiable connections‘ (quoted in Wodak, DeCillia et al 1999:25). To 
Rugova and the political leadership of the LDK, such historical revisions were 
essential in the process of ideological justification and ‗scientific‘ institutionalization 
of its strategy of action. This is where the concept of ‗Dardania‘ as a distinct, ancient, 
geographical location of the primordial Kosovars/Albanians enters the discourse as an 
additional signifier. 
 
Described as the prehistoric state of the Dardans—allegedly an ancient tribe of the 
Illyrian civilisation—their existence and contemporary affirmation would assist in 
reconstructing a major claim on the historical roots that led to the great ideological 
shift from irredentist to the independentist model. Moreover, such claim would have 
an added value due to the prevalent assumption that ‗the Dardans‘ were among the 
first populations of the region to embrace the Christian/Catholic religion. A relevant 
account comes from Tim Judah (2008): 
 
(Rugova) toyed with the idea of renaming Kosovo ‗Dardania,‘ after the 
ancient Illyrian tribe supposed to have lived in Kosovo in antiquity. Hence 
while the official flag of the president of Kosovo has at its center 
Skanderbeg‘s double-headed eagle it also has the name Dardania emblazoned 
across it (...) As far as partisans of Dardania are concerned this theory has an 
added historical cum political advantage. They argue that the ancient 
Dardanians were the ancestors of the Albanians but more important in this 
context, Roman Catholics. Thus, they argue, Albanians were historically part 
of Western civilisation and their churches were usurped and turned into 
Orthodox ones by the invading Slavs, who were not. (2008:31) 
 
In the period of the LDK and Rugova, a large number of Kosovo Albanian Catholic 
clerics rose to become personalities of high political importance with the Kosovo 
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Albanian movement of nonviolent resistance. Alongside, a vast number of 
publications was disseminated and followed with the organising of conferences and 
round-tables in which the Catholic legacy of Albanians was widely discussed and 
reconstructed. The subsequent visit to Albania by the Pope John Paul II in April 1993 
was followed with unprecedented attention by the Kosovo Albanian media and its 
political elite. The excerpt below from an interview of Dom Lush Gjergji (1991), a 
Kosovo Albanian Catholic bishop, on the occassion, accounts for a clear attempt to 
‗perennialise‘ both ethnic (Albanian) belonging as well as its assumed catholic 
ancientness: 
 
Q: Can you tell us about the Christian tradition among Albanians? 
A: A letter sent by the Saint Paul to the Church community of Rome in 320 
a.d. wrote: ‗From the Jerusalem to Illyria I have been spreading the Gospel of 
Christ‘. This explains that Christianity has been among Albanians since the 
early days of its revelation‘ (quoted in Bujku, 6 July, 1991. 
 
The linkage between the catholic religion/church and the process of 
‗democratisation‘—i.e. westernisation—has been voiced with similar fervour in the 
Republic of Albania during the early 1990s. Sali Berisha, the key exponent of 
Albania‘s new anti-communist political leadership portrayed the Pope John Paul II as 
‗the Pope of the East‘, who in Berisha‘s views connoted ‗the Pope of martyrism, of 
resistance and human suffering‘ (Rilindja Demokratike, 10 April, 1993)‘. I find 
Berisha‘s ‗eastern‘ analogy as particularly important in terms of the revelation of the 
tendency of contextualizing the cultural/religious division: in his formulation the 
‗Catholic west‘ was the subject of oppression by the ‗East‘. That analogy, uttered as 
part of the solemn speech in the massive rally, held in Tirana on the occassion of the 
Pope‘s visit, accounts for a logic which appeared rather common in the Balkan 
political discourses of the time. It is about the strategy of constructing the existence of 
‗oppressed‘ parts of the ‗west‘ in the ‗east‘; more precisely, the projection of 
existence of historically—indeed, perennially—‗western‘ societies which were 
enduring the ‗eastern‘ oppression. As noted by Todorova, ‗with exception to the 
Turks . . . all other Balkan nations have renounced what they perceive as East and 
think of themselves as, if incompletely Western, certainly not Eastern‘ (2002 
(1997):58). According to this logic, Berisha constructs the Pope as the representative 
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of the eastern-terrorised ‗west‘—thus establishing a clear analogy with Albanians, 
their perennial ‗westernness‘ and their undoubtedly rich historical portfolio of 
‗eastern‘ sufferings. 
 
Berisha‘s formulation is relevant for it broadens the definition of the ethnic/political 
victimhood into a cultural/civilisational category. This is where Berisha‘s claim 
converges with Rugova‘s emphasis on the catholicisation of the nationalist legacy. 
They both appear to share a common belief that such exercise could enhance further 
the projection of ‗the Albanian victim‘ in the Balkans: this time, it would no longer be 
about an eastern ethnicity (Albanians) suffering from the eastern hegemony 
(Serbs/communism). On the contrary, the aim of such orientalist exercise was to 
present the Albanian/Serbian conflict as an indiscriminate terror conducted against a 
western ethnicity (Albanians) by an eastern hegemony (Serbian/communist). 
According to this logic, once formulated in this context, the state-sponsored terror 
upon Kosovo Albanians would be explained through the prism of civilisational 
conquest and brutality: the west should rise in defence of Albanians as its next-of-kin 
rather than extending its support because of the apathetic universalist principles which 
would never compel it to undertake any concrete intervention. 
 
Here, it is important to note that the discourse of democracy through the imposition of 
distinct orientalist feature in the 1990s was shared by Albanian elites from both sides 
of the border, in Kosovo and Albania proper. In fact, the timing of the popular 
upheaval for change coincided on both sides albeit with diametrically opposed effects: 
while the overthrowing of Hoxha‘s regime in Albania (1990) put an end to the harsh 
dictatorship, Kosovo was sinking into a dangerous period of confrontation with the 
Serbian regime and the threat of the ‗spill-over‘ effect of war raging in the region. 
Yet, to Albanian societies on both sides of the border, the affirmation of ‗Christian 
values‘ was perceived as an acceleration of their ‗Europeanness‘ and, thus, the 
acceleration of their political legitimation by the western authorities. I find the 
analysis of such public communication practices from this period particularly 
interesting due to the fact that their promotion was taking place in a society that was 
resting on the cultural heritage of the half-a-millennium long Ottoman presence. 
Moreover, I argue that such orientalist exercise by the new elites that brought about 
the ideological shift of ethnonationalist paradigm received a wide support by the 
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majority of Muslim Albanians, particularly during the early days of its conception. An 
ironic observation by Malcolm (1998) appears useful to describe such, rather bizzare, 
manifestation of collective self-orientalisation: 
 
Indeed, so untroubled are the Kosovars by religious politics that no one there 
thinks it strange to have a ‗Christian Democrat‘ party in which the 
overwhelming majority of the members are Muslims. (1998:351) 
 
To-date, the photograph of Ibrahim Rugova meeting the Pope John Paul II remains as 
the main artefact at the former headquarters-turned-museum of the LDK in Kosovo‘s 
capital, Prishtina. That photograph (image 7.1), taken during his first visit to the 
Vatican in 1992 became among the most widely used posters and – to paraphrase 
Barthes – visual ‗myths‘ of Kosovo‘s ‗Europeanised‘ ethnonationalism: its 
dissemination in the form of cards, newspaper posters, conference placards and party 
gatherings made it into a graphic trade-mark of the new social practice. 
 
 
Image 7.1. Ibrahim Rugova with the Pope John II, on a visit in the Vatican during 1990s. This photo in a 
larger-size version continues to hang in the premises of the former LDK headquarters in Prishtina.  
 
Nevertheless, at this point I will have to disagree with the Malcolm‘s observation 
(1998:351-2) on Albanians‘ ‗untroubledness‘ with the ‗religious politics‘. I argue that, 
quite the contrary, Kosovo Albanians‘ premeditated self-orientalisation of the 
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ethnonationalist discourse informs a great deal about their critical interest and active 
engagement in the religious politics. In fact, both Rugova‘s personal investment in its 
catholicisation coupled with the—by any means, odd—feature of Muslim (Kosovo) 
Albanians‘ membership with Demochristian Party of Kosovo (the key local ally to 
Rugova‘s LDK throughout the 1990s), or the local Mother Theresa Charity, speak 
clearly about the strategic employment of the religious politics. The only difference 
here lies with the transformation of the historical phenomenon of their abandoning or 
downplaying of the Islamic legacy, as discussed in chapter 6. While the component of 
downplaying the religious belonging during the National Rebirth Movement of 1880s 
involved an ‗equalised‘ castigation of all religious doctrines in favor of the newly-
founded idea of nation, Rugova‘s period of ‗catholic preference‘ over the existing 
prevalent Islamic cultural legacy—or even secularist, for that matter—represents a 
quite different momentum, which I understand as an outright act of religious politics. 
 
What else could it be, considering that we deal here with social practices of deliberate 
adherence of individuals and groups within organisations (deliberately) carrying 
religious insignia and ideological imagery. Further I argue that such practices 
represented premeditated acts aimed to produce certain representational effects, 
namely the collective zeal for ‗westernisation‘. I argue that Malcolm‘s conclusion 
about Kosovo Albanians‘ ‗untroubledness‘ itself confirms the already achieved 
ideological effect of such practices. His external depiction of Kosovo Albanians as a 
population ‗untroubled‘ with the religious belonging and politics has been the very 
aim behind such symbolics of the orientalist ethnonationalist strategy. Yet, I argue, it 
is about the manipulative manner of engagement in the ‗religious politics‘—rather 
than an untroubleness—that was guiding Kosovo Albanians to such, seemingly out of 
the ordinary, acts. 
 
Therefore, I think it was essential to analyse more carefully the aspects of 
‗intertextuality‘ which are often employed during the historical juxtaposing of 
ideological features of a given Balkans ethnicity, for it is very likely that 
representations of Kosovo Albanian contemporary ethnonationalist discursive practice 
along Malcolm‘s lines carry their roots from past accounts such those of Durham 
(1905), Herbert (1912) or even Frasheri‘s pamphlet and Wassa Effendi‘s supra-
religious poetry. However, as noted earlier, the feature of downplaying the religious 
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background introduced at the outset of the 20th century represents a different 
phenomenon than the Rugova‘s and LDK‘s ‗catholicisation‘ tendency. Going beyond 
the existing religious landscape is one thing, but the downplaying of one and 
affirmation of the other is a completely different thing. ‗Albanianism‘ as ‗the religion 
of Albanians‘ (Wasa Effendi 1912) or the Kosovo Albanian religious ‗fluidity‘ as a 
daily routine (Dujizings, 1995) should not be equalised with the programmatic 
principles deriving from Rugova‘s period. Neither should the latter be confused as a 
repetition, a display of the continuity of the former. 
 
Rather, I argue that the religious politics should be seen as a major component of the 
orientalist feature of Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse. It represented a 
deliberate manipulative practice perceived as a social practice that would trigger the 
acceleration of the international/western legitimation and its subsequent intervention 
in the local political conflict. In reality, the period following Rugova‘s demise and the 
solution of the Kosovo conflict through the international military intervention 
confirms the ultimate ineffectiveness of such symbolic exercises. Moderate Islam 
remains the predominant religious trait among Kosovo Albanians to-date, and there 
are no reports about any event of religious conversion. The idea of ‗christianisation‘ 
of the ethnonationalist ideology was dropped a few years after—together with the 
practice of nonviolent resistance and the ‗parallel state‘—as Kosovo was brought to 
the point of launching an armed struggle against the Serbian security forces by the late 
1998. 
 
Academia and the ‘scientification’ of Europeaness  
 
In the period concerning this research the rediscovery of the Christian-European 
origine has been a major focus of the Kosovo Albanian academic circles. During the 
1990s, a vast number of Prishtina University teachers, members of the Kosovo 
Academia of Sciences and Arts, authors, writers and scholars from all profiles have 
offered their contribution to the construction of the new, ‗European‘, Kosovo. Below, 
I will focus on the analysis of a number of selected publications that employ these 
references to the ‗scientific‘ and historical ‗truths‘ in the marketing strategy of the 
Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse of democracy: 
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 The excerpts from a four-days academic conference ‘Europe and Albanians: 
Past and the Present’ (translation of the Albanian original is ‗Europe and 
Albanians: Yesterday and Today‘), held between 24-27 May, 1991. 
Presentations and discussions with the event were, at the time, regularly 
published in the local Albanian daily ‗Bujku‘. 
 Fragments from a compilation of presentations and essays on the state of the 
Kosovo Albanian political strategy and programme, ‘National Cause and 
Critical Awareness’ published in 1998 by members of the then-Forum of 
Albanian Intellectualls (time span of the writings encompasses the period 
1991-1998). 
 Analysis of major highlights from a pseudo-
historical/anthropological/linguistic textbook ‘The Albanians–a Divided 
Nation’, a compilation of analysis and discussion by three authors: Giuseppe 
Catapano (Italy), Nermin Vlora-Falaschi (Italy) and Skender Rizaj (Kosovo), 
published in 1996. 
 
These publications have been selectd for two reasons: first, in a condensed format, 
they encapsulate a large number of then-major Kosovo Albanian scholars and experts 
in the fields of Albanian culture, literature and history; second, the period of their 
publishing made them into influential texts as they exercised a substantial influence in 
the context of a ‗scientific‘ underpinning of the new discursive practice on Kosovo 
Albanians‘ ‗Europeanness‘. 
 
Here, the discussion about the scientific accuracy of such presentations is not the 
object of this study; rather, it is the logic that guided their semantic construction, the 
historical context of their articulation and the manner of their publication that 
represent components that I find essential for the nature of this research. Moreover, I 
argue that—whereas they inform about the logic that assisted in the reconstruction of 
the key postulates of the contemporary Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalism—such 
texts have also assisted in the processes of epistemological ‗disciplining‘ of public 
criticism, as well as in the ‗normalisation‘ of the public validity of its postulates. I 
argue that this Foucauldian process of establishing a separate, specific ‗regime of 
truth‘—perceived as a means to confronting similar exercises coming from a 
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repressive (Serbian) hegemony—has had a critical effect on the manner in which, to-
date, Kosovo Albanians continue to project their historical and political existence. 
 
Europe and Albanians: From Frasheri to Qosja 
 
The first relevant gathering of Kosovo Albanian academic circles that was aimed at 
providing a ‗scientific‘ contribution to the major claims of the new ethnonationalist 
discourse and political movement from the early 1990s took place in May 1991. It 
was organised under the title of ‗Scientific Symposium: Albanians and Europe – Past 
and Present‘ by the Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Institute for Albanian 
Studies (otherwise known as The Albanological Institute) and then-existing Albanian 
Cultural Association ‗Migjeni‘ with its seat in Lubjana, Slovenia. 
 
Each of the organising institutions carried a specific weight and intellectual authority 
in the context of Kosovo Albanian political thought of the time: Kosovo Academy of 
Sciences and Arts represented the supreme scholarly body of Kosovo; the Institute for 
Albanian Studies was the workplace of the new political leader, Ibrahim Rugova, and 
the charismatic ideologist Rexhep Qosja, a widely acclaimed public intellectual, 
author and literary critic of the era. Finally, the Albanian Cultural Association 
‗Migjeni‘ from Lubljana, Slovenia played an important role in the early days of the 
political movements (1989-1990) through the publication and dissemination of a 
monthly magazine ‗The Albanian Alternative‘. 
 
The academic symposium was given special attention with in the then only Albanian 
newpaper, ‗Bujku‘ and went on for two days under the headlines ‗Life at the Edge of 
the Two Worlds‘ and ‗the Albanian Cause is Wider than the Status of Kosovo‘ (May 
24-25, 1991). The event was introduced with a voluminous opening speech by Qosja 
who set the ideological tone of the symposium and highlighted the major postulates of 
its public message: 
 
Although it was geography that linked the Albanian nation with the Europe, it 
was the Turkish conquests in the 15
th
 century that compelled it to secede from 
its realm. The Ottoman Empire built a wall between Albanians and Europe, 
primarily through the Islamic ideology as its state ideology. The Turkish yoke 
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damaged severely the natural development of the Albanian nation – it caused 
the destruction of the ties that were linking it with the Europe. (Qosja quoted 
in Bujku, 24 April, 1991:10-14) 
 
To Qosja and the rest of the speakers the symposium was seen as an appropriate point 
of departure for highlighting the conceptual ‗intertextuality‘ of the ideological text as 
a ‗tissue of quotations‘ (Barthes in Allen, 2000) designed to resemble heavily the 
major principles stemming from the Albanian Rebirth Movement from 1870s. In fact, 
the majority of presentations at the event were calibrated to re-invoke and reiterate the 
historical continuity of (a) the national liberation struggle, and (b) the national plight 
and victimhood. I argue that the importance of reconstruction of such historical 
continuity reinforces the validation of the definition of national victimhood which, in 
turn, creates a political and legal base of historical injustice done to Kosovo and 
Albanians. The following quote provides a common depiction of such a historical 
continuity: 
 
Never in their history did the Albanians accept their forced partition from 
Europe. They have proved this through their continuous struggle and 
rebellions since the times of the glorious leadership of Scanderbeg. The 
Movement of Albanian National Rebirth reveals its leaders‘ inspiration with 
the national ideology and with the philosophical ideas of the great French 
Revolution. (ibid) 
 
Whereas the discursive continuity of the national struggle is stated as necessary for 
the institutionalisation of the collective victimhood as a historical constant, the 
linkage of ‗national ideology‘ with the ‗philosophical ideas‘ of the ‗great‘ French 
Revolution represents an effort to attach it the distinct ‗European‘ connotations within 
the realm of Enlightenment. Albanian inspiration with it is presented as a testimony of 
that historical linkage. Finally, the contextualisation of the position of the 
ethnonational political strategy of the moment is presented as follows: 
 
The Communist ideology which is also of a foreign extract deepened further 
the distance between Albanians and Europe. To them (Albanians), this 
ideology is projected and understood as an anti-western ideology. As a state 
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ideology (of Yugoslavia and Albania) the communist ideology brought 
Albanians at a stage that does not represent their natural development. (ibid)  
 
Qosja creates a clear analogy between the ‗easterness‘—or, at least, anti-
westernness—of the Ottoman Empire and the Communist ideology. In his 
presentation, they are ‗of Asian extract‘, ‗based on domination‘ and ‗restriction of 
freedoms‘. According to him, communism-–employed here as a parallel to 
Ottomanism—was unwanted, imposed and fought against on both sides of the 
Albanian border. It is important to observe that the notion of ‗foreign extract‘ 
specifies the exercise of orientalist othering at work as it assists in the process of 
identifying and locating ‗the east‘ and ‗the west‘. To Qosja and his colleagues from 
the Kosovo Academy of Sciences, Albanians are not Eastern: they represent an 
ancient western nation that fell prey to the Eastern hegemonies that ranged from the 
Ottoman conquests, to Communism and, presently, the Serbian Christian-Orthodox 
ethnoreligious nationalism. Their ethnic ancientness accounts for their 
‗Europeanness‘, therefore ‗westernness‘. Finally, the conclusion of Qosja‘s 
presentation follows with the discursive construction of the future and its ‗ideology of 
democracy‘: 
 
The revival of the ideology of democracy within the Albanian nation comes 
with the retreat of the Communist ideology. The principles of this ideology 
pave the way to a historical process inspired by the freedom-loving ideals: the 
ideal of the life in freedom and democracy across the Albanian lands; here, in 
Kosovo, it represents the ideal of national independence. (ibid) 
 
In short, Qosja manages to encapsulate here all the major components of the great 
ideological shift of paradigm within the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse: 
according to him, it‘s about ‗the ideology of democracy‘ which is undergoing its 
‗revival‘ (i.e. it existed before and is not a novelty) with the ‗retreat of the communist 
ideology.‘ This formulation entails its previous existence among Albanians—at least, 
the previous existence of conditions that would have enabled it, if the communist 
hegemony wouldn‘t have happened. Nevertheless, to Qosja, democracy is now being 
re-introduced and revived across the Albanian societies and—while based on the 
‗ideal of the life in freedom‘—the various shapes of its manifestation across the 
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Albanian ethnic body should be considered natural. He devises a multi-functional 
definition of democracy in attempts to justify the irredentist/independentist 
paradigmatic shift: to the state of Albania, democracy is about the ‗life in freedom‘; to 
Kosovo, it‘s really about ‗the national independence‘. The invention of ‗democratic‘ 
tradition—to paraphrase here Hobsbawm (1983)—as the historical legacy of Albanian 
struggle for liberation appears a common trait among the Kosovo academics and 
historians. Similarly, the following quote of Stavileci (1993) from an excerpt from a 
communiqué/paper presented at the roundtable titled ‗Albanians Today‘ accounts for 
a direct attempt to ‗traditionalize‘ and invent the present aspiration towards 
‗democracy‘: 
 
Although descendants of a democratic tradition of the National Rebirth, 
Albanians failed to preserve and cultivate it sufficiently. The enlighted 
tradition of our Rebirth forefathers—who were so democratic and tolerant 
that they could be easily defined among the classics (of democracy?—my 
remark)—could not be cultivated due to a set of internal and external 
circumstances (Bujku, 25 May, 1993:12) 
 
Let us return to Qosja‘s presentation: I find it of particular importance because the act 
of its articulation formalised all the major components of the reformed, future 
ethnonationalist discourse. Moreover, the logic, the style of its construction and the 
historical moment of its presentation-–at the sunset of the communist regime---
produced powerful analogies with Sami Bey Frasheri‘s pamphlet ‗What Will Become 
of Albania?‘. This ideological intertextuality with Frasheri—a patriotic resemblance 
of Kosovo academia with Stavileci‘s paper on ‗Rebirth forefathers‘ of Albanian 
nation—has been a recurrent feature in texts of Kosovo Albanian academics and 
public intellectuals for decades. Therefore, not only the bare meaning of statements 
and utterances in Qosja‘s presentation, but the very moment of their performance 
carries a ‗historical and social significance‘ (Bakhtin/Medvedev (1978:120) in Allen 
2000:17), as it enables the respective audiences to construct a historical and 
conceptual fusion with its ethnonational ideological text. To Kosovo academia of the 
time it marked the point of departure of the new (Kosovo) movement of national 
rebirth. The present state of the nation carried all the ingredients and necessary 
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conditions for such parallelism: a hegemony (Ottoman/Communist) was at its 
deathbed and the nation‘s future was submerged in fears from the unknown. 
 
FISH: Intellectuals, the self-evident democrats 
 
The establishment of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals (Forumi i Intelektualeve 
Shqiptarë – FISH) in May 1992 marks an attempt to institutionalise the mobilising 
enthusiasm of the local academia for contributing to the Kosovo Albanian political 
movement of the 1990s. Founded by university teachers, historians and literary critics 
gathered around its intellectual leader, Rexhep Qosja, the FISH membership saw itself 
as the academic base for ideological interpretations of the current state of the political 
resistance and its strategy of action. Although its practical political influence in 
Kosovo‘s political arena was modest throughout the period of its existence, the 
ideological logic that guided its operation appears relevant to this research. In this 
context, due to the limited space, I will focus on describing and analysing a few 
exerpts from its ‗Programme‘—a compilation of definitions of the national grievances 
and projected principles of the strategy of action—because of its specific, candid 
belief about the historical and enlightening role of intellectuals in political struggle. 
 
FISH members ‗aim to focus on their creative, intellectual potential on the general 
national, political, economic, social, cultural and spiritual emancipation.‘ 
(Programme, FISH 1998:7). I argue that such tendency of sacralization of the 
category of the ‗intellectual‘ stems directly from the National Rebirth Movement 
which itself represents the Albanian ocurrence/variation of Enlightement/Illuminism 
(as referred to in Qosja‘s presentation with the ‗ideals of the French Revolution‘). In 
this context the FISH programme draws heavily on the conviction about the historical 
necessity of the ‗revival‘ of ethnonationalist Illuminism through contemporary 
revisions of its strategy of action. Here are few opening statements from the 
Programme: 
 
The Albanian nation today is confronted with two major historical 
challenges: the unresolved national issue and the historical aim for 
comprehensive integration in western civilisation. Its historical destiny 
depends on the resolution of these two national strategic questions. (1998:9) 
 271 
 
The orientalist feature here is blunt and unquestionable: the national salvation and the 
western integration are to be seen as indivisible from one another: one cannot happen 
without the other. Moreover, they represent a one single thing. In this view, the 
resolution of the national question equals to the integration in the western civilisation. 
It is statements such as this that I consider essential in the process of application and 
concretisation of the Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist discourse of democracy 
during the 1990s. The logic of producing the inextricable link between the historical 
legacy of Albanian ethnonationalism and the ‗historical aim‘ of western integration 
comprises the basis of the communication practices that evolved in the period of the 
nonviolent resistance. 
 
The section in the Programme titled ‗The Modern Civilisation‘ reiterates the 
‗historical aim‘ of Albanian nation for ‗comprehensive integration with the western 
civilisation, to which it belongs geographically, historically and spiritually (1998:8)‘. 
Again, the bluntness of equalizing the ‗western‘ with ‗modern‘ reveals the trait of 
intellectual unquestionability of the validity of claims. A more careful reading of these 
passages accounts for an interesting—yet, familiar—confusion. On the one hand, 
Albanians aspire ‗comprehensive integration in the western civilisation‘ while on the 
other, they belong to it ‗geographically, historically and spiritually‘. This would, 
indeed, sound slightly confusing to an uninformed reader; however, I argue that such 
semantic dichotomy is premeditated and goes along the lines of the logic about a 
‗western nation under eastern domination‘, as discussed earlier. Remarkably, such 
seemingly paradoxical statements are almost identical to those in Sami Frasheri‘s 
pamphlet from 1899, about ‗perennial‘ Europeannes of Albanians and the anxiety of 
not being accepted as Europeans.49 The feature of intertextuality here appears quite 
striking, as it accounts for similar—if not, identical—challenges to Kosovo/Albanians 
in the context of European/western rejection. 
 
One can easily note the painstaking tactics of formulation at work—for, the political 
message at stake must encapsulate the essence of ‗liminal‘ (see particularly Bjelic 
2002, Fleming 2002) existence in/of the Balkans. I find this as an exemplary 
                                                 
49 See the chapter 6: Albanian Orientalist  Ethnonationalism: The National Rebirth  (1870-1930) 
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illustration of the hidden syntax of ‗Balkanism‘ as it adheres to the understanding of 
its societal being as dwelling in a state of civilisational ‗inbetweenness‘ and 
uncertainty. I argue that, to-date, such feature remains one of the major utterances 
with the Kosovo Albanian (and Balkan) ethnonationalist discourse which performance 
at a certain historical moment accounts for a domestication of a ‗heteroglotic‘ or a 
‗double-voiced discourse‘ (Bakhtin, in Allen 2000:22) in the process of defining its 
social being. Indeed, there is a certain communicative strategy at work here which I 
argue to have been induced by internalisation of external perceptions about oneself 
(‗We are what They say we are‘). On the one hand, such communicative strategising 
is aimed at producing the impression of a civilisational ‗complementarity‘—
‘Albanians belong to the western civilisation‘—while on the other, it admits that the 
ultimate verification of such complementarity depends on an unstable, dynamic 
category and political action: the ‗comprehensive integration with the western 
civilisation‘. 
 
Finally, the very name of the association deserves analysis: The Forum of Albanian 
Intellectuals. The employment of the ‗intellectual‘ as a noun with distinct meaning—
almost ideologically engaged—accounts for romantic/illuminist attitudes of its 
members. I argue that in Albanian political communication practice—as in most of 
the former Yugoslavia and/or Eastern European societies throughout the 20th 
century—the notion of the ‗intellectual‘ had the overlapping meaning with that of 
‗dissident‘ accompanied with an allusion to an underlying anti-establishment attitude. 
More commonly, in time it acquired the connotation of a ‗westernised liberal‘ 
(Tismaneanu 1998:4) and as such became a signifier of specific ideological potency. 
In the context of Kosovo Albanian political discourse, the history of the evolution—or 
politicisation—of its meaning appears indivisible from the ethnopolitical effect that 
was produced through the founding of Albanian educational institutions. Here, it is 
important to note an observation by Kostoviceva (2005) that, historically, ‗the 
struggle for Albanian education has been a struggle for Albanian national identity‘ 
(2005:29). Therefore, the usage of the ‗intellectual‘ in the Kosovo Albanian political 
discourse of the 1990s encapsulates a range of ideologically-charged meanings: that 
of a westernised, liberal, educated, illuminist, patriotic and a qualified interpreter of 
the ‗national cause‘ narrative. I argue that the latter is specifically important, for as 
noted by Vaclav Havel, author, former Czech president and celebrated anti-
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communist dissident: ‗politics and intellectuals can be linked, but the responsibility 
for the ideas, even when advocated for by the politician, remains with the intellectual‘ 
(in Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997:13). I adhere to the view that such a definition 
reflects a great deal the logic employed by the FISH members whose usage of the 
word signifies, in an almost self-evident manner, their belief in their role as the 
patriotic elite of the nation carrying the burden of ideological responsibility. 
 
From Etruscans to Europeans 
 
Finally, the last piece of analysis in this chapter is reserved for a publication with – to 
put it mildly – a rather estranged content described as a ‗monograph‘ of historical, 
ethnographical and anthropological works of three authors: Giuseppe Catapano and 
Nermin Vlora-Falaschi from Italy, and Dr. Skender Rizaj from Kosovo. The 
compilation bears the title ‗Albanians – a Divided Nation‘ and was published in 1996 
by a local branch of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals. Whereas the publication 
contains the versions in English and Italian, there is hardly any note of personal or 
professional biography of the authors: Dr. Skender Rizaj was a professor of history 
with the University of Prishtina while Giuseppe Catapano and Nermin Vlora-Falaschi 
are stated as ‗Albanian writers and scholars from Italy‘. However, the latter‘s family 
origin accounts for an added value in the context of ethnonationalist discursive 
paraphernalia: Nermin Vlora-Falaschi is highlighted as the last surviving relative, the 
niece of Ismail Kemal Bey (Alb. Ismail Qemali) the founder of the Independent 
Albania (1912, see Chapter 6) and therefore a personality of essential importance to 
the ethnopolitical symbolics. Although the publication has been, over time, 
downgraded to the level of ‗obsolete theories‘ of ‗delightful ingenuity‘ (Malcolm, in 
Schwandner-Sievers & Fischer 2002:70-87) its content at the time of its publication 
was a matter of a wide public acclaim and academic discussion in Kosovo and 
Albania. 
 
In short, the publication focuses on the exercise of demonstrating the ultimate 
ancientness and, therefore, invaluable sociocultural worth of the Albanian origine and 
culture. Whereas its radical pseudo-scientific approach may account for some severe 
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academic profanity, it by no means represented an exception in the region.50 As in the 
earlier analysis, the historical/scientific accuracy of its content is not the object of this 
research. Rather, I engage in understanding the logic behind the technology of its 
formulation within the context of intensified revival and reproduction of alike 
ethnopolitical myths across the former Yugoslav societies of the period. Below, I will 
start with an excerpt from the introductory chapter which, among others, sets the tone 
and informs about the rest of its content: 
 
The study of the (Arberesh)
51
 scholar Giuseppe Catapano confirms that the 
Albanian language is the mother of all the languages: it is the language of 
prophets since the times of Adam (derived from ‗ad‘ or ‗at‘ which in 
Albanian means ‗father‘ and ‗am‘ or ‗amë‘ which means ‗mother‘) – and all 
the way to the Jesus. According to this internationally acclaimed author, all 
other languages in existence represent the direct descendants of the ancient 
Albanian language (1996: 24). 
 
In short, the compilation in the ‗monograph‘ revolves around three basic theories 
whose discussion is underpinned by an abundance of historical ‗evidence‘ and 
‗scientific‘ verification: 
 
 Albanians are the most ancient race on Earth; 
 Albanians are the ‗primordial‘ Europeans; 
 Western civilisation is a mere legacy of Albanian language and culture. 
 
The abundance of theories and ‗findings‘ that underpin these claims—formulated as 
the monograph‘s axiomatic pillars—are listed in the form of an endless presentation 
of ancient hieroglyphs, alphabets and deciphering exercises. Albanians are 
rediscovered as descendants of ‗Pelasgians‘—an alleged ancient civilisation stated as 
precursory to the Hellenic culture (1996:72-79)—who, in turn, gave birth to an 
equally ancient and somewhat mysterious ‗Etruscan‘ culture. Quotations from ancient 
                                                 
50 For an exhaustive analysis and comprehensive account on the ethnonationalist  m ythologies in the former Yugoslavia 
(Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia), see Gavrilovic, Despotovic, Perica: Mitovi Nacionalizma i Demokratija, 2009.  
51 Arberesh – Albanian name denoting a member of ethnic Albanian community in the southern Italy (regions in and 
around Calabria). 
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historiographers such Herodotus, Seneca, Titus Livius—followed by a range of 
‗internationally acclaimed‘ scholars such as Von Hahn, A.V. Pearson, I. Benlow, 
Norbert Jokl—are listed and referred to at a tireless rate. References to their works 
and essays are invoked as irrefutable pieces of a larger historical discovery poised to 
confirm a single goal—the ancient Albanian ‗Europeanness‘. 
 
I would argue that the true inventive zeal of the compilation lies elsewhere. The 
directness of its claims and discursive rigidity is aimed at accomplishing a yet more 
ambitious goal: that of introducing a new epistemological system that would render 
useless the very necessity of applying the nesting orientalist approach as the 
representational weapon in the regional competition on the issue of ‗who is the real 
European?‘ Through ‗scientific‘ proclamation of Albanians as the unquestionable 
center of the civilised universe, their participation in such orientalist olympics would 
no longer be necessary—for they ‗are‘ Europe. Here is another illustration: 
 
Etruscan words can be found in Basque language, in Hebrew and other 
languages (...) Philistines, another expanding Illyrian tribe, after stopping in 
the Island of Crete, finally settled in the land of Cannan which was called 
Palestine after them (...) In fact, looking at the map of Israel there can be 
spotted names with a meaning in Albanian. (1996:102) 
 
The logic of the ideological build-up of the content of the publication appears to have 
a well-premeditated pace: it is introduced through a combination of detailed 
etymological comparisons and anthropological ‗findings‘. Subsequently, once the 
issue of ‗Europeanness‘ and cultural/political legitimation is resolved by the ‗western‘ 
contributors (Catapano and Vlora-Falaschi) through meticulous employment of a 
colorful spectrum of profanities, the stage is set for the introduction of a more 
calibrated approach to the ever-popular Balkan narrative of emphasizing the ‗self-
sacrificing‘, historical duty of the ‗defence of Europe‘ from ‗the eastern hordes of 
panslavism‘, by the ‗ancient Albanian nation‘ (Rizaj 1994:180-8). 
 
The Kosovo contributor to the publication, Prishtina University historian, Dr. Skender 
Rizaj, takes on a more contemporary issue—that of the Serbian political threat to the 
Albanian national existence—with his work titled ‗The Degeneration of the 
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Pelasgian-Illyrian-Albanian Philosophy or Panslavism–the Key Factor of Albanian 
Self-Assimilation‘ (1996:182). Meant as an ultimate blow to the current political 
domination of the Serbian state over Kosovo, Rizaj‘s contribution represents a 
combination of a pseudo-factography and an ideological pamphlet in which an almost 
catechist-modelled listing of repudiating statements about the ‗other‘ are a frequent 
occurrence. Here, Rizaj focuses on his understanding of ‗pan-slavism,‘ a term coined 
during the 19th century anti-Ottoman uprisals by Slavic ethnic communities, 
specifically Serbs and Macedonians (see Perica, 2002). He classifies the pan-slavism 
as a hegemonic, hostile pan-national organisation of ‗eastern‘ derivation, and goes on 
to illustrate its destructive tendencies towards Albanians, as well as the rest of the 
‗Europe and the world‘: 
 
Panslavism is the annihilation of Muslim and Catholic Albanians, of 
Bosnians and Muslim Turks – as well as Catholic Croats 
Panslavism is the Asiatization of Europe and the world 
Panslavism is an opium to the people 
Panslavism is primitivism and barbarism 
Panslavism is hegemony, dictatorship and despotism 
Panslavism is slavization of non-Slav peoples 
Panslavism is the falsification of history 
Panslavism is demagogy, intrigue, hypocrisy, egoism, defamation, lie, 
amorality and carreerism 
Panslavism is about penetration of Russia to the Egean Sea, Mediterranean 
and Adriatic 
Panslavism is usurpation of Albanian historical personalities 
Panslavism is usurpation of Albanian churches and monasteries 
Panslavism is conquest and plundering of the territories and wealth of others 
(1994:186-7) 
 
This type of construction of the relation between the Serbian state-sponsored 
oppression and the historical projections of premeditated, ‗pan-slavist‘ invasion from 
‗the East‘ towards the western world is a very common feature in the Kosovo 
Albanian ethnonationalist discourse during the 1990s. As in Rizaj‘s colorful 
illustration, the pan-slavist threat was regularly attributed to states and societies that 
were ‗historically‘ opposed to Albanians‘ statehood and independence—specifically, 
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the alliance between Russia and Serbia. In Rizaj‘s context, the ‗pan-slavism‘ 
represents a direct reference to the threat that is emanated through assumed 
Serbian/Russian expansionist tendencies against the Albanians, the Balkans and the 
‗west‘. Here, the ‗panslavism‘ is employed as a powerful and negative signifier in the 
discourse with the aim of depicting the ultimate threat to the national existence, a 
label for the perceived, premeditated strategy of annihilation of Albanian nation—and 
should therefore serve as a mobilisatory wake-up call for all-national resistance and 
struggle.  
 
To illustrate the variety of usage of ‗the Slav‘ as the ultimate projection of national 
enemy, I will provide here an excerpt from a political essay by Kelmendi titled ‗The 
Annihilation of the Albanian Nation in former Yugoslavia, the Aim of the Slav 
Occupiers‘: 
 
The Annihilation of Albanians and the Serbization of areas inhabited by this 
ancient nation has been part of pan-slavism since their settlement in the 
Balkans. They came to this area from the east, the Carpatian Mountains of the 
present Russia (. . .) As organised barbarians that they were, they 
immediately set out to expand their territories on the expense of Albanian 
lands who began their withdrawal to the southeast of the Peninsula. (1998:60) 
 
Indeed, similar accounts of senseless exercises of civilisational othering and 
demonization of the imminent political rival appear frequently across the region 
during the 1990s. Studies such those by Gavrilovic et al (2009), Perica (2002) 
produced an extensive compilation of the radical ethnonationalist myths of the 
Balkans with the specific focus on Serbian features. My argument here is that, other 
than aimed at cultural elimination and moral humiliation of the imminent regional 
ethnic rival, such constructions, by all means ‗delightfully ingenious‘ practices of 
nesting orientalism, uncover a trait of severe and generalized ressentiment with the 
surrounding world—namely with the cultural and political rejections by the ‗west‘ 
and Europe. They demonstrate the perception of the self (the nation) as undergoing a 
state of deep civilisational subjugation in relation to dominant, western‘ narratives of 
modernity and rationality which ‗disciplining and normalising‘ capacity—to 
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paraphrase Foucault—is seen as a discriminatory act against minor ethnic cultures for 
it reduces them into a sum of worthless periphery of civilised societies. 
 
I argue that the overpowering feeling of imposed political powerlessness, social 
helplessness, cultural worthlessness—indeed, a bitter ressentiment as defined by 
Greenfeld (1992)—assisted in the constitution of such rejective, sarcastic traits of 
ultimate othering and stigmatisation of ethnic rivals. In the context of the 
ethnonationalist/ethnoreligious discourses in the former Yugoslav conflicts such 
depictions have often assisted in escalation of brutalities and the practices of ethnic 
cleansing making the ‗mythical discreditation of the enemy an integral component of 
media war‘ (Despotovic et al 2009:26). 
 
Ultimately, going back to the Kosovo Albanian discursive landscape in the 1990s, I 
argue that such ‗mythic style of thinking‘ (Malcolm 2002) had the role of acceleration 
and escalation of the disseminating capacity of the ethnonationalist discourse. The 
abundance and bluntness of such claims were aimed at eliding the difference ‗between 
the ancestral past and the present‘ where the role of etymology is reduced to a mere 
tool for implying ‗the eternal present‘ (2002:79). 
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Conclusions 
 
‗Nationalism is in this sense like a class,‘ Terry Eagelton (1990) paraphrases a 
character from a novel in his discussion about nationalism. ‗To have it, and to feel it, 
is the only way to end it. If you fail to claim it, or give it up too soon, you will merely 
be cheated, by other classes and other nations‘ (ibid:23). 
 
Today, Albanians from both sides of the Kosovo/Albania border live in recognised 
states which bear the imprints of their political ideology of nationalism. The year 
2012 marks the first centennial of the state of Albania (1912) and the Republic of 
Kosovo is four years old. The narrative about the nation, distinct national identity, 
Albanian language and ethnic autochthonousness was the discursive engine that 
produced, shaped and constituted their knowledge about the congruence between the 
concepts of ethnicity, nation and state. In the formal Albanian ethnonationalist 
narrative, the nation retained the position of a genuine religion of Albanians. It 
became their supreme identity signifier, entrenching a range of conditions which 
induced the sense of belonging, collective understanding, familiarity and nearness. It 
produced the feelings of unquestionable ethnic brotherhood, cultural sameness, 
victimised past and a common political ideology. 
 
Today, on both sides of the border, Albanians cherish the myth about themselves as 
the forgotten Europeans, the ancient members—even, the very co-founders—of the 
‗western civilisation‘; its defenders and disciples. In the contemporary, modern 
(western) sense of the term, the Albanian ethnonationalism remains distant and 
exclusionist to the concepts of supra-ethnic, civic nationalism that constitutes the 
nation states of the western-European civilisation. Its particularist, ethnic variant 
struggles with the acceptance and adoption of notions of multi-ethnicity and multi-
culturalism—the major requirements of contemporary western-European political 
discourse. On the other hand, as shown through the chronological analysis of its 
narrative in this research, its ideological core—as exclusionist as it may seem—has 
been coined through a long exercise of internalisation of principles and norms of 
nationhood that were emanated by the western sociopolitical and sociocultural 
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narratives. The ‗talking about the nation‘ among Albanians has been triggered and 
codified through adoption—often, through mere simulation—of the projected western 
discourse about it. 
 
In simpler terms, at the core of Kosovo/Albanian nationalism lies the feature of 
‗westernisation‘ as a narrative behind its very construction, its driving idea. Through 
the adoption of the concept of the ‗nation‘, the Albanian elites from the 1870s 
National Rebirth Movement believed that they could produce a normative 
complementarity in terms of a westward-looking, ‗modern‘ social contract that would 
bind together their society. It was a process of importation and—often—simulation of 
formal application of such norms which in the Albanian micro-cosm produced 
illustrative societal demarcations between the ‗regressive‘ ‗a‘la Turca‘ and the 
‗progressive‘ ‗a‘la Franca‘ (i.e. the ‗Turkish way‘ and ‗The French way‘). The 
‗nation‘ became just another word for ‗modernisation‘ while the latter became just 
another term for ‗westernisation‘. Over time, a nationalist came to mean a social 
‗moderniser‘—a vestige of the western civilisation touched by the epistemological 
flames of the Enlightenment. 
 
In general, the discourse about the nation enabled an endless playground for historical 
constructions about its origin and history. The great thing about the nation was that, to 
paraphrase Anthony Smith (1981), it could be projected as both ancient and modern—
as ‗perennial‘. Its ancientness provided for ethnic dignity, historical continuity and 
cultural tradition; its modern resonance produced a sentiment of attachment—even, 
participation—with the idealised western sociopolitical and sociocultural 
developments. To-date, the tale about the nation has the capacity to unite all social 
strata: from those who hold on to the past fearing the future, to those who disregard 
the past in their obsession with the ‗modern‘ future. Thus, the meaning of the nation 
differs accordingly in the eyes of the nationalist beholder: it remains an open-ended 
project, able to mirror one‘s already established preconceptions about belonging, 
origin, purpose and worth. Above all, in the context of this research, the discourse 
about the nation appears essential against the immediate vicinity: it constituted one‘s 
ethnocultural difference, authenticity and uniqueness as opposed to the immediate 
neighbor. It became a way to demonstrating one‘s assumed ethnically inherent 
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‗westernness‘ and thus expose other‘s assumed inherent ‗anti-westernness‘, or 
simply—‗easterness‘. 
 
Hence, I feel obliged to reiterate what the idea of ‗nation‘ was not, whether in the case 
of Kosovo/Albanians and/or the rest of the former Yugoslav societies: until now at 
least, it was never about a civic, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural construction. The 
demise of the formally supra-ethnic federation of Yugoslavia through armed 
aggressions and ethnic wars remains a testimony to the inability of its ethnonationalist 
narratives to project the idea of the nation beyond the confines of ethnic kinship. 
Moreover, in practice, their axiomatic claims about nation‘s ‗organic‘ association with 
‗the West‘ hardly went beyond a mere political rhetoric, invoked solely for the 
purposes of pursuing local feuds based on inter-ethnic delineations and racial 
othering. Yugoslavia failed to produce ‗Yugoslavs‘ and, as the ensuing wars have 
demonstrated, the nationalist rhetoric of its ethnic comunities became reduced into a 
bizzare practice of denigrating the ethnic ‗other‘ in the name of the ‗western‘ and 
‗European‘ ideals. 
 
What then—if anything—was lost in this process of importation and internalisation of 
the assumed ‗western‘ principles of nationhood and democracy ? What and how made 
possible such coexistence between the exclusionist, ethnic—even, ethnoreligious—
nationalisms and the projected ‗western‘ norms of democracy, inclusion and multi-
ethnicity? What sort of narrative could manage to introduce, reconcile and maintain 
such seemingly diametrically opposed social concepts? 
 
In the period of writing of this research, in the confined context of Kosovo Albanian 
sociopolitical reality, such ideological dichotomy continued to persistently raise a 
question: can they sustain and develop a multi-ethnic state and a multi-cultural society 
which—as paradoxically as it may sound—has been constituted through distinct, 
exclusionist, ethnonationalist discourse? Can such narrative, historically built on 
traumas of territorial partition, on  fears from competing neighborhood, internal 
religious diversity and idealisation of ‗the West‘, be capable of drawing a difference 
between the ethnic nation, citizenship and the institution of the state as a poly-ethnic, 
political construction? 
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In this research I argue that the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist discourse accounts 
for a selective adoption and internalisation of the western discursive practices about 
the nation, statehood, democracy and independence. And, indeed, it has been this 
‗selective‘ part that triggered the idea behind the launch of this painstakingly 
ambitious study. Risking to sound essentialist and foundationalist, I admit that it was 
this personal impression—or, rather, a personal apprehension—about the possibility 
that something was persistently being ‗lost‘ in that process of translation and 
internalisation, that drove me to analyse the ways and means through which certain 
knowledges are projected, transformed, exported and imported. And, as an aspiring 
discourse analyst, in time I became more and more gripped with the question as to 
‗why‘ and ‗how‘ rather than ‗if‘ that loss in epistemological translation occurred and 
recurred across the turmoiled 20th century Balkans of subsiding empires, succeeding 
nation-states, advent of Communism and the ‗new‘ order of pluralist, democratic 
societies. 
 
Certainly, there is no licence on the ways and means how a knowledge or a 
representational system will be adopted, interpreted, internalised and naturalised by an 
individual or a society at large. One can hardly insist on the ‗right‘ and the ‗adequate‘ 
manner in which a certain social condition, such as ‗nationhood‘, ‗democracy‘ or 
‗independence‘ is to be comprehended and deployed within a society‘s discursive and 
social practices. In this respect—and, in the context of Kosovo/Albanian 
ethnonationalist narrative—the dilemma as to whether Albanians have ‗adequately‘ 
understood the ‗normative‘ implications of such conditions appears virtually 
pointless. In the research, I argue that it is within the liminal ‗epistemic field‘ of such 
discrepancy—found between the normative expectations (i.e. how things ‗ought‘ to 
be) and the factual exertion (i.e. how things actually ‗are‘)—that one should attempt 
to detect and study the logic of discursive technologies that produced the current, by 
all means dichotomous, state of sociopolitical and sociocultural affairs within the 
Kosovo/Albanian societies. 
 
Again, risking the danger of generalisation, I adhere to the view that Albanians do not 
differ substantially in their ‗normatively distorted‘ discourse about nation and state 
from their immediate, competing neighborhood. Similarly with the most of the south-
western Balkans nations, Kosovo Albanians live within an ‗ethnocentric democracy‘, 
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predominantly articulated and constituted through ethnonationalist discourse, while 
formally reiterating political and cultural adherence to the European/western standards 
of a modern and democratic society. To-date, such formal, collective, longing ‗to go 
to Europe‘, in Todorova‘s (1997) terms, remains paradoxically coupled with pursuing 
of ethnic politics which runs parallely (and, against) with their ‗historically‘ aspired 
‗Europeanness‘. And, it is here that Mocnik‘s (2002) theory about ‗horizontal 
antagonisms‘ (with the neighborhood) and ‗vertical cooperation‘ (with the idealised 
Europe/west) comes to light in its entire ambiguity. As the research highlights, the 
exercise of internalisation of a system of knowledge is almost regularly 
‗contaminated‘ with the local ethnocultural heritage and the sociopolitical objectives 
of the ‗internalising‘ society. I argue that, in the context of Kosovo/Albanian exercise 
of ‗internalised orientalism‘, this process represented a slightly more pragmatic and 
utilitarian process than it would initally appear to the eye of a scholar on post-colonial 
studies, immersed into detecting the influences and consequences of western political, 
cultural and moral hegemony onto the smaller and weaker societies under its realm. I 
argue that it was the pragmatic logic of societies deemed ‗peripheral‘—Huntington‘s 
(1993) ‗frontier guardians‘—with a track record of preservation of their ethnocultural 
traits during centuries of foreign rules. It is a dichotomous logic of communities with 
a developed proficiency to reproducing and maintaining parallel dicursive practices—
that of external ‗normative‘ formality (towards the supreme, imperial rule), and that of 
local ethnic rivalry (towards the immediate other). Ultimately, it is about a discursive 
ability to produce and emanate such ‗double-talk‘ conducted on parallel 
communicative levels where, dependently on the level, the same object of discussion 
is constituted and articulated differently: a discourse about one‘s external acceptance 
aspired through one‘s renunciation of resemblance with locality. 
 
The chronology of its Albanian variation —whether in Kosovo and/or Albania 
proper—accounts not so much about the mere existence of such external/internal 
dichotomy: much more, it accouns for the ‗reconciliatory‘ and ‗naturalising‘ capacity 
of that discourse, able to structure such dichotomy within the local definition of 
communicative ‗normality‘. The orientalist ethnonationalist discourse makes both the 
formal/external ‗Europeaness‘ and the internal /ethnic exclusionism cohabitate side-
by-side—for over a century now. I argue that such inherent discursive dualism speaks 
about the cultural and political specifities to which the region—Albanians included—
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has been exposed throughout its difficult history. It is a discourse that speaks about 
the local feuds, collective anxieties toward the external unknown and the common 
distrust about the preservation of one‘s ethnocultural identity under the realm of a 
larger—imperial or neo-colonial, if you wish—imposed sameness and uniformity. 
Ultimately, it speaks about perpetually conflicting sentiments of the so-called 
‗rational‘, ‗modern‘ need for inter-ethnic and inter-national association, and the 
‗irrational‘ entrenchment within the persisting local canons of ethnonational, 
exclusionist micro-cosm. 
 
In many ways, such inherently dualist (orientalist) ethnonationalist discourse accounts 
for Bjelic‘s (2002) sociocultural definition of the Balkans as a ‗liminal‘ place, as a 
condition of in-betweenness which, be that the case, creates its own sense of 
‗centrality‘. I argue that such centrality and ‗authenticity‘ has been acquired through 
the endemic tradition of non-belonging and the discursive flirting with external, 
structural systems of knowledge. In this respect, the Balkan orientalist 
ethnonationalisms—including the Kosovo/Albanian variation—account for a social 
mosaique of Foucault‘s ‗subjugated knowledges‘ which find their way to articulation 
through the adoption of such discursive parallelism. Local ethnic histories and 
national mythologies of the Balkans may not mean more than a discursive circus to a 
western outsider, but they continue to reproduce and maintain the local/regional 
systems of representation, social hierarchies and political norms that preside over 
one‘s individual and national/ethnic worthiness—or worthlessness. 
 
The competitive manner in which Albanians continue to discursively construct their 
‗Europeanness‘ adds further flames to their assertive and particularist discourse about 
the nation‘s cultural uniqueness and political significance. While there is no licence 
over the ways in which one will construct and internalise one‘s idea about ‗Europe‘ 
and ‗the West‘, I argue that, nonetheless, there seems to exist a broadly defined 
common denominator of what it represents in the local ethnonationalist narratives. It 
stands for a cultural and political imperative, the idealised final destination in a 
nation‘s long journey to safety and welfare—away from a tumultuous existence and 
participation in the history of regional slaughter and local tragedies. The research 
reveals that the orientalist ethnonationalist discourse was utilised as a means to 
prevent the possibility for conceiving of this imagined ‗road to Europe‘ as an 
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endeavor shared by all—in this particular case, by all of the former Yugoslav 
ethnicities. According to such narrative, ‗the Europe‘—more specifically, the 
European Union—was only possible through denying it to the immediate other; in the 
orientalist ethnonationalist discourse ‗Europe‘ has been conceived and defined as 
internally inclusive and externally exclusive, an elite club open only to the chosen. 
Therefore, the rite of passage to ‗Europe‘ was both simple and brutal: one‘s 
‗Europeanness‘ is to be demonstrated through ‗de-Europeanising‘ the other. 
 
Even today, the EU narratives about federalism and ‗enlargement criteria‘ continue to 
stimulate and reproduce Bakic-Hayden‘s (1992) competing, ‗nesting‘ orientalist 
discourses across the region—thus perpetualising the entrenchment of its societies 
within the mutual feuds aimed at hindering each-other‘s prospects for EU candidacy 
and membership. To-date, the narratives of ‗Eurocentrism‘ continue to construct the 
Balkans as the Europe‘s ‗internal‘ other (Petrovic, 2011) and, thus, to reproduce its 
‗easterness‘—the same ‗primitive‘ and alien ‗East‘, the memories of which continue 
to vividly shape the Balkans ethnonationalist narratives. The research shows that, 
dependently on the historical period, in the eyes of the west, the ‗face of the East‘ in 
the Balkans has been evolving accordingly: from that personifying the ailing Ottoman 
Empire to that of the Communist regime and, ultimately, to the savagery of ethnic 
cleansing and mass-graves. On the other hand, internally, in the recent and tragic post-
communist history, the demonised ‗East‘ is still projected in the form of assumed 
local ‗remnants‘ of the Ottoman, the Communists, and, ultimately, the ethnoreligious 
chauvinists from the 1990s. To-date, the projection of such ideological posterity of the 
Balkans ‗eastern evil‘ continues to remain the focus of its competing ethnonationalist 
narratives which have, for over a century now, grown specialized to regularly detect it 
in the eyes of their immediate ‗other‘. 
 
In this respect, most of the contemporary violence in the region—particularly during 
the last, so-called ‗Yugoslav wars‘—has been pursued on the grounds of adoption of 
‗Europeanness‘ that was, simultaneously, denied to the immediate ‗other‘. Albanians 
do not make an exception here: in the Balkans micro-cosm, the projections of western 
‗progressiveness‘ opposing the eastern ‗primitiveness‘ have constituted the simplified 
ideological signifiers that constructed and shaped the ways in which a particular 
ethnicity would be defined, referred to and—dealt with. Conflicts were fuelled and 
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maintained through projections of the other as an obstacle on one‘s road ‗to Europe‘ 
and western recognition. To paraphrase Bakic-Hayden, nobody in the Balkans desires 
to be seen as ‗eastern‘, for only the immediate ‗other‘ is to bear the ‗eastern‘ imprint. 
In the research, I argue that such exercise of detection and exposure of imprints of 
‗easterness‘ in the immediate other comprises another significant feature of the 20th 
century ethnonationalist discourse in the Balkans. The research reveals the discursive 
technologies through which the common ‗eastern‘ enemy from the outset of the 20th 
century—‗the Turk‘—has been transmutated within the local ethnonationalist 
narratives, poised to detect and identify ‗the Turk‘s posterity‘ among the succeeding 
ethnic nations and states. The ‗Asian hurdles‘ of ‗Muslim fundamentalists‘ or the 
‗Slavo-Carpatian hurdles‘ of ‗pan-Russian Orthodoxy‘ (see Gavrilovic et al, 2009) 
represent only a few of the commonly used pejorative signifiers from the recent 
history of the former Yugoslav conflicts, illustrating the profound ethnocultural hatred 
towards the immediate ‗other‘. Such discursive war on ‗easterness‘ has been waged 
both between and within the Balkans societies: the local orientalist ethnonationalism 
has been pursuing the ‗internal‘ eastern ‗other‘with the equal zeal with which it 
maintained the societal fears about the ‗eastern‘ other from the immediate vicinity. 
 
However, there is a certain feature that made the Kosovo/Albanian orientalist 
ethnonationalism differ significantly with that of the rest of the immediate 
neighborhood: it was not strictly ethnoreligious. In fact, as discussed in this research 
(see specifically chapters 6 and 7), it projected religious affiliation as an obstacle in its 
attempts to produce a coherent ideology of national unity. Moreover, the emphasis of 
the religious component—specifically, the dominant presence of Islam among 
Albanians—has been systematically constructed as the nation‘s major obstacle to 
demonstrating its aspirations towards ‗progress‘ and ‗modernisation‘ thought to 
embed the driving ideas of ‗Europeanness‘. I argue that although, formally, the 
religious belonging in general has been viewed as an impediment to the unity of the 
nation, a closer analysis of the ethnonationalist discourse reveals that it was 
specifically directed against the dominant presence of Islam—constructed as the least 
popular, alien and ‗eastern‘ legacy of the Ottoman conquests—and, to a much lesser 
degree, the Greek Orthodox. Enter the ‗catholicisation‘ of the Kosovo Albanian 
political resistance discourse by the end of the 20th century (1990s), the birth of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the discursive influences by then-Eastern 
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European anti-Communist movements. Briefly, during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
the discursive linkage between ‗the West‘ and ‗Christianity‘ in the Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalist discourse became reduced into equating the Holy Chair/the Pope and 
the sociopolitical definition of ‗western Europe‘. It is at this point that I began to 
realise the degree to which the self-orientalising discourse was able to transmutate and 
naturalise the ‗Muslim/East‘ and the ‗Christian(Catholic)/West‘ binary opposition 
through ideological intertextuality during the process of re-interpreting the narratives 
from the National Rebirth period in the context of the 1990s Kosovo Albanian anti-
Yugoslav/Serbian political resistance. 
 
In this respect, I have often asked myself whether Albanians have been blessed or 
condemned to a formally secularist—at moments, even religiously ‗manipulative‘—
ethnonationalist discourse. I can only imagine that, a hundred years ago, a similar 
dilemma was battling the minds of their founding fathers from the National Rebirth 
Period, compelling them to devise the amorphous ‗Albanianism‘ as the religion of all 
Albanians. One could argue that the legacy of the intra-Albanian religious diversity—
or, of what Duijizings (1999) rightly defines as the feature of ‗religious fluidity‘—
compelled the elites from the National Rebirth period to search for an authentic 
concept of social contract: a unique ideological fabric which would produce, define 
and keep the Albanians together. Indeed, since then the discourse about ‗Albanianism‘ 
persevered as an ideological construct about a nation of ancient ‗Europeanness‘ which 
is older—and beyond—any contemporary religion. It was devised to serve as an 
umbrella to every kind of Albanian: Ottoman Muslim, Roman Catholic or Greek 
Orthodox. The tale about the nation represented the epistemological ‗glue‘ that kept 
the community together through overruning and castigating its internal religious 
differences. It unfolded as a revolutionary and authoritarian novelty, based on the idea 
of ‗progress‘ and ‗modernisation‘—the dignifiers of the idealised vision of ‗the West‘. 
 
As such, the Kosovo/Albanian ethnonationalist narrative was in stark contrast with the 
rest of competing counterparts from the immediate vicinity, where the congruency 
between the ethnic and religious belonging represented the foremost nation-building 
principle. Nowadays, similarly to the early days of 19th century nation-building 
exercises, it is virtually impossible to be an ethnic Serb and not be a Christian 
Orthodox; it is impossible to be a Croat and not be a Roman Catholic; it goes without 
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saying that to be a Bosnian Muslim—or, a ‗Bosniac‘—requires one‘s affiliation with 
Islam. Again, it is almost impossible to be a Slovene and a Christian Orthodox; one 
can call himself a ‗Macedonian‘ but the term would only signify a mere citizenship 
until one does not admit his/her mother-tongue which will, in turn, make him a 
Macedonian ‗Orthodox Slav‘, Macedonian ‗Muslim Albanian‘, Macedonian ‗Turk‘ or 
‗Roma‘. Ethnic codification and classification along the lines of religious belonging 
represented the defining features of the majority of the Balkans ethnonationalist 
narratives during the key periods of the fall of the Ottoman and the fall of 
Communism—except for the Albanians. In both cases, I argue, it was about the 
resurrection of the ‗subjugated‘ ethnoreligious knowledges in the light of departing 
order of domination—whether in the form of the imperial Ottoman Islam or the 
Communist secularism streaming from the doctrine of ‗class-struggle‘. 
Correspondingly, in the ensuing ethnonational upheavals the religious flags were 
regularly waving alongside ethnic/national ones. Moreover, in both processes, the 
religious clergy was as much part of the ideological and political struggle as were the 
proclaimed national warriors and political leaders. 
 
But what about Albanians, both in Albania and in Kosovo? How did their supra-
religious ethnonationalist narrative manage to produce a common sociocultural and 
sociopolitical project that would provide for all-national unity and homogeneity? The 
history of the region shows that, at least during the first round of the Balkan Wars 
(1912-1913)—it certainly did not. The long list of unresolved questions that 
Albanians confronted during the lengthy period of the Ottoman retreat from the region 
hampered significantly the efforts of their minute nationalist elites to establish a 
unified political discourse and ‗awareness‘ about the nation. The delays in timely 
construction and collective acceptance of the new, mobilisatory, narrative about the 
nation. i.e. the ‗national rebirth‘, resulted in their political unpreparedness for what 
was to follow: annexation of parts of their ethnically homogenous territories by the 
the new, ‗nationalising‘ nations. It was only in the aftermath of the pogroms from the 
Balkan Wars that, I argue, ‗Albanianism‘ became the most important ideological 
signifier in the ethnonationalist discourse. And, far more than in the state of Albania, 
the idea of ‗Albanianism‘ as an all-encompassing, supra-religious identifier was to 
take hold in Kosovo and in other Albanian-inhabited parts of the former 
Kingdom/Federation of Yugoslavia. Ironically, it appears that, to a certain degree, the 
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enabling environment for the production and maintainance of such rigidly secularist 
discursive practice was to be found within then-existing variants of communist 
regimes in both Socialist Yugoslavia and Albania—dwelling on the outright 
prohibition of any religious display (Albania under Enver Hoxha) or on the 
relativization of its social importance (Yugoslavia under Tito). In this respect, as the 
research shows, the post WWII Kosovo Albanian ethnonationalist narrative fluctuated 
between the predominantly ‗marxist-lenninist‘/irredentist discourse (until 1990s) and 
‗nationalist-democratic‘/independentist (1990s onwards). As a profoundly defensive 
discourse about the ethnic preservation and survival, the Kosovo Albanian 
ethnonationalism retained its distinct ‗secularist‘ feature through its embedded 
orientalist fabric; the imperative of a ‗genuinely non-religious nation‘ survived 
through (or, perhaps, because of) the Communism and was capable of utilizing its 
inherent ‗religious fluidity‘ during the post-communist decade of ethnic conflicts. 
Specifically, the chapter 7 of this research analyses the Kosovo Albanian post-
communist ethnonationalist discourse of religious ‗untroubledness‘—as noted by 
Malcolm (1998)—focusing on the orientalist exploitation of its ‗Christian roots‘ that 
were projected as an indication of the nation‘s ancient ‗Europeanness‘ and its 
inherited cultural complementarity with the perceived ‗Christian West‘. 
 
Finally, at this point I will return to Eagleton‘s remark from the beginning of this 
section, in the context of the possibility of ‗ending‘ of the nationalist sentiment only 
through obtaining and ‗feeling‘ the belonging to a nation. This remark has a specific 
importance for me, as today I live in a state which came to life through a combination 
of ethnonationalist political resistance and the international/western military 
intervention and administration. Now that the defensive, orientalist ethnonationalism 
has finally managed to produce a complementary social reality of institutionalised 
westward-oriented political strategy, one question remains lingering: what does it 
mean to be an Albanian, today? For, as every day goes by, it becomes more and more 
difficult to answer this solely through Benhabib‘s (1999) ‗negative‘ identity 
construction—i.e. through what one is not. In other words, today it appears hardly 
sufficient to note that to be an Albanian primarily means not to be a Serb, a Croat or a 
Turk. Rather, a different identity quest is emerging in the nowadays Kosovo: the 
introduction of the individual, the return of the religious and the dillution of the 
idealised projection of ‗Europe‘ and ‗the West‘. More often than not, as I am writing 
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this, the public debates within the Kosovo Albanian society focus on the religious 
rights and identities, and acknowledgment of existing religious diversities which, 
among others, affect the manner in which the ‗nation‘ is perceived and ‗talked‘; more 
often than not, on the other hand, the post-independence resurrection of visions of the 
‗unification with the Motherland‘ are edited their internalised orientalist features as 
they are poised to head for an ideological collision with the ‗western‘ standards of 
acceptable political action in the region. In the period of writing this research, the 
newly emerging and competing identity narratives in the post-independent Kosovo 
Albanian public discourse, demonstrate the societal unease with the internationally-
brokered project of the state of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-
religious construction. According to that project, Kosovo is certainly not a part of 
Serbia, but it is not Albanian either. Moreover, it is not based on the idea of an 
individual citizen as the primary carrier of its statehood. Instead, the complex post-
conflict process of political negotiations that led Kosovo to its formal independence 
was compelled to cite the ‗communities‘ rather than ‗citizens‘ as the formal holders of 
political and institutional legitimacy52. 
 
In this respect, the discourse of ‗Albanianism‘ lies at the heart of the Kosovo‘s nation-
building narrative. It was and continues to remain an idea, an aspired imperative, a 
tale about the nation—but still far from a meticulously compiled set of principles that 
would organise social life among Albanians. By the day, one can see how its narrow 
and rigid definition becomes ever more challenging to adhere to, as it, at least 
formally, continues to consist of requirements which appear difficult to be met in a 
contemporary social reality of individual, civic and religious freedoms. Formally, 
‗Albanianism‘ continues to require abandonment or at least, relativisation of the 
importance of religious belonging and tradition which, on the other hand, is 
experiencing its postwar re-emerging as an important factor in organising one‘s social 
life through pre-established principles, rituals, but also worldviews. As I often remark 
ironically, it is at the weddings and funerals where one will find Albanians endlessly 
quarreling about what rite would be the most adequate to apply: a religious/traditional, 
or the so-called ‗national‘ which regularly entails a clumsily applied set of customs 
and procedures, imported hastily from popular western culture. It is a society—
                                                 
52 See http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html and The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement. 
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indeed, societies—in which the holy month of Ramadan or subsequent Bayram 
feasts53 often collide with Christmas holidays; when the traditionally Muslim tea-
serving ritual is done in spaces decorated with Christmas trees and other traditional 
paraphernalia from western/Christian popular culture. 
 
In this context, I argue that, as a nation-building narrative of a religiously diverse 
community, ‗Albanianism‘ ought to signify a political ideology, a dynamic act of 
political will rather than an assumed, static category of kinship legacy and ethnic 
tradition. It is here that I see its great normative ‗flaw‘ of definition, for the narrative 
that brought it to life struggled for transforming and naturalising such act of political 
will—adherence to the idea of ‗Albanianism‘—into an invariable category of 
genealogic, even genetic, heritage. All along, I argue, since the National Rebirth, 
‗Albanianism‘ has been about a political/civic nationalism, much more than about an 
ideological signifier of an ethnic nation. Inasmuch as Albanians proved historically 
willing to support the formal principles of the narrative about themselves as members 
of a large—in Herderian terms—extended, ethnic family, they were unwilling to 
effectively abandon and uproot their inherited, diverse religious/cultural identities. 
Throughout the 19th and 20th century, they remained Muslim Albanians, Catholic 
Albanians and Greek Orthodox Albanians. Ultimately, I see their readiness for 
internalisation of the narrative about the idealised ‗west‘ and ‗Europe‘ as entirely 
complementary with their nation-building discourse—for I understand them both as 
socially constructed categories, devised and shaped through complex historical 
processes of the Balkan region. 
 
To-date, the project of ‗Albanianism‘ continued as a discursive exercise of marketing 
a political act of nation-building as a static, ethnic category of traceable genealogical 
ancientness and unique heritage. I argue that in the contemporary context of liberal 
society, governed by the principles of the freedom of choice and diversity, such 
definition risks to produce an internal sociopolitical/sociocultural collision as to who 
and what specifically qualifies for being labelled ‗Albanian‘. In this respect, I remain 
                                                 
53 Eid-ul Fitr, or ‗Bayram feast‘ (Arabic for the ‗Ramadan Bayram‘ a Muslim holiday that marks the end of Ramadan, 
the Islamic holy month of fasting). Also, there is the Eid-al-Adha (Arabic for ‗Kurban Bayram‘, another religious holiday 
that commemorates the willingness of Abraham/Ibrahim to sacrifice his son Ishmael/Ismail as an act of obedience to God.  
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hopeful that this research might assist as a modest contribution to initiating a wider 
debate about rethinking and redefining the idea of common national belonging 
through its acknowledgment and adoption as a major act of will that gave birth to the 
nation as a ‗community of opinion‘ rather than as a static and vague signifier of 
genealogical legacy. Inasmuch as I adhere to Anthony Smith‘s claim about the 
potential presence of at least traces of an ‗ethnie‘ at the core of every nation, I argue 
that one is not inherently born as an Albanian; rather, one becomes an Albanian as 
he/she adheres to the principles, the history and the aspirations that its narrative would 
continue to produce and regulate. I find such new understanding—indeed, revision—
of the very definition essential for loosening of its rigid normative boundaries which 
should discard exclusionist—indeed, ‗sociobiological‘—claims that have insofar 
constituted the notion of Albanian national identity. I remain firmly convinced that the 
adoption and naturalisation of ‗Albanianism‘ as an act of will rather than a signifier of 
one‘s assumed genealogical ancientness would assist in increasing the awareness and 
chances for sustaining a free, diverse, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society of today. 
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